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  1. Gwen Adshead (2010). Looking Backward and Forward. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (3):251-253.
    Philosophy says that life must be understood backwards. But . . . it must be lived forward. . , , It is more and more evident that life can never be really understood in Time. It was a pleasure to read Jason Thompson’s serious and thought-provoking piece, and I am grateful to the editors for giving me a chance to comment. The idea that the self is revealed in narrative is a popular one among different schools of psychotherapy, both in (...)
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Emergent Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):734-736.
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  3. Simon Beck (2006). Fiction and Fictions: On Ricoeur on the Route to the Self. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):329-335.
    In reaching his narrative view of the self in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur argues that, while literature offers revealing insights into the nature of the self, the sort of fictions involving brain transplants, fission, and so on, that philosophers often take seriously do not (and cannot). My paper is a response to Ricoeur's charge, contending that the arguments Ricoeur rejects are not flawed in the way he suggests, and that his own arguments are sometimes guilty of the very charges (...)
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  4. Kathy Behrendt (2013). Illness as Narrative. [REVIEW] Medical Humanities 39 (1):65-66.
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  5. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  6. Jiri Benovsky (forthcoming). I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self. Metaphysica, An International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics.
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
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  7. Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Aspects of the Self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self. Inquiry 38 (4):1-15.
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  8. Stephan Blatti (2008). Review: Raymond Martin and John Barresi: The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (465):191-195.
    This is a review of Raymond Martin and John Barresi's The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Columbia University Press, 2006).
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  9. Ruth Boeker (2013). Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):803-6.
  10. William R. Carter (1988). Our Bodies, Our Selves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):308-319.
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  11. Luca Castagnoli (2009). Self and Personal Identity (R.) Sorabji Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death. Pp. Xii + 400. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Cased, £25. ISBN: 0-19-926639-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 59 (01):69-.
  12. Christopher Cherry (1984). Self, Near-Death and Death. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1):3 - 11.
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  13. Samuel Clark (2011). Love, Poetry, and the Good Life: Mill's Autobiography and Perfectionist Ethics. Inquiry 53 (6):565-578.
    I argue for a perfectionist reading of Mill’s account of the good life, by using the failures of development recorded in his Autobiography as a way to understand his official account of happiness in Utilitarianism. This work offers both a new perspective on Mill’s thought, and a distinctive account of the role of aesthetic and emotional capacities in the most choiceworthy human life. I consider the philosophical purposes of autobiography, Mill’s disagreements with Bentham, and the nature of competent judges and (...)
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  14. David S. Clarke (1972). A Defence of the No-Ownership Theory. Mind 81 (January):97-101.
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  15. Barry Dainton (2012). On Singularities and Simulations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1):42.
  16. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...)
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  17. Ulrich Diehl (1997). The Selfhood of the Human Person. [REVIEW] The Personalist Forum 13 (2):332-338.
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  18. Michael D. Doan (2010). The Self and Its Emotions. [REVIEW] Dialogue 49 (4):654-656.
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  19. Robert M. Ellis (2013). Middle Way Philosophy 2: The Integration of Desire. Lulu.
    An argument that there is a common pattern in conflict between desires and the dialectical integration of those conflicts, at both individual and socio-political levels. Philosophical, psychological, poltical and Buddhist approaches to integration are brought together here to show how the integration of desire contributes to moral objectivity.
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  20. Kathinka Evers (2001). The Importance of Being a Self. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):65-83.
    A traditional belief is that there is but one self to a body, and that each of us has a single biography and personality. Varieties of this monistic view have dominated most of mankind’s intellectual history in philosophy, science, religion, and psychology, as well as legal and social theory. It has been challenged by appeal to those people whom psychiatry labels “multiple,” or “dissociated” personalities who, some claim, are “multiple selves.” This may be adequate if the self is explained by (...)
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  21. Shaun Gallagher (2013). A Pattern Theory of Self. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (443):1-7.
    I argue for a pattern theory of self as a usefulway to organize an interdisciplinary approach to discussions of what constitutes a self. According to the pattern theory, a self is constituted by a number of characteristic features or aspects that may include minimal embodied, minimal experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended, and situated aspects. A pattern theory of self helps to clarify various interpretations of self as compatible or commensurable instead of thinking them in opposition, and it helps to (...)
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  22. James Giles (1997). No Self to Be Found: The Search for Personal Identity. University Press of America.
    This book is a exploration of the notion of personal identity. Here it is shown how the various attempts to give an account of personal identity are all based on false assumptions and so inevitably run aground. One of the first Western thinkers to realize this was David Hume, the 18th century empiricist philosopher who argued that self was a fiction. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive point (...)
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  23. Grant Gillett (2009). The Subjective Brain, Identity, and Neuroethics. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (9):5-13.
    The human brain is subjective and reflects the life of a being-in-the-world-with-others whose identity reflects that complex engaged reality. Human subjectivity is shaped and in-formed (formed by inner processes) that are adapted to the human life-world and embody meaning and the relatedness of a human being. Questions of identity relate to this complex and dynamic reality to reflect the fact that biology, human ecology, culture, and one's historic-political situation are inscribed in one's neural network and have configured its architecture so (...)
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  24. Peter Goldie (2012). The Inner Mess. Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie explores the ways in which we think about our lives--our past, present, and future--in narrative terms. The notion of narrative is highly topical, and highly contentious, in a wide range of fields including philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis, historical studies, and literature. The Mess Inside engages with all of these areas of discourse, and steers a path between the sceptics who are dismissive of the idea of narrative as having any worthwhile use at all, and those who argue that (...)
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  25. Mariusz Grygianiec (2013). On E.J. Lowe's Argument for Brobdingnagian Atomism. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    In a number of his essays E. J. Lowe has presented an interesting argument for the ontological simplicity of the self. This argument became the subject of Eric T. Ol-son’s polemic reaction, who tried — unsuccesfully — to discover a formal mistake in the argument. Eventually, the modified and improved version of Lowe’s reasoning came out in his paper Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self. It seemed that the argument for the ontological simplicity of the self has resisted (...)
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  26. William Hasker (1999). The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press.
    In The Emergent Self, William Hasker joins one of the most heated debates in contemporary analytic philosophy, that over the nature of mind.
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  27. Steven Heine (2004). Beyond Personal Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self (Review). Philosophy East and West 54 (4):569-571.
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  28. Soraj Hongladarom (2011). Personal Identity and the Self in the Online and Offline World. Minds and Machines 21 (4):533-548.
    The emergence of social networking sites has created a problem of how the self is to be understood in the online world. As these sites are social, they relate someone with others in a network. Thus there seems to emerge a new kind of self which exists in the online world. Accounting for the online self here also has implications on how the self in the outside world should be understood. It is argued that, as the use of online social (...)
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  29. Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2012). The Subject of Attention. Synthese 189 (3):535-554.
    The absence of a common understanding of attention plagues current research on the topic. Combining the findings from three domains of research on attention, this paper presents a univocal account that fits normal use of the term as well as its many associated phenomena: attention is a process of mental selection that is within the control of the subject. The role of the subject is often excluded from naturalized accounts, but this paper will be an exception to that rule. The (...)
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  30. Albert A. Johnstone (2011). The Basic Self and Its Doubles. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):169-195.
    As Descartes noted, a proper account of the nature of the being one is begins with a basic self present in first-person experience, a self that one cannot cogently doubt being. This paper seeks to uncover such a self, first within consciousness and thinking, then within the lived or first-person felt body. After noting the lack of grounding of Merleau-Ponty’s commonly referenced reflections, it undertakes a phenomenological investigation of the body that finds the basic self to reside in one’s espoused (...)
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  31. Albert A. Johnstone (1992). The Bodily Nature of the Self, or What Descartes Should Have Conceded Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. In Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (ed.), Giving the Body Its Due.
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  32. Stan Klein (2014). The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
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  33. Stan Klein (2012). The Self and its Brain. Social Cognition 30 (4):474–518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of “self” can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
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  34. Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Free Will and the Scientific Vision. In Edouard Machery & Elizabeth O.’Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.
    A review of existing work in experimental philosophy on intuitions about free will. The paper argues that people ordinarily understand free human action, not as something that is caused by psychological states (beliefs, desires, etc.) but as something that completely transcends the normal causal order.
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  35. S. K. Leung (2000). Nature of the Self: A Philosophy on Human Nature. Empiricus.
    CHAPTER ONE Paving a Way for a Treatise Identity Those who are not of the philosophical persuasion may find it surprising that the Self appears to be such ...
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  36. E. J. Lowe (1999). Self, Agency, and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8):225-239.
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  37. E. J. Lowe (1991). Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind. Philosophy 29:87-107.
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  38. David Lumsden (2013). Whole Life Narratives and the Self. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):1-10.
    Narrative theory provides an interesting contribution to the rich philosophical literature on the self and personal identity. This links with psychological and psychiatric themes concerning the self, because many cases of disorder involve some kind of loss or fragmentation of the self. What follows is a philosophical inquiry into these narrative theories, which should have some implications for how we should regard subjects with these disorders. My primary philosophical conclusion is that there is an interesting germ of truth in the (...)
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  39. David H. Lund (1990). Disembodied Existence, Personal Identity, and the First Person Perspective. Idealistic Studies 20 (3):187-202.
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  40. Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a (...)
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  41. Mary B. Mahowald (1996). The Brain and the I: Neurodevelopment and Personal Identity. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):49-60.
  42. R. Martin (2006). Review: Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):472-475.
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  43. C. McCall (1990). Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being. Avebury.
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  44. Tom McClelland (2010). What is It Like to Be John Malkovich? Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 7 (2).
    To what extent can film - or individual films - act as a vehicle of or forum for philosophy itself?. Many have responded that films can indeed do philosophy to a substantial degree. Furthermore, it has been claimed that this virtue does not belong solely to ‘art’ films, but that popular cinema too can do philosophy. A case in point is Spike Jonze’s 1999 film Being John Malkovich, the Oscar-winning screenplay of which was written by Charlie Kaufman. The outrageous premise (...)
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  45. Richard Menary (2008). Embodied Narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.
    Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from (...)
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  46. Diana Tietjens Meyers (2012). Psychocorporeal Selfhood, Practical Intelligence, and Adaptive Autonomy. In Michael Kuhler & Najda Jelinek (eds.), Autonomy and the Self. springer.
    It is not uncommon for people to suffer identity crises. Yet, faced with similarly disruptive circumstances, some people plunge into an identity crisis while others do not. How must selfhood be construed given that people are vulnerable to identity crises? And how must agency be construed given that some people skirt potential identity crises and renegotiate the terms of their personal identity without losing their equilibrium -- their sense of self? If an adequate theory of the self and agency must (...)
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  47. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'. Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.
    In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO.
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  48. Daniel Moseley (2012). Self-Creation, Identity and Authenticity: A Study of "A History of Violence" and "Eastern Promises&Quot;. In Simon Riches (ed.), The Philosophy of David Cronenberg. University Press of Kentucky.
    This essay explores philosophical questions about practical identity that emerge in David Cronenberg's films, "A History of Violence" and "Eastern Promises." I distinguish the metaphysical problems of personal identity from the practical problems and contend that the latter are of central importance to the topic of authenticity. Central scenes from both films are examined with an eye to their engagement with the issues of authenticity and self-creation.
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  49. Gregory Nixon (2011). Breaking Out of One's Head (& Awakening to the World). Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):1006-1022.
    Herein, I review the moment in my life when I awoke from the dream of self to find being as part of the living world. It was a sudden, momentous event that is difficult to explain since transcending the self ultimately requires transcending the language structures of which the self consists. Since awakening to the world took place beyond the enclosure of self-speech, it also took place outside our symbolic construction of time. It is strange to place this event and (...)
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  50. Hilda D. Oakeley (1930). Time and the Self in Mctaggart's System. Mind 39 (154):175-193.
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