In this paper, we focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometric cognition has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such as phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early core cognitive systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. In particular, we show that the development of Greek mathematics, enshrined in Euclid’s Elements, was driven by the use of two tightly intertwined cognitive artifacts: the use of (...) lettered diagrams; and the creation of linguistic formulae. Together, these artifacts formed the professional language of geometry. In this respect, the case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time. This practice, as we suggest, has also contributed heavily to the understanding of what mathematical proof is; classically, it has been assumed that proofs are not merely deductively correct but also remain invariant over various individuals sharing the same cognitive practice. Cognitive artifacts in Greek geometry constrained the repertoire of admissible inferential operations, which made these proofs inter-subjectively testable and compelling. By focusing on the cognitive operations on artifacts, we also stress that mental mechanisms that contribute to these operations are still poorly understood, in contrast to those mechanisms which drive symbolic logical inference. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i krytyczna analiza koncepcji uczuć egzystencjalnych, autorstwa współczesnego filozofa psychiatrii o orientacji fenomenologicznej — Matthew Ratcliffe’a. Uczucia egzystencjalne są specjalną klasą stanów afektywnych, nadającą emocjonalnego zabarwienia subiektywnemu doświadczeniu rzeczywistości. Mają one charakter przedrefleksyjny i stanowią niejawne tło świadomości fenomenalnej, które w potocznym doświadczeniu pozostaje poza polem uwagi. Uczucia te mają ścisły związek z emocjami, determinując typy przedmiotów intencjonalnych zawartych w stanach emocjonalnych i wyznaczając repertuar możliwych do doświadczenia emocji. Najważniejsze uczucia egzystencjalne, które wyróżnia Ratcliffe, to: (1) (...) poczucie rzeczywistości, czyli przedrefleksyjne i fenomenalne wrażenie o realnym istnieniu świata jako takiego; (2) poczucie przynależności, czyli przedrefleksyjne i fenomenalne wrażenie własnego istnienia i osadzenia w świecie pośród osób i rzeczy. Te dwie kategorie stanowią fundamentalne składowe pierwszoosobowego doświadczenia podmiotu, wyznaczając tym samym jego relację do innych ludzi oraz rzeczywistości w jej najbardziej ogólnym sensie. W artykule przedstawiam główne cechy i typy uczuć egzystencjalnych. Zwracam także uwagę na szczególną rolę psychopatologii w analizie i uzasadnianiu istnienia tego zjawiska. W związku z tym, za Ratcliffem, opisuję w jaki sposób określone aspekty uczuć egzystencjalnych ulegają dezintegracji w przebiegu epizodów zaburzeń psychicznych, takich jak depresja czy schizofrenia. Pokazuję także różnicę pomiędzy fenomenologicznym i poznawczo-behoawioralnym podejściem do zaburzeń psychicznych. Powołując się na badania neurobiologiczne staram się wskazać potencjalne neuronalne korelaty uczuć egzystencjalnych. Tekst wieńczą krytyczne uwagi na temat koncepcji uczuć egzystencjalnych w ujęciu Matthew Ratcliffe’a. Rozwiązanie zidentyfikowanych wad i niedociągnięć tej teorii filozoficznej zarazem nakreśla przyszłe perspektywy jej rozwoju. (shrink)

In this article we investigate the relationship between legal translation and legal interpretation. The common wisdom is that these activities are closely related, but the nature of that relationship remains disputable. We adopt the perspective of legal theory—as opposed to the perspective of translation studies—which seems to be underrepresented in the literature of the subject. We start with distinguishing between the two notions of legal interpretation: the wide sense and the narrow sense. We argue that the relationship between legal translation (...) and legal interpretation changes significantly depending on the notion of legal interpretation that is assumed. The wide sense is often assumed by translation scholars and it renders legal interpretation as a necessary prerequisite for legal translation. Jurists, on the other hand, usually assume the narrow sense which renders legal interpretation and legal translation as two distinct activities with some shared features. We then focus on four issues of legal interpretation in the narrow sense: the types of legal interpretive problems, the creation of legal interpretive problems, the methods of legal interpretation, the resolution of legal interpretive problems. We conclude with a detailed comparison of legal translation and legal interpretation in the context of those four issues. (shrink)

This article contributes to the discussion regarding the relationship between idealisation, de-idealisation and cognitive scientific progress. In this, I raise the question of the significance of the gradual de-idealisation procedure for constructing political science theories. I show that conceptions that assume the reversibility of the idealisation process can be an extremely useful theoretical perspective in reconstructions of political science modelling and analyses of scientific progress in political science. I base my position on the results of the methodological reconstruction of Richard (...) Jankowski’s theory of voting. My reconstruction and results of empirical studies show that by gradually removing simplifying assumptions, models can emerge that more accurately identify the determinants of the voting decision and the corresponding relationships. In the case I analysed, the transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained models likely demarcates the line of scientific progress. (shrink)

The current paper studies the formal properties of the Global Reflection Principle, to wit the assertion “All theorems of$\mathrm {Th}$are true,” where$\mathrm {Th}$is a theory in the language of arithmetic and the truth predicate satisfies the usual Tarskian inductive conditions for formulae in the language of arithmetic. We fix the gap in Kotlarski’s proof from [15], showing that the Global Reflection Principle for Peano Arithmetic is provable in the theory of compositional truth with bounded induction only ($\mathrm {CT}_0$). Furthermore, we (...) extend the above result showing that$\Sigma _1$-uniform reflection over a theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals ($\mathrm {UTB}^-$) is provable in$\mathrm {CT}_0$, thus answering the question of Beklemishev and Pakhomov [2]. Finally, we introduce the notion of a prolongable satisfaction class and use it to study the structure of models of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. In particular, we provide a new model-theoretical characterization of theories of finite iterations of uniform reflection and present a new proof characterizing the arithmetical consequences of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. (shrink)

The notion of implicit commitment has played a prominent role in recent works in logic and philosophy of mathematics. Although implicit commitment is often associated with highly technical studies, it remains an elusive notion. In particular, it is often claimed that the acceptance of a mathematical theory implicitly commits one to the acceptance of a Uniform Reflection Principle for it. However, philosophers agree that a satisfactory analysis of the transition from a theory to its reflection principle is still lacking. We (...) provide an axiomatization of the minimal commitments implicit in the acceptance of a mathematical theory. The theory entails that the Uniform Reflection Principle is part of one’s implicit commitments, and sheds light on why this is so. We argue that the theory has significant epistemological consequences in that it explains how justified belief in the axioms of a theory can be preserved to the corresponding reflection principle. The theory also improves on recent analyses of implicit commitment based on truth or epistemic notions. (shrink)

Author: Bonecki Mateusz Title: HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION AND THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE (Interpretacja humanistyczna a teoretyczna rekonstrukcja kultury) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 189-211 Keywords: CULTURE, SOCIO-REGULATORY THEORY OF CULTURE, KMITA, INTERPRETATION, HUMANITIES, FUNCTIONALISM, CULTURAL STUDIES, KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author presents crucial aspects of Jerzy Kmita’s socio-regulatory conception of culture in order to define it as a theoretical background of “humanistic (...) interpretation”. When the latter is to be understood as a method of explanation of human behavior with regard to its cultural meaning, the theoretical background is provided by variety of research activities which the author defines as “theoretical reconstruction of culture”. They consist in e.g. socio-functional explanation, linguistic and semantic analysis, or even in epistemological considerations, and guarantee theoretically independent justification of the interpretive hypotheses applied in the course of “humanistic interpretation”. Such “reconstruction” specifies further conditions of intersubjective acceptability of the statements within the discourse of humanities and therefore it also limits the subjective and individual character of the attribution of cultural beliefs to the members of a certain cultural community. (shrink)

A method of constructing Hilbert-type axiom systems for standard many-valued propositional logics was offered by Rosser and Turquette. Although this method is considered to be a solution of the problem of axiomatisability of a wide class of many-valued logics, the article demonstrates that it fails to produce adequate axiom systems. The article concerns finitely many-valued propositional logics of Łukasiewicz. It proves that if standard propositional connectives of the Rosser–Turquette axiom systems are definable in terms of the propositional connectives of Łukasiewicz’s (...) logics, and thus, they are normal ones, then every Rosser–Turquette axiom system for a finite-valued Łukasiewicz’s logic is semantically incomplete. (shrink)

In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the “strength” of various truth theories which are conservative over $$ PA $$. Let $${\mathfrak {Th}}$$ denote the class of models of $$ PA $$ which admit an expansion to a model of theory $${ Th}$$. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that $$\begin{aligned} {{\mathfrak {PA}}}\supset {\mathfrak {TB}}\supset {{\mathfrak {RS}}}\supset {\mathfrak {UTB}}\supseteq \mathfrak {CT^-}, \end{aligned}$$ where $${\mathfrak {PA}}$$ denotes simply the class of all models of (...) $$ PA $$ and $${\mathfrak {RS}}$$ denotes the class of recursively saturated models of $$ PA $$. Our main original result is that every model of $$ PA $$ which admits an expansion to a model of $$ CT ^-$$, admits also an expansion to a model of $$ UTB $$. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results (brought to us by Carlo Nicolai) we conclude that $$ UTB $$ is not relatively interpretable in $$ TB $$, thus answering the question from Fujimoto (Bull Symb Log 16:305–344, 2010). (shrink)

This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian identity (...) of the knower with the known, as well as by grounding self-knowledge in the fact of the mind’s intimate presence to itself. Ultimately, self-knowledge appears to be an ‘objectless’ knowledge, a knowledge that the mind exists rather than knowledge of what the mind is. (shrink)

Branching is a set-theoretical model of reality that is in accord with contemporary physics. This structure is also a model for some logical calculi. However, if the formal language defined on the basis of branching is to correspond to our ways of speaking about possible events, a number of issues must be clarified. All of them are connected with the notion of possibility that is employed in this language. Yet the apparent need to supplement this language with an additional notion (...) of possibility means that branching ceases to be attractive as a candidate for a model of physical reality, as it contains considerably more elements than we would like to see in reality. Thus, the connection between this logical tool and ontology becomes questionable. (shrink)

This paper discusses main issues concerning Toulmin’s theory of evolutionary development of scientific knowledge. The reconstruction of Toulmin’s assumptions, which underlie the theory, and the presentation of the theory itself, is followed by the analysis of the difficulties of the conception in general. The author tries to show that these difficulties consist primarily in the discrepancy between what Toulmin aimed at and what he actually achieved. The problem is that although incorporating the means of Darwin’s theory may itself be — (...) in the context of describing the growth of scientifi c knowledge — justifi able, it is not consistent with Toulmin’s demand for the rationality of science. The purpose of creating the evolutionary theory was, as Toulmin claimed, to give an account of the development of scientific knowledge which would be non-relativistic and rationalistic. However, this purpose is, as the author argues, not achievable on the grounds of Toulmin’s accounts of rationality. Key words S. TOULMIN, SCIENCE, EVOLUTION. (shrink)

The paper presents a partial evaluation of employment and factors related to the labour markets in European countries in 2007-2016. The interconnectedness of these determinants in the context of GDP dynamics per capita for each country was examined. The quoted partial subject literature and empirical research allowed to formulate the most important conclusions, among others: in the context of GDP dynamics per capita, at least four groups of countries can be distinguished in Europe, each of them has completely different characteristics (...) having an influence (in the Granger causality sense) on change in GDP per capita of these countries for various time steps. (shrink)

Tomasz z Akwinu nie kojarzy się w pierwszym odruchu z kimś, kto kładłby mocny akcent na teologię Boga uniżonego we wcieleniu i na krzyżu. Tak przynajmniej wydaje się wielu współczesnym teologom, zwłaszcza tym, którzy są przedstawicielami szeroko rozumianego nurtu kenotycznego. Według nich Akwinata jest przykładem myśliciela, w którego teologii absolutność Boga, Jego transcendencja, niezmienność, suwerenność i potęga zostały tak mocno podkreślone, że ma to wręcz uniemożliwiać adekwatne uchwycenie zdumiewającej prawdy objawionej w Chrystusie: Bóg jest Bogiem uniżającym siebie samego. Zatem, zdaniem (...) wielu współczesnych teologów, proponowana przez Tomasza wizja Boga ma więcej wspólnego ze skonstruowaną za pomocą metafizyki filozoficzną doktryną Absolutu niż z Bogiem, który stał się człowiekiem i umarł na krzyżu dla naszego zbawienia. Czy jednak zarzut ten jest słuszny? Czy Akwinata rzeczywiście nie dostrzega uniżenia Boga? Właśnie z próby odpowiedzenia na te pytania zrodziła się niniejsza książka. Ze Wstępu. (shrink)

In 1890 William James distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (...) (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” (following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein) can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self from cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. (shrink)

This study offers an experiential and practical way of understanding Plotinus' thought and philosophy through a focus on the act of contemplation. Mateusz Stróżyński argues that contemplation, or direct seeing of the principles of reality, is not merely a part of Plotinus' thought, but rather a significant dimension of it.

We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is arithmetically conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the (...) case of the induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate. (shrink)

Boolean connexive logic is an extension of Boolean logic that is closed under Modus Ponens and contains Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses. According to these theses a sentence cannot imply its negation and the negation of a sentence cannot imply the sentence; and if the antecedent implies the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the negation of the consequent and if the antecedent implies the negation of the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the consequent. Such a logic was first introduced (...) by Jarmużek and Malinowski, by means of so-called relating semantics and tableau systems. Subsequently its modal extension was determined by means of the combination of possible-worlds semantics and relating semantics. In the following article we present axiomatic systems of some basic and modal Boolean connexive logics. Proofs of completeness will be carried out using canonical models defined with respect to maximal consistent sets. (shrink)

This paper is a follow-up to [4], in which a mistake in [6] was corrected. We give a strenghtening of the main result on the semantical nonconservativity of the theory of PT−with internal induction for total formulae${$, denoted by PT−in [9]). We show that if to PT−the axiom of internal induction forallarithmetical formulae is added, then this theory is semantically stronger than${\rm{P}}{{\rm{T}}^ - } + {\rm{INT}}\left$. In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable in the former. Last but not (...) least, we provide an axiomatic theory of truth which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in [9]. The truth theory we define is based on Weak Kleene Logic instead of the Strong one. (shrink)

The cognitive foundations of geometry have puzzled academics for a long time, and even today are mostly unknown to many scholars, including mathematical cognition researchers. -/- Foundations of Geometric Cognition shows that basic geometric skills are deeply hardwired in the visuospatial cognitive capacities of our brains, namely spatial navigation and object recognition. These capacities, shared with non-human animals and appearing in early stages of the human ontogeny, cannot, however, fully explain a uniquely human form of geometric cognition. In the book, (...) Hohol argues that Euclidean geometry would not be possible without the human capacity to create and use abstract concepts, demonstrating how language and diagrams provide cognitive scaffolding for abstract geometric thinking, within a context of a Euclidean system of thought. -/- Taking an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on research from diverse fields including psychology, cognitive science, and mathematics, this book is a must-read for cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists of mathematics, alongside anyone interested in mathematical education or the philosophical and historical aspects of geometry. (shrink)

In this paper I venture to examine from several different (but related) perspectives the ambivalent significance of practice in Greek thought. On the one hand, philosophical culture (vita contemplative or theoria) evolves in stark opposition to political culture (vita activa). On the other hand, philosophy in the era of post-Socratic schools takes the form of a spiritual practice (askesis) oriented on the conversion or transformation of the soul of a pupil, and quite often is defined as a preparation for social (...) life (both in the ethical and political aspect). I discuss the Greek problem of anthropocentrism in the context of the critical opposition of bios theoretikos and bios politikos, special attention being paid to the internal tension between theoria (and its self-understanding) and philosophical practise as present in the schools. It is not my intention to deny the distance which separates theoria from praxis. Nevertheless, my objective is to bring out the ambivalence of the notion of theoretical contemplation in the context of Platonic dialectics. Near the end of the paper, I suggest – alluding to Nietzsche's judgment of the relation between post-Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy – that one should approach with caution two very tempting visions of Greek philosophy. The one is the idea of alleged primacy of the practical over the theoretical in Greek philosophy. The other is the myth of the "primordial practise of the ancient sages", characterized in metaphysical terms. (shrink)

The study is an intercultural comparison of the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior (original and modified versions) to predict students’ intentions for academic cheating. The sample included university students from 7 countries: Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Turkey, Switzerland, United States, and New Zealand. Across countries, results show that attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and moral obligation predict students’ intentions to engage in academic dishonesty in the form of cheating. The extended modified version of the theory of planned (...) behavior emerged as the best explanatory model predicting intentions to cheat. Significant cross-cultural differences were found and discussed. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą analizy koncepcji minimalistycznej neurofilozofii autorstwa Henrika Waltera w kontekście dyskusji dotyczącej problemu psychofizycznego. Bezpośrednio związana z ową koncepcją teoria o „zróżnicowanej metafizyce” została w tekście powiązana z ideą pluralizmu eksplanacyjnego i ukazana jako metodologiczna alternatywa dla poszukiwania fundamentalnych teorii świadomości. Jednocześnie poza ewentualnymi zaletami metafilozoficznej refleksji podejmowanej w ramach minimalistycznej neurofilozofii zarysowane zostały jej podstawowe ograniczenia i problemy związane m.in. z uznaniem superweniencji za punkt łączący różnorodne stanowiska neurofilozoficzne.

The Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith’s Dignitas personae does not offer a definitive rejection of the practice of human embryo adoption as intrinsically evil, but neither does it simply leave the matter an “open question.” The document does indeed oppose the practice, but its reasons for doing so are not clearly stated and seem to be in tension with its own affirmations of the personal dignity of embryos and the goodness of adoption. The Congregation’s opposition is therefore best (...) read as a prudential judgment that embryo adoption cannot be justified in the present circumstances due to the potential for scandal and the cooperation with the fertility industry which it involves. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 307–328. (shrink)

The paper explores the link between contemplation of the One and happiness in Plotinus and challenges the traditional interpretation according to which a contemplative or mystical experience of the One is by necessity brief and transitory, while the experience of Intellect can become a stable state in this life. Were it so, it would not serve as a ground for the good or happy life. In order to reconcile this point with Plotinus’s other claim about contemplation, his doctrine of the (...) double activity of Intellect is invoked. (shrink)

SENSEMAKING. ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE IN THE LIGHT OF INTEGRATED HUMANITIES Definitions of organizational culture usually focus on shared symbols, rituals, behavioral patterns, or even propositional assumptions concerning reality. Such phenomena represent heterogeneous collection of objects, events, and processes. Instead, the paradigm of integrated humanities defines organizational culture in terms of beliefs which provide both practical instructions for agents and shared interpretative schemes which guide the understanding of the environment. In this context, the process of “sensemaking” is understood as a (...) knowledge-based act of cultural sense-giving or of culturally mediated construction of organizational reality. Since the meaning-creation process seems to be both culturally mediated and knowledge-based, the perspective presented in the paper is defined as an “epistemic model of organizational culture”. Keywords: SENSEMAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE, ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, TACIT KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, CULTURE, KNOW-HOW. (shrink)

Poster ma na celu zaprezentowanie na konkretnym przykładzie wizualizacji w nauce jako dzieła sztuki. Składa się z dwóch części. Pierwsza to skrócona wersja artykułu oraz graficzna prezentacji owego skrótu, wygenerowana za pomocą algorytmu uwzględniającego rozkład liter w tekście (kod został dołączony). Druga część to hasła zapisane krojem pisma tak dobranym, aby wywoływał napięcie między wizualną stroną hasła (emocjami, myślami, skojarzeniami związanymi z formą) a jego znaczeniem (treścią). Poster zasadza się na założeniach przedstawionych w artykule. Proponujemy mianowicie, aby spojrzeć na wizualizacje (...) danych jako na obiekty, których twórcy stają przed podobnymi wyzwaniami, z jakimi muszą się zmierzyć autorzy dzieł sztuk wizualnych, oraz jako obiekty, których odbiorcy muszą wykonać pracę interpretacyjną podobną do tej, której wymagają od nich dzieła sztuki. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to distinguish the position which I call „arealism” from both semantic realism and semantic anti-realism. Arealism is based on the deflationary critique of the logico-semantic debate on realism, i.e., on the argument which undermines the foundationist presuppositions of this debate. I attempt to draw carefully the distinction between arealist, deflationist approach to the problem of realism and the position of semantic anti-realism, which is usually framed in terms of the assertability-conditions semantics. Moreover, I argue (...) that linguistic antirealism faces problems similar to those which haunted transcendental idealism. In the second part of the paper I demonstrate in a dialectical manner that arealism (1) is holistic in a particular Wittgensteinian sense, (2) does not support nor assume linguistic relativism, (3) should not be confused with meta-theoretical thesis of inexhaustibility of semantics, (4) involves a particular strategy of deflationary criticism, and (5) does not lead to semantic nihilism or eliminationism. (shrink)

Angela of Foligno was certainly born in the middle of the 13th century, in a rich family. Most scholars accept, at least to a certain extent, a more exact chronology of her life, proposed by Martin-Jean Ferré.1 According to him, Angela, born in 1248, experienced a conversion in 1285 and lost her entire family – husband, children, and mother – in a few subsequent years. In this time she also sold all of her possessions. At the beginning of 1291 she (...) entered the Third Order of St. Francis and went on a pilgrimage to Assisi, during which she experienced powerful mystical graces, hearing the voice of the Holy Spirit and conversing with him almost the whole way. During her stay in Assisi, she caused a scandal, screaming... (shrink)