Gracias a los estudios de los últimos años, la Escuela de Salamanca ha dejado de ser esa gran desconocida de la historia del pensamiento español. Con ello se ha ganado también precisión sobre qué se entienda por Escuela de Salamanca, algo solidario con la comprensión de su carácter específico y sus integrantes. Los temas de “moral” y “política” que sus autores iluminaron dándoles una fundamentación teológica y filosófica, siguen siendo una propuesta interesante, no sólo para comprender la historia de las (...) ideas, sino como propuesta sistemática con la que considerar la temática señalada. (shrink)

La gamificación o ludificación, entendida como la aplicación de la filosofía del juego en contextos no lúdicos, está experimentando en los últimos años un desarrollo espectacular en áreas de diversa naturaleza. Si bien está más que comúnmente aceptado que las funciones principales de los museos consisten en preservar y dar a conocer sus colecciones, resulta fundamental que logren conectar de manera satisfactoria con los usuarios empleando para ello medios y estrategias innovadoras y accesibles. En las siguientes páginas ponemos de manifiesto (...) cómo la gamificación no es sino un recurso idóneo para motivar, fidelizar e influir en el comportamiento de los usuarios. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...) the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. (shrink)

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. Discussing the matter in connection with the status (...) of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. This paper appeals to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and argues that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist (...) reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

La Filosofía para Niños ha contemplado en los últimos años la emergencia de prácticas entre comunidades indígenas en todo el mundo. Desde las prácticas mexicanas de Madrid o Ezcurdia a las africanas de Odierna y las asiáticas de Elicor, diversos especialistas han demandado su necesidad para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico y, por extensión, la liberación de las condiciones de opresión y colonialismo a las que se han sometido a los pueblos originarios. A pesar de estas buenas intenciones, se despierta (...) la inquietud de que las propias metodologías del pensamiento crítico o de la verdad nacida según criterios discursivos o lógico-argumentales pueda convertirse en un mecanismo neocolonial al imponer formas de pensamiento occidentales. Además, la agenda de los temas y los materiales corresponden a horizontes nacidos en Estados Unidos o en Europa y, por ende, podríamos encontrarnos ante un proceso de imposición de discursos donde la salvación crítica se convierta en un nuevo modelo de opresión.Este artículo analiza los riesgos de esta realidad y avanza a una propuesta co-operativa. Esta co-operación anima a quedar a la escucha de las filosofías de estos pueblos para ampliar, corregir y mejorar los presupuestos de la Filosofía para Niños. Por tanto, recorre el camino inverso a las experiencias con comunidades indígenas. Reflexiona sobre los avances que supone su filosofía respecto a los presupuestos occidentales de nuestro campo. De esta forma, deja el campo abonado para un producto sinérgico que facilite la creación de una Filosofía desde Niños indígenas mayas-tojolabales y no una para ellos. (shrink)

In the last decade, the importance of Simone de Beauvoir’s contribution to 20th-century French philosophy has been beyond debate. However, it can be tempting to read her contributions as the dated beginnings of feminist philosophy, and to believe that her work is only interesting from the perspective of the history of philosophy. To the contrary, this article claims that contemporary philosophers can and should take Beauvoirian philosophy as a source of fruitful insights on contemporary issues in political and moral philosophy (...) by showing the limited scope of two classic critiques of Beauvoir and by defending the relevance of her work for thinking about female submission and the importance of erotic experience. (shrink)

Este artículo comienza describiendo las posibilidades de la Filosofía en prisiones. Para ello, define los objetivos y el diseño de los principales talleres y clases filosóficas de centros penitenciarios nacionales y extranjeros. Este rastreo descubre las debilidades de las dimensiones éticas de estos trabajos, deteniéndose en los principios bioéticos básicos (autonomía, beneficencia y justicia). Por último, el texto desciende a dilemas reales de cada principio y propone algunas salidas, usando la experiencia del proyecto de Filosofía Aplicada en Prisiones BOECIO.

I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non-consensual distribution and consumption of sexually intimate images or videos. The idea is that if (...) viewing sexually explicit content shared without the permission of the people featured within it is unethical, then the same is often true of the consumption of commercial pornographic content that has been shared illegally. My primary focus is on the commercial pornography produced and distributed by the performers themselves, but I also consider the moral status of more traditional forms of pornographic content. (shrink)

Although the correlation between Entrepreneurial Orientation and concrete actions to set up a business or the Probability of Starting a Business has been widely studied, the psychological factors that can affect this relationship have not yet been sufficiently addressed in the field of entrepreneurship. One of them is curiosity. Both at theoretical and empirical level, a distinction are usually made between two types of curiosity. I-type curiosity is associated with the anticipated pleasure of discovering something new, and D-type curiosity is (...) associated with reducing uncertainty and eliminating unwanted states of ignorance. Consequently, this paper aims to analyze the moderating role that the types of curiosity play in the relationship between EO and PSB, considering their interaction with sociodemographic variables. The sample of this cross-sectional study consisted of 1,761 participants. The EO scale and a curiosity scale were applied. In addition, participants were asked, based on their perception, how likely they were to start their own business within the next 5 years. A simple moderation analysis was considered to test the moderating role of both types of curiosity in the relationship between EO and PSB. Next, a double moderation analysis was carried out in order to identify, which sociodemographic variables moderate the moderating effect of curiosity. The results show that only the D-type component moderates the relationship between EO and PSB: The higher the D-type curiosity, the stronger the association between EO and PSB. In terms of sociodemographic variables, neither culture nor gender showed a moderating effect on the moderation exerted by D-type curiosity. While, age did moderate the moderating effect of D-type curiosity on the relationship between EO and PSB. Results are discussed in terms of spirituality and the resolution of problems associated with the entrepreneurial process, considering cognitive and psychological factors, particularly with an emphasis on explaining why only D-type curiosity shows a moderating effect. Finally, the limitations of the study and potential future lines of research are pointed out. (shrink)

A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not (...) as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature. (shrink)

El artículo se propone elucidar el papel que juegan los usos de “raza” en los escritos de Nietzsche, situándolos e interpretándolos en conjunto con el léxico de transformación del ser humano y de su crítica de la cultura. Para ello, se estudia su empleo junto a otros conceptos fronterizos e ideas análogas como el tratamiento de la cuestión judía, su crítica del nacionalismo, la figura de los buenos europeos, la metáfora de la bestia rubia, los tipos humanos y el pensamiento (...) de la cría. Se concluye que “raza” posee un indudable carácter fisiológico y evolutivo, pero a través del proceso de incorporación (Einverleibung), el ámbito de la cultura y la moral intervienen de manera fundamental en su conformación, y como concepto, forma parte del mismo proyecto de transvaloración de los valores, la reforma de la cultura y de la humanidad. El artículo finaliza con una reflexión de la llamada a superar la raza (Über-Rasse). (shrink)

This review note surveys some important aspects of a recent publication by Amos Edelheit, A Philosopher at the Crossroads: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Scholastic Philosophy. While focus over the last decades has been placed on Pico’s thought in relation to Jewish Kabbalah and mysticism, Edelheit hopes to emphasize the importance of the scholastic tradition (or, rather, the pluriform and various tradition of late medieval and Renaissance scholasticism) in Pico’s thought, and the ways in which this intellectual context places (...) this unique Renaissance thinker at a sort of ‘crossroads’. Beyond providing a brief overview of the three main parts of the text, this note examines more closely Edelheit’s study of Pico’s 900 Theses and the methodological approach which involves a reconstruction of the dialectical context for each thesis. The Latin scholastics are real conversational partners for Pico: he is versed in the 13th-century scholastic sources, is certainly familiar with contemporaneous scholastic thought, and is able to employ scholastic methods and terminology within his wider philosophical project. While scholastic philosophy was very much alive at the end of the fifteenth century, Pico’s new and inclusive approach to philosophy and the history of philosophy, never eschewing the Latin masters, departs from both scholastic and humanist trends. (shrink)

I present a novel position vis-à-vis the views in the Latin American philosophy literature regarding whether subjects more aptly use "Hispanic" or "Latinx" to refer to Hispanic- or-Latinx people. To this end, I will argue (C) the term "Afro-Latinx" is more apt than "Hispanic" or "Latinx" in a significant number of cases. This conclusion is based on three premises. The first premise (P1) is that use of "Afro-Latinx" provides subjects with understanding of how certain events depend on anti-Black racism, US (...) society's racially unjust structure and US colonial policy. The second premise (P2) is that that neither the term "Hispanic" nor the term "Latinx" provide subjects with this understanding of how certain events depend on anti-Black racism, US society's racially unjust structure and US colonial policy. The third premise (P3) is that the term "Afro-Latinx" provides subjects with more understanding of these events than the terms, "Hispanic" and "Latinx.” I present three cases which feature the experiences of Afro-Dominican people. The 1992 murder of Dominican man Kiko García by New York Police officer O’Keefe is first case. The second case is the Washington Heights Uprising that ensued Kiko García’ murder. An instance where a nightclub bouncer in the Dominican Republic denies a Dominican women entry because of her hair texture composes the third case. (shrink)

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. This is glaringly revealed by the contrasting recent (...) takes on the issue by writers such as Soames (2005) – who adopts the view by Donnellan (1979) to be outlined presently – and Jeshion (2001), otherwise sharing a similar direct-reference approach to the prototypical expression of those contents. Discussing the matter in connection with the status of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori in the just mentioned article, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent; he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. (Thus, for instance, if, while listening to an utterance in a language that I do not know, I am told by a reliable person who knows the language and whom I trust that the utterance is true, I come thereby to know that the sentence expresses a truth, without knowing the truth that it expresses.) Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. In this paper, I will appeal to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and I will argue that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

The benefits of implementing the methodology of Philosophy for/with Children are clear. Nevertheless, an excessive emphasis on critical thinking skills weakness its application in groups at risk of social exclusion. These groups require a profound transformation and not just a better way of thinking. This is due to the cognitive dissonance provoked when one only works with discourse: session participants can learn to give good answers without becoming able to apply them outside of philosophical settings. One way to address this (...) limitation is to design an experiential reason, something described, in part, by Mathew Lipman. If life experience determines children’s identity construction, it is crucial to investigate its meaning and how it is articulated. Therefore, an Experiential Philosophy with Children, the topic of this paper, does not focus exclusively on the discursive work rooted in critical thinking. Rather, it is based on three pillars: the creation of experiential exercises, the promotion of provisions that encourage the transformative capacity of these exercises, and the design of experiential scenarios and metaphors that promote the attainment of transformative truths. This article describes the limitations of the cognitive approach of philosophical work with children, summarizes the bases of experientiality, and adds a brief appendix on the work done at the University of Seville in non-profit associations like the Maparra Project of Caritas. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial transforma el derecho. No es solo un modo de facilitar la actividad jurídica. Tiene implicaciones epistemológicas y sociales. El derecho se reduce a datos y a cálculos. Prospera un jurista maquinal. Se empobrece la racionalidad jurídica. Se olvida que la clave del derecho no es el procesamiento de datos sino la creación de sentido.

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, (...) it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self‐defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges. (shrink)

Background Prison creates philosophical needs due to the exceptionality of the situation. This study explores how philosophy can meet these needs by focusing on three aspects: critical thinking, personal relationships and the government of passions. It builds on similar interventions in several countries and is proposed as a research that bypasses some limitations of previous projects in prisons.Method Following the participation of 81 inmates in 22 philosophical sessions over six months, the results of both interventions were analyzed using mixed methods, (...) as well as a pretest posttest design with a control group. Specifically, Webster’s Self Assessed Wisdom Scale, a questionnaire and an interview with four participants were used. These methods were triangulated in order to obtain data from the various methodologies and to improve the validity and reliability of the results.Results It was demonstrated that the experimental group showed significant progress in relation to the categories “openness”, “humor” and “emotion regulation”. Participants also showed a progression in categories related to the project’s goals. These results allow for a description of the categories that explain in what sense philosophy can act in the context of imprisonment.Conclusions This study demonstrates, on the one hand, how philosophy workshops involve outcomes linked to cognitive, affective and relational aspects. Furthermore, it provides evidence to confirm previous studies and interventions that are more modest in their results and use less rigorous scientific methodologies. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo pretende analizar la pérdida del símbolo en la actualidad dialogando con las bases de la hermenéutica y de la filosofía de la cultura. Seguidamente, expondrá el paso del sentido ontológico al pragmático del símbolo. Finalmente, propondrá una vía para su recuperación, centrándose en la figura de la palabra y en la necesidad de rescatar su verdad diciente y aletheica, esto es, defendiendo que la verdad es más que “adequatio” entre la cosa y el intelecto y recuperando las (...) fuentes sagradas del ente y de la palabra.: This paper aims to analyze the loss of the symbol today, by means of a dialogue on the foundations of hermeneutics and philosophy of culture. Then, it will expose the transfer from an ontological to a pragmatic sense of symbol. Finally, it will propose a path to recuperation, by focusing on the figure of the word and the need to rescue its aletheica, that is, by defending that the truth is more than ‘adequatio’ between the thing and intellect and by recovering the sacred sources of body and word. (shrink)