Jainism is essentially a spiritual philosophy having a strong focus on the ultimate purification of the soul (ātmā). A human being usually when fails to understand things, when sorrows attack, etc., then he attributes to memorize the deva (celestial being) to seek help. Man can be guided both correctly and incorrectly by the deva and can establish a new system in a society that can be both in a positive form and a negative form. Thus, this involvement of deva in (...) human life brings change in his culture, behavior, spirituality, etc. There is a lot of misunderstanding about deva. In Jain literature, it is mentioned as the difference between Arhat (Supreme Divine) and deva (celestial being), which will help the man to move in the right direction. In various positive and negative ways, a human is affected by deva, in the past and the present. (shrink)

BackgroundVideo-calls have proven to be useful for older care home residents in improving socialization and reducing loneliness. Nonetheless, to facilitate the acceptability and usability of a new technological intervention, especially among people with dementia, there is a need for user-led design improvements. The current study conducted focus groups with an embedded activity with older people to allow for a person-centered design of a video-call intervention.MethodsTwenty-eight residents across four care homes in the South West of England participated in focus groups to (...) aesthetically personalize and ‘dress-up’ the equipment used in a video-call intervention. Each care home was provided with a ‘Skype on Wheels’ device, a wheelable ‘chassis’ comprising an iPad or tablet for access to Skype, and a telephone handset. During the focus group, residents were encouraged to participate in an activity using colorful materials to ‘dress-up’ SoW. Comments before, during and after the ‘dress up’ activity were audio recorded. Framework analysis was used to analyze the focus group data.ResultsOlder people, including seven with dementia were able to interact with and implement design changes to SoW through aesthetic personalization. Themes arising from the data included estrangement, anthropomorphism, reminiscence, personalization, need for socialization versus fear of socialization and attitudes toward technology. After this brief exposure to SoW, residents expressed the likelihood of using video-calls for socialization in the future.ConclusionCare home residents enjoy engaging with new technologies when given the opportunity to interact with it, to personalize it and to understand its purpose. Low cost aesthetic personalization of technologies can improve their acceptability, usability, and implementation within complex care environments. (shrink)

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)

All lineages of Tibetan Buddhism today claim allegiance to the philosophy of the Middle Way, the exposition of emptiness propounded by the second-century Indian master Nagarjuna. But not everyone interprets it the same way. A major faultline runs through Tibetan Buddhism around the interpretation of what are called the two truths-the deceptive truth of conventional appearances and the ultimate truth of emptiness. An understanding of this faultline illuminates the beliefs that separate the Gelug descendents of Tsongkhapa from contemporary Dzogchen and (...) Mahamudra adherents.The Two Truths Debate digs into the debate of how the two truths are defined and how they are related by looking at two figures, one on either side of the faultline, and shows how their philosophical positions have dramatic implications for how one approaches Buddhist practice and how one understands enlightenment itself. (shrink)

Human experience is not confined to waking life. Do experiences in dreams matter? Humans are not the only living beings who have experiences. Does nonhuman experience matter? The Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu, writing during the late fourth and early fifth centuries C.E., argues in his work The Twenty Verses that these alternative contexts ought to inform our understanding of mind and world. Vasubandhu invites readers to explore experiences in dreams and to inhabit the experiences of nonhuman beings—animals, hungry ghosts, and beings (...) in hell. Other Lives offers a deep engagement with Vasubandhu’s account of mind in a global philosophical perspective. Sonam Kachru takes up Vasubandhu’s challenge to think with perspective-diversifying contexts, showing how his novel theory draws together action and perception, minds and worlds. Kachru pieces together the conceptual system in which Vasubandhu thought to show the deep originality of the argument. He reconstructs Vasubandhu’s ecological concept of mind, in which mindedness is meaningful only in a nexus with life and world, to explore its ongoing philosophical significance. Engaging with a vast range of classical, modern, and contemporary Asian and Western thought, Other Lives is both a groundbreaking work in Buddhist studies and a model of truly global philosophy. The book also includes an accessible new translation of The Twenty Verses, providing a fresh introduction to one of the most influential works of Buddhist thought. (shrink)

Though perhaps a dubious honor, Dharmakīrti is the first philosopher in any tradition to explicitly recognize the epistemological threat of solipsism, devoting an entire essay to the problem—The Justification of Other Minds. This essay revisits Ratnakīrti’s Doing Away with Other Beings as a diagnosis of Dharmakīrti’s attempt to reconstruct the very idea of other beings, with particular attention to Ratnakīrti’s sensitivity to the conceptual preconditions for a genuine threat of solipsism. Along with the diagnosis of the conditions for the emergence (...) of a problem of genuine solipsism, this essay takes as its focus Ratnakīrti’s criticism of attempts to meet with the problem. In particular, I shall stress an insight Ratnakīrti adduces in the course of his diagnosis. Attempts to meet the problem of solipsism head on, Ratnakīrti shows us, obscure what the preconditions for a genuine problem reveal: the fact of our possessing two incommensurable conceptions of mind, one of which is intrinsically and entirely first-personal—in a sense to be clarified in the course of this essay—and the other not. I conclude this essay with an inconclusive sketch of the difficulties that remain when considering what Ratnakīrti would have us conclude from his own diagnosis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn my response to Ganeri's [2018] paper, I take Buddhagosha's deflationary account of episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti deflates episodic memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra's thesis that episodic memory requires the admission of reflexive awareness. Also unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti shows the incoherence of the Mimāṁsāka-Naiyāyika's (...) self-implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulving's challenge to the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that Candrakīrti may have even greater success in deflating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory. (shrink)

Nationwide, almost 11% of women abuse drugs during their pregnancy. In some communities, these numbers are as high as 25–30%. Drug abuse is not limited to the poor or to African Americans, but is seen among affluent and white Americans as well. It is widespread, irrespective of race or social class. Annually, nearly 375,000 infants are exposed to drugs in America. Because of the terrible suffering caused by these births, and the conflicts caregivers experience in the treatment of these infants, (...) Trollope's quote is very apropos. Although caregivers have good motives in trying to rescue these babies and helping place them in a nurturing environment, despair about this objective is always close to the surface. (shrink)

We appreciated the important commentary provided by Michelle Oberman on our paper, “Discontinuing Life Support in an Infant of a Drug-Addicted Mother: Whose Decision Is It?” . For the most part we agree with Oberman's analysis of the issues, but there are seven points of variance, either of conception, emphasis, or accuracy. We wish to clarify these and welcome the chance her commentary provided to offer aspects of the social situation surrounding the case we presented.

Buddhist semantic realists assert that reality is always non-linguistic, beyond the domain of conceptual thought. Anything that is conceptual and linguistic, they maintain, cannot be reality and therefore cannot function as reality.The Pra¯san˙gika however rejects the realist theory and argues that all realities are purely linguistic—just names and concepts—and that only linguistic reality can have any causal function. This paper seeks to understand the Pra¯san˙gika’s radical semantic nominalism and its philosophical justifications by comparing and contrasting it with the realistic semantic (...) theories. (shrink)

Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core non-foundationalist ontology.

Richard Hayes and Dan Arnold have made the claim that Dharmakīrti is a mind-body dualist by virtue of his doctrine of rebirth. Dharmakīrti, "elaborating the Buddhist tradition's most complete defenses of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition's most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism". Arnold identifies Dharmakīrti as an exemplary Buddhist philosopher who defends Buddhist reductionism and mind-body dualism. In Dharmakīrti's view, argues Arnold, the dynamic and relational character of subjectivity is not in conflict with the view that among the (...) psychophysical components of phenomenological persons are constitutively mental... (shrink)

The two traditional Indian Buddhist philosophers – the Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna (c.150–250) and the Sautrāntika-Vasubandhu (c. 350–430) – agree that mental causation involves a causal relationship between successive consciousness moments in which the previous moments are causes and the latter moments effects. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of this relation at stake. Is it a type of relationship that requires (1) necessary connection between successive consciousness moments in which there is an internal causal connection between the previous and the (...) latter conscious moments? (2) Alternatively, is the causal relationship between consciousness moments just a matter of constant conjunctions of intrinsic natures (svabhāvas) without any necessary causal relation? If the former, the two Buddhist philosophers need to explain which of the two truths – conventional truth or ultimate truth – does this necessary relation belong and why? If the latter, they need to explain how mental causation – a continuum of interrupted mental events in which the previous moment are causes and the subsequent moments effects – possible with intrinsic natures, absent any necessary causal connection between them? Either way, the Buddhist philosophers must address these two questions concerning causal relation adequately. (shrink)

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s epistemology, and (...) by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsaṅgika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed. (shrink)

Ayurveda is a traditional system of healthcare that is native to India and has a rich documented literature of its own. Most of the historians agree that the documentation of core Ayurveda literature took place approximately in between 400 BCE and 200 CE, while acknowledging that the roots of its theoretical framework can be traced back to a much earlier period. For multiple reasons many significant contributions of Ayurveda literature to various streams of biological and medical sciences have remained under-recognized (...) while recounting the historical milestones of development. This is true in the context of the physiology of digestion and metabolism too. In this communication we try to reconstruct a picture of the processes of digestion and metabolism as had been understood by ancient Ayurveda scholars. Though this understanding was primitive and insufficient in many ways, we argue that this deserves to be documented and acknowledged. To help with grasping the importance of these contributions, we juxtapose them with the corresponding insights pertaining to this subject reported by prominent western scientists. The major contributions of Ayurveda that have been recounted in this paper are those related to the description of three distinct phases of digestion (Avasthapaka), multiple sets of transformative entities acting at different levels of metabolism (Agni), and the roles ascribed to various internal and external factors in executing these physiological functions. (shrink)

The interest of this essay is meta-philosophical: I seek to reconstruct neglected concepts of thought available to us given the diverse use South Asian Buddhist philosophers have made of the term-of-art vikalpa. In contemporary Anglophone engagements with Buddhist philosophy, it has come to mean either the categorization and reidentification of particulars in terms of the construction of equivalence classes and/or the representation of extra-mental causes of content. While this does track much that is important in the history of Buddhist philosophy, (...) it is overly restrictive. Based on three examples, this essay reconstructs other concepts of vikalpa available before, during, and after Digṅāga’s epochal reformulation of Buddhist epistemology. The first example takes us away from the familiar context of content introduction in perceptual experience to consider Ratnakīrti’s way of treating cases where one exits from concept-involving modes of engaging content. The second takes up with Vasubandhu and Sthiramati the case of the contents of background awareness. The third and final case builds on the last concern, taking up a discussion of possible worlds in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This last was intended to address the relationship of thought to language. Moving beyond narrowly epistemological concerns allows a more expansive sense of vikalpa to come into view. Doing so, in turn, allows one to see that vikalpa need not indicate only occurrent representations, but also the structured systems of possible discriminations which some Buddhists took to serve as the background for all possible perception, thought, and action. The existence of such a background changes the salience and the value of distinctions drawn between conceptual and non-conceptual contents and experiences. (shrink)

Once encountered in Beautiful Nanda, Aśvaghoṣa’s Sundarī is unforgettable. It is easy, then, to forget that we are given to see and hear her only in two of the eighteen chapters of Aśvaghoṣa’s long, lyrical narrative of Nanda. When she is given to speak, her words and voice resonate powerfully, but the narrative reduces her at last to silence. Among the last images of her, there is the moment when she is likened to a screaming bird, bereaved of her mate, (...) her voice transformed and eventually drowned out. This essay argues for a new interpretation of the salience of this figurative transformation, and of two different ways in which Sundarī is lost to view as she is forgotten or overlooked by characters in the narrative. Along with a close-reading of Sundarī?s loss of voice, this essay offers readings of the depiction of Sundarī?s grief and Nanda?s?disremembering? of her. In conclusion, I suggest that re-reading such passages recommends taking very seriously the possibility that for Aśvaghoṣa there might be a close relationship between the kind of sensitivity his poetry enables and a variety of moral attention. (shrink)

The subject of this extraordinary, demanding, and often moving book is being human. What it means to be such a being is here explored by means of scrupulous attention to ways in which "bodily being"--the author's term for how subjectivity may be expressed through contextually specific modes of embodiment--are drawn on, expressed, and transformed in what one might call different epistemic and experiential contexts found in premodern Indian thought in Sanskrit and Pāli.One of the most attractive things in this book (...) is that, within its pages, Indian philosophy is found in a number of genres: in medical texts, in epic (in the... (shrink)

Abhidharma, the genre of knowledge concerned with putting into systematic shape what the Buddha taught, can seem a forbidding subject. In this essay, taking Skandhila’s Introduction to Abhidharma and Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as touchstones, I will try to shed a little philosophical light on Abhidharma as a variety of epistemic culture in the long fifth century C.E. in South Asia. To think of Abhidharma as an epistemic culture is not only to think of what goes into the making of knowledge and (...) its justification. It is also a way to counter-point presentations of domains of inquiry which stress the retroactive organization and unity of knowledge at the expense of the heterogeneity that goes into its making. More particularly, what is at stake is a feel for the diversity of epistemic machinery Abhidharma can involve and why such diversity can matter. The essay concludes with a consideration of Vasubandhu’s closing remarks, which suggest the importance of temporal contexts of intellectual practice in which certain styles of knowledge and virtues associated with knowledge may acquire variable salience. (shrink)

This chapter looks at Dignaga's insistence on the non--conceptuality of perceptual experience in the light of Sellars' critique of the myth of the given as well as his other philosophical committments.

Human perception has long been a critical subject of design thinking. While various studies have stressed the link between thinking and acting, particularly in spatial experience, the term “design thinking” seems to disconnect conceptual thinking from physical expression or process. Spatial perception is multimodal and fundamentally bound to the body that is not a mere receptor of sensory stimuli but an active agent engaged with the perceivable environment. The body apprehends the experience in which one’s kinesthetic engagement and knowledge play (...) an essential role. Although design disciplines have integrated the abstract, metaphoric, and visual aspects of the body and its movement into conceptual thinking, studies have pointed out that design disciplines have emphasized visuality above the other sensory domains and heavily engaged with the perception of visual configurations, relying on the Gestalt principles. Gestalt psychology must be valued for its attention to a whole. However, the theories of design elements and principles over-empathizing such visuality posit the aesthetics of design mainly as visual value and understate other sensorial and perceptual aspects. Although the visual approach may provide a practical means to represent and communicate ideas, a design process heavily driven by visuality can exhibit weaknesses undermining certain aspects of spatial experience despite the complexity. Grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s notion of multisensory perception, this article discusses the relationship between body awareness and spatial perception and its implication for design disciplines concerning built environments. Special attention is given to the concepts of kinesthetic and synesthetic phenomena known as multisensory and cross-sensory, respectively. This discussion integrates the corporeal and spatiotemporal realms of human experience into the discourse of kinesthetic and synesthetic perceptions. Based on the conceptual, theoretical, and precedent analyses, this article proposes three models for design thinking: Synesthetic Translation, Kinesthetic Resonance, and Kinesthetic Engagement. To discuss the concepts rooted in action-based perception and embodied cognition, this study borrows the neurological interpretation of haptic perception, interoception, and proprioception of space. This article suggests how consideration of the kinesthetic or synesthetic body can deepen and challenge the existing models of the perceptual aspects of environmental psychology adopted in design disciplines. (shrink)

On the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy.

As Acharya Vidyanand writes in the Foreword of Samayasara, it is the ultimate conscious reality. The enlightened soul has infinite glory. It has the innate ability to demolish the power of karmas, both auspicious as well as inauspicious, which constitute the cycle of births and deaths, and are an obstacle in the path of liberation of the soul. Samayasara is an essential reading for anyone who wishes to lead a purposeful and contented life. It provides irrefutable and lasting solutions to (...) all our problems, concerning worldly ways as well as spiritual curiosities and misgivings. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers provide several toolkits for exploring the relationship between meditation and introspection. Drawing on some of their tools, we explore three models of mind, which offer different ways of thinking about the possibility of introspection: an entirely mindful observer, who introspectively experiences 'pure consciousness'; a thin mind, which avoids appealing to a witness or observer of mental episodes by positing a form of reflexive selfawareness; and a thicker mind, which is active, historically situated, and dependent upon an ecological and (...) social context. We then explore practical and theoretical models of a thicker mind, which suggest that meditation is not simply a matter of representing mental episodes and then using these representations for online behavioural control. Drawing upon these models, we close by proposing that meditation should be understood as a practice of mental cultivation, which requires a more radical reconceptualization of knowing a mind. (shrink)

Numerous high-profile ethics scandals, rising inequality, and the detrimental effects of climate change dramatically underscore the need for business schools to instill a commitment to social purpose in their students. At the same time, the rising financial burden of education, increasing competition in the education space, and overreliance on graduates’ financial success as the accepted metric of quality have reinforced an instrumentalist climate. These conflicting aims between social and financial purpose have created an existential crisis for business education. To resolve (...) this impasse, we draw on the concept of moral self-awareness to offer a system-theoretical strategy for crowding-in a culture of ethics within business schools. We argue that to do so, business schools will need to (1) reframe the purpose of business, (2) reframe the meaning of professional success, and (3) reframe the ethos of business education itself. (shrink)

"This book... is the English translation of the Hindi book Tattvārthasūtra with Upādhyāya (now Ailācārya) Srutasāgarji, as the principal commentator and edited by Dr Sudeep Jain in Hindi"--P. 3.

Academic dishonesty among students at colleges and universities has been a serious problem all over the world. Due to advances in information and communication technologies, particularly the Internet, the problem has become more severe in the past two decades. This is especially serious among undergraduate students. Very little research has been done in this field in Botswana and Zambia. This study was an attempt in this direction. This paper presents the findings of the study carried out with second year students (...) at the University of Botswana and the University of Zambia. The main objectives of the research were to investigate students' attitudes toward academic dishonesty, frequency of cheating, cheating methods used, and motives for cheating in a local university context. To pursue the study a questionnaire survey was used. The results revealed that students had a high knowledge of various forms of academic dishonesty; and were of the opinion that academic dishonesty devalues academic qualifications. Academic dishonesty was widely practiced; yet, it was not adequately dealt with. The paper recommends that various stakeholders should collaborate to continually educate and discourage students from indulging in academic dishonesty. (shrink)

We investigate dependence of recursively enumerable graphs on the equality relation given by a specific r.e. equivalence relation on ω. In particular we compare r.e. equivalence relations in terms of graphs they permit to represent. This defines partially ordered sets that depend on classes of graphs under consideration. We investigate some algebraic properties of these partially ordered sets. For instance, we show that some of these partial ordered sets possess atoms, minimal and maximal elements. We also fully describe the isomorphism (...) types of some of these partial orders. (shrink)

Freivalds defined an acceptable programming system independent criterion for learning programs for functions in which the final programs were required to be both correct and "nearly" minimal size, i.e., within a computable function of being purely minimal size. Kinber showed that this parsimony requirement on final programs limits learning power. However, in scientific inference, parsimony is considered highly desirable. A lim-computablefunction is (by definition) one calculable by a total procedure allowed to change its mind finitely many times about its output. (...) Investigated is the possibility of assuaging somewhat the limitation on learning power resulting from requiring parsimonious final programs by use of criteria which require the final, correct programs to be "not-so-nearly" minimal size, e.g., to be within a lim-computable function of actual minimal size. It is shown that some parsimony in the final program is thereby retained, yet learning power strictly increases. Considered, then, are lim-computable functions as above but for which notations for constructive ordinals are used to bound the number of mind changes allowed regarding the output. This is a variant of an idea introduced by Freivalds and Smith. For this ordinal notation complexity bounded version of lim-computability, the power of the resultant learning criteria form finely graded, infinitely ramifying, infinite hierarchies intermediate between the computable and the lim-computable cases. Some of these hierarchies, for the natural notations determining them, are shown to be optimally tight. (shrink)

A generator program for a computable function (by definition) generates an infinite sequence of programs all but finitely many of which compute that function. Machine learning of generator programs for computable functions is studied. To motivate these studies partially, it is shown that, in some cases, interesting global properties for computable functions can be proved from suitable generator programs which cannot be proved from any ordinary programs for them. The power (for variants of various learning criteria from the literature) of (...) learning generator programs is compared with the power of learning ordinary programs. The learning power in these cases is also compared to that of learning limiting programs, i.e., programs allowed finitely many mind changes about their correct outputs. (shrink)

Most theories of learning consider inferring a function f from either observations about f or, questions about f. We consider a scenario whereby the learner observes f and asks queries to some set A. If I is a notion of learning then I[A] is the set of concept classes I-learnable by an inductive inference machine with oracle A. A and B are I-equivalent if I[A] = I[B]. The equivalence classes induced are the degrees of inferability. We prove several results about (...) when these degrees are trivial, and when the degrees are omniscient. (shrink)

This paper considers reductions between types of numberings; these reductions preserve the Rogers Semilattice of the numberings reduced and also preserve the number of minimal and positive degrees in their semilattice. It is shown how to use these reductions to simplify some constructions of specific semilattices. Furthermore, it is shown that for the basic types of numberings, one can reduce the left-r.e. numberings to the r.e. numberings and the k-r.e. numberings to the k+1-r.e. numberings; all further reductions are obtained by (...) concatenating these reductions. (shrink)

Purpose Along with their immense benefit, online channels of communication and information-sharing also present a myriad set of challenges. The unauthorized downloading and sharing of copyrighted content such as music and movies is one such issue. This study aims to examine the factors related to the unauthorized downloading of content amongst young internet users in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach An online structured questionnaire was used to collect primary data from 219 internet users between 17 and 24 years of age. The (...) partial least squares structural equation modelling was used to analyse the primary data. Findings The study findings report that monetary savings and social influence are the main drivers underlying the propensity to engage in unauthorized downloading amongst young adults. Perceptions of harm caused to artists and producers appear to be a deterrent. Though the respondents perceive the quality of content downloaded from unauthorized sites to be less than desirable, and there is also a higher perceived threat from viruses, this does not appear to deter unauthorized downloading behaviour amongst this segment of consumers. Research limitations/implications Combating unauthorized downloading and other forms of questionable online behaviours is a challenge for multiple stakeholders. Consumption of unauthorized digital content is examined in the context of online consumers whose demographic profile is often associated with this category of questionable behaviour. The study adds to the extant understanding of the aetiology of what are often considered online unethical and illegal behaviours and makes both practical and theoretical contributions to the subject field. Originality/value The study examines an important aspect of rapidly evolving internet technologies. The internet provides a veil to individuals engaging in unethical online activities. Despite the existence of laws declaring these activities to be illegal, instances of copyright violations of music and movies abound. The insights regarding the drivers and deterrents of a form of online unauthorized activity are used to present a set of strategies aimed at addressing such behaviours. (shrink)

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance (...) the discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. (shrink)

Perceived supervisor support is widely studied in terms of its positive outcomes. This paper, in contrast, investigates employees’ unethical pro-supervisor behavior as a negative consequence of perceived supervisor support. Drawing upon the multifoci approach of social exchange theory and the reciprocity principle, we hypothesized that perceived supervisor support can engender unethical pro-supervisor behavior via employees’ feelings of reciprocity towards the supervisor. Building on the instrumental reasons that underlie social exchanges, we further hypothesized that this mediation relationship is stronger for employees (...) high in Machiavellianism. We collected data for three experimental studies from full-time MBA students of a European business school and from U.S. working professionals, and the results provided consistent support for our proposed model. Taken together, the current study highlights the “dark side” of perceived supervisor support, in that it can lead to unethical behavior and that this effect can be accentuated by employees’ Machiavellianism. (shrink)

Emotions play a significant role in human cognitive processes such as attention, motivation, learning, memory, and decision making. Many researchers have worked in the field of incorporating emotions in a cognitive agent. However, each model has its own merits and demerits. Moreover, most studies on emotion focus on steady-state emotions than emotion switching. Thus, in this article, a domain-independent computational model of emotions for intelligent agent is proposed that have modules for emotion elicitation, emotion regulation, and emotion transition. The model (...) is built on some well-known psychological theories such as appraisal theories of emotions, emotion regulation theory, and multistore human memory model. The design of the model is using the concept of fuzzy logic to handle uncertain and subjective information. The main focus is on primary emotions as suggested by Ekman; however, simultaneous elicitation of multiple emotions is also supported by the model. (shrink)