That much goes without saying. What is controversial, however, is how we might understand and respond to these new wars. This book offers a new approach.

The poem elucidates the universal Self, indestructible, immortal and free from the duality of bondage and attachment, knowledge and ignorance. Readers of philosophy and poetry will appreciate the deep, meditative exploration in this 9th-century Advaita Vedanta text. The comprehensive Sanskrit-English word-for-word translation is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of Sanskrit literature.

Triage-like procedures for solving the problems of rationing cannot work. And anyway, why should health- and medical workers carry the can for the economic and political decisions of their managers and our politicians? To foist rationing decisions onto them is a political con-trick, a deliberate attempt to deflect managerial and political responsibility elsewhere. Those on the front line should simply toss a coin; expalin to patients’ friends and relatives that that’s what they’re doing and why; and go public that that's (...) what they're doing. (shrink)

The ‘Kantian ideal’ is often misunderstood as invoking individual autonomy rather than rational self-legislation. Le Morvan and Stock’s otherwise insightful discussion of ‘Medical learning curves and the Kantian ideal’, for example, draws the mistaken inference that that ideal is inconsistent with the realities of medical practice. But it is not. Rationally to be a patient entails accepting its necessary conditions, one of which is the ineliminable existence of medical learning curves. Their rational necessity, therefore, offers no grounds against a Kantian (...) understanding of how morality might function in the practgice of medicine. (shrink)

Fulford’s discussion of ‘values-based practice’ as a model for medical ethics is deeply puzzling. First, it remains unclear what exactly he takes values to be or how tyhey can be based in clinical skills. Second, his proposal does not make it clear whose values these are supposed to be. I conclude that his attempt in effect to take the morality out of ethics fails.

This timely and passionate book is the first to address itself to Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz’s controversial arguments for the limited use of interrogational torture and its legalisation. Argues that the respectability Dershowitz's arguments confer on the view that torture is a legitimate weapon in the war on terror needs urgently to be countered Takes on the advocates of torture on their own utilitarian grounds Timely and passionately written, in an accessible, jargon-free style Forms part of the provocative and (...) timely _Blackwell Public Philosophy_ series. (shrink)

Has history assigned special obligations to Germans that can transcend generation borders? Do the grandchildren of Holocaust perpetrators or the grandchildren of inactive bystanders carry any obligations that are only related to their ancestry? These questions will be at the centre of this investigation. It will be argued that five different models of justification are available for or against transgenerational obligations, namely liberalism, the unique evil argument, the psychological view, a form of consequentialist pragmatism and the community‐based approach. Only two (...) of these models stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Applying the community‐based model leads to the conclusion that young Germans do indeed have indirect, indeterminate, but strict obligations that transcend generation borders. However, it will be argued that only the obligation of compensation can be restricted to Germans. The remaining two Holocaust‐related obligations of prevention and remembrance have to be seen as universal. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Dershowitz's Argument and the Ticking Bomb Who Tortures? Effectiveness and Time Knowledge and Necessity The Ticking Bomb Scenario: Conclusion.

This timely and passionate book is the first to address itself to Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz’s controversial arguments for the limited use of interrogational torture and its legalisation. Argues that the respectability Dershowitz's arguments confer on the view that torture is a legitimate weapon in the war on terror needs urgently to be countered Takes on the advocates of torture on their own utilitarian grounds Timely and passionately written, in an accessible, jargon-free style Forms part of the provocative and (...) timely _Blackwell Public Philosophy_ series. (shrink)

It is commonly held that National Health Service (NHS) workers are under a moral obligation not to go on strike, because doing so might well result in people's dying. Unless sainthood is demanded, however, this position is untenable: indeed, those most vociferously pursuing it are often those who bear the greatest responsibility, on their own grounds, for needless death and suffering.

I attempt in this paper to do two things: to offer some comments about recent discussions of the suggested institutionalization of surrogacy agreements; and in doing so, to draw attention to a range of considerations which liberals tend to omit from their moral assessments. The main link between these concerns is the idea that what people want is a fundamental justification for their getting it. I believe that this idea is profoundly mistaken; yet it is an inevitable consequence of a (...) liberal notion of the individual and liberals' extremely limited conception of harm. My intention, then, is to illustrate how unease about a concrete problem—whether or not surrogacy agreements should be institutionalized—might interact with dissatisfaction about liberal individualism to make clearer what the unease consists in and to suggest why liberal individualism is inadequate as a basis for moral philosophy. (shrink)

Can we have a real obligation to the dead, just as we do to the living, or is such a notion merely sentimental or metaphorical? Starting with the example of making a promise, I try to show that we can, since the dead, as well as the living, can have interests, not least because the notion of a person is, in part, a moral construction. ‘The dead’, then, are not merely dead, but particular dead persons, members of something like the (...) sort of ‘transgenerational community’ proposed by Avner de–Shalit. More generally, I argue, we have an obligation to the dead that goes beyond the particularities of promise–making, on account of their role in having made us who we are. I then suggest, though only embryonically, that such obligations may appropriately be discharged by remembering the dead, who they were and what they did. Finally, I consider some possible objections. (shrink)

Much of the opinion scandalized by recent reports of kidneys being sold for transplant is significantly inconsistent. The sale of kidneys is not substantially different from practices espoused, and indeed endorsed, by many of those who condemn the former. Our moral concern, I suggest, needs to focus on the customer's actions rather than the seller's; and on the implications for larger questions of the considerations to which this gives rise.

Sex, love, and friendship play an integral role in Immanuel Kant’s conception of human life. Against common prejudices, Kant provides substantial contributions to the philosophical discussion of these topics. This unique collection of essays sheds light on how the notions function in Kant’s philosophy, both individually and in conjunction with each other. The essays examine intertwined issues such as theory of sexuality, marriage (including same-sex marriage), morality and sexual objectification, love and autonomy, love of human beings, the conceptual structure of (...) love, friendship, misanthropy, and the highest good. The contributors include internationally well-known experts in the field. They approach the topics diversely from historical, philosophical, critical, and interpretative perspectives. The collection will be an invaluable resource for Kant scholars and for anyone interested in affective social relations in the history of philosophy and beyond. (shrink)

Has history assigned special obligations to Germans that can transcend generation borders? Do the grandchildren of Holocaust perpetrators or the grandchildren of inactive bystanders carry any obligations that are only related to their ancestry? These questions will be at the centre of this investigation. It will be argued that five different models of justification are available for or against transgenerational obligations, namely liberalism, the unique evil argument, the psychological view, a form of consequentialist pragmatism and the community-based approach. Only two (...) of these models stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Applying the community-based model leads to the conclusion that young Germans do indeed have indirect, indeterminate, but strict obligations that transcend generation borders. However, it will be argued that only the obligation of compensation can be restricted to Germans. The remaining two Holocaust-related obligations of prevention and remembrance have to be seen as universal. (shrink)

An argument often made against the genetic elimination of disability is that to prevent people with a particular genetic make-up being born is to disvalue, or even threaten, those people who actually have it. The thought is that the view that the world would be a better place without, say, Huntingdon’s Chorea, must imply that the world would be a better place without those people who currently have it. In opposition to this objection to the elimination of genetically based conditions, (...) I argue (i) that there is no significant moral difference in this regard between the elimination of genetically based and other conditions; and thus (ii) that there is no such implication. As consideration of all sorts of non-genetic examples of a person’s condition shows, to disvalue that condition is not to disvalue the person whose condition it is. No negative attitude to polio sufferers is implied by the attempt to rid the world of polio, for example. Indeed, just the opposite conclusion can be drawn. (shrink)

Paul Griseri’s generous response to my ‘Against Professional Ethics’1 offers an interesting point of view and there is much on which we agree. But we continue to differ about the nature of the primacy of morality, the possibility of a ‘general idea of professionalism’ and — perhaps — about Kant’s Categorical Imperative.

This chapter contains section titled: Some Clarifications Three Positive Claims about the Consequences of Legalizing Interrogational Torture The Institutionalization of Interrogational Torture A Torturous Society.

This chapter contains section titled: Torture Torture, Death and Interrogation Why No Decent Society Can Torture Torture, the “War on Terror” and Intellectual Irresponsibility But What if Torture Really is the Only Possible Way to Avoid Catast rophe? Two Final Points.

Nation-building initiatives during Japan's Meiji period (1868?1912) erected a rigid normalcy that galvanized a culture of exclusionism. They afforded broader spheres of social activity but a narrower range of acceptable behaviors, greater opportunities for individual empowerment but less tolerance for individuality itself. Backward-looking artists and writers were particularly susceptible to these developments, many earning repute as ?useless losers,? heretics, or traitors. This article speaks to the dynamics between modernity and marginalization through an analysis of the exclusionism that accompanied Japan's modernization (...) initiatives in the late nineteenth century. It demonstrates how Meiji's modernization program fostered the development of new paradigms of knowledge while condemning non-conformists as social misfits. The article begins with a review of early Meiji's construction of normalcy and then proceeds with a discussion of talented writers and artists rendered irrelevant by this process, ultimately exploring how conceptions of marginality played out in the social, political, and cultural contexts of that period. (shrink)

A socialist health service cannot be a socialist island in a sea of capitalism, as the record of the British National Health Service shows. Nonetheless, since health is a basic need, it can be a key component of the advocacy of socialism. I propose two central socialist principles. On the basis of these I suggest that a socialist health system would emphasise care rather than service; insist on democratic structures and control of resources; and require the prohibition of private medicine.

Getting What You Want? offers a critique of liberal morality and an analysis of its understanding of the individual as a 'wanting thing'.

In order to illustrate how terms of reference themselves, such as those announced by ‘professional ethics’, delimit and distort moral consideration I start with an extended discussion of how Just War Theory operates to do this; and go on to discuss ‘the power of naming’ with reference to the British attack on Iraq. Having thus situated my approach to the politics of professional ethics in a broader political context I offer a critique of ‘professional’ ethics in terms of what is (...) left out of the moral picture and how in particular political considerations are sidelined. Finally I argue that ‘codes’ of professional ethics are especially insidious. (shrink)

I argue that the family remains integral to neoliberal capitalism. First, I identify two tensions in the neoliberals' advocacy of the traditional family: that the ?family values? advocated run directly counter to the homo economicus of the ?free market?; and the fact that the increasingly strident rhetoric of the family belies its decreasing popularity. The implications of these tensions for how we might think of the family, I then propose, suggest that earlier critiques are worth revisiting for what they have (...) to say about the family?whether in biological or in social form?as a structure of ownership. Finally, I conclude with some embryonic thoughts about the ideological role of that state of affairs in shaping at once our understanding of ?politics? and our politics. (shrink)

I argue that the current popularity of ‘ethics’ in general, and the extension of ‘professional ethics’ in particular, masks an increasingly unethical culture. Furthermore, attempts to codify ethics encourage a rule-governed approach, thus misunderstanding the nature of ethical practice and — whether or not inadvertently — serving to protect the professions from ethical considerations rather than the opposite.