A intenção do presente artigo é essencialmente responder à pergunta por que é que Hume constitui um claro representante do construtivismo ético. Nesse sentido, o autor começa por demonstrar até que ponto a gnoseologia de Hume determina em grande medida o conteúdo da sua teoria moral. Aquela, bem como a sua aplicação ao campo da moral, origina-se na sua aceitação do nominalismo, tanto em epistemologia como em metafísica. Com efeito, mediante a teoria associacionista das ideias, é possível inferir noções prováveis, (...) pois a repetição de acontecimentos gera o costume e o costume provoca uma crença. Tal como ocorre com os factos comuns, segundo o filósofo escocês, assim também acontece com o mundo das valorações éticas. Assim sendo, afirma Hume, não há demonstração possível de que um facto seja bom ou mau, dado que não se trata de um assunto que se possa dirimir racionalmente. /// What is it that makes David Hume a clear representative ofethical constructivism? His gnoseology outlines most ofthe content of his moral theory, that together with its application to moral, are based in the acceptance of nominalism, both in its epistemology and metaphysics. By analyzing his association theory of ideas, it becomes possible to infer probable notions, since from repetition of events customs are produced, and a custom produces a belief. According to this Scottish philosopher, the some that happens with ordinary actions happens in the world of ethical appreciation. Thus, he states, there is no possible demostration of an action as neither good nor bad, since it is something that cannot be rationally assessed. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se analizan los conceptos hegelianos de sociedad civil y Estado, ámbitos donde el hombre —burgués y ciudadano— desarrolla los diversos aspectos de su singularidad y su vocación por lo universal. Se tratará de ahondar en la vertiente ética que abarca la vida del hombre como individuo y como ciudadano, y que, dadas las condiciones del mundo moderno, participa de la vida típica de un sujeto que goza de su libertad esencial y originaria en dos esferas complementarias, (...) a la vez que necesarias, para poder desenvolver su libertad en plenitud: las actividades que como particular lleva a cabo en la “sociedad civil” y las que también ejerce como un sujeto comunitario, dotado de capacidades éticas, con participación en la vida política de su Estado. (shrink)

Starting from David Hume's analysis on the notion of justice in his main work on the topic, his 'Treatise of Human Nature', the author sets out, firstly, to comment on Hume's explanation on the notion of justice as a nonarbitrary artifice resulting from men's conventions, and then to outline the value system which determines the theory of justice of the Scottish philosopher. Finally, a criticism is presented on Hume's supposedly "nonarbitrary" conception of justice and the existing link between his empirical (...) deduction and the nominalist explanation of justice. (shrink)

Se comprende por "contractualismo" la teona por la cual se explica y justifica el fundamento y la posibilidad de la sociedad a partir de un pacto entre sus miembros y que es desarrollado en toda su expresión en la Modemidad.

Hobbes julgava ter encontrado na ciência e na sua metodologia, especifi­camente naquelas ciências que eram consideradas como indubitáveis, o modelo que lhe permitiria construir as bases da nova sociedade. Com isto buscava evadir-se das ambiguidades predominantes no seu tempo, as quais não faziam outra coisa senão manter a sociedade num estado bélico. O presente artigo mostra como Hobbes constrói o seu pensamento político de modo geométrico, como uma ciência demonstrativa, comparando o dever-ser da ciência política com a ordem imperante na (...) matemática. O autor mostra ainda até que ponto Hobbes colocou todos os seus esforços na tarefa de dar um carácter científico à política, já que a sua pretensão era fazer dela uma ciência racional. Numa palavra, o artigo mostra de que modo Hobbes pretendeu elevar o carácter da filosofia política ao de uma verdadeira ciência política.In science – particularly in those sciences that were considered indubitable – and in its methodology, Hobbes thought to have found the pattern which would allow him to build the bases of a new society. In doing so he was trying to avoid the prevailing ambiguities of his time, which did not go beyond keeping society in an ongoing state of war. Accordingly, he builds his thought around the geometrical mode, as a demonstrative science. Thus he compares the “ought be” of political science to the prevailing order of mathematics. Hobbes took great pains to give politics a scientific character, as he tried to make a rational science out of it. By doing this, Hobbes attempted to raise the nature of political philosophy to political science. (shrink)

Una escueta visión histórica de la filosofía política analizada desde el punto de vista de la teoría del derecho y de la sociedad, nos permite ver cómo ha ido desarrollándose, desde Ockham, y actualmente hasta filósofos liberales como Rawls, una concepción de la justicia fundada en el hecho contractual, dispositivo mediante el cual se establece un determinado orden en la sociedad, orden basado en una noción artificial (construida) de la justicia. Hobbes se constituye en el momento clave del giro copernicano (...) de la cuestión, con su idea convencional de justicia. Luego el utilitarista Hume elabora las llamadas ¿circunstancias de la justicia¿, también convencionales, argumentación que influirá finalmente en Rawls en su idea de ¿sociedad bien ordenada¿. (shrink)

La concepción legalista de la justicia es una doctrina originada en la filosofía política de Hobbes. Para el filósofo inglés, son justos los actos que se conforman a la ley, e injustos lo contrario; lo único que se tiene en cuenta es el hecho del cumplimiento, y no la naturaleza y el fin del deber. Además, en la noción hobbesiana de equidad hay un aspecto fuertemente convencional, ya que el deber del soberano de obrar equitativamente se constituye en un motivo (...) fundamental del pacto acordado. (shrink)

Background: Serious games have shown positive results in increasing motivation, adherence to treatment and strengthening the therapeutic alliance in multiple psychiatric disorders. In particular, patients with impulse control disorders and other disorders in which the patient suffers from inhibitory control deficits have been shown to benefit from serious games.Aim: The aim of this study was to describe the characteristics and to evaluate the usability of a new serious videogame, e-Estesia. This serious videogame was designed to improve emotion regulation in patients (...) with gambling disorder. Preliminary results from a pilot sample are also reported.Method: A pilot sample of 26 patients undergoing treatment for GD was recruited. Participants used e-Estesia on a tablet, which was connected to a thoracic band that sent heart rate and heart rate variability data to the videogame platform in order to provide biofeedback. The System Usability Scale was completed by patients to determine the usability of e-Estesia.Results and Discussion: e-Estesia performed comparatively well for all the explored groups. Around 84.6% of the patients endorsed that it was easy to use. Female patients with GD presented higher HRV during the use of the serious videogame compared to men. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 485-495.

For thousands of years, people have used nature to justify their political, moral, and social judgments. Such appeals to the moral authority of nature are still very much with us today, as heated debates over genetically modified organisms and human cloning testify. _The Moral Authority of Nature_ offers a wide-ranging account of how people have used nature to think about what counts as good, beautiful, just, or valuable. The eighteen essays cover a diverse array of topics, including the connection of (...) cosmic and human orders in ancient Greece, medieval notions of sexual disorder, early modern contexts for categorizing individuals and judging acts as "against nature," race and the origin of humans, ecological economics, and radical feminism. The essays also range widely in time and place, from archaic Greece to early twentieth-century China, medieval Europe to contemporary America. Scholars from a wide variety of fields will welcome _The Moral Authority of Nature_, which provides the first sustained historical survey of its topic. Contributors: Danielle Allen, Joan Cadden, Lorraine Daston, Fa-ti Fan, Eckhardt Fuchs, Valentin Groebner, Abigail J. Lustig, Gregg Mitman, Michelle Murphy, Katharine Park, Matt Price, Robert N. Proctor, Helmut Puff, Robert J. Richards, Londa Schiebinger, Laura Slatkin, Julia Adeney Thomas, Fernando Vidal. (shrink)

We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case, is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task. Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled stakeholders or involved spectators. (...) Risk preferences partly explain why veiled stakeholders propose less egalitarian redistributions. Surprisingly, involved spectators, who are informed about their position in society, tend to favour stakeholders holding the same position as they do after the initial distribution. (shrink)

In this article we define a logical system called Hybrid Partial Type Theory ( $\mathcal {HPTT}$ ). The system is obtained by combining William Farmer’s partial type theory with a strong form of hybrid logic. William Farmer’s system is a version of Church’s theory of types which allows terms to be non-denoting; hybrid logic is a version of modal logic in which it is possible to name worlds and evaluate expressions with respect to particular worlds. We motivate this combination of (...) ideas in the introduction, and devote the rest of the article to defining, axiomatising, and proving a completeness result for $\mathcal {HPTT}$. (shrink)

Subjective and psychophysiological emotional responses to music from two different cultures were compared within these two cultures. Two identical experiments were conducted: the first in the Congolese rainforest with an isolated population of Mebenzélé Pygmies without any exposure to Western music and culture, the second with a group of Western music listeners, with no experience with Congolese music. Forty Pygmies and 40 Canadians listened in pairs to 19 music excerpts of 29–99 s in duration in random order (eight from the (...) Pygmy population and 11 Western instrumental excerpts). For both groups, emotion components were continuously measured: subjective feeling (using a two- dimensional valence and arousal rating interface), peripheral physiological activation, and facial expression. While Pygmy music was rated as positive and arousing by Pygmies, ratings of Western music by Westerners covered the range from arousing to calming and from positive to negative. Comparing psychophysiological responses to emotional qualities of Pygmy music across participant groups showed no similarities. However, Western stimuli, rated as high and low arousing by Canadians, created similar responses in both participant groups (with high arousal associated with increases in subjective and physiological activation). Several low-level acoustical features of the music presented (tempo, pitch, and timbre) were shown to affect subjective and physiological arousal similarly in both cultures. Results suggest that while the subjective dimension of emotional valence might be mediated by cultural learning, changes in arousal might involve a more basic, universal response to low-level acoustical characteristics of music. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la metafísica para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y tendría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico (...) específico, que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. ABSTRACT What is Kant referring to when, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he speaks of the “revolution in the way of thinking” that is needed for metaphysics to enter the path of science? Two meanings are possible. The first is a methodological one, which assumes that knowledge governs objects and would, therefore, extend to metaphysics. Applied to the latter, a more profound transformation is needed, one that would make it possible to speak of a specific metaphysical meaning entailing that knowledge constitutes the object of representations. (shrink)

En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la meta-física para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y ten-dría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico específico, (...) que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. (shrink)

Conservativity in generalized quantifiers is linked to presupposition filtering, under a propositions-as-types analysis extended with dependent quantifiers. That analysis is underpinned by modeltheoretically interpretable proofs which inhabit propositions they prove, thereby providing objects for quantification and hooks for anaphora.

When is humanitarian intervention legitimate and how should such interventions be conducted? This article sets out eight liberal principles that underlie humanitarian intervention, some of them abstract principles of international ethics and others more concrete principles that apply specifically to humanitarian intervention. It argues that whilst these principles do not determine the legitimacy of particular interventions, they should ?incline? our judgments towards approval or disapproval. The basic principles include the liberal idea that governments are the mere agents of the people, (...) that tyrannical governments forfeit their legal protections, that human rights entail obligations for governments, that justifiable intervention must intend the end of tyranny or anarchy, that the doctrine of double-effect should be respected, that intervention is only warranted in severe cases, that intervention be welcomed by those it is intended to save, and that ideally it is welcomed by the community of democratic states. (shrink)