The rise in interdisciplinary scholarship between philosophy and theology has produced a number of critiques of historical biblical criticism (HBC) by philosophers of religion. Some dialogue has resulted, but these critiques have gone largely unnoticed by historical critical scholars. This article argues that two such critiques of HBC, offered by Plantinga and Stump, are undermined by faulty presuppositions on the philosophers' part regarding the nature and value of HBC and misunderstandings of the nature of the ancient texts on which the (...) discipline of HBC focuses. (shrink)

Le présent défi pour l’Église, c’est à la fois celui de la mondialisation et d’un pluralisme religieux croissant, qu’il s’agisse des grandes religions ou des nouvelles religiosités. Mais elle doit affronter aussi un indifférentisme religieux qui peut être l’envers d’un combat passionné pour l’homme. Face à ces défis, il faut tenir compte d’un nouveau paradigme théologique, celui d’un pluralisme religieux de principe qui s’interroge sur la signification de la pluralité des religions à l’intérieur du dessein de Dieu. Ce nouveau paradigme (...) nous invite à instaurer un nouveau rapport à la vérité en théologie. Et c’est en allant jusqu’au bout du paradoxe christologique que l’on peut désigner le christianisme comme une religion essentiellement dialogale. Comme l’œcuménisme, le dialogue interreligieux doit être une dimension de toute la théologie. La théologie des religions tend alors à devenir une théologie interreligieuse qui manifeste la fécondation mutuelle des religions dans notre discours sur Dieu et sur le salut de l’homme. (shrink)

Tainted political symbols ought to be confronted, removed, or at least recontextualized. Despite the best efforts to achieve this, however, official actions on tainted symbols often fail to take place. In such cases, I argue that political vandalism—the unauthorized defacement, destruction, or removal of political symbols—may be morally permissible or even obligatory. This is when, and insofar as, political vandalism serves as fitting counter-speech that undermines the authority of tainted symbols in ways that match their publicity, refuses to let them (...) speak in our name, and challenges the derogatory messages expressed through a mechanism I call derogatory pedestalling: the glorification or honoring of certain individuals or ideologies that can only make sense when members of a targeted group are taken to be inferior. (shrink)

A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience. However, this view entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also justified. Thus, either a) civil disobedience is never justified or b) uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified. Since a) is implausible, we should accept b). I respond to the objection that this ignores the fact that (...) civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: nonviolence, publicity, the acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I then show that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility and that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is justifiable in but only in unfavorable conditions. (shrink)

Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or (...) distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past. (shrink)

La publication du Journal du Concile de l’ambassadeur P. Poswick est l’occasion de rappeler quelques questions majeures de Vatican II dans le traitement desquelles trois évêques belges se sont particulièrement illustrés. Ce rapide parcours permet de dépasser les oppositions émises récemment à propos du Concile entre « l’événement et le texte » de même qu’entre « la discontinuité et la continuité ». On constate en effet que le témoignage des acteurs est indispensable pour la compréhension des textes et que les (...) avancées du Concile permettent une meilleure compréhension de la tradition. (shrink)

La publication du Journal du Concile de l’ambassadeur P. Poswick est l’occasion de rappeler quelques questions majeures de Vatican II dans le traitement desquelles trois évêques belges se sont particulièrement illustrés. Ce rapide parcours permet de dépasser les oppositions émises récemment à propos du Concile entre « l’événement et le texte » de même qu’entre « la discontinuité et la continuité ». On constate en effet que le témoignage des acteurs est indispensable pour la compréhension des textes et que les (...) avancées du Concile permettent une meilleure compréhension de la tradition. (shrink)

Several extensions of the basic modal language are characterized in terms of interpolation. Our main results are of the following form: Language ℒ' is the least expressive extension of ℒ with interpolation. For instance, let ℳ be the extension of the basic modal language with a difference operator [7]. First-order logic is the least expressive extension of ℳ with interpolation. These characterizations are subsequently used to derive new results about hybrid logic, relation algebra and the guarded fragment.

Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being (...) costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible. (shrink)

In the essay On Liberty , Mill put forward his famous principle that society may only interfere with those actions of an individual which concern others and not with actions which merely concern himself. The validity of this principle depends on there being a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions. But the concept of self-regarding actions has been severely criticised on the ground that all actions affect others in some way and are therefore other-regarding. The notion of self-regarding actions appears (...) to be completely discredited. Very recently, however, there has been some dissatisfaction with the traditional debunking of Mill on this score. Two serious and important attempts to reinterpret the principle were made by Mr J. C. Rees in an article entitled ‘A Re-Reading of Mill on Liberty’, and by Mr Alan Ryan in two brief but extremely useful contributions. My aim is to discuss these reinterpretations of Mill, and on the basis of this, build up what I think is the correct account of Mill's notion of self-regarding actions. (shrink)