In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional assumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P , because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there (...) is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Ian T. Ramsey.Evil and the God of Love. By John Hick.Blondel et Teilhard de Chardin, Correspondance Commentée. By Henri de Lubac.The Structure of Behaviour. By Maurice Merleau-Ponty.New Testament Essays. By Raymond E. Brown, S.S.Ideologies. By Patrick Corbett.Worship in Israel. By Hans-Joachim Kraus. Translated by Geoffrey Boswell.The Theology of St John. By Joseph Crehan, S.J.Jesus and the Kingdom. By George Eldon Ladd.Finding the Historical. By James Peter.The Shape of Christology By John Mcntyre.Christology. By Dietrich (...) Bonhoeffer. Translated by John Bowden, with an introduction by Edwin H. Robertson.Theology of the English Reformers. By Philip Edgcumbe Hughes.The Execution of Justice in England: A True, Sincere, and Modest Defense of English Catholics. By William Cecil and William Allen. Edited by Robert M. Kingdon.The Revolution of the Saints. By Michael Walzer.L'Église au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire. By E. Delaruelle, E.-R. Labande and P. Ourliac.John Hus at the Council of Constance. Translated and introduced by M. Spinka.Mission to France 1944–1953, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Pope John XXIII. Edited by Don Loris Capovilla. Translated by Dorothy White.The Vatican Council and Christian Unity. A commentary on the Decree on Ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council. By Bernard Leeming, S.J.The Documents of Vatican II. Edited by Walter M. Abbott, S.J. Translations edited by Mgr Joseph Gallagher. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

V příspěvku připomínáme originální spolupráci s prof. P. Maternou, která začala v 60. letech minulého století a vedla ke vzniku třísložkové teorie jazyka, jejímiž autory jsou spolu s Pavlem Maternou Karel Pala a Aleš Svoboda. Články o třísložkové teorii byly publikovány v r. 1976 a 1979, ovšem jméno P. Materny se v titulcích článků ne­smělo objevit, byl tak komunistickým režimem trestán za vyloučení z KSČ v r. 1969. Třísložková teorie jazyka, jak název naznačuje, pokrývá tři základní komponenty sys­tému jazyka, tedy (...) syntax, sémantiku a pragmatiku, a je plně srovnatelná s podobnými pokusy u nás i v zahraničí. Stala se východiskem pro další propojení logiky, lingvistiky a informatiky díky působení K. Paly a P. Materny na Fakultě informatiky od roku 1995. Do této spolupráce se zapojili studenti Fakulty informatiky, zejména Aleš Horák, jehož zásadním příspěvkem je počítačová implementace systému transparentní intenzionální logiky (TILu) ve vztahu ke zpracování přirozeného jazyka (češtiny). (shrink)

O impacto para a saúde mental dos filhos da gravidade da depressão materna (DM), em comorbidade com outros transtornos, carece de estudos. Objetivou-se comparar indicadores de saúde mental de escolares, considerando grupos diferenciados pela gravidade da DM com e sem comorbidade com Transtorno de Personalidade Borderline (TPB). Foram avaliadas 90 díades mães-crianças, distribuídas em três grupos, sistematicamente avaliados: Grupo Depressão (GD) - mães com indicadores de sintomas atuais de depressão e histórico de episódios anteriores, sem indicadores de TPB, Grupo (...) Depressão em Comorbidade com TPB (GD-TPB) - mães com sintomas depressivos atuais e histórico de episódios anteriores com comorbidade com indicadores de TPB, e Grupo de Comparação (GC) - mães sem histórico de sintomas depressivos nem indicadores de TPB. As crianças, de ambos os sexos, tinham idade entre seis e 10 anos. Procedeu-se às avaliações em sessões individuais: a) com as mães - Questionário Geral e Questionário Sobre a Saúde do Paciente, Entrevista Clínica TPB e Questionário de Capacidades e Dificuldades (SDQ); e b) com as crianças - Teste das Matrizes Progressivas Coloridas de Raven. Tratou-se os dados por procedimentos estatísticos (p ≤0,05). As crianças do GD-TPB apresentaram, com significância estatística, média maior que GD e GC quanto ao escore de problemas total, conduta, hiperatividade e problemas de relacionamento. Verificou-se associação da gravidade da DM com TPB com mais problemas de saúde mental infantil, caracterizando um grupo clínico preferencial para intervenções em saúde mental. (shrink)

When it comes to Second and Foreign Language Teaching, the teaching of pronunciation has, for long, been neglected and it has not been given due attention in textbooks. Additionally, studies tend to focus on only some intonation patterns such as wh- questions and yes-no questions, leaving other patterns which are as important unexplored. Thus, a research gap is generated. This study aims to narrow that gap by means of exploring the effectiveness of the teaching of intonation to Spanish-speaking trainee teachers (...) at a Chilean university. The study focuses on a less familiar intonation pattern, that of utterances which express implied information, namely, implications. The study involved 9 participants who were in the process of becoming English teachers and who were enrolled in an English phonetics course. All participants took a pre-test followed by a four-session intervention on the intonation of English implications and a post-test which involved the reading of 29 prompts. In order to compare pre- and post-test results, a Wilcoxon signed-ranked test was run. The results drawn from the non-parametric test revealed that the participants were able to perform English intonation for implications better after having received training than before the treatment, Z=-2,668, p=0,008. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

The book is about logical analysis of natural language. Since we humans communicate by means of natural language, we need a tool that helps us to understand in a precise manner how the logical and formal mechanisms of natural language work. Moreover, in the age of computers, we need to communicate both with and through computers as well. Transparent Intensional Logic is a tool that is helpful in making our communication and reasoning smooth and precise. It deals with all kinds (...) of linguistic context in a fully compositional and anti-contextual way. (shrink)

Propositional and notional attitudes are construed as relations (-in-intension) between individuals and constructions (rather than propositrions etc,). The apparatus of transparent intensional logic (Tichy) is applied to derive two rules that make it possible to export existential quantifiers without conceiving attitudes as relations to expressions (sententialism).

There is a distinctive kind of command, namely commands to answer specific questions. An imperative sentence denoting such a command has an interrogative sentence corresponding to it-a sentence denoting the respective question. LetImp, Int, andQ be such an imperative sentence, the interrogative sentence corresponding to it, and the question denoted by the interrogative sentence, respectively. LetQ be an empirical question, i. e., and ((ητ)ω)-object. LetP be an ((ητ)ω)-construction constructingQ. Then the analysis ofImp has the form (QL).LetQ be an analytical question, (...) i. e., a molecular extensional η-construction. LetQ=C, whereC is a ℊ-object (over the extended base). Then the analysis ofImp has the form (QL′). The imperative sentences whose analyses have the form (QL) or (QL′) can be called ‘question-like imperative sentences’ or simply ‘QL-imperative sentences’. No imperative sentence whose analysis differs from (QL) and (QL\t') can be associated with a question. Therefore, no transformation of such an imperative sentence should result in a correct interrogative sentence. Fulfilling an order which is determined by a QL-imperative sentenceImp, one simultaneously gives the right answer to the questionQ (which is associated withImp). One who does not fulfil this order either wrongly answersQ or does not answerQ at all. (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van de wijsgerige ethiek.

Scientific realists have suggested that changes in our scientific communities over the course of their history have rendered those communities progressively less vulnerable to the problem of unconcieved alternatives over time. I argue in response not only that the most fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have generated steadily mounting obstacles to revolutionary, transformative, or unorthodox scientific theorizing, but also that we have substantial independent evidence that the institutional apparatus of contemporary scientific inquiry fosters an exceedingly and increasingly theoretically (...) conservative form of that inquiry. I conclude that contemporary scientific communities are actually more vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives than their historical predecessors, and I briefly suggest how we might seek to pursue scientific inquiry in a less theoretically conservative way. (shrink)

The author defends the view that the notion of concept, if used in the logical tradition, should be explicated procedurally . He argues that Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic is an apt tool for such an explication and derives the respective definition. Some consequences of this definition concern the notions of emptiness, simple concepts, empirical concepts and algorithmic concepts.

It is shown that: classicality is connected with various criteria some of which are fulfilled by TIL while some other are not; some more general characteristic of classicality connects it with philosophical realism whereas anti-realism is connected with non-classical logics; TIL is highly expressive due to its hyperintensionality, which makes it possible to handle procedures as objects sui generis. Thus TIL is classical in obeying principles of realism and non-classical in transcending some principles taught by textbooks of classical logic.

On the one hand, Pavel Tichý has shown in his Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) that the best way of explicating meaning of the expressions of a natural language consists in identification of meanings with abstract procedures. TIL explicates objective abstract procedures as so-called constructions. Constructions that do not contain free variables and are in a well-defined sense ´normalized´ are called concepts in TIL. On the second hand, Kolmogorov in (Mathematische Zeitschrift 35: 58–65, 1932) formulated a theory of problems, using NL (...) expressions. He explicitly avoids presenting a definition of problems. In the present paper an attempt at such a definition (explication)—independent of but in harmony with Medvedev´s explication—is given together with the claim that every concept defines a problem. The paper treats just mathematical concepts, and so mathematical problems, and tries to show that this view makes it possible to take into account some links between conceptual systems and the ways how to replace a noneffective formulation of a problem by an effective one. To show this in concreto a wellknown Kleene’s idea from his (Introduction to metamathematics. D. van Nostrand, New York, 1952) is exemplified and explained in terms of conceptual systems so that a threatening inconsistence is avoided. (shrink)

If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.

The following well-known problem motivated my handling more general problems. As we surely know, our pupils and even students are confronted with much more trouble when learning mathematics (and even physics) than when they learn ‘empirical’ sciences like biology, mineralogy etc. There are many factors that can at least partially explain this phenomenon. I would however mention one factor that is not too frequently adduced: mathematics, logic, and much of physics use concepts that are abstract while the empirical sciences seem (...) to support understanding by using expressions concerning (denoting? expressing?) concrete objects. Therefore the first topic to be explained (or explicated) is: Abstract vs. concrete. The second point will consist of applying the first point to explanation of the trouble with learning mathematics. The third point will ask Logical Analysis of Natural Language how to tell abstract expressions from concrete ones. The fourth point will confront the concept described in the foregoing point with conceptions trying to abandon the distinction between analytic and empirical expressions. Here it will be shown that the empiricism representing this latter conception deprives semantics as applied to Natural language of important features of expressivity. (shrink)