Search results for 'modus ponens' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Modus Ponens (Bergen University)
  1.  28
    Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.
    The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s non-contractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which (...)
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  2.  43
    Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results. Mind.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of ‘Preservation’ for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. -/- We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of ‘Commutativity’, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of Modus (...)—are problematic in a significant number of respects. -/- We then turn to a recent u-turn on his part, in which he winds up rescinding his commitment to Modus Ponens, on the grounds of a tension with the rule of Import-Export for conditionals. Here we offer an important positive contribution to the literature, settling the following crucial question that Bradley leaves unanswered: Assuming that one gives up on full-blown Modus Ponens on the grounds of its incompatibility with Import-Export, what weakened version of the principle should one be settling for instead? Our discussion of the issue turns out to unearth an interesting connection between epistemic undermining and the apparent failures of Modus Ponens in McGee’s famous counterexamples. (shrink)
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  3. Susanne Bobzien (2002). The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From Aristotle to the 2nd Century AD. Phronesis 47 (4):359-394.
    ABSTRACT: ‘Aristotelian logic’, as it was taught from late antiquity until the 20th century, commonly included a short presentation of the argument forms modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo tollens, and modus tollendo ponens. In late antiquity, arguments of these forms were generally classified as ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. However, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any arguments ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. The Stoic indemonstrables resemble the modus ponens/tollens arguments. But (...)
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  4. Huajie Liu (2006). Instability, Modus Ponens and Uncertainty of Deduction. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):658-674.
    Considering the instability of nonlinear dynamics, the deductive inference rule Modus ponens itself is not enough to guarantee the validity of reasoning sequences in the real physical world, and similar results cannot necessarily be obtained from similar causes. Some kind of stability hypothesis should be added in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Hence, the uncertainty of deductive inference appears to be like that of inductive inference, and the asymmetry between deduction and induction becomes unrecognizable such as to undermine (...)
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  5.  17
    Andreas Fjellstad (forthcoming). Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-8.
    In the recent paper “Naive modus ponens”, Zardini presents some brief considerations against an approach to semantic paradoxes that rejects the transitivity of entailment. The problem with the approach is, according to Zardini, that the failure of a meta-inference closely resembling modus ponens clashes both with the logical idea of modus ponens as a valid inference and the semantic idea of the conditional as requiring that a true conditional cannot have true antecedent and false (...)
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  6.  14
    Douglas Walton (2001). Are Some Modus Ponens Arguments Deductively Invalid? Informal Logic 22 (1).
    This article concerns the structure of defeasible arguments like: 'If Bob has red spots, Bob has the measles; Bob has red spots; therefore Bob has the measles.' The issue is whether such arguments have the form of modus ponens or not. Either way there is a problem. If they don't have the form of modus ponens, the common opinion to the contrary taught in leading logic textbooks is wrong. But if they do have the form of (...)
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  7.  8
    Félix Bou, Josep Maria Font & José Luis García Lapresta (2004). On Weakening the Deduction Theorem and Strengthening Modus Ponens. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (3):303-324.
    This paper studies, with techniques ofAlgebraic Logic, the effects of putting a bound on the cardinality of the set of side formulas in the Deduction Theorem, viewed as a Gentzen-style rule, and of adding additional assumptions inside the formulas present in Modus Ponens, viewed as a Hilbert-style rule. As a result, a denumerable collection of new Gentzen systems and two new sentential logics have been isolated. These logics are weaker than the positive implicative logic. We have determined their (...)
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  8.  24
    Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez (2014). Curry's Paradox, Generalized Modus Ponens Axiom and Depth Relevance. Studia Logica 102 (1):185-217.
    “Weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure ${\mathcal{M}_{\rm CL}}$ built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. It is shown how to falsify in any wr-ms the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom and similar schemes used to derive Curry’s Paradox. In the last section of the paper we discuss how to extend this method of falsification to more general schemes that could also be used in deriving Curry’s Paradox.
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  9.  5
    Liu Huajie (2006). Instability, Modus Ponens and Uncertainty of Deduction. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):658-674.
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  10.  23
    Justin Bledin (2015). Modus Ponens Defended. Journal of Philosophy 112 (2):57-83.
    Is modus ponens valid for the indicative conditional? McGee [1985] famously presents several alleged counterexamples to this inference rule. More recently, Kolodny and MacFarlane [2010] and Willer [2010] argue that modus ponens is unreliable in certain hypothetical contexts. However, none of these attacks undermines an informational conception of logic on which modus ponens is valid.
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  11. Joshua Schechter & David Enoch (2006). Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens. Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  12. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or (...)
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  13.  32
    Timothy D. Lyons (2014). A Historically Informed Modus Ponens Against Scientific Realism: Articulation, Critique, and Restoration. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):369-392.
    There are two primary arguments against scientific realism, one pertaining to underdetermination, the other to the history of science. While these arguments are usually treated as altogether distinct, P. Kyle Stanford's ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ constitutes one kind of synthesis: I propose that Stanford's argument is best understood as a broad modus ponens underdetermination argument, into which he has inserted a unique variant of the historical pessimistic induction. After articulating three criticisms against Stanford's argument and the evidence that (...)
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  14.  4
    Christian Straßer (2012). Adaptively Applying Modus Ponens in Conditional Logics of Normality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):125-148.
    This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional and a fact on the condition that it is ?safe' to do so concerning the factual and (...)
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  15.  47
    Colin Howson (2009). Sorites is No Threat to Modus Ponens: A Reply to Kochan. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):209-212.
    A recent article by Jeff Kochan contains a discussion of modus ponens that among other thing alleges that the paradox of the heap is a counterexample to it. In this note I show that it is the conditional major premise of a modus ponens inference, rather than the rule itself, that is impugned. This premise is the contrapositive of the inductive step in the principle of mathematical induction, confirming the widely accepted view that it is the (...)
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  16.  2
    Lloyd Humberstone (2008). Replacing Modus Ponens With One-Premiss Rules. Logic Journal of the IGPL 16 (5):431-451.
    After some motivating remarks in Section 1, in Section 2 we show how to replace an axiomatic basis for any one of a broad range of sentential logics having finitely many axiom schemes and Modus Ponens as the sole proper rule, by a basis with the same axiom schemes and finitely many one-premiss rules. Section 3 mentions some questions arising from this replacement procedure , explores another such procedure, and discusses some aspects of the consequence relations associated with (...)
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  17.  20
    Joseph S. Fulda (2010). Vann McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens: An Enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):271-273.
    Solves Vann McGee's counterexample to Modus Ponens within classical logic by disclosing the suppressed premises and bringing them /within/ the argument.
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  18.  18
    Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Denis J. Hilton (2002). The Suppression of Modus Ponens as a Case of Pragmatic Preconditional Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):21 – 40.
    The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument ''If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1'' where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature ''there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied'', and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., ''If C then (...)
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  19.  3
    F. Bou, J. M. Font & J. L. G. Lapresta (2004). On Weakening the Deduction Theorem and Strengthening of Modus Ponens. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (3):303.
    This paper studies, with techniques ofAlgebraic Logic, the effects of putting a bound on the cardinality of the set of side formulas in the Deduction Theorem, viewed as a Gentzen-style rule, and of adding additional assumptions inside the formulas present in Modus Ponens, viewed as a Hilbert-style rule. As a result, a denumerable collection of new Gentzen systems and two new sentential logics have been isolated. These logics are weaker than the positive implicative logic. We have determined their (...)
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  20.  29
    Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. 347--356.
    The modus ponens (A -> B, A :. B) is, along with modus tollens and the two logically not valid counterparts denying the antecedent (A -> B, ¬A :. ¬B) and affirming the consequent, the argument form that was most often investigated in the psychology of human reasoning. The present contribution reports the results of three experiments on the probabilistic versions of modus ponens and denying the antecedent. In probability logic these arguments lead to conclusions (...)
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  21. Benjamin Schnieder, Modus Ponens Revisited.
    The compositional structure of language might have led one to expect that a proper analysis of simple conditionals would have been adequate to determine the analysis of iterated conditionals. But McGee has presented an interesting group of examples that shows that this is not so for indicative conditionals. The examples are particularly arresting since they appear to show that modus ponens does not hold as a generally valid rule of inference for conditionals in natural language.
     
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  22. Vann McGee (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
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  23.  65
    G. F. Schueler (1988). Modus Ponens and Moral Realism. Ethics 98 (3):492-500.
  24. Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404-415.
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  25.  86
    E. J. Lowe (1987). Not a Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (1):44 - 47.
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  26.  30
    Nick Zangwill (1992). Moral modus ponens. Ratio 5 (2):177-193.
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  27.  23
    Graham Priest (1980). Sense, Entailment and Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4):415 - 435.
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  28. Vann McGee (1985). ``A Counterexample to Modus Ponens&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 83:462-471.
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  29.  29
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, James Moor & Robert Fogelin (1986). A Defense of Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):296-300.
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  30.  54
    Christian Piller (1996). Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.
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  31.  1
    Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2008). Probability Logic and the Modus Ponens-Modus Tollens Asymmetry in Conditional Inference. In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. OUP Oxford 97--120.
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  32.  56
    D. E. Over (1987). Assumptions and the Supposed Counterexamples to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (3):142 - 146.
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  33.  20
    Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404 - 415.
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  34. Mike Oaksford & Chater & Nick (2008). Probability Logic and the 'Modus Ponens - Modus Tollens' Asymmetry. In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. OUP Oxford
     
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  35.  42
    Peter Marton (2004). Achilles Versus the Tortoise: The Battle Over Modus Ponens (an Aristotelian Argument). Philosophia 31 (3-4):383-400.
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  36.  10
    L. Lenka (2001). [Accordance with the Rule Rk That Belongs to R. Then, S] Can Be Presented in the Following Modus Ponens. If Ck is in Accordance with Rk, Then Rk Determines Ck. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2).
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  37.  12
    Gilbert Harman (1979). If and Modus Ponens. Theory and Decision 11 (1):41-53.
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  38.  8
    M. P. Aulisio (1997). One Person's Modus Ponens: Boyle, Absolutist Catholicism, and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Christian Bioethics 3 (2):142-157.
    The doctrine of double effect (DOE) has its origins in Roman Catholic thought and has been held to have widespread applications in bioethics. Its applications range over issues of maternal-fetal conflict, organ donation and transplant, euthanasia, and resource allocation, among other controversial issues. Recently, Joseph Boyle, the foremost proponent of the DOE over the past few decades, has argued that the DOE is required by the absolutist context of the Catholic tradition, and, further, that anyone who rejects this particular context (...)
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  39.  16
    Jordan Howard Sobel, Hosiasson-Lindenbaum/Kolmogorov Probability Theory: Solutions to Exercises in Appendix a of Extended Version of “Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens …”.
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  40.  10
    Dale Miller (2004). One Meat-Eater's Modus Ponens. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):175-177.
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  41.  2
    Enrique Trillas Ruiz (2011). Modus Ponens y Modus Tollens. In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta
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  42.  3
    Alan Rose (1982). A Generalisation of the Concept of Functional Completeness and Applications to Modus Ponens. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 28 (22‐24):317-322.
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  43.  3
    Christian Strasser (2012). Adaptively Applying Modus Ponens in Conditional Logics of Normality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):125-148.
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  44.  1
    William Craig (1967). Modus Ponens and Derivation From Horn Formulas. Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 13 (3‐5):33-54.
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  45.  6
    A. F. Bausch (1965). Modus Ponens Under Hypothesis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (1):26.
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  46. J. F. Bonnefon & D. J. Hilton (forthcoming). The Suppression of Modus Ponens as a Case of Pragmatic Preconditional Reasoning. Accepted Subject to Revision. Thinking and Reasoning.
     
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  47. Joan Gispert & Antoni Torrens (2014). Lattice BCK Logics with Modus Ponens as Unique Rule. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 60 (3):230-238.
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  48. Sten Lindström (1994). Måste det vara något fel på modus ponens? Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  49. Masaharu Mizumoto (2009). Bennett on Modus Ponens. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:11-28.
  50. Masaharu Mizumoto (2009). On a Supposed Criticism of Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:1-10.
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