ZusammenfassungDie Erkenntnistheorie der Wissenschaften ist als selbständige Wissenschaft nur zu begründen, wenn es gelingt, den Begriff der Wissenschaftlichkeit unabhängig von der Untersuchung der Wissenschaften im einzelnen zu bilden. Das ist die Aufgabe, die Wittgenstein in seinem Tractatus logico‐philosophicus zu lösen versuchte, nicht ohne dabei auch einiges Unerkennbare und Spekulative zu berühren. Die Bedeutung des Tractatus ist daher ohne den Begriff der Spekulation nicht zu klären. Die Spekulation und die Grenzen der Spekulation zu untersuchen, ist eine wesentliche vernünftige Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie. (...) Sie ist aktuell auch für die Erkenntnistheorie der exakten Wissenschaften, weil sich Physik und Spekulation direkt berühren und einige Physiker von Rang die Darstellung ihrer Wissenschaft kritiklos mit spekulativen Gedanken vermischen.RésuméL'épistémologie des sciences ne peut ětre fondée comme science indépendante que si l'on parvient à délimiter le domaine scientifique indépendamment de tout examen des sciences particulières. C'est le problème que Wittgenstein essaya de résoudre dans son traité logico‐philosophique, non sans d'ailleurs se heurter à quelques inconnaissables ni sans se permettre quelques spéculations. L'importance du » traité « ne peut done ětre dissociée du concept de spéculation. Etudier la spéculation et ses limites est un problème rationnel essentiel de la théorie de la connaissance. Elle est également actuelle pour l'épistémologie des sciences exactes, car physique et spéculation se touchent et quelques physiciens éminents mělent sans critique à l'exposé de leur science des idées spéculatives.A theory of knowledge can only exist as an independent philosophical discipline if we can establish a concept of scientific thought independently of an inquiry into individual sciences. This is the problem, which Wittgenstein tried to solve in his tractatus logico philosophicus, not without touching on some very speculative and unknowable things. For that reason, we cannot understand the significance of the tractatus without the idea of speculation. It is an essential and reasonable problem for the theory of knowledge to determine the nature and the limits of speculation. It is a relevant problem also for the theory of science, since physics and speculation have points of contact and some distinguished physicists have introduced speculative ideas uncritically into scientific exposition. (shrink)

Was ist Philosophie? Philosophie sei die Anleitung zu philosophieren heiBt es und die Gesmichte der Philosophie das imaginare Museum, das dem Publikum zu andamtigem Besum offen zu halten sei und in dem der junge Philosoph die Meister studiere, um seinen eigenen Stil zu finden. Diese Parallele zur Kunst macht die Mannigfaltigkeit der Smulen, die so bedrockend ist, wenn Philosophie eine Wissenschaft sein solI, zu Reimtum und es ware alles gut, wenn die klassische Philo sophie nimt so unverkennbar im Stil der (...) Wissenschaft gesmrieben ware. Das gibt zu denken: Die scheinbar soliberale Idee, die Philo sophie sei nimt eine Wissenschaft, wird zu einem Vorurteil, sob aId man folgert, nach ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit braume nun nicht mehr gefragt zu werden, und die Objektivitat der Unterbringung von Ge danken in der Geschichte der Gedanken ist eine Verflihrung, in Ge schichte zu spekulieren statt selbst zu denken. Aber PLATO und DES CARTES wenden sich an verbindlich mitdenkende Leser und die Kritik der Vernunft ist nicht als Dokument des geistigen Adels eines groBen Mannes oder als Ausdruck einer Epoche geschrieben, sondern als Lehre. Die drei Antinomieen der Vernunft z. B. wollen gewiB als eine kri tische Entdeckung gelten und es ist nimt von vorne herein klar, daB diese Absicht keine Rlicksicht verdient. Welche Bedeutung hat die Wissenschaftlichkeit flir die Philosophie? Konnen wir sie zurockgewinnen, sollten wir es und wie. (shrink)

Ein gutes Verfahren, reine Mathematik kennenzulernen, ist - ein mathematisches Buch in die Hand zu nehmen und zu lesen. Es ist moglich, auf diese Weise in mathematisches Denken zu kommen ohne Reflexion iiber dies Denken. Aber da die Mathematik auch anwendbar ist, fiihren viele Wege von vorweisbaren Sachverhalten her zur Mathe­ matik, und auf solchen Wegen sich der Mathematik anzunahern, mag um so wertvoller sein, als man dabei nach Mathematischem zu fragen lernt und fertige Theorien dann vielleicht besser wiirdigen kann. (...) Bei einer solchen Annaherung stellen sich aber immer Gedanken iiber das Denken seiber ein und diese Gedanken haben ihre eigenen Gefahren. Sofern sie nur eine Annaherung vorbereiten, die dann in medias res fiihrt und die Mathematik so wie sie ist und sein solI zu W orte kommen laBt, ist alles gut. Aber Anleitungen machen um der Verstandlichkeit willen gern in einem Vorstadium halt, das sich womoglich noch als lebendig und dem reinen mathematischen Denken als iiberlegen anempfiehlt. Aus diesem Vorbezirk nahrt die Legende, das mathematische Denken der Neuzeit sei wesentlich von dem der Antike verschieden, ihre Lebenskraft. Fiir Nichtmathematiker, insbesondere solche mit philosophischen Neigungen, scheint diese Legende eine unwiderstehliche Glaubwiirdigkeit zu be­ sitzen. Sie hii. ngt mit der Meinung zusammen, daB die neuere Mathematik die Anschauung als Quelle mathematischer Erkenntnis vernachlassige. (shrink)

In 1926 and 1927, James W. Alexander and Kurt Reidemeister claimed to have made “the same” crucial breakthrough in a branch of modern topology which soon thereafter was called knot theory. A detailed comparison of the techniques and objects studied in these two roughly simultaneous episodes of mathematical research shows, however, that the two mathematicians worked in quite different mathematical traditions and that they drew on related, but distinctly different epistemic resources. These traditions and resources were local, not (...) universal elements of mathematical culture. Even certain common features of the main publications such as their modernist, formal style of exposition can be explained by reference to particular constellations in the intellectual and professional environments of Alexander and Reidemeister. In order to analyze the role of such elements and constellations of mathematical research practice, a historiographical perspective is developed which emphasizes parallels with the recent historiography of experiment. In particular, a notion characterizing those “working units of scientific knowledge production” which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has termed “experimental systems” in the case of empirical sciences proves helpful in understanding research episodes such as those bringing about modern knot theory. (shrink)

It is not unusual to speculate on the contrary-to-fact implications of political assassinations. Lincoln's is the classic case in point, but we need only think of Julius Caesar, Gandhi, or John Kennedy, if we require further examples. One totally neglected case in this context is that of Moritz Schlick. One of the remote consequences of his murder, on June 22, 1936, which was most definitely a political assassination, is that today's academic world may well have been an entirely different one (...) if he had gone on to lead the Vienna Circle into exile. That group of young philosophers of science had formed as he assumed the University of Vienna's chair of natural philosophy in 1922. A quarter of a century later, the entire English-speaking world (and Scandinavia) was in thrall to “logical positivism,” a caricature of scientific philosophy as the circle conceived it but an incredibly powerful intellectual standpoint, for all that. The view that all genuine knowledge can be quantified not only dominated philosophy but transformed the nature of universities to the point of threatening the very existence of the humanities, which could scarcely meet this demand. The polemical and oversimplified view of Rudolf Carnap's strong program for scientific philosophy simply found no place for disciplines based on mere description (ethnology) or on understanding complex interlinked constellations of events as they develop over time (history and its myriad allied disciplines).The die was cast, and the humanities became saddled with an inferiority complex that, even today, they have only partially shaken off. Only disciplines that employed mathematical methods in aid of rigorous explanation, working collectively in networks like those of physics or chemistry, were worthy of being institutionalized at universities. Since the humanities were, for the most part, embodied in individual researchers burning the Midnight Oil as they pondered the Eternal Verities, they were disqualified as sciences. They would have to reform themselves radically or disappear. The battle commenced, and sensitive observers can attest that, administrative rhetoric to the contrary, it still goes on. Had Schlick lived on, the pluralism and tolerance that was part of his view of the world might well have carried more influence than the more radical elements in the group ultimately did, and so the humanities might well have fared better in a more secure environment than they have done.Edmonds's The Murder of Professor Schlick does not venture into such speculations. Instead, it offers us a vibrant, suspense-filled narrative replete with as much information as the reader can digest (and more). Briefly, Edmonds presents a fully detailed, complex version of the high drama of the rise and decline of logical positivism in both its philosophical and its political dimensions, complete with vivid portraits of the characters whose thought and personalities supplied that movement with its dazzling dynamism. They include such characters as Schlick himself; the irrepressible Otto Neurath, who had been a minister in the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic; Rudolf Carnap, the circle's standard-bearer; Ludwig Wittgenstein, its unwilling ideal; Bertrand Russell, its Promethean inspiration; the eccentric Kurt Gödel; the rabbi Josef Schächter; the clever Englishman A. J. Ayer; America's rising star, W. V. Quine; the perennial contrarian, Karl Popper; the unfortunate Friedrich Waismann, doomed to failure in all his efforts; the tragic Edgar Zilsel, who committed suicide in American exile; and several frequently neglected women, such as Rose Rand, Olga Hahn, Marie Reidemeister, and Olga Taussky. In addition, the strong Jewish presence in the circle and the surrounding anti-Semitism that was a continuing stumbling block to it are clearly and powerfully described.These are but highlights of Edmond's narrative, but they are proof positive that his study is where to begin an encounter with the Vienna Circle and thus with the philosophical view that, more than any other, has conferred its character on modern thought and deeply molded people who have never heard of it. (shrink)

It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason (...) is a distinctive achievement that isn’t exhausted by the mere conjunction of (i) and (ii). Its being an achievement entails that (i) and (ii) are not independent when one believes for a normative reason: minimally, (i) must hold because (ii) holds. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our discussion has important upshots for central issues in epistemology, including the analysis of doxastic justification, the epistemology of perception, and the place of competence in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.

Recent writers claim that responsibilist virtue epistemology courts skepticism, owing to the fact that most of us lack the virtues it deems necessary for justified belief and knowledge. A powerful version of this objection is the challenge from situationist social psychology pressed by Alfano (2012, 2013) and Olin and Doris (2014). This paper develops a new version of responsibilism that is immune from this objection, and shows that this view has many advantages over other forms of virtue epistemology. My responsibilism (...) dispenses with the ubiquitous but (I argue) mistaken idea that responsibilist virtue properties must be understood in terms of character traits. My view parallels an often overlooked form of virtue ethics suggested by Thomson (1997) that some situationists (e.g., Harman (2001)) have praised. That form shares with other forms the thought that virtue properties are normatively fundamental, but it adds that act-attaching ones are prior to person-attaching ones, and require no backing by character traits. Far from being an ad hoc retreat position, I argue that this view is independently attractive. (shrink)

Many epistemologists treat rationality and justification as the same thing. Those who don’t lack detailed accounts of the difference, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justification. In this paper, I offer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Specifically, it turns on a version (...) of the familiar distinction in meta-ethics between possessing apparent normative reasons (which may be merely apparent) and possessing objective normative reasons. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I discuss the history of indifference to the distinction between rationality and justification in epistemology and the striking contrast with meta-ethics. I introduced the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons in §2 and provide a deeper basis for it in §3. I explain how the ideas extend to epistemology in §4 and explore the upshots for some central issues in §5. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Platon" verfügbar.

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

In early German ecology, the key concept used to refer to a synecological unit was Biozönose. Taken together with the concept of the Biotop, it was also understood as an integrated higher-order unit of life, sometimes called a “Holozön”. These units were often perceived as having properties similar to those of individual organisms, and they informed the mainstream of German ecology until at least the late 1960s. Here I ask how “organismic” these concepts really were and what conceptual problems they (...) entailed. To do so, I focus on some almost forgotten dissident positions, especially those of Friedrich Simon Bodenheimer and Fritz Peus, which I contrast with the mainstream German ecology of the time. In a radical paper published in 1954 that postulated the “dissolution of the concepts of biocoenosis and biotope”, Peus in particular elicited a forceful response from many prominent German ecologists. An analysis of the ensuing debate, including especially a colloquium held in 1959 that was partly inspired by Peus’ paper, is helpful for sifting the various arguments proffered with respect to a quasi-organismic perception of the biocoenosis in German speaking ecology. Although German mainstream ecologists rejected the notion of the biocoenosis as a superorganism, ontological holism was quite common among them. Additionally, the mainstream concept of the biocoenosis was plagued by several methodological problems and much conceptual confusion, to which the “dissidents” rightly pointed. Some of these problems are still pertinent today, e.g. in connection with more modern concepts such as “ecosystem”. (shrink)

Past research has found that mere in‐group/out‐group categorizations are sufficient to elicit biases in face memory. The current research yields novel evidence that mere social categorization is also sufficient to modulate processes underlying face perception, even for faces for which we have strong perceptual expertise: same‐race (SR) faces. Using the composite face paradigm, we find that SR faces categorized as in‐group members (i.e., fellow university students) are processed more holistically than are SR faces categorized as out‐group members (i.e., students at (...) another university). Hence, holding perceptual expertise with faces constant, categorizing an SR target as an out‐group member debilitates the strong holistic processing typically observed for SR faces. (shrink)