ABSTRACT The article treats the universal history Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires (Les ruines ou Méditations sur les révolutions des empires) of the French cultural philosopher Constantin-François Volney (1757–1820). Using a textual, interdisciplinary study, which focuses upon Volney’s complex cultural and historical philosophical contexts, I demonstrate that his primary concern was a nearly 2500 years coherent Europe of tradition and reception: this Europe did not represent a western corner of a larger Asian landmass (...) but, in the late eighteenth century, rather offered the opportunity for a complex and harmonious unity of European peoples under French circumstances. Volney chose the ruins of the desert town of Palmyra as the starting point of his historical and philosophical reflections. As a cultural philosopher of the late Enlightenment, he looks past the divine workings of the course of history in order to take instead the finite, man-made world as his focal interest. The following pages emphasize these reflections on human history that – in the face of a melancholic mode – highlighted the cultural anthropological characteristics and committed them to the promotion of a self-creating future. (shrink)

The French Revolution had a complex relationship with historical thought. In a significant sense, the politics of 1789 was built upon a rejection of the authority of the past. As old institutions and practices were swept away, many champions of the Revolution attacked conventional historical modes for legitimating authority, seeking to replace them with a politics anchored in notions of reason, natural law and natural rights. Yet history was not so easily purged from politics. In practice, symbols and images borrowed (...) from the past saturated Revolutionary culture. The factional disputes of the 1790s, too, invoked history in a range of ways. The politics of nature itself often relied on a range of historical propositions and, as the Revolution developed, a new battle between “ancients” and ‘moderns’ gradually emerged amongst those seeking to direct the future of France. This article explores these issues by focusing on a series of lectures delivered at the École Normale in the Year III (1795), in the wake of Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre. The lectures, commissioned by the Ministry of Education, were designed to lay out a program for historical pedagogy in the French Republic. Their author, Constantin-Francois Volney (1757–1820), was one of a group of figures who sought, during these years, to stabilise French politics by tying it to the development of a new form of social science—a science that would eventually be labelled “idéologie.” With this in mind, Volney sought to promote historical study as an antidote to the political appropriation of the past, with particular reference to its recent uses in France. In doing so, he also sought to appropriate the past for political purposes. These lectures illustrate a series of tensions in the wider Revolutionary relationship with history, particularly during the Thermidorian moment. They also, however, reflect ongoing ambiguities in the social role of the discipline and the self-understanding of its practitioners. (shrink)

This article analyses the complex and contested geo-politics associated with the concept of a universal human society during the era of the French Revolution. It focuses on the figure of Constantin-François Volney (1757?1820), a neglected philosopher who played a significant role in the history of both French anti-imperialist thought and French imperial practice in North Africa and the Levant. It uses that focus to explore the relationship between visions of human emancipation and the exercise of global power (...) during the 1790s and beyond. (shrink)

The French writer, explorer, and historian Constantin-François de Volney (1757–1820) has been interpreted as embracing a Eurocentric Orientalism and a typically Enlightenment progressivist historical understanding. In this article, however, I argue that, far from simply offering yet another rationalistic or teleological historical narrative, Volney set out to refound the historical discipline by erecting historiography on a firmly empirical basis in order to repudiate the idea of historical design altogether. In this respect, his best-known work, The Ruins, (...) or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires (1791), seems to occupy a special status in his oeuvre in that it did not confine its analyses to the epistemological realm and historiographical practice, but explicitly linked historical narratives and practice to historical developments themselves, ascribing civilizational decline and devastation predominantly to ignorance and blind faith in religion or myths of the past. According to this reasoning, a new, more critical historical practice – akin to social anthropology – would, by making people conscious of their historical agency, liberate historical development itself and ideally bring an end to seemingly unending cycles of political tyranny and social destruction. (shrink)

Trata-se de pesquisa de natureza bibliográfica e de caráter exploratório, que tem por finalidade, apresentar os principais pressupostos teóricos da concepção multiculturalista de Charles Taylor. Assim, o presente trabalho visa fazer uma crítica, a partir do pensamento do filósofo Charles Taylor, ao modelo de sociedade habitualmente denominado liberalismo procedimental, ou liberalismo igualitário, no sentido de que esse modelo não corresponde, dentro de suas pretensões, a um modelo possível de sociedade livre e com padrões de justiça compatíveis com o fato do (...) pluralismo que caracteriza a sociedades contemporâneas. (shrink)

This paper uses Victor Turner's recent discussion of liminal and liminoid forms of communitas to criticize psychoanalytic praxis, both theory and therapy. In so doing it argues that Turner's distinction can be sharpened by assimilating it to the Marxist concept of commoditization. Heinz Kohut's analysis of narcissism can be supplemented by considering how self‐esteem, like other forms of behavior, is ritualized, particularly in the mother‐child matrix. We can account for the recent increase in narcissistic disorders, in part, by noting how (...) liminal forms of communitas have given way to liminoid forms. Liminoid forms of communitas, like that established in the analytic relationship, secure self‐esteem less adequately than do liminal forms. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose (...) that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation,irrespectiveof the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is acore characteristicof the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into aspecific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible. (shrink)

Money and support tend to flow in the direction of economics, science, and other academic departments that demonstrate measurable "progress." The humanities, on the other hand, offer more abstract and uncertain outcomes. A humanist's objects of study are more obscure in certain ways than pathogens and cells. Consequently, it seems as if the humanities never truly progress. Is this a fair assessment? By comparing objects of science, such as the brain, the galaxy, the amoeba, and the quark, with objects of (...) humanistic inquiry, such as the poem, the photograph, the belief, and the philosophical concept, Volney Gay reestablishes a fundamental distinction between science and the humanities. He frees the latter from its pursuit of material-based progress and restores its disciplines to a place of privilege and respect. Using the metaphor of magnification, Gay shows that, while we can investigate natural objects to the limits of imaging capacity, magnifying cultural objects dissolves them into noise. In other words, cultural objects can be studied only within their contexts and through the prism of metaphor and narrative. Gathering examples from literature, art, film, philosophy, religion, science, and psychoanalysis, Gay builds a new justification for the humanities. By revealing the unseen and making abstract ideas tangible, the arts create meaningful wholes, which itself is a form of progress. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose (...) that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible. (shrink)

La représentation des ombres portées est un fait très rare dans l’histoire des arts: d’abord en Grèce et dans l’Empire gréco-romain, ensuite à partir du XVe siècle en Europe, avec une éclipse médiévale. Jamais en Asie, ni ailleurs. Ce trait caractéristique, qui est souvent passé inaperçu et n’a (durant ces deux périodes) pas donné lieu à théorisation, crée ainsi un lien spécifique entre la Renaissance et l’Antiquité qu’elle voulait revivre. On peut se demander s’il existe ainsi des« marqueurs culturels» et (...) quel genre d’existence ils mènent. (shrink)

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...) discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it. (shrink)

A fresh modern translation of a major French Revolutionary text, whose arguments for popular sovereignty are couched in the form of an Oriental dream-tale. This is a forgotten bestseller in the history of political thought which was translated by Thomas Jefferson and hugely influenced radical poets from Shelley to Whitman.

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to defend Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics against what I call the radical hermeneutic critique, specifically the critique developed in Robert Bernasconi’s article “’You Don’t Know What I’m Talking About’: Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal” (1995). Key to this critique is the claim that Gadamer’s account does not rise to the ethical task of embracing the alterity of the Other, but instead reduces it to a projection of one’s self. The implication is therefore that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (...) has to be rejected on ethical grounds, as it does not appreciate but assimilates the alterity of the Other. In contrast to this radical hermeneutic critique, I argue that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics can accommodate an Other that is not assimilated but appreciated, on the condition that the unique status of a dialogue with the Other as a person is no longer neglected, as Gadamer does, but instead truly distinguished from a dialogue with the Other as a text. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Is knowledge-how, or “practical” knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as a subspecies of theoretical knowledge is threatened by its (...) own set of counterexamples, which convincingly establish that practical knowledge lacks many of the typical characteristics of theoretical knowledge. Most strikingly it does not even appear to require a belief. In this paper, I develop an account of practical knowledge that avoids these counterexamples. It also manages to preserve both the status of such knowledge as a cognitive achievement and its apparently close conceptual relation to abilities. I start with the counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge and show that they fail because they underestimate the cognitive demands of attempts. I then make use of the logic of dispositions to bridge the gap that counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge open. It is argued that, instead of the ability to ϕ, it is a specific disposition to have the ability to ϕ that constitutes practical knowledge about ϕ. The resulting theory is an anti-intellectualist position that preserves essential intellectualist motivations and thus should be satisfactory for proponents of both views. (shrink)

Hierdie boek is n inleiding tot moderne denkrigtings wat alle fasette van die staat betref. Dit verduidelik die verbintenis tussen die huidige proses van staatsvorming in Suid-Afrika en die tradisionele faktore wat dit elders in die w reld aangehelp het.

We establish the existence uncountably many atoms in the subvariety lattice of the variety of involutive residuated lattices. The proof utilizes a construction used in the proof of the corresponding result for residuated lattices and is based on the fact that every residuated lattice with greatest element can be associated in a canonical way with an involutive residuated lattice.

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

Interview with Constantine Sigov, dedicated to the history of the "European Dictionary of Philosophies": from the emergence of an idea in the early 90's in France until the accomplishment of the Ukrainian edition in 2019.

Recent years have seen a high increase in the teaching of Philosophy in schools. Programs such as Pathways Schools in Australia International Society for Philosophers, since 2003), 'Philosophy in Schools' in the UK (Royal Institute of Philosophy, since 1999), and 'Philosophy for Children' in the USA, Australia, and the UK (International Council for Philosophical Inquiry since 1985 & Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education since 1993) are spreading around the world. Within a decade of its introduction Philosophy (...) (AS/A2) has become one of the most popular standard subjects taught across UK secondary.. (shrink)

History casts a spell on our minds more powerful than science or religion. It does not root us in the past at all. It rather flatters us with the belief in our ability to recreate the world in our image. It is a form of self-assertion that brooks no opposition or dissent and shelters us from the experience of time. So argues Constantin Fasolt in The Limits of History , an ambitious and pathbreaking study that conquers history's power by (...) carrying the fight into the center of its domain. Fasolt considers the work of Hermann Conring (1606-81) and Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313/14-57), two antipodes in early modern battles over the principles of European thought and action that ended with the triumph of historical consciousness. Proceeding according to the rules of normal historical analysis--gathering evidence, putting it in context, and analyzing its meaning--Fasolt uncovers limits that no kind of history can cross. He concludes that history is a ritual designed to maintain the modern faith in the autonomy of states and individuals. God wants it, the old crusaders would have said. The truth, Fasolt insists, only begins where that illusion ends. With its probing look at the ideological underpinnings of historical practice, The Limits of History demonstrates that history presupposes highly political assumptions about free will, responsibility, and the relationship between the past and the present. A work of both intellectual history and historiography, it will prove invaluable to students of historical method, philosophy, political theory, and early modern European culture. (shrink)

This paper studies Bukharin’s Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism presented at the 2nd International Congress of the History of Science in London, June 29–July 3, 1931. Bukharin’s paper has not received the attention it deserves despite the fact that it provides the theoretical framework for the paper mostly highlighted in this Congress, Boris Hessen’s The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia. In this work, I try to show that Bukharin’s main achievement is a theory of (...) science based on the concept of practice and at the same time present the internal coherence and the logical structure of Bukharin’s schema. Finally, I discuss what, in my opinion, is a drawback in Bukharin’s paper: his failure to discuss the possibility for scientific objectivity. (shrink)

The deliberative conception of politics seems to be necessary for the legitimation of state power through democratic will‐formation and decision‐making. However, the author maintains that a complex theory of democracy cannot merely consist in procedural prerequisites for organizing the concomitant institutional settings. In particular, such a theory must comprise some substantive presuppositions, such as social and economic rights, in order to diminish existing material inequalities, especially those connected with social exploitation and domination. The author argues that a contemporary theory of (...) democracy should reflect on the autonomization of mechanisms of egoistic action challenging not only the democratic political order, but also the very reproduction preconditions of societies all over the world. In this perspective, the model of associative democracy, which is suggested nowadays as a sort of substantive correlative to the institutional proceduralism, could not significantly rejuvenate the traditional representative democracy. Instead, democracy could only be given a fresh impulse if democratic deliberation penetrates the currently forbidden field of capitalist production and social exploitation, the locus where social inequality and effective unfreedom are endlessly reproduced. (shrink)

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat--when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby (...) prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited. (shrink)

Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...) I show that this assumption does not hold for the class of models of classical propositional logic. In particular, I show that the existence of non-normal models for negation undermines McGee’s argument. (shrink)

With AI permeating our lives, there is widespread concern regarding the proper framework needed to morally assess and regulate it. This has given rise to many attempts to devise ethical guidelines that infuse guidance for both AI development and deployment. Our main concern is that, instead of a genuine ethical interest for AI, we are witnessing moral diplomacies resulting in moral bureaucracies battling for moral supremacy and political domination. After providing a short overview of what we term ‘ethics washing’ in (...) the AI industry, we analyze the 2021 UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (Category II) tasked with drafting the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and show why the term ‘moral diplomacy’ is better suited to explain what is happening in the field of the ethics of AI. Our paper ends with some general considerations regarding the future of the ethics of AI. (shrink)