What responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? Iris Marion Young has offered the most fully developed account to date, the Social Connections Model. She argues that we all bear responsibility because we each causally contribute to structural processes that produce injustice. My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative account that improves on Young’s model by addressing five fundamental challenges faced by any such theory. The core idea of what I call the “Role-Ideal Model” is (...) that we are each responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles, i.e. our roles as parents, colleagues, employers, citizens, etc., because roles are the site where structure meets agency. In short, the Role-Ideal Model explains how individual action contributes to structural change, justifies demands for action from each particular agent, specifies what kinds of acts should be undertaken, moderates between demanding too much and too little of individual agents, and provides an account of the critical responses appropriate for holding individuals accountable for structural injustice. (shrink)

Moral agency is limited, imperfect, and structurally constrained. This is evident in the many ways we all unwittingly participate in widespread injustice through our everyday actions, which I call ‘structural wrongs’. To do justice to these facts, I argue that we should distinguish between summative and formative moral criticism. While summative criticism functions to conclusively assess an agent's performance relative to some benchmark, formative criticism aims only to improve performance in an ongoing way. I show that the negative sanctions associated (...) with summative responses are only justifiably imposed under certain conditions when persons exercise their agency wrongly — conditions that do not always hold for structural wrongs. Yet even in such cases we can still use formative responses, which are warranted whenever agents fall short of moral ideals. Expanding our repertoire of moral criticism to include both summative and formative responses enables us to better appreciate both the powers and limitations of our agency, and the complexity of moral life. (shrink)

Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy, one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow (...) fever’, to argue against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial social meanings. (shrink)

Sally Haslanger has recently argued that philosophical focus on implicit bias is overly individualist, since social inequalities are best explained in terms of social structures rather than the actions and attitudes of individuals. I argue that questions of individual responsibility and implicit bias, properly understood, do constitute an important part of addressing structural injustice, and I propose an alternative conception of social structure according to which implicit biases are themselves best understood as a special type of structure.

Iris Marion Young’s influential Social Connections Model of responsibility offers a compelling approach to theorizing structural injustice. However, the precise nature of the kind of responsibility modelled by the SCM, along with its relationship to the liability model, has remained unclear. I offer a reading of Young that takes the difference between the liability model and the SCM to be an instance of a more longstanding distinction in the literature on moral responsibility: attributability vs. accountability. I show that interpreting the (...) SCM as a conception of accountability resolves a number of objections, while also highlighting the SCM’s distinctive stance on the relationship between ethics and politics. (shrink)

What is objectionable about “blacking up” or other comparable acts of imagining involving unethical attitudes? Can such imaginings be wrong, even if there are no harmful consequences and imaginers are not meant to apply these attitudes beyond the fiction? In this article, we argue that blackface—and imagining in general—can be ethically flawed in virtue of being oppressive, in virtue of either its content or what imaginers do with it, where both depend on how the imagined attitudes interact with the imagining’s (...) context. We explain and demonstrate this using speech act theory alongside a detailed case study of blackface. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 4, April 2022.

This chapter distinguishes between two concepts of moral responsibility. We are responsible for our actions in the first sense only when those actions reflect our identities as moral agents, i.e. when they are attributable to us. We are responsible in the second sense when it is appropriate for others to enforce certain expectations and demands on those actions, i.e. to hold us accountable for them. This distinction allows for an account of moral responsibility for implicit bias, defended here, on which (...) people may lack attributability for actions caused by implicit bias but are still accountable for them. What this amounts to is leaving aside appraisal-based forms of moral criticism such as blame and punishment in favor of non-appraising forms of accountability. This account not only does more justice to our moral experience and agency, but will also lead to more effective practices for combating the harms of implicit bias. (shrink)

I propose a new concept of solidarity, which I call “solidarity from below,” that highlights an aspect of solidarity widely recognized in popular uses of the term, but which has hitherto been neglected in the philosophical literature. Solidarity from below is the collective ability of otherwise powerless people to organize themselves for transformative social change. I situate this concept with respect to four distinct but intertwined questions that have motivated extant theorizing about solidarity. I explain what it means to conceptualize (...) solidarity from below as a form of power, rather than as a feeling, disposition, duty, or scheme of social arrangements. Finally, I suggest that the moral-relational aspects of solidarity emerge secondarily from the process of collective power, and not the other way around. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers have challenged a wide range of gender injustices in professional philosophy. However, the problem of precarity, that is, the increasing numbers of contingent faculty who cannot find permanent employment, has received scarcely any attention. What explains this oversight? In this article, I argue, first, that academics are held in the grips of an ideology that diverts attention away from the structural conditions of precarity, and second, that the gendered dimensions of such an ideology have been overlooked. To do (...) so, I identify two myths: the myth of meritocracy and the myth of work as its own reward. I demonstrate that these myths—and the two-tier system itself—manifest an unmistakably gendered logic, such that gender and precarity are mutually reinforcing and co-constitutive. I conclude that feminist philosophers have particular reason to organize against the casualization of academic work. (shrink)

People disagree about the causes of social inequality and how to most effectively intervene in them. These may seem like empirical questions for social scientists, not philosophers. However, causal explanation itself depends on broadly normative commitments. From this it follows that (moral) philosophers have an important role to play in determining those causal explanations. I examine the case of causal explanations of poverty to demonstrate these claims. In short, philosophers who work to reshape our moral expectations also work, on the (...) back end, to restructure acceptable causal explanations—and hence solutions—for social inequality. Empirical and normative inquiry, then, are a two-way street. (shrink)

BackgroundCompassion fatigue is often associated with moral distress in the nursing practice among registered nurses. Moral resilience is an important ability to maintain, restore, or promote their...

An interesting phenomenon called “hidden opportunity cost of time effect” was detected in intertemporal choices. The majority of our participants preferred the smaller but sooner (SS) option to the larger but later (LL) option if opportunity cost was explicit. However, a higher proportion of participants preferred the LL to SS option if opportunity cost was hidden. This shift violates the invariance principle and opens a new way to encourage future-oriented behavior. By simply mentioning the ‘obvious’ opportunity cost of alternatives, decision (...) makers can be more informed in prioritizing their long-term goals rather than short-term goals. (shrink)

Several functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have demonstrated abnormalities in static intra- and interhemispheric functional connectivity among diverse brain regions in patients with major depressive disorder. However, the dynamic changes in intra- and interhemispheric functional connectivity patterns in patients with MDD remain unclear. Fifty-eight first-episode, drug-naive patients with MDD and 48 age-, sex-, and education level-matched healthy controls underwent resting-state fMRI. Whole-brain functional connectivity, analyzed using the functional connectivity density approach, was decomposed into ipsilateral and contralateral functional connectivity. We computed (...) the intra- and interhemispheric dynamic FCD using a sliding window analysis to capture the dynamic patterns of functional connectivity. The temporal variability in functional connectivity was quantified as the variance of the dFCD over time. In addition, intra- and interhemispheric static FCD patterns were calculated. Associations between the dFCD variance and sFCD in abnormal brain regions and the severity of depressive symptoms were analyzed. Compared to HCs, patients with MDD showed lower interhemispheric dFCD variability in the inferior/middle frontal gyrus and decreased sFCD in the medial prefrontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus in both intra- and interhemispheric comparisons. No significant correlations were found between any abnormal dFCD variance or sFCD at the intra- and interhemispheric levels and the severity of depressive symptoms. Our results suggest intra- and interhemispheric functional connectivity alterations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and default mode network regions involved in cognition, execution and emotion. Furthermore, our study emphasizes the essential role of altered interhemispheric communication dynamics in the DLPFC in patients with MDD. These findings contribute to our understanding of the pathophysiology of MDD. (shrink)

I defend an account of moral responsibility for implicit bias that is sensitive to both normative and pragmatic constraints: an acceptable theory of moral responsibility must not only do justice to our moral experience and agency, but also issue directives that are psychologically effective in bringing about positive changes in judgment and behavior. I begin by offering a conceptual genealogy of two different concepts of moral responsibility that arise from two distinct sources of philosophical concerns. We are morally responsible for (...) our actions in first sense only when those actions reflect our identities as moral agents—that is, when they are attributable to us as manifestations of our character, attitudes, ends, commitments, or values. On the other hand, we are responsible in the second sense when it is appropriate for others to enforce certain demands and expectations on those actions—in other words, to hold us accountable for them. I argue that we may sometimes lack attributability for actions caused by implicit bias, but that even then we are still accountable for them. Next, I expand beyond individual actions at a particular time to patterns of action across time, to consider what we can reasonably be expected to do when it comes to avoiding and eliminating implicit bias in our selves. By thinking of these expectations as grounded in imperfect duties, I show, we can expand our moral repertoire to include non-appraising critical moral responses, in addition to appraisal-based responses such as blame and punishment. Finally, I move beyond the actions of individuals to address the question of responsibility for eliminating the social conditions that breed implicit biases in the first place. I argue that accountability requires us not only to conform to a system of demands and expectations, but also to collectively organize to reform the system itself. By elaborating these multiple dimensions of moral responsibility—attributability versus accountability, particular versus patterns of action, individual versus collective—I demonstrate that the project of developing better practices of moral responsibility is continuous with, and thus contributes to, larger struggles for social equality and justice. (shrink)

I raise two worries about the Debunker's and Defeater Dilemmas, respectively, and I argue that moral cognition is inextricable from social cognition, which tends to rationalize deep social inequality. I thus opine that our moral-social capacities fare badly in profoundly unjust social contexts such as our own.

David Shoemaker's highly innovative and intricately argued new book brings much of his previous work together with substantial original material to form a detailed and cohesive treatment of responsibility. The book is engaging, crisp, and admirably clear. It is marvelously ambitious in its strategy and framework, engagement with multiple literatures, and decidedly novel approach to Strawsonian theory. Moral philosophers, psychologists, clinicians and practitioners, and anyone who has ever wondered about "marginal agents"—people with dementia, autism, depression, OCD, and psychopathy—will find much (...) to entice them in this thorough and accessible treatise.Shoemaker's starting point—the phenomenon he aims to... (shrink)

Though individual categorization or decision processes have been studied separately in many previous investigations, few studies have investigated how they interact by using a two-stage task of first categorizing and then deciding. To address this issue, we investigated a categorization-decision task in two experiments. In both, participants were shown six faces varying in width, first asked to categorize the faces, and then decide a course of action for each face. Each experiment was designed to include three groups, and for each (...) group, we manipulated the probabilistic contingencies between stimulus, category assignments, and decision consequences. For each group, each participant received three different sequences of category response, category feedback, decision response, and decision feedback. We found that participants were only partially responsive in the appropriate directions to the contingencies assigned to each group. Comparisons of results from different sequences provided evidence for empirical interference effects of categorization on decisions. The empirical interference effect is defined as the difference between the probability of taking a hostile action in decision-alone conditions and the total probability of taking a hostile action in categorization-decision conditions. To test competing accounts for multiple empirical results, including two-stage choice probabilities and empirical interference effects, we compared a quantum cognition model versus a two-stage exemplar categorization model at both aggregate and individual levels. Using a Bayesian information criterion, we found that the quantum model provided an overall better model fit than the exemplar model. Although both models predicted empirical interference effects, the exemplar model was able to generate probabilistic deviation by incorporating category information of the first stage into the feature representation of the subsequent decision stage, while the quantum model produced interference effect by superposition, measurement, and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

A surprisingly large number of lottery prizes go unclaimed every year. This leads us to suspect that what people bet on is not only money, but also good mood. We conducted three studies to explain, from an emotional perspective, why people play lottery games. We first conducted two survey studies to assess mood state reported by online (Study 1a) and offline lottery buyers (Study 1b) at different stages of lottery play. The results revealed that participants’ highest mood appeared before knowing (...) whether they had won. In Study 2, we manipulated the means of reward (lottery tickets vs. cash) and compared participants’ mood changes at different stages of a rewards game in the laboratory. We found the following: first, lottery group participants were generally in a better mood; second, 42% of lottery group participants did not come to the laboratory to collect scratch cards; and third, lottery group participants took more time to return to the laboratory to check their tickets than participants in the cash group. In Study 3, we examined whether priming good or bad mood could influence participants’ preferences for cash versus lottery tickets. The results revealed that participants who were primed for poor mood had a higher preference for lottery tickets compared with their good mood counterparts. These findings suggest that what our participants sought in lottery play was not only money, but improved mood. (shrink)

Contemporary social reform promotes rapid social transformation, and social practice has a special educational function in higher education. However, research shows weak willingness to participate in social practice among college students. Using the mixed research method, 438 completed questionnaire surveys on perceived environmental support were collected from college students. The influence of perceived environmental support on Chinese college students’ willingness to participate in social practice was analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling, and an empirical test was conducted. The (...) findings are as follows: Perceived environmental support significantly impacts students’ participation attitude and perceived behavioral control. Participation attitude and perceived behavioral control significantly influence participation intention, but behavioral norms have no significant influence. Participation intention and perceived behavioral control significantly influence actual behavior. This study provides the theoretical basis of perceived environmental support for future research on social practice participation intention and offers some theoretical guidance for the implementation of social practice in China. (shrink)

Following the outbreak of COVID-19, farmer-assisted live streaming has become a hot topic in China. In this manuscript, we explore the ways in which broadcaster and platform characteristics jointly influence consumers’ purchase intention. To examine our hypotheses, we distributed questionnaires to 261 Chinese consumers who viewed farmer-assisted live streaming. Correlational analyses, regression analyses, and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to examine our hypotheses. The results show that broadcasters’ expertise is positively related to consumer trust and that platform reputation moderates this (...) relationship. In addition, consumer trust mediates the positive relationship between broadcasters’ expertise and consumer purchase intention. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

IntroductionRace-walking is a sport that mimics normal walking and running. Previous studies on sports science mainly focused on the cardiovascular and musculoskeletal systems. However, there is still a lack of research on the central nervous system, especially the real-time changes in brain network characteristics during race-walking exercise. This study aimed to use a network perspective to investigate the effects of different exercise intensities on brain functional connectivity.Materials and methodsA total of 16 right-handed healthy young athletes were recruited as participants in (...) this study. The cerebral cortex concentration of oxyhemoglobin was measured by functional near-infrared spectroscopy in the bilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), the motor cortex (MC) and occipital cortex (OC) during resting and race-walking states. Three specific periods as time windows corresponding to different exercise intensities were divided from the race-walking time of participants, including initial, intermediate and sprint stages. The brain activation and functional connectivity (FC) were calculated to describe the 0.01-0.1 Hz frequency-specific cortical activities.ResultsCompared to the resting state, FC changes mainly exist between MC and OC in the initial stage, while PFC was involved in FC changes in the intermediate stage, and FC changes in the sprint stage were widely present in PFC, MC and OC. In addition, from the initial-development to the sprint stage, the significant changes in FC were displayed in PFC and MC.ConclusionThis brain functional connectivity-based study confirmed that hemodynamic changes at different exercise intensities reflected different brain network-specific characteristics. During race-walking exercise, more extensive brain activation might increase information processing speed. Increased exercise intensity could facilitate the integration of neural signals such as proprioception, motor control and motor planning, which may be an important factor for athletes to maintain sustained motor coordination and activity control at high intensity. This study was beneficial to understanding the neural mechanisms of brain networks under different exercise intensities. (shrink)

本书收录论文17篇及附录三则,是汉语学术界第一部全面论述18世纪朝鲜阳明学者郑齐斗的专著,在东亚儒学研究中特别具有开拓新领域之意义。.

Volume 97, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 843-844.