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Profile: Galen Strawson (University of Reading)
Profile: Galen Strawson
  1. Galen Strawson (forthcoming). Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism. In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
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  2. Galen Strawson (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument (...)
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  3. Galen Strawson (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
  4. Galen Strawson (2004). Against Narrativity. Ratio 17 (4):428-452.
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  5. Galen Strawson (2006). Realistic Monism - Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
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  6.  69
    Galen Strawson (2002). The Bounds of Freedom. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press 441-460.
    The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows: [1] When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. [2] If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But [3] You cannot be fully (...)
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  7. Galen Strawson (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.
    On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the (...)
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  8.  97
    Galen Strawson (1997). The Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:405-28.
    This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.
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  9. Galen Strawson, Free Will.
    ‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even (...)
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  10. Galen Strawson (2009). Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Oxford University Press Inc..
    What is the self? Does it exist? If it does exist, what is it like? It's not clear that we even know what we're asking about when we ask these large, metaphysical questions. The idea of the self comes very naturally to us, and it seems rather important, but it's also extremely puzzling. As for the word "self"--it's been taken in so many different ways that it seems that you can mean more or less what you like by it and (...)
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  11. Galen Strawson (2003). Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.
    It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought and judgement essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action-intentional, voluntary and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought and judgement neither are nor can be a matter of action; and any spontaneity they involve can be connected with freedom only when the word 'freedom' is used in the Spinozan-Kantian sense according (...)
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  12. Galen Strawson (1989). The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    It is widely supposed that David Hume invented and espoused the "regularity" theory of causation, holding that causal relations are nothing but a matter of one type of thing being regularly followed by another. It is also widely supposed that he was not only right about this, but that it was one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. Strawson here argues that the regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and that Hume never adopted it in any case. Strawson maintains that (...)
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  13. Galen Strawson (2008). The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 68 (300):271-282.
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  14.  36
    Galen Strawson (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press 285--325.
    Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, for example, as this occurs in thinking or reading or (...)
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  15. Galen Strawson (1999). Realistic Materialist Monism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.
    Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we (...)
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  16. Galen Strawson (2002). The Self and the SESMET. In Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  17.  53
    Galen Strawson (1998). Free Will. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge
    ‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even (...)
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  18.  8
    Galen Strawson (2011). Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment. Princeton University Press.
    This book argues that in fact it is Locke 's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid.
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  19. Galen Strawson (2004). Real Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):287-313.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008).
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  20.  27
    Galen Strawson (2015). ‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:111-141.
    Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses 'consciousness' to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the ‘concernment’ that always accompanies ‘consciousness’, on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term 'person', in Locke's text, as if it were only some kind of fundamental sortal term like ‘human being’ or ‘thinking thing’, and (...)
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  21. Galen Strawson (1986). On the Inevitability of Freedom (From the Compatibilist Point of View). American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.
    This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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  22. Galen Strawson (2003). What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  23. Galen Strawson (2006). Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.
  24. Galen Strawson (2011). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This is a revised and updated edition of Galen Strawson's groundbreaking first book, where he argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility. This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. Strawson devotes much of the book to an attempt to explain why this (...)
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  25. Galen Strawson (2005). Real Intentionality V.2: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):279-297.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008).
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  26.  21
    Galen Strawson (2000). The Unhelpfulness of Determinism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.
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  27.  79
    Galen Strawson (2015). Self-Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  28. Galen Strawson (2005). Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press 41--66.
  29.  25
    Galen Strawson (2003). Real Materialism. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell Publishing 49--88.
    (1) Materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon. (2) Consciousness ('what-it's-likeness', etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that (3) all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley, Eddington, Russell and others observe) (...)
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  30.  27
    Galen Strawson (2013). The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. OUP Usa 363.
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  31.  26
    Galen Strawson (2013). David Hume: Objects and Power. In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge 231.
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  32.  4
    G. Strawson (2008). The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional. Analysis 68 (4):271-282.
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  33. Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.
    This article begins with some brief reflexions on the definition of determinism (II), on the notion of the subject of experience (III), and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events (IV). The main discussion (V?XIII) focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ?life?hopes'). It is argued that (...)
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  34. Galen Strawson (2000). The Phenomenology and Ontology of the Self. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self. John Benjamins 23--39.
  35. Galen Strawson (2011). The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. Oxford University Press.
    This lucid book is the first to be wholly dedicated to Hume's theory of personal identity, and presents a bold new interpretation which bears directly on ...
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  36. G. Strawson (2010). The Depth(s) of the Twentieth Century. Analysis 70 (4):607.
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  37.  94
    Galen Strawson (1989). Red and 'Red'. Synthese 78 (February):193-232.
    THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT TWO PEOPLE COULD POSSIBLY (...)
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  38.  53
    Galen Strawson (2012). We Live Beyond Any Tale That We Happen to Enact. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):73-90.
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  39.  76
    Galen Strawson (2007). Episodic Ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):85-.
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  40. Galen Strawson (2008). Real Materialism: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Real Materialism draws together papers written over twenty years by Galen Strawson in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Strawson focuses on five main areas of enquiry: [1] the nature of the physical, consciousness, the 'mind-body problem', and the prospects for panpsychism; [2] the self, the subject of experience, self-consciousness, and the 'narrative' self; [3] free will and moral responsibility; [4] the nature of thought and intentionality and their connection with consciousness; [5] the problem of causation with particular reference to the (...)
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  41.  84
    Galen Strawson (1987). Realism and Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):253-277.
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  42. Galen Strawson (2002). Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
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  43.  83
    Galen Strawson (2007). Why I Have No Future. The Philosophers' Magazine 38 (38):21-26.
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  44. Galen Strawson (2012). 'All My Hopes Vanish': Hume on the Mind. In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum 181.
  45. Galen Strawson (2011). Real Naturalism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86 (2).
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  46.  31
    Galen Strawson (2013). On "Humean". In Https://Www.Academia.Edu/. 1–6.
    In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.
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  47. Susan Blackmore, Thomas W. Clark, Mark Hallett, John-Dylan Haynes, Ted Honderich, Neil Levy, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Michael Pauen, Derk Pereboom, Susan Pockett, Maureen Sie, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Manuel Vargas, Benjamin Vilhauer & Bruce Waller (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.
     
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  48.  44
    Galen Strawson (2004). Free Agents. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):371-402.
  49.  99
    Galen Strawson (1998). Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):461-486.
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  50.  44
    Galen Strawson (1991). The Contingent Reality of Natural Necessity. Analysis 51 (4):209 - 213.
    Nicholas Everitt's objection to my discussion of the regularity theory of causation is a common one. Ithink it misses the point, but the point it misses is in a way a delicate one, and hard to express, and the general worry he expresses is a natural one. For that reason it is important, and its importance is reflected in the fact that it is very difficult to find a satisfyingly substantive way of stating the difference between regularity theories of causation (...)
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