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  1. Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over (2015). Bayesian Reasoning with Ifs and Ands and Ors. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  2. Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over (2015). Uncertain Deduction and Conditional Reasoning. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  3. Jonathan Evans & David E. Over (unknown). Rationality in Reasoning: The Problem of Deductive Competence. Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
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  4. Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers (1998). Rationality and Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.
     
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  5.  18
    David E. Over (2011). New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.
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  6.  8
    Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer (2013). Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
  7.  34
    K. Manktelow & David E. Over (1987). Reasoning and Rationality. Mind and Language 2 (3):199-219.
  8.  10
    Shira Elqayam & David E. Over (2013). New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning: An Introduction to the Special Issue Edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):249-265.
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  9.  23
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2013). Reasoning to and From Belief: Deduction and Induction Are Still Distinct. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  10.  44
    David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence. Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
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  11.  59
    Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer (2011). Betting on Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...)
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  12.  3
    Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson (2000). Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems. Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  13.  1
    Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over (2008). When Can We Say ‘If’? Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
  14.  9
    Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven A. Sloman & David E. Over (2014). Categorical Induction From Uncertain Premises: Jeffrey's Doesn't Completely Rule. Thinking and Reasoning 20 (4):405-431.
    Studies of categorical induction typically examine how belief in a premise (e.g., Falcons have an ulnar artery) projects on to a conclusion (e.g., Robins have an ulnar artery). We study induction in cases in which the premise is uncertain (e.g., There is an 80% chance that falcons have an ulnar artery). Jeffrey's rule is a normative model for updating beliefs in the face of uncertain evidence. In three studies we tested the descriptive validity of Jeffrey's rule and a related probability (...)
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  15.  11
    David E. Over (ed.) (2003). Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press.
    In this collection, leading experts evaluate the status of this controversial field, providing a critical analysis of its main hypotheses These hypotheses have ...
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  16.  9
    Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over (2001). Reasoning From Uncertain Premises: Effects of Expertise and Conversational Context. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (4):367 – 390.
    Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty (...)
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  17.  5
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2010). Conditional Truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):5.
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  18.  15
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson (2000). Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems. Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  19.  10
    David E. Over (2007). The Logic of Natural Sampling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):277-277.
    Barbey & Sloman (B&S) relegate the logical rule of the excluded middle to a footnote. But this logical rule is necessary for natural sampling. Making the rule explicit in a logical tree can make a problem easier to solve. Examples are given of uses of the rule that are non-constructive and not reducible to a domain-specific module.
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  20.  76
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2008). Whole Mind Theory: Massive Modularity Meets Dual Processes. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.
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  21.  15
    David E. Over & Constantinos Hadjichristidis (2009). Uncertain Premises and Jeffrey's Rule. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):97-98.
    Oaksford & Chater (O&C) begin in the halfway Bayesian house of assuming that minor premises in conditional inferences are certain. We demonstrate that this assumption is a serious limitation. They additionally suggest that appealing to Jeffrey's rule could make their approach more general. We present evidence that this rule is not limited enough to account for actual probability judgements.
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  22.  5
    David E. Over (2000). Ecological Issues: A Reply to Todd, Fiddick, & Krauss. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):385 – 388.
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  23. David E. Over (2003). From Massive Modularity to Metarepresentation: The Evolution of Higher Cognition. In Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press 121--144.
     
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  24.  3
    David W. Green, David E. Over & Robin A. Pyne (1997). Probability and Choice in the Selection Task. Thinking and Reasoning 3 (3):209-235.
    Two experiments using a realistic version of the selection task examined the relationship between participants' probability estimates of finding a counter example and their selections. Experiment 1 used everyday categories in the context of a scenario to determine whether or not the number of instances in a category affected the estimated probability of a counter-example. Experiment 2 modified the scenario in order to alter participants' estimates of finding a specific counter-example. Unlike Kirby 1994a, but consistent with his proposals, both studies (...)
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  25.  23
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (1999). Explicit Representations in Hypothetical Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
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  26.  41
    Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2002). The Role of Language in the Dual Process Theory of Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):684-685.
    Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that (...)
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  27.  4
    Janneke Wijnbergen‐Huitink, Shira Elqayam & David E. Over (2015). The Probability of Iterated Conditionals. Cognitive Science 39 (4):788-803.
    Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth-table task, (...)
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  28.  6
    David E. Over (2002). The Rationality of Evolutionary Psychology. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon 187--207.
  29. Jonathan Evans & David E. Over (1996). Rationality in the Selection Task: Epistemic Utility Versus Uncertainty Reduction. Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.
    M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...)
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  30.  2
    David W. Green & David E. Over (1998). Reaching a Decision: A Reply to Oaksford. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):187-192.
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  31. Ken I. Manktelow & David E. Over (1995). Deontic Reasoning. Perspectives on Thinking and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Peter Wason.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd Hove,, UK.
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  32. Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over (1995). Deduction From Uncertain Premises. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (3):613-643.
    We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne. These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given (...)
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  33.  9
    David E. Over (2005). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. By Jonathan Bennett. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2003. Pp. XII + 387. Mind and Language 20 (3):357–363.
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  34. Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over (2015). Corrigendum: Bayesian Reasoning with Ifs and Ands and Ors. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  35. Shira Elqayam & David E. Over (2016). Editorial: From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought. Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  36. Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Simon J. Handley (2005). Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne. Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
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  37. David E. Over (2005). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Mind and Language 20 (3):357-363.
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  38. David E. Over & David W. Green (2001). Contingency, Causation, and Adaptive Inference. Psychological Review 108 (3):682-684.
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