Haunted by dreams of a powerful red tide, Odd Thomas, accompanied by two otherworldly sidekicks--his dog Boo and the Chairman of the Board--is drawn to a small California coastal town, where nothing is at it appears and where he confronts overwhelming and sinister forces out to stop his quest.

Joshua Parker’s article on green inhaler prescribing is important and timely. I agree with much of it, specifically regarding the institutional duty to make climate-friendly changes (from environmentally expensive prescriptions to ‘greener,’ similarly effective ones). The challenge, however, comes in determining how that institutional obligation impacts the rights and duties of patients. In this commentary, I want to offer a friendly alternative to Parker’s view of individual patient obligation, which I suggest is important for reasons that go beyond this one (...) case. Parker’s broad view is that, because metered-dose inhalers (MDIs) emit far more greenhouse gases (GHG) than do dry powder inhalers (DPIs), and the two are equally effective for most patients, the healthcare system should switch most patients on MDIs to DPIs, and the patients have a pro tanto duty to accept this change.1 The problem is that no individual inhaler use causes harmful climate change, and so it is difficult to explain a duty not to use MDIs. It seems that my individual behaviour ‘makes no difference’ to climate change, so familiar more principles have a difficult time justifying a prohibition of such behaviour. Parker’s response to this worry fits into the consequentialist tradition,2 3 as he argues that each individual contribution to climate change causes some amount of ‘expected harm,’ because it contributes a little bit to future climate changes which will cause harm. And since we have a duty to minimise expected harm, we have a duty not to make such small contributions to climate change. I think we should be sceptical of this sort of argument. It makes the most sense if we endorse a bathtub metaphor, in which the atmosphere is like a bathtub, and once it is full, every …. (shrink)

Recently, there has been renewed interest in so-called evidence-based policy making. Enticed by the grand promises of Big Data, public officials seem increasingly inclined to experiment with more data-driven forms of governance. But while the rise of Big Data and related consequences has been a major issue of concern across different disciplines, attempts to develop a better understanding of the phenomenon's historical foundations have been rare. This short commentary addresses this gap by situating the current push for numerical evidence within (...) a broader socio-political context, demonstrating how the epistemological claims of Big Data science intersect with specific forms of trust, truth, and objectivity. We conclude by arguing that regulators' faith in numbers can be attributed to a distinct political culture, a representative democracy undermined by pervasive public distrust and uncertainty. (shrink)

Contrary to political and philosophical consensus, we argue that the threats posed by climate change justify population engineering, the intentional manipulation of the size and structure of human populations. Specifically, we defend three types of policies aimed at reducing fertility rates: choice enhancement, preference adjustment, and incentivization. While few object to the first type of policy, the latter two are generally rejected because of their potential for coercion or morally objectionable manipulation. We argue that forms of each policy type are (...) pragmatically and morally justified tools for preventing the harms of global climate change. (shrink)

Neonatal intensive care units represent simultaneously one of the great success stories of modern medicine, and one of its most controversial developments. One particularly controversial issue is the resuscitation of extremely preterm infants. Physicians in the United States generally accept that they are required to resuscitate infants born as early as 25 weeks and that it is permissible to resuscitate as early as 22 weeks. In this article, I question the moral pressure to resuscitate by criticizing the idea that resuscitation (...) in this context “saves” a human life. Our radical medical advancements have allowed us to intervene in the life of a human before it makes sense to say that such an intervention “saves” someone; rather, what the physician does in resuscitating and treating an extremely preterm infant is to take over creating it. This matters, I argue, because “rescues” are much more morally urgent than “creations.”. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to evaluate the defensibility of wide-spread beliefs concerning the moral value of procreating. Very many of us are ‘pro-natal’ — that is, we have a positive moral view of making more people — but pro-natalism is under serious threat. In particular, I argue that combining several arguments in procreative ethics generates a powerful case for the Anti-Natal Pro-Adoption View, or the view that we are obligated not to procreate, but instead to satisfy any parenting (...) desires through adoption. Although this article ultimately serves as a defence against ANPA, it does so in a very limited way: while it is false that we are obligated to adopt-rather-than-procreate, I contend, this does not mean that we are off the moral hook altogether. Failing in our obligations is only one way to fail morality. Our procreative acts may yet be bad, dishonourable, selfish, and open to multiple other criticisms. And indeed, I'm afraid many of them are. (shrink)

The issue of socio-economic inequality has after many decades of benign neglect, in both the academy and journalism, become an increasingly important question. The economic crisis, beginning in 2007/2008 and followed by years of austerity has exasperated class and regional division. There have been numerous socio-economic and political outcomes from this; not least the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump, both unimaginable a decade ago. The role of journalism and the wider media in the production (...) and reproduction of inequality is an increasingly important issue. Has journalism treated the issue of inequality in a satisfactory fashion? Has journalism challenged powerful interests, or has journalism itself played an ideological role in the reproduction of structures of inequality? This special edition includes eight papers concerned around the area of socio economic inequality and media treatment; including investigations of discourses defending growing economic inequality and discourses... (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay argues for the importance of formalizing public engagement efforts around bioethics as something we might call "bioethics communication," and it outlines the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics' plans for engaging in this effort. Because science is complex and difficult to explain to nonexperts, the field of science communication has arisen to meet this need. The field involves both a practice and a subject of empirical research. Like science, bioethics is also complex and difficult to explain, which is (...) why the world needs bioethics communication. The authors are engaged in a brand-new effort to establish the sort of public bioethics efforts that would constitute bioethics communication, through a program which they call the Dracopoulos-Bloomberg iDeas Lab. The authors invite colleagues to experiment and learn with them as they invest in the development of bioethics communicators and their products. (shrink)

Brian Earp and his colleagues argue in this issue’s target article that racial justice requires ending the War on Drugs. In this they are absolutely correct. Indeed, de...

Over recent years, the stakes and complexity of online content moderation have been steadily raised, swelling from concerns about personal conflict in smaller communities to worries about effects on public life and democracy. Because of the massive growth in online expressions, automated tools based on machine learning are increasingly used to moderate speech. While ‘design-based governance’ through complex algorithmic techniques has come under intense scrutiny, critical research covering algorithmic content moderation is still rare. To add to our understanding of concrete (...) instances of machine moderation, this article examines Perspective API, a system for the automated detection of ‘toxicity’ developed and run by the Google unit Jigsaw that can be used by websites to help moderate their forums and comment sections. The article proceeds in four steps. First, we present our methodological strategy and the empirical materials we were able to draw on, including interviews, documentation, and GitHub repositories. We then summarize our findings along five axes to identify the various threads Perspective API brings together to deliver a working product. The third section discusses two conflicting organizational logics within the project, paying attention to both critique and what can be learned from the specific case at hand. We conclude by arguing that the opposition between ‘human’ and ‘machine’ in speech moderation obscures the many ways these two come together in concrete systems, and suggest that the way forward requires proactive engagement with the design of technologies as well as the institutions they are embedded in. (shrink)

Der Streit um die Prinzipien der Theorienentwicklung hat in den Jahren seit dem Erscheinen von TH. S. KUHNS "Die Struktur wissen schaftlicher Revolutionen" mannigfache und lebhafte AufSerungen pro und contra hervorgerufen. Die Gegenposition wird im wesent lichen durch die Namen POPPER und LAKATOS charakterisiert. Die Kontroverse erweist sich als eine solche zwischen synchronischer und diachronischer, zwischen systematischer und historischer Betrach tungsweise. 1st die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften, wie man es nach KUHN glauben kann, in entscheidendem MafSe aufSeren Einfliissen und Zufalligkeiten ausgesetzt, (...) oder gibt es nicht doch rationale, rein wissenschaftsimmanente Kriterien, auf Grund derer eine Entwicklung im Sinne eines Fortschrittes zu immer besseren, richtigeren und lei stungsfahigeren Theorien moglich ist? Eine wesentliche Schwierigkeit, um dabei weiterzukommen, besteht darin, dafS es keine Moglichkeit zu geben scheint, eine Theorie zu bewerten, zu entscheiden, welche von zwei Theorien "wahrscheinlicher, richtiger, besser oder leistungs fahiger" ist. Wenn es geiange, eine numerische Bewertung von Hypothesen und Theorien in dieser Richtung zu finden, so ware damit auch ein Weg gewiesen, die Entwicklung der Theorien nicht nur zu rekon struieren, sondern vielleicht auch zu lei ten. Die Bewertung einer Theorie im Sinne ihrer Richtigkeit ist bisher nicht gelungen. Wenn POPPER, insbesondere in seinen spaten Arbeiten ("Objective Knowl edge"), die Auffassung vertritt, dafS die Entwicklung der Wissen schaften im Sinne einer immer grofSeren Wahrheitsahnlichkeit von statten gehe, so ist das bei ihm ein reiner Glaube, der auf Grund seines Modells von Versuch und Irrtum postuliert wird. (shrink)

Justice, Sustainability, and Security not only enhances our knowledge of these issues, but it teases out our moral dimensions and offer prescriptions for how governments and global actors might craft their policies to better consider their effects on the global human condition.

This junior/senior level text is devoted to a study of first-order logic and its role in the foundations of mathematics: What is a proof? How can a proof be justified? To what extent can a proof be made a purely mechanical procedure? How much faith can we have in a proof that is so complex that no one can follow it through in a lifetime? The first substantial answers to these questions have only been obtained in this century. The most (...) striking results are contained in Goedel's work: First, it is possible to give a simple set of rules that suffice to carry out all mathematical proofs; but, second, these rules are necessarily incomplete - it is impossible, for example, to prove all true statements of arithmetic. The book begins with an introduction to first-order logic, Goedel's theorem, and model theory. A second part covers extensions of first-order logic and limitations of the formal methods. The book covers several advanced topics, not commonly treated in introductory texts, such as Trachtenbrot's undecidability theorem. Fraissé's elementary equivalence, and Lindstroem's theorem on the maximality of first-order logic. (shrink)

There are too many people on the planet. This isn’t a popular thing to say, but it’s becoming more and more obvious that it’s true, and that we need to do something to address it. Even in our radically unjust world, where billions of people do not have adequate access to food, water, energy, and other resources, we’re still living unsustainably—overcharging our ecological credit card and torching the climate. But discussing the link between these environmental problems and the population is (...) uncomfortable, because many people believe that procreation is an essentially private act that is morally and politically off-limits. In her new book, One Child, Sarah Conly argues that this belief is false: If... (shrink)

Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism. On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is (...) a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be. (shrink)

Many of us believe that we can and do have individual obligations to refrain from contributing to massive collective harms – say, from producing luxury greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, our individual actions are so small as to be practically meaningless. Can we then, justify the intuition that we ought to refrain? In this paper, we argue that this debate may have been mis-framed. Rather than investigating whether or not we have obligations to refrain from contributing to collective action, perhaps (...) we should ask whether we have reason to do so. However, this framing brings challenges of its own, and so we close by asking what problems are generated if we focus on these questions of ‘contributory ethics’. (shrink)

Procreative limitarians, according to Kalle Grill, believe that we—especially the globally wealthy—should limit our procreative behaviors in order to reduce our impact on the natural environment. However, according to Grill, limitarians tend not to perform a complete moral analysis of procreating, as they cite the costs without noting the substantial benefits. In particular, Grill argues that procreation has benefits that consumption lacks, which is relevant for deciding where to focus in our efforts to mitigate environmental harms. As one of the (...) limitarians cited by Grill, I think this is an interesting argument to consider, but I will here suggest that it does not succeed in fully responding to the force of the limitarian position. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 3, Page 274-282, March 2022.

Several philosophers have recently argued that policies aimed at reducing human fertility are a practical and morally justifiable way to mitigate the risk of dangerous climate change. There is a powerful objection to such “population engineering” proposals: even if drastic fertility reductions are needed to prevent dangerous climate change, implementing those reductions would wreak havoc on the global economy, which would seriously undermine international antipoverty efforts. In this article, we articulate this economic objection to population engineering and show how it (...) fails. We argue, first, that the economic objection paints an inaccurate picture of the complicated relationship between demographic change and economic growth, and second, that any untoward economic effects of fertility reduction can be mitigated with additional policies. Specifically, we argue that supplementing fertility reduction with policies that facilitate the emigration of younger people from developing nations to developed nations could allow for both global reductions in GHG emissions and continued economic stability. Further, we show that moral arguments against such unprecedented increases in immigration are unsuccessful. We conclude that population engineering is a practical and morally justifiable tool for addressing the twin evils of climate change and global poverty. (shrink)

The notion of trustworthy AI has been proposed in response to mounting public criticism of AI systems, in particular with regard to the proliferation of such systems into ever more sensitive areas of human life without proper checks and balances. In Europe, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has recently presented its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. To some, the guidelines are an important step for the governance of AI. To others, the guidelines distract effort from genuine AI regulation. (...) In this chapter, we engage in a critical discussion of the concept of trustworthy AI by probing the concept both on theoretical and practical grounds, assessing its substance and the feasibility of its intent. We offer a concise overview of the guidelines and their vision for trustworthy AI and examine the conceptual underpinnings of trustworthy AI by considering how notions of 'trust' and 'trustworthiness' have been discussed in the philosophical literature. We then discuss several epistemic obstacles and moral requirements when striving to achieve trustworthy AI in practice before concluding with an argument in support of the establishment of a trustworthy AI culture that respects and protects foundational values. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe continued rise of socio-economic inequality over the past decades with its connected political outcomes such as the Brexit vote in the UK, and the election of Donald Trump are currently a matter of intense debate both in academia and in journalism. One significant sign of the heightened interest was the surprise popularity of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the twenty-first Century. The book reached the top of the bestseller lists and was described as a ‘media sensation’, with Piketty himself as (...) a ‘rock star economist’. This paper, drawing from a major international and cross-disciplinary study, investigates the print media treatment in four European countries of economic policy proposals presented in Capital. Applying social semiotic and critical discourse analysis, we specifically focus on articles which are in disagreement with these proposals and identify five categories of counterarguments used against Piketty: authorisation, moralisation, rationalisation, portrayal of victimhood and inevitab... (shrink)

Mammalian neural cells contain at least two forms of brain spectrin: brain spectrin (240/235) which is located primarily in the axons and presynaptic terminals of neurons, and brain spectrin (240/235E) which is found in the cell bodies, dendrites and postsynaptic terminals of neurones. Brain spectrin (240/235E) is also found in certain glial cell types. Antibodies against red blood cell spectrin detect only brain spectrin (240/235E), while antibodies against brain spectrin isolated from axonal and synaptic membranes detect brain spectrin (240/235). Previous (...) apparent discrepancies in the literature concerning brain spectrin localization at the light microscope level were undoubtedly due to different laboratories detecting distinct brain spectrin subtypes, based on the particular antibody being utilized for immunohistochemistry. In this review we (1) discuss the data supporting the presence of at least two distinct subtypes of mammalian brain spectrin, (2) explain how these results reconcile previous discrepancies concerning the localization of spectrin within neural cells, and (3) suggest the future implications of these findings. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to validate the computerized Symbol Digit Modalities Test in a Swiss pediatric cohort, in comparing the Swiss sample to the Canadian norms. Secondly, we evaluated sex effects, age-effects, and test–retest reliability of the c-SDMT in comparison to values obtained for the paper and pencil version of the Symbol Digit Modalities Test.MethodsThis longitudinal observational study was conducted in a single-center setting at the University Children’s Hospital of Bern. Our cohort consisted of 86 children aged from (...) 8 to 16 years. The cohort included both healthy participants and patients hospitalized for a non-neurological disease. Forty eight participants were assessed during two testing sessions with the SDMT and the c-SDMT.ResultsTest–retest reliability was high in both tests. A reliable change index was calculated for the SDMT and the c-SDMT corrected for practice effects. While a significant age effect on information processing speed was observed, no such effect was found for sex. When data on the c-SDMT performance of the Swiss cohort was compared with that from a Canadian cohort, no significant difference was found for the mean time per trial in any age group. Norm values for age groups between 8 and 16 years in the Swiss cohort were established.ConclusionNorms for the c-SDMT between the Swiss and the Canadian cohort were comparable. The c-SDMT is a valid alternative to the SDMT. It is a feasible and easy to administer bedside tool due to high reliability and the lack of motor demands. (shrink)

It is with great pleasure and a sense of urgency that we present this KIEJ double issue on ethical issues raised by the COVID-19 pandemic. The sheer range of ethical concerns raised by the pandemic, combined with the speed with which these problems emerged, is staggering and unprecedented in our generation. We have tried to give space to papers that raise immediately pressing ethical issues that have not received much discussion in popular media. Topics range from fundamental questions about how (...) we set up our public health infrastructure, to ethical issues in scientific communication and the translation of science into policy, to the impact of the pandemic on people with intellectual disabilities, to the ethics of... (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon’s contractualist account of morality is articulated alongside and built upon groundbreaking work on moral motivation. According to Scanlon, the central challenge of providing an account of moral motivation is navigating “Prichard’s Dilemma,” which requires that an account be both helpfully explanatory and morally relevant. Scanlon’s own solution is that one has a reason to act rightly because doing so is an aspect of living with others on terms they could accept. There is much to like about this (...) account, and so, in this paper, I begin with many of Scanlon’s assumptions. I then argue that Scanlon’s own account of moral motivation fails to navigate Prichard’s Dilemma, as does another solution that I derive from his broader view. I then close by suggesting that an account of moral motivation must be “complex,” involving different reasons to satisfy the competing desiderata of Prichard’s Dilemma. (shrink)

This paper argues that individuals in many high-income countries typically have moral reasons to limit their beef consumption and consume plant-based protein instead, given the negative effects of beef production and consumption. Beef production is a significant source of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts, high levels of beef consumption are associated with health risks, and some cattle production systems raise animal welfare concerns. These negative effects matter, from a variety of moral perspectives, and give us collective moral (...) reasons to reduce beef production and consumption. But, as some ethicists have argued, we cannot draw a straight line from the ethics of production to the ethics of consumption: even if a production system is morally impermissible, this does not mean that any given individual has moral reasons to stop consuming the products of that system, given how miniscule one individual’s contributions are. This paper considers how to connect those dots. We consider three distinct lines of argument in support of the conclusion that individuals have moral reasons to limit their beef consumption and shift to plant-based protein, and we consider objections to each argument. This argument applies to individuals in high beef-consuming and high greenhouse gas-emitting high-income countries, though we make this argument with a specific focus on the United States. (shrink)

Among those who discuss America's opioid crisis, it is popular to claim that we know what we, as a society, ought to do to solve the problem—we simply don't want it badly enough. We don't lack knowledge; we lack the will to act and to fund the right policies. In fact, I've heard two versions of this. Among those who focus on prescription opioids, it is clear that we ought to stop prescribing so many powerful opioid painkillers. And among my (...) public health colleagues focusing on illicit drug use, it is clear that we ought to expand addiction treatment and harm‐reduction services. The problem, however, is that the second claim is not obvious (and, indeed, is denied by many Americans), and the first claim probably isn't even true (at least, not in so crude a form). In short, the opioid crisis presents not only a problem of political will but also one of ethics. It will take work to discover or justify our normative claims in this arena. (shrink)

Einleitung. A. Das Problem eines Systems der Philosophie als solchen - B. Das System der Philosophie von 1800 bis 1804 im Grundriss - C. Methodischer Ausgangspunkt und sachliche Problematik der Darstellung dieses Systems Erster Teil. Logik und Metaphysik als Grundlegung des Systems - A. Die Einleitung - B. Die Logik - C. Die Metaphysik Zweiter Teil. Philosophie der Natur als sachlicher und methodischer Schwerpunkt der Entfaltung des Systems - A. Der Naturbegriff als Grundbegriff des Systems nach den Ausserungen der Jahre (...) 1801-1802 - B. Die zusammenhangende Entfaltung der Naturphilosophie von 1803/04 und von 1804 - C. Die Begrenzung der systematischen Bedeutung der Naturphilosophie auf Grund ihrer zusammenhangenden Entfaltung Dritter Teil. Die Entwicklung von der Philosophie der Intelligenz zur Philosophie des Geistes als Ausgangspunkt fur den Umbildungsprozess des Systems im ganzen - A. Der Plan der Philosophie der Intelligenz als in sich begrenzter Gegenseite zur Philosophie der Natur in den Jahren 1800-1801 - B. Die Entfaltung des praktischen Teils der Philosophie der Intelligenz als Naturrecht (1802-1803) - C. Die Entstehung der Philosophie des Geistes aus der Philosophie der Intelligenz und der Philosophie des Absoluten in den Fragmenten des Systementwurfs von 1803/04 Vierter Teil. Philosophie des Absoluten als Abschluss des Systems in sich selbst - A. Die spekulative Erfassung der Wahrheit der Religion als Voraussetzung fur die Philosophie des Absoluten (1800-1801) - B. Die Anschauung des sich selbst gestaltenden Absoluten in Kunst und Spekulation im Anschluss an Schellings Systemkonzeption (1801-1803) - C. Das Sichbegreifen des Absoluten als absolutes Bewusstsein innerhalb der Philosophie des Geistes (1803/04) Schluss. A. Das System von 1800-1804 als Entwicklung zur Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens in sich selbst - B. Die Philosophie als System und die Frage nach der Philosophie uberhaupt Anhang. Zum Verhaltnis von Geschichte und Philosophie im D". (shrink)

In Thomas Thomson's System of chemistry of 1802 Bergman and Scheele are actually considered as creators of the analytical concept of an element. With regard to this, a detailed investigation of the work of Bergman and Scheele shows that Thomson's statement contains mistakes as well as inadmissable simplifications and generalizations. It is correct, however, that Bergman in 1774–1777 specifically anticipated in essential aspects the analytical element concept proposed by Lavoisier in 1787–1789.

This is one of the most important books on quantum mechanics ever written for lay readers, in which an eminent physicist and successful science writer, Heinz Pagels, discusses and explains the core concepts of physics without resorting to complicated mathematics. "Can be read by anyone. I heartily recommend it!" -- New York Times Book Review. 1982 edition.