This paper begins with Hegel’s critique of Kant in the Encyclopaedia’s examination of three positions on objectivity. According to this critique, Kant’s philosophy is flawed because it reduces objectivity to a relation isolated within the subjectivity of the knower, does not integrate the contingent into its understanding of the rational, and does not acknowledge the reality status of contradiction. The second section of the paper examines Hegel’s analysis of dialectical proof procedure in the introductory essays of his major works. The (...) rest of the paper examines the way the Phenomenology proves that rationality is a common ground governing both independent thought and the independence of the natural world, that the contradictory otherness of nature requires an irrational element, which neither observational nor practical thought can overcome, and that truth is an infinite spirit that both transcends and dwells within the finite reality of the human spirit. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy depends on the answer to a fundamental question: why assume that the abstract structures and necessities of pure thought reveal anything at all about the varied and mutable realm of real life experience? In her study of Hegel's Phenomenology, Ardis Collins examines the way Hegel interprets the Phenomenology of Spirit as an answer to this question and in the process invents a proof procedure that does not depend on unquestioned philosophical principles, cherished social norms, or established (...) prejudices for or against certain ways of thinking or acting. Employing close readings and innovative analysis, this groundbreaking study challenges current interpretations of the Phenomenology. Collins demonstrates that the way Hegel interprets the role of the Phenomenology remains consistent throughout his career, that he claims for the demonstration developed in it the strict necessity of a proof, and that the beginning of philosophy cannot be justified without this proof. In the process, she sheds light on the way Hegel examines the structures and truth expectations of experience to show that the human spirit is involved in a shared project of culture and history that challenges us to become engaged in conscientious causes. Skilfully argued and persuasive, this study of Hegel's Phenomenology explores the concreteness of human experience and shows how Hegel finds in it evidence that the whole domain of human experience belongs to the logical spirit investigated by philosophy. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE THE SEARCH FOR GOD He who separates the study of philosophy from holy religion errs no less than the man who would separate the pursuit of ...

RésuméCet article étudie lafaçon dont Hegel élabore sa conception des rapports entre la pensée et la nature dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. L'examen montre que 1) Hegel étend le concept de raison pour y inclure i'indépendance de la nature à l'endroit de la pensée rationnelle, 2) cette indépendance se révèle dans le donné contingent de l'empiricité, 3) le concept étendu de raison détermine et justifie les présuppositions de la logique hégélienne, et 4) ce même concept limite le rôle de la (...) logique dans la philosophie hégélienne prise comme un tout, de telle manière que la philosophie y dépend de la science empirique en quelque chose d'essentiel pour sa connaissance de la vérité. En étayant ces thèses, l'article analyse la procédure de preuve utilisée par Hegel, expose le rôle qu'y joue la contradiction, et discute les explications phénoménologiques qu'il propose de la perception, de l'entendement, du stoïcisme, de l'idéalisme, de la biologie, du monde moral kantien, de la religion révélée, et du savoir absolu. (shrink)

Critics of Hegel's social philosophy usually focus their objections on Hegel's account of the relation between civil society and the state. Herbert Marcuse provides the best example of the standard Marxist objection. According to Marcuse, Hegel recognizes the inevitable destructiveness of competing individual interests and handles the problem by giving the state strong political powers. The state imposes restraints on the free play of individuality in the workplace while upholding and protecting the rights of individual freedom. Marcuse objects to this (...) structure because in his judgment the restraints imposed by the state are external to the free individuality they control. The dynamic of competing individual interests cannot produce a common interest and hence cannot establish a basis for real social unity. The rule of the state must stand above this competitiveness, not be involved in it, if the state is to overcome the divisiveness of free individuality. Hence, the law, which embodies the rule of the state, treats every individual as the same, guarantees to each and all the same rights, and imposes on all the same restrictions. But this sameness is an abstraction. Individuals exist with real differences and opposing interests. They live their freedom in competition with the freedom of others and some lose. The law escapes from this inequality and divisiveness by detaching itself from the realities of social living. (shrink)

_This book relates Hegel to later philosophers and philosophies._.

With this issue, The Owl of Minerva begins its life under a new administration. This change will bring with it some changes in the journal’s policies, its design, the constitution of its Boards. Readers of The Owl, however, will understand why a journal dedicated to the study of Hegel’s thought must acknowledge the moment of transition. They will know, too, that transitions have two moments: one that looks back to the previous life-form and discerns in it the seeds of a (...) new spirit; one that rethinks the old life in a new form. In what follows, we will do both. Section I looks back to what we owe Larry Stepelevich and his staff. Section II describes the new form this legacy will take under the new administration. (shrink)

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park Campus, served as host for the meeting, which began Friday afternoon, October 2, and continued until Sunday midday, October 4, 1992. Approximately seventy members and friends of the Hegel Society attended. The topic was Hegel on the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.

Hegel’s Phenomenology, Part II, which begins with the section on spirit, completes a study begun in an earlier publication, Hegel’s Phenomenology, Part I. The study is divided into analysis and commentary, and these run parallel to each other. The commentary takes the form of notes separated from the main text. These notes identify historical, literary, religious, and philosophical influences, compare the issues Hegel is dealing with to similar issues identified by other philosophers, give cross references to other parts of the (...) Phenomenology, and suggest certain ramifications and broader applications of the experiences Hegel is describing. Kainz’s commentary is rich with suggestive ideas for filling in the historical context and appreciating the perennial significance of the Phenomenology. But it is not a continuous, coherent response to Hegel’s text. For this we must look to the analysis part of the study. (shrink)

Hegel’s Phenomenology, Part II, which begins with the section on spirit, completes a study begun in an earlier publication, Hegel’s Phenomenology, Part I. The study is divided into analysis and commentary, and these run parallel to each other. The commentary takes the form of notes separated from the main text. These notes identify historical, literary, religious, and philosophical influences, compare the issues Hegel is dealing with to similar issues identified by other philosophers, give cross references to other parts of the (...) Phenomenology, and suggest certain ramifications and broader applications of the experiences Hegel is describing. Kainz’s commentary is rich with suggestive ideas for filling in the historical context and appreciating the perennial significance of the Phenomenology. But it is not a continuous, coherent response to Hegel’s text. For this we must look to the analysis part of the study. (shrink)

The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference (...) Theorem is a purely synchronic one that depends in no way of the properties of Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...) with the right kind of structure – groups I call ‘collectives’ – have the agency to bear action-demanding duties. Yet neither can individuals bear these duties, assuming that individuals cannot perform group actions and that duty implies ability. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties to perform some group actions. I argue we can solve this problem by assigning collectivization duties to individuals – duties to form a collective that then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...) they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts. (shrink)