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The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Conceptual analysis and x-phi.Mark Balaguer - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).details
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Moral Luck as Moral Lack of Control.Mark B. Anderson - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):5-29.details
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The Zygote Argument is invalid: Now what?Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
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Beyond Verbal Disputes: The Compatibilism Debate Revisited.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):669-685.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Hume and the phenomenology of agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517.details
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Agent causation and the alleged impossibility of rational free action.Chris Tucker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.details
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The mechanism—the secret—of the given.Galen Strawson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10909-10928.details
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Why Strawson’s Basic Argument Is Not Impressive: an Answer from Frankfurt, Christman and Ekstrom.Fei Song - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1595-1607.details
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Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?Scott Sehon - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):363-380.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Incapacity, Inconceivability, and Two Types of Objectivity.Nicholas Sars - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):76-94.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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Media Portrayal of a Landmark Neuroscience Experiment on Free Will.Eric Racine, Valentin Nguyen, Victoria Saigle & Veljko Dubljevic - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4):989-1007.details
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Self-Representation & Good Determination.Michael Popejoy - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):113-122.details
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Undivided Forward-Looking Moral Responsibility.Derk Pereboom - 2021 - The Monist 104 (4):484-497.details
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Substance Causation.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (1):287-308.details
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Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8):e12873.details
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Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
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A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification.Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):85-99.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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A Reason To Be Free: Operationalizing ‘Free Action’.Giulio Mecacci & Pim Haselager - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (3):327-334.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.details
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A timid response to the consequence argument.Michael McKenna - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):155-169.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):69-90.details
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The Foundations of Agency – and Ethics?Olof Leffler - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):547-563.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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On Libertarianism as an Explanatory Hypothesis.Andrew Kissel - 2019 - Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (2):91-110.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities.T. Kapitan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):102-110.details
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