From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the free algebras in a subvariety equation image of the variety equation image of semi-Heyting algebras are directly decomposable if and only if equation image satisfies the Stone identity.

The founding operation of the American States involves a mediating mechanism that enables the connection between the ideals supporting it and the intent for its popularization among people. Such is the function assigned to the founding heroes, which is analyzed as a cultural operation that aims to enshrine these ideals, thereby eliding the violence contained in the formation of modern States.

In the international sphere, sovereignty and fundamental rights are often at odds, giving these rights little space for action and, in general, only after crisis has led to tragedy, and tragedy to disgrace. International Law, on the other hand, consistently succumbs to forms of domination and power, and its scope of action is often limited to certain codifications which are frequently suspended by political exception. Sixteenth century Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, established the principles for a Law of the people, (...) based on secular civil power that, while still exercising internal sovereignty, could defend and privilege the “rights of all men” over the exercise of power and private interest. This article focuses on this dispute to show Vitoria’s position, who long preceded the great declarations of human rights of the 18 th century, presenting an original doctrine within the framework of an emerging globalization and based on the defense of fundamental rights. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...) avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample. (shrink)

Interrogation sur les conditions transcendentales d'une réceptivité sensible et sur la formation des formes pures. L'étude se base sur les présupposés de l'esthétique critique de Kant, en vue d'interroger l'origine de la sensibilité pure.

La posmodernidad es una tendencia emergente a lo largo del siglo XX, un proceso general de la cultura occidental que fue aglutinando síntomas contrapuestos, y que acabó por dominar la escena filosófico-cultural a medida que avanzaba el siglo. En la época de la multiplicación de los discursos y del triunfo universal del mercado, y tras la pérdida posmoderna de los horizontes totalizantes de la civilización, se impone cartografiar de nuevo nuestra comprensión de la realidad. Índice: Prólogo de Miguel Morey.- Introducción.- (...) Notas para una genealogía de la posmodernidad.- De la crítica de la alienación a la fragmentación de la subjetividad.- Últimas tribulaciones (¿la decadencia de la posmodernidad?).- Cronología filosófica del siglo posmoderno.- Bibliografía. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo argumentar a favor de la tolerancia de ciertas "inmoralidades inofensivas o sin víctimas". Tomando como punto de partida el liberalismo perfeccionista de Joseph Raz, así como la crítica que de él hace Robert P. George, se plantean argumentos a favor de tolerar ciertos males en aras de evitar que se instrumentalice a las personas. Como conclusión se afirma que, aunque equivocadamente, es posible elegir realizar acciones consentidas que atenten contra el principio del daño. This paper (...) argues for tolerance of some "harmless or victimless immoralities". To this end —and taking into account both Joseph Raz's perfectionist liberalism, and the critique of the latter by Robert P. George— arguments are set forth for tolerance of some evils aimed at avoiding using people as a means. In conclusion, it is stated that, although mistakenly, people should be free to carry out consented actions which infringe upon harm principle. (shrink)

In “Willpower with and without effort”, G. Ainslie advances our understanding of selfcontrol by theoretically unifying multiple forms of willpower. But one crucial question remains unanswered: How do agents pick the right forms of willpower in each situation? I argue that willpower requires tactical skill, which detects willpower-demanding contexts, selects context-appropriate tactics, and monitors their implementation. Research on tactical skill will significantly advance our understanding of willpower.

Habitual action would still be a tremendously pervasive feature of our agency. And yet, references to habitual action have been marginal at best in contemporary philosophy of action. This neglect is due, at least, to the combination of two ideas. The first is a widespread view of habit as entirely automatic, inflexible, and irresponsive to reasons. The second is philosophy of action’s tendency (dominant at least since Anscombe and Davidson) to focus on explaining action by reference to reasons. Arguably, if (...) habitual behavior is reasons-irresponsive, and if action is explained by reference to reasons, the study of habit would have very little to teach about action. Recently, however, there has been a surge in philosophical interest on habit and habitual action. Novel approaches are challenging the two ideas mentioned above, arguing that (1) habitual behavior is not entirely automatic or inflexible, but instead has a particular kind of flexibility and intentionality; and that (2) acting out of habit can count as a form of acting for reasons, even in the absence of the traditional rationalizing mental states: belief, desire, and intention. -/- The essays contained in this issue move discussions forward in exciting new directions. In what follows we present each paper and situate it within its broader theoretical context, so that this introduction may serve also as an introduction to the topic of habitual action. A crucial lesson that emerges from these essays is a need to move past disputes between philosophical schools or traditions. Rather than combatting between different philosophical factions, an ecumenical approach capable of skillfully bringing together elements from different traditions seems better able to tackle problems that remain unsolved. These problems include (but are not limited to): developing an account of responsibility for habitual action; explaining our ability to perform joint habitual actions; and clarifying the link between habit and self-control. (shrink)

We give examples of calculi that extend Gentzen’s sequent calculusLKby unsound quantifier inferences in such a way that derivations lead only to true sequents, and proofs therein are nonelementarily shorter thanLK-proofs.

Philosophical personalism has generated a very powerful field of study in the twentieth and twenty first centuries but has not produced a systematic exposition. This book fills this big gap by offering for the first time a full systematic personalistic vision of the human person. This ambitious volume offers a pedagogical and integrated exposition of philosophical personalism, answering vital questions about human identity and existence in a way that the reader can achieve an integrated view of the person. The book (...) points to the real life of each person so that, by partially unraveling the mystery of the personal being, it becomes a philosophical guide for life. For these reasons, the book can be used both for academic purposes, as a manual of philosophy of man or for personal enlightenment. Divided in five parts, the first part of the book works as an introduction, offering an overview of the human person and of the notion of person. The second part describes the internal structure of the human being addressing topics as corporeity as a personal fact; sensibility and the senses; affectivity; intelligence; freedom understood as choice and self-determination and, finally, the personal self. The third part analyses the person in action and some special types of action such as work and language. The fourth part deals with interpersonal relationships beginning with I-You relationship and following with the family and the social structure. Finally, part five deals with the so-called ultimate questions, that is, those that decide the final meaning of each person's life, namely, time, death, immortality, and religion. (shrink)

This paper aims to argue for two related statements: first, that formal semantics should not be conceived of as interpreting natural language expressions in a single model (a very large one representing the world as a whole, or something like that) but as interpreting them in many different models (formal counterparts, say, of little fragments of reality); second, that accepting such a conception of formal semantics yields a better comprehension of the relation between semantics and pragmatics and of the role (...) to be played by formal semantics in the general enterprise of understanding meaning. For this purpose, three kinds of arguments are given: firstly, empirical arguments showing that the many models approach is the most straightforward and natural way of giving a formal counterpart to natural language sentences. Secondly, logical arguments proving the logical impossibility of a single universal model. And thirdly, theoretical arguments to the effect that such a conception of formal semantics fits in a natural and fruitful way with pragmatic theories and facts. In passing, this conception will be shown to cast some new light on the old problems raised by liar and sorites paradoxes. (shrink)

Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is (...) so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, "indexical reliabilism", based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

El propósito del presente artículo consiste en indagar las diferencias de fuerza que sostienen el aparato conceptual de la obra de Suely Rolnik, para pensar una poética de la resistencia pasiva. Para ello, se abordará primero un análisis de la tradición biopolítica para distinguir una tendencia inmanentista (Foucault, Agamben) de otra que vincula la vida con la alteridad (Butler, Coccia). A continuación, se leerá esta segunda tendencia desde la teoría de la performatividad después de la deconstrucción, para proponer una genealogía (...) de la fuerza vulnerable que se denominará speech passion theory. En fin, el artículo enmarca en esta genealogía la fuerza afirmativa de Rolnik, y piensa desde ella la tarea de la política y el arte como una práctica estética más allá de la institución del arte. (shrink)

Resumen Este trabajo tiene dos objetivos. Desde el punto de vista conceptual, nos proponemos contribuir al conocimiento del concepto de voz y su construcción conversacional a partir de la (des)afiliación y el (des)alineamiento en el proceso de validación o rechazo de la voz de los participantes. Desde el punto de vista práctico, esperamos contribuir al desarrollo de los métodos de la investigación participativa, entendidos en ciencias sociales como una metodología de investigación y aprendizaje colectivo, a partir del análisis crítico de (...) un caso. Para ello, adoptamos sobre el análisis de la interacción verbal un punto de vista discursivo que nos permite definir el concepto de voz como un conjunto de regularidades semióticas que indexicalizan una trayectoria biográfica a través de los discursos sociales que la componen. De este modo, la voz individual es producto de la trayectoria social -y discursiva- del hablante, la cual, al recibir validación o rechazo de los demás participantes, se pone a prueba en cada interacción. En ese sentido, proponemos que la (des)afiliación y el (des)alineamiento conversacionales permiten validar o rechazar las dimensiones de voz propuestas por el hablante. Exploraremos esta hipótesis en un corpus de reuniones de un proyecto de investigación participativa desarrollado en Buenos Aires, Argentina, con la participación de investigadoras e investigadores académicos y dirigentes sindicales, deteniéndonos especialmente en el caso de una de las participantes, que abandonó el proyecto al poco tiempo de comenzar. (shrink)

We prove a number of results on the determinacy of σ-projective sets of reals, i.e., those belonging to the smallest pointclass containing the open sets and closed under complements, countable unions, and projections. We first prove the equivalence between σ-projective determinacy and the determinacy of certain classes of games of variable length <ω^2 (Theorem 2.4). We then give an elementary proof of the determinacy of σ-projective sets from optimal large-cardinal hypotheses (Theorem 4.4). Finally, we show how to generalize the proof (...) to obtain proofs of the determinacy of σ-projective games of a given countable length and of games with payoff in the smallest σ-algebra containing the projective sets, from corresponding assumptions (Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.4). (shrink)

We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal interidentities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related (...) notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilise and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency towards an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realise relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending towards a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them. (shrink)

Para delimitar la formalidad propia de la Filosofía de la Educación es necesario precisar si ésta es filosofía teórica o filosofía práctica, si incluye en su argumentación conceptos metafísicos, antropológicos y éticos o si se subordina a ellos sin incluirlos. La Filosofía de la Educación como saber práctico se subordina a la Ética. Esta es filosofía práctica porque trata sobre operables con el fin de conocerlos y no de actuar. Es directiva del obrar humano solamente en lo que se refiere (...) a los principios generales, no a la dirección del obrar concreto. Las estimaciones morales primeras no son conclusiones de tesis metafísicas, aunque sea necesario algún conocimiento de éstas para que sea efectiva la evidencia de aquéllas. Tampoco se derivan las proposiciones prácticas de proposiciones teóricas, por lo que no hay "paso indebido" como pretendía la "ley de Hume". El fin de la filosofía práctica es el conocimiento del deber ser de los actos humanos. En el caso de la Filosofía de la Educación, el conocimiento está formalmente dirigido al proceso o actividad que permite perfeccionar al hombre a través de sus actos, sus hábitos y su modo de vida, y al fin o producto de esa actividad que le permite encaminarse hacia su fin último. Lo que afirmamos sobre la educación y su fin universal exige comprender qué son los diversos fines y cómo se relacionan unos con otros, lo que requiere conocimientos propios de la filosofía teórica, presupuestos por la Filosofía de Educación, que busca el fundamento de los juicios prescriptivos, indagando por qué se debe hacer lo que recomiendan las normas que se proponen para dar sentido al proceso educativo. (shrink)

Recently, Indigenous commentators have begun to analyse the way in which institutional Research Ethics Boards engage with Indigenous researchers and participants, respond to Indigenous peoples’ concerns with academic research activities, and scrutinise the ethics proposals of Indigenous scholars. Of particular concern for Indigenous commentators is that the work of REBs often results in the marginalisation of Indigenous approaches to knowledge construction and dissemination, especially in relation to the vexed issue of informed consent. Based on analysis of the results of research (...) with Indigenous researchers and research participants, this paper argues that institutionalised REBs’ preference for ‘universal’ and ‘individualised’ approaches for determining ethical research conduct marginalises Indigenous approaches to ethical research conduct. The paper concludes by calling for a decolonisation of REB processes through recognition of the validity of communal processes for attaining the informed conse... (shrink)

Risk taking is a component of the decision-making process in situations that involve uncertainty and in which the probability of each outcome – rewards and/or negative consequences – is already known. The influence of cognitive and emotional processes in decision making may affect how risky situations are addressed. First, inaccurate assessments of situations may constitute a perceptual bias in decision making, which might influence RT. Second, there seems to be consensus that a proneness bias exists, known as risk proneness, which (...) can be defined as the propensity to be attracted to potentially risky activities. In the present study, we take the approach that risk perception and risk proneness affect RT behaviours. The study hypothesises that locus of control, emotion regulation, and executive control act as perceptual biases in RT, and that personality, sensation seeking, and impulsivity traits act as proneness biases in RT. The results suggest that locus of control, emotion regulation and executive control influence certain domains of RT, while personality influences in all domains except the recreational, and sensation seeking and impulsivity are involved in all domains of RT. The results of the study constitute a foundation upon which to build in this research area and can contribute to the increased understanding of human behaviour in risky situations. (shrink)

From the 12th to the 15th centuries, women were better considered in Canon Law than in Civil Law. The Church accepted the way of thinking and the civil laws of the period, but defended the basic content of Natural Law concerning the dignity of the womanhood.

Justo Lipsio publicó en 1598 la primera ed. de _Admiranda sive de magnitudine romana libri IV_, una de las fuentes bibliográficas del _Decline and Fall_ de Gibbon. El trabajo presenta las relaciones entre ambos proyectos historiográficos y revisa el análisis que de esa relación realizó J. G. A. Pococken _Barbarism and Religion. __Volume Three. The First Decline and Fall_ (2003).

Moving to the discipline of political sociology, we will articulate certain contributions of the critical Argentine Marxists, Silvio Frondizi and José Aricó, whose primary writings spanned the decades of 1960s to the 1990s.As a hypothesis, we will consider that these contributions can be productively linked to the themes of the “translatability of scientific and philosophical languages” and of “constitutionalism”, referred to by Antonio Gramsci at different moments of his political-intellectual trajectory, but fundamentally in his already legendary Prison Notebooks.In the period (...) from the Cuban Revolution of 1959 to the transitions to democracy in Latin America in the last decades of the 20th century, what Frondizi and Aricó have set out to develop is the full potential of the notion of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

Knowledge of diverse sexual motivations can have profound implications for our comprehension of the causes, correlations, and consequences of sexual behavior. This study had two objectives: on the one hand, to determine the different motives why young Spanish university students have sex and their relationship with different sociodemographic and psychosexual variables and sexual behavior; on the other hand, to review and improve the psychometric properties of the Sexual Motivations Scale and validate it in Spanish. Participants were 805 university students of (...) both sexes, aged between 18 and 26 years, who completed a battery of online questionnaires. Significant associations were found between young people's sexual motives, especially the motives of coping, peer pressure, and enhancement, the sociodemographic variables, sexual behavior, and psychosexual variables. Also, a new structure of the Sexual Motivations Scale was proposed, with the elimination of the factor of Self-Affirmation. The discussion highlights the relevance of the results obtained due to their implications in the promotion of sexual health, in addition to achieving the first instrument validated in Spanish for the evaluation of sexual motivations. (shrink)

We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...) discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims. (shrink)

The traditional Square of Opposition consists of four sentence types. Two are universal and two particular; two are affirmative and two negative. Examples, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ designate the subject and the predicate, are: ‘every S is P’, ‘no S is P’, ‘some S is P’ and ‘some S is not P’. Taking the usual sentences of the square of opposition, quantifying over their predicates exhibits non-standard sentence forms. These sentences may be combined into non-standard Squares of Opposition , and (...) they reveal a new relationship not found in the usual Square. Medieval logicians termed ‘disparatae’ pairs of sentences like ‘every S is some P’ and ‘some S is every P’, which are neither subaltern nor contrary, neither contradictory nor subcontrary. Walter Redmond has designed a special language L to express the logical form of these sentences in a precise way. I will use this language to show how Squares of Opposition, standard and non-standard, form a complex network of relations which bring to .. (shrink)