This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good (...) is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence, the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß die Idee der,,Angleichung an Gott" als der Kern von Platons Philosophie betrachtet werden kann. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet eine skizzenhafte Erörterung des platonischen Philosophiebegriffs. Daran anschließend wird die Verwurzelung der oμoιωσιζ θεω in Platons Theologie hervorgehoben. Die Behandlung ihrer dem platonischen Denken immanenten Voraussetzungen wie ihres konkreten Inhalts führt schließlich im letzten Teil der Arbeit zu der Frage nach der Rolle der oμoιωσιζ θεω in den verschiedenen Dimensionen der platonischen Philosophie. So ergibt sich ein einheitliches Bild von (...) Platons Philosophieren, in dem alle Bestandteile vom Begriff der,,Angleichung an Gott" zusammengehalten und getragen werden. (shrink)

In Resp. 509c7 and 9 Socrates declares that he has omitted many things in the exposition of the analogy between the supreme Good and the sun. In fact Socrates’ exposition leaves some questions open which are seminal with regard to the interpretation of the aforesaid analogy : 1) Why Plato designates the sun as analogon of the Good? 2) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists in a plurality of intelligible beings? 3) Why the original manifestation of the Good (...) consists not only in a purely objective intelligible being, but also in an intellect, that is in a form of consciousness? 4) How can be explained the fact that Plato perceives the Good as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical reality? While the first question can be simply answered by referring to the infinite manifestativity of the Good, the other three questions require a significant effort in the field of speculation. Basing on some clues given by Plato in the exposition of the analogy between the Good and the sun, this article attempts to answer these questions by conjecturing that Plato could have presupposed the image of an infinite sphere consisting in intelligible light. This image, which could have already been presupposed by Parmenides, would offer a conceptual background capable of explaining on the one hand the unity of intelligibility and intellect characterizing the original manifestation of the Good, on the other hand why in Plato’s perspective the Good can be perceived as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical light. (shrink)

Trotz der Zentralität des Begriffs σ^φια in Platons Denken wurden bis jetzt die nicht zahlreichen Stellen der platonischen Dialoge, wo die σ^φια direkt charakterisiert wird, nie einer angemessenen Analyse unterzogen. Ausgehend von diesen Stellen erweist sich die σ^φια als lebendige Einheit von Erkennen und Handeln, die auf der Erfahrung des höchsten Prinzips bzw. des Guten fußt. Die genannte Erfahrung führt den Menschen dazu, sich selbst zu transzendieren und dem Intellekt ν^υζ) ähnlich zu werden, der das Weltall erschafft und lenkt. Dadurch (...) wird der Mensch fähig, das eigene Leben in einen Kosmos zu verwandeln, der sich, vom Guten durchdrungen, als Manifestation der wahren Schönheit offenbart. (shrink)

This article focuses on certain dimensions of Plotinus’ notion of the noetic self, which so far have not received sufficient scholarly atten­tion. The evidence of Enn. V 8 makes clear the assumption about the inexhaustible generativity of the noetic self. This generativity implies an intimate relation with the notions of image and suddenness: the former is intended as a medium of unconditional self-transparency, whereas the latter is understood as pointing to the unlimited newness that is char­acteristic of the noetic life, (...) which, according to Plotinus, consists in an indissoluble unity of identity and alterity. The aforesaid notions make it reasonable to view Plotinus’ concept of noetic self as pointing to a predominantly relational and dynamic ontology, in which essentialism presupposes no staticity whatsoever, but can rather be seen as a perspective that leads to the development of a harmonious and non-narcissistic creativity. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation : by revealing itself, the ἀγαϑὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the ἰδέα (...) τοῦ ἀγαϑοῦ; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato’s notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called ἄγραφα δόγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato’s work. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation : by revealing itself, the ἀγαϑὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the ἰδέα (...) τοῦ ἀγαϑοῦ; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato’s notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called ἄγραφα δόγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato’s work. (shrink)

Semantic theories based on a hierarchy of types have prominently been used to defend the possibility of unrestricted quantification. However, they also pose a prima facie problem for it: each quantifier ranges over at most one level of the hierarchy and is therefore not unrestricted. It is difficult to evaluate this problem without a principled account of what it is for a quantifier to be unrestricted. Drawing on an insight of Russell’s about the relationship between quantification and the structure of (...) predication, we offer such an account. We use this account to examine the problem in three different type-theoretic settings, which are increasingly permissive with respect to predication. We conclude that unrestricted quantification is available in all but the most permissive kind of type theory. (shrink)

Plural expressions found in natural languages allow us to talk about many objects simultaneously. Plural logic — a logical system that takes plurals at face value — has seen a surge of interest in recent years. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between (...) this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic's applications than has been given thus far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the final chapters, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a "critical" alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

Acceptable analyticities, i.e. contradictions or tautologies, constitute problematic evidence for the idea that language includes a deductive system. In recent discussion, two accounts have been presented in the literature to explain the available evidence. According to one of the accounts, grammatical analyticities are accessible to the system but a pragmatic strengthening repair mechanism can apply and prevent the structures from being actually interpreted as contradictions or tautologies. The proposed data, however, leaves it open whether other versions of the meaning modulation (...) operation are required. Novel evidence we present argues that a loosening version of the repair mechanism must be available. Our observation concerns acceptable lexical contradictions that cannot be rescued if only a strengthening version of the pragmatic strategy is available. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive and systematic introduction to the linguistics of humor, exploring not only theoretical linguistic analyses, but also topics from applied linguistics. It will be a valuable resource for students from advanced undergraduate level upwards, particularly those coming to linguistics from related disciplines.

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first-order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non-standard interpretations that confronts higher-order logics on their more traditional, set-based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic (...) that does not resort to sets or set-like objects to interpret plural variables, but adopts the view that a plural variable has many objects as its values. Using this semantics, we also articulate a generalized notion of ontological commitment which enables us to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic. (shrink)

We construct an explicit covariant Majorana formulation of Maxwell electromagnetism which does not make use of vector 4-potential. This allows us to write a “Dirac” equation for the photon containing all the known properties of it. In particular, the spin and (intrinsic) boost matrices are derived and the helicity properties of the photon are studied.

This case study extends the findings of Pickering et al. 2009 to the domain of conversational humor. We find that, as was the case in humorous narratives, conversational humor is not marked by higher pitch or volume, increased speech rate, or significant pauses. Unlike narrative humor, conversational humor is not produced at a lower pitch and slower rate than non-humorous parts of the text. We find that smiling and laughter tend to occur with humor.

World-systems analysis is a well-established but poorly-defined critical research tradition in the social sciences. Its undisputed progenitor, Immanuel Wallerstein, steadfastly maintains that world-systems analysis is not a theory, yet it is widely referred to as such by commentators, critics, and practitioners alike. The resolution to this conundrum is to identify the defining elements of world-systems analysis as a perspective for understanding human society, then to evaluate propositions based on these defining elements as theories that have been conceptualized from a world-systems (...) perspective. In this paper five defining elements of world-systems analysis are identified that together support a central theorem that the core-periphery hierarchy of the modern world-system can best be understood in terms of state strength and cultural integration. A further conjecture is made that the successor world-system to the current capitalist world-economy is more likely to be an American world-empire than the socialist world-government craved by many world-systems analysts. (shrink)

The information contained in DNA is not definitive, but modifiable. Indeed, the environment has the power to modify the genetic material expression without altering the DNA genes sequence. The principal environmental factors that work in this way, whether in a positive or in a negative way, are diet and stress with their ruling hormones, insulin and cortisol; these hormones are normally antagonists but, when they reach their respective resistances, they become the ubiquitary etiopathogenetic factors in bidirectional convergent relationship, each other (...) causing the disinhibition and development of low grade systemic inflammation that opens the door to a myriad of interconnected sets of problems. Among these problems the greater one is cancer, which represents the extreme junction between hyperinsulinemia and hypercortisolemia, just because cancer cells never become insulin resistant and/or cortisol resistant. (shrink)

This paper presents a case study of the “electric hypothesis” of the causes of earthquakes, which emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century as part of the first studies of seismology. This hypothesis was related to Franklin’s views on atmospheric electricity and developed in a period when electric phenomena were widely studied, and was essentially based on solid empirical evidence and confirmed by model experiments. Even though it resulted from scientific reasoning, the theory remained strongly empirical, and was (...) supported by Italian scholars who were familiar with seismic events. Among these, Giuseppe Saverio Poli, a follower of Franklin, was able to provide a careful and comprehensive explanation of the disastrous earthquake of 1783, which occurred in Calabria, a region of southern Italy, and the St. Anne earthquake of 1805, by drawing not just upon the electric evidence, but all the relevant phenomenology available. We outline here the emergence, the development, and the later evolution (up to the beginning of the nineteenth century) of the “electric earthquake” paradigm by focusing on different works by Poli, including a previously unknown manuscript containing a thorough account of the Calabria earthquake prepared by the Neapolitan scholar for the Royal Society. The present case study therefore offers the opportunity to illustrate how electrical science shaped earthquake science to a degree not usually appreciated in the literature, and is also supported to some extent by the transition from Enlightenment scientific ideals to the Romantic conception of unity in the natural world, in search of common causes among phenomena belonging to different fields. (shrink)

Wittgenstein: Epistemology Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth … Continue reading Wittgenstein: Epistemology →.

Quine maintained that philosophical and scientific theorizing should be conducted in an untyped language, which has just one style of variables and quantifiers. By contrast, typed languages, such as those advocated by Frege and Russell, include multiple styles of variables and matching kinds of quantification. Which form should our theories take? In this article, I argue that expressivity does not favour typed languages over untyped ones.

What is absolutely unrestricted quantification? We distinguish two theoretical roles and identify two conceptions of absolute generality: maximally strong generality and maximally inclusive generality. We also distinguish two corresponding kinds of absolute domain. A maximally strong domain contains every potential counterexample to a generalisation. A maximally inclusive domain is such that no domain extends it. We argue that both conceptions of absolute generality are legitimate and investigate the relations between them. Although these conceptions coincide in standard settings, we show how (...) they diverge under more complex assumptions about the structure of meaningful predication, such as cumulative type theory. We conclude by arguing that maximally strong generality is the more theoretically valuable conception. (shrink)

It is futile to say that scholars have worn themselves out in an attempt to give a name to the pagan philosopher with whom Macarius Magnes argues in the Apocriticus. The first to take up the question, Crusius, a follower of Wagenmann, Hauschildt, Harnack and Goulet, identified him as Porphyry. This identification was refuted by Möller, Salmon, Zahn and Frassinetti, who thought of Julian the Apostate; and by Duchesne and Crafer, followed, in part by Pezzella, who proposed Hierocles. Following the (...) studies by Corsaro, who, advised by Borzì, argued with good reason the impossibility of giving a precise name to the pagan philosopher, the vexata quaestio seemed to come to an end. In a recent intervention, Digeser reproposed the identification of Hierocles, going back, in large part, and not without some original notions, to the arguments of Duchesne and Crafer. It is the intent of this contribution to demonstrate the insufficient credibility of this identification. (shrink)