Research on the influence of industry on chemical regulation has mostly been conducted within the framework of the production of ignorance. This special issue extends this research by looking at how industry asserts its interests––not just in the scientific sphere but also at other stages of policy-making and regulatory process––with a specific focus on the types of tools or instruments industry has used. Bringing together sociologists and historians specialized in Science and Technology Studies, the articles of the special issue study (...) the arenas in which instruments and practical guidelines for public policy are negotiated or used. The aim is to observe the devices in the making or in action, from the selection of actors to the production of thresholds, criteria, and other technical regulations. The introduction highlights how industry influence on expertise and regulation is undoubtedly far more pervasive and multifarious than has been conceptualized to date by social scientists. Putting this issue back at the heart of both the STS and social sciences research agendas is increasingly urgent and could lead to new inquiries able to highlight these logics even more widely, using fresh empirical examples. (shrink)

Populated with the likes of Francis of Assisi, Teresa of Avila, and Padre Pio, this book is a fascinating inquiry into the status of saints in the modern world.

In the eleventh of his Antiquarian Letters, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing discusses a phrase from Lucian's description of the painting by Zeuxis called A Family of Centaurs: ‘at the top of the painting a centaur is leaning down as if from an observation point, smiling’. ‘This as if from an observation point, Lessing notes, obviously implies that Lucian himself was uncertain whether this figure was positioned further back, or was at the same time on higher ground. We need to recognize the (...) logic of ancient bas-reliefs where figures further to the back look over those at the front, not because they are actually positioned above them but because they are meant to appear as if standing behind.'1 · 1. The passage is in George Lessing, Briefe, antiquarischen Inhalts, p. 81. Panofsky's discussion does not note that the original text of Lucian makes clear that what is described is a copy of the original painting. This means that some of the issues of misunderstanding situated by Lessing and Panofsky in Lucian's court may in principle be attributable to the copyist. This makes no difference to the conceptual thrust of Panofsky's case.—Trans. (shrink)

This volume brings together, for the first time, experts on Greek, Syriac, and Arabic traditions of doxography, in order to investigate and present shared contexts and questions, and to initiate future collaboration among the fields of classics, Arabic studies, and the history of philosophy.

I provide indestructibility results for large cardinals consistent with V = L, such as weakly compact, indescribable and strongly unfoldable cardinals. The Main Theorem shows that any strongly unfoldable cardinal κ can be made indestructible by <κ-closed. κ-proper forcing. This class of posets includes for instance all <κ-closed posets that are either κ -c.c, or ≤κ-strategically closed as well as finite iterations of such posets. Since strongly unfoldable cardinals strengthen both indescribable and weakly compact cardinals, the Main Theorem therefore makes (...) these two large cardinal notions similarly indestructible. Finally. I apply the Main Theorem forcing extension preserving all strongly unfoldable cardinals in which every strongly unfoldable cardinal κ is indestructible by <κ-closed. κ-proper forcing. (shrink)

_Philosophy and Argument_ presents systematic analysis of the role of argumentation in philosophy.

Social work is underpinned by values of anti-oppressive practice and social justice. Our professional standards require social workers to consider their personal and professional development. Thus, this article combines a reflection on both our professional role as academics and our existential identity as social workers in challenging racism and mental health stigma. To progress equality of opportunity, we argue it is necessary to understand first what we mean by an ‘integrated society’ before we can secondly challenge diverse forms of oppression. (...) We conclude by positing that a community free of interpersonal, institutional and structural oppression may only be possible within a virtual world. (shrink)

It has often been argued that since all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, and philosophical arguments are neither, no philosophical arguments are sound. In his recent book Philosophical Reasoning, Passmore attempts to show that sound philosophical arguments are possible. He does this not by attacking the premise that all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, but rather by attacking the premise that philosophical arguments are neither deductive nor inductive. In fact, he asserts, “Philosophical reasoning, if it is (...) to be valid at all, must be deductive in its formal structure.” Passmore’s point is that deductive arguments are by no means confined to mathematical reasoning. Mathematics uses deductive inference in one way, and philosophy in another. Passmore does not attempt to define this alleged difference between the way mathematics uses deductive inference and the way philosophy uses it. Instead he gives examples of kinds of argument that are often used in philosophy and seldom elsewhere. One such kind of argument consists in pointing out that one’s opponent has begged the question. Another is the so-called ‘infinite regress’ argument. Again, the kind of argument that a philosopher is using when he ‘reminds’ his interlocutor of a principle that he has presumably forgotten or overlooked in the process of formulating his philosophical position is fairly common in philosophy although not frequently used in other fields. Other sorts of argument cited by Passmore as basically philosophical are ‘verbal analysis’ and ‘self-refutation’. The considerations that Passmore has in mind in characterizing all of these arguments as philosophical are stylometric. By this I mean that what motivates him to classify an argument as philosophical is not any property attaching to the argument itself, but rather the fact that it occurs for the most part in philosophical contexts. He explicitly states that other kinds of arguments, including those mainly used in mathematical contexts, can occur in philosophy, and that the arguments which he classifies as philosophical can occur in non-philosophical contexts. (shrink)