Sous la forme d’une vaste question, « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie présocratique? », le premier Symposium Praesocraticum, tenu à Lille en 2000 à l’initiative d’André Laks et publié en 2002 par A. Laks et C. Louguet aux Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, avait analysé la légitimité controversée de cette catégorie de l’historiographie philosophique. Face à la profusion de démarches intellectuelles qui voit le jour dans la Grèce du vie siècle av. J.-C., est-il possible de dégager quelque ch...

What is the role of Hesiod's poetry in the beginnings of Greek philosophy? This book explores the question by going beyond the traditional responses that stress either continuities or discontinuities between myth and philosophy. Instead, this volume attempts a reflexive or response-oriented approach, that highlights the active re-appropriation and renewal of Hesiodic thought by the Presocratic philosophers. Its fifteen contributions offer large scale comparisons, historiographical considerations, thematic and generic approaches, and detailed case studies.

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone describir e interpretar, en una primera etapa, los mecanismos de canonización literaria de obra y autor en una comunidad cultural específica, la latinoamericana. El caso estudiado es el del escritor argentino Manuel Puig y su obra. La relación interactiva entre contexto cultural, institucionalidad y sistemas de significado social y valoración permite modelar una descripción e intento de explicación de las relaciones de significado entrañadas en la constitución de los repertorios literarios canonizados, sus criterios de selección, (...) su naturaleza ideológica y la manera en que las prácticas sociales asociadas a este proceso se constituyen por un número variable de prácticas discursivas. Para ello se analiza un conjunto ilustrativo de eventos comunicativos y sus instancias textuales, donde se articulan los cánones literarios y sus efectos culturales: posicionamiento, valoración estética, iconización de autor y de discurso, influencia profesional, tematización crítica y académica, entre otros. Se estudia, por tanto, un caso de integración canónica: la del escritor argentino Manuel Puig en el canon literario de habla hispana y el canon literario universal de fines de siglo y se establece un plano de interacción con los parámetros de construcción canónica de la generación previa, la del llamado “boom literario latinoamericano”. This paper aims to initially describe and interpret the mechanisms of work and author’s literary canonization in a specific cultural community, Latin America. The case studied is that of Argentine writer Manuel Puig and his work. The interactive relationship among cultural context, social institutions and systems of social and evaluation meaning allows a description and attempted explanation of the imbued meaning relations in the constitution of the canonized literary repertoires, their selection criteria, ideological nature and the way in which social practices associated with this process are formed by a variable number of discursive practices. To do this, we analyze an illustrative set of communicative events and their textual instances, through which the literary canon and cultural effects are articulated: positioning, aesthetic appreciation, author and discourse iconisation, and professional influence, critical and academic thematization, among others. Thus, we study a case of canonical integration by the Argentine writer Manuel Puig into Hispanic and universal literary canon at the end of the century, and set up an interaction with the parameters of canonical construction from the previous generation, the so-called “Latin American literary boom”. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

The first is of a more historical nature, the second of philosophical concern: what was the place occupied by angels in the medieval world-view and what was ...

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Les cinq contributions que l’on va lire ont été présentées et discutées lors d’une journée d’étude organisée par Leopoldo Iribarren et André Laks (Centre Léon Robin, UMR 8061) les 11 et 12 février 2011 dans le cadre du programme ANR « Présocratiques Grecs/Présocratiques latins » (ANR Blanc ANR 08‑BLAN‑0063‑01, responsable A. Laks). Couvrant quelques aspects centraux ou représentatifs de la pratique pré‑aristotélicienne de l’analogie et de la réflexion (le plus souvent implicite) dont celle-ci...

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 201-203, January 2013.

Ce volume rassemble une dizaine d’études inédites, précédées d’une préface générale, portant sur l’articulation entre mythe et philosophie dans l’œuvre de Platon. Plus spécifiquement, la question qui intéresse les études ici réunies est celle du rapport complexe entre les récits mythiques que l’on voit apparaître dans les dialogues et le projet proprement philosophique (dialectique) de Platon. Cette question est d’autant plus prégnante que Platon lui-même ne cesse de probléma­tiser la fonctio...

Quelle que soit la démarche adoptée pour rendre compte de l’émergence de la pensée rationnelle en Grèce ancienne, on est nécessairement amené à poser le problème épistémologique de la continuité et de la discontinuité en histoire. D’autant plus lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer les origines de la rationalité spécifiquement philosophique, dont les procédés spéculatifs et les prétentions universalisantes témoignent à la fois d’un lien et d’une rupture avec les grands récits mythiques qui portent s...

Cet article est consacré au fragment B23 d’Empédocle, où l’auteur met en relation la génération des espèces vivantes à partir des quatre éléments avec l’art pictural dont les productions résultent des divers mélanges d’un nombre limité de pigments. La première partie aborde la dimension heuristique de l’analogie dans le cadre du récit cosmologique, notamment la question de la correspondance entre comparans et comparandum. À l’intérieur de cette relation, un problème grammatical et théorique retient mon attention : alors que le sujet (...) et les verbes du fragment sont au pluriel, les procédés des peintres sont exprimés par des participes au duel. Ces duels ont souvent été interprétés comme des allusions aux deux puissances cosmiques d’Empédocle, l’Amour et la Haine. Prenant appui sur l’interprétation récente du cycle cosmique donnée par Oliver Primavesi, selon laquelle même dans la période où la Haine domine, l’Amour reste le principe de production des espèces mortelles, je propose d’interpréter les duels comme une allusion aux mains de Cypris, l’une des personnifications du pouvoir démiurgique de l’Amour. En ce sens, la lecture que je propose ici de l’analogie s’avère compatible avec les deux courants interprétatifs principaux de la zoogonie d’Empédocle (unique/double). Dans la deuxième partie de l’article, j’analyse l’écart réflexif que l’analogie des peintres introduit par rapport à deux formes de discours contemporaines d’Empédocle qui thématisent la question de la représentation : d’une part, la tradition lyrique, notamment Simonide et Pindare ; de l’autre, le poème philosophique de Parménide. (shrink)

Estas notas de ánimo ensayístico tienen como objetivo establecer relaciones entre la experiencia, la memoria y la escritura, y el rescate de esta relación que realiza la lectura. De esta manera, a través del análisis de las figuras benjaminianas del flâneur, el narrador, el coleccionista, el historiador, el alegorista, se buscará identificar a diferentes “lectores” de la modernidad, “documentalistas” que dan cuenta de las marcas de la experiencia en la memoria y de una temporalidad suspendida que actualiza presente y pasado (...) en una imagen que se presenta como una narración de la realidad que articula el mundo como texto. (shrink)

Le regain d’intérêt de ces derniers temps pour la philosophie présocratique est avant tout perceptible dans le nombre d’ouvrages collectifs importants dont cette période de l’histoire de la pensée fait l’objet depuis une dizaine d’années. Les divers « companions », « handbooks » et autres collections d’études qui lui sont consacrées, sans oublier les actes des Symposia Praesocratica, qui visent l’explora­tion suivie de ce domaine, donnent une idée de la complexification croissante des problém...

This article examines a group of interconnected texts written in bilingual version by Jean Gerson between 1405 and 1408, as an example of the impact that the exercise of introspection had on late- medieval doctrinal expression. Although writing both in Latin and in the vernacular is not unusual during the Middle French period, Gerson is one of the rare authors of this period to render a bilingual version of one and the same work. The letter he addressed to Philippe de (...) Mézières shortly before the latter’s death along with a collection of treatises on ars moriendi offer a privileged framework to examine the way bilingualism operates and the reasons leading to it. That the use of the vernacular responds to pastoral preoccupations regarding the laity is well attested in the Middle Ages; less obvious within a context of clerical elitism is the hypothesis according to which the vernacular responds to a penitential approach freed from all logic of subordination. In this perspective, the choice of the vernacular would be dictated by a discipline of introspection seeking moral perfection. (shrink)

La poesía de Rodrigo Lira está marcada por el uso del humor negro y la polifonía, tanto para referirse a la voz poética como a su contexto literario, cultural, social y político. Estas estrategias para la configuración de su identidad y posicionamiento discursivo, de carácter fragmentario, se utilizan para conjurar su sentido de despertenencia, soledad y culpa de ser.

El canon literario implica un proceso de selección sistemático y jerárquico de escritores, obras y géneros con el fin de delimitar un corpus modélico imitableligado fuertemente a la instrucción pedagógica. En el presente trabajo se analizará el particular proceso de formación y conformación del canon –así como surecepción y transformación respecto de los cánones previos– establecido por Quintiliano en el Libro 10 de la Institutio Oratoria, a fin de demostrar que los criterios de selección que guían dicho canon exceden la (...) mera función didáctica. (shrink)

This article revisits certain aspects of the discussion originated by dissident Franciscans over the two keys conferred by Christ to Peter, bringing it into connection with the value that Ockham and John XXII accord respectively to knowledge and power in the definition of doctrine. Rather than an extraneous element in the debate, as it has often been perceived, the two-keys argument is pivotal to the proper understanding of Ockham’s ecclesiology and the pope’s own, as it serves to articulate the twin (...) notions they both advance of “authority to inquire” and “authority to determine” on a question of faith. By focusing away from the usual template of the competing claims of infallibility and sovereignty, this article hopes to bring to light the profound similarities in their respective views on doctrinal authority and the value accorded to the theological enterprise. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

Resumen: Diez años después de la muerte de Franco, la escritora catalana Maria Barbal publicó Pedra de tartera, una novela sobre la trayectoria vital de una campesina del Pirineo marcada por la Guerra Civil española. El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que el éxito local e internacional de la obra reside en la capacidad de la voz narrativa por rememorar el pasado desde el posicionamiento ético en contra de los seculares poderes patriarcales y el compromiso con la denuncia de (...) la condición de la mujer. La obra de Barbal ha merecido una atención académica poco significativa, que además no ha profundizado en su dimensión de relato de guerra. Con el fin de situar Pedra de tartera en el corpus de narrativas de la memoria que abordan la Guerra Civil, proponemos una exégesis que pone el foco en el reconocimiento de la violencia patriarcal, bélica y postbélica que sufre la protagonista.: Ten years after Franco’s death, the Catalan writer Maria Barbal published Stone in a Landslide, a novel about the life story of a peasant woman of the Pyrenees marked by the Spanish Civil War. The aim of this paper is to prove that local and international success of the work lies in the ability of the narrative voice to remember the past from the ethical stance against the secular patriarchal powers and commitment to denouncing the woman’s condition. The work of Barbal still has not had the academic attention that it deserves, especially as a war narrative. In order to place Stone in a Landslide in the corpus of the narrative of memory addressing Civil War, we propose an exegesis that places the focus on the recognition of patriarchal, war and postwar violence suffered by the protagonist. (shrink)

The works of the early Greek philosophers are not only a fundamental source for understanding archaic Greek culture and the whole of ancient philosophy, but also a perennially fresh resource that has stimulated Western thought until the present day. This nine-volume edition presents all the major fragments from the sixth to the fourth centuries BC.

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

Twitter makes conversation into something like a game. It scores our communication, giving us vivid and quantified feedback, via Likes, Retweets, and Follower counts. But this gamification doesn’t just increase our motivation to communicate; it changes the very nature of the activity. Games are more satisfying than ordinary life precisely because game-goals are simpler, cleaner, and easier to apply. Twitter is thrilling precisely because its goals have been artificially clarified and narrowed. When we buy into Twitter’s gamification, then our values (...) shift from the complex and pluralistic values of communication, to the narrower quest for popularity and virality. Twitter’s gamification bears some resemblance with the phenomena of echo chambers and moral outrage porn. In all these phenomena, we are instrumentalizing our ends for hedonistic reasons. We have shifted our aims in an activity, not because the new aims are more valuable, but in exchange for extra pleasure. (shrink)

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.