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  1. Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument.Finnur Dellsén - 2015 - Theoria 82 (3):217-237.
    Although many aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation have been extensively discussed, very little has so far been said about what it takes for a hypothesis to count as a rival explanatory hypothesis in the context of IBE. The primary aim of this article is to rectify this situation by arguing for a specific account of explanatory rivalry. On this account, explanatory rivals are complete explanations of a given explanandum. When explanatory rivals are conceived of in this way, I (...)
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  2. The Debate over Scientific Realism.Chrysovalantis 5. Stergiou - 2013 - In Aristidis Baltas & Kostas Stergiopoulos (eds.), Philosophy and Sciences in Twentieth Century. Crete University Press. pp. 467-498.
  3. Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
    This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen’s account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine’s account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by (...)
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  4. Heidegger, Arthur Fine, and the Natural Ontological Attitude.J. Wisnewski - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (2):443-458.
    In this paper I argue that Arthur Fine and Martin Heidegger present responses to the dispute between realism and antirealism that are remarkably close in character. Both claim that this dispute arises from a failure to take seriously our everyday experience of things in the world. I argue that it is useful to note the similarity between Fine and Heidegger for two distinct reasons: 1) their view provides a viable alternative to the current realist/antirealist dispute–an alternative that has not been (...)
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  5. The Natural Ontological Attitude in a Hermeneutic Context.Dimitri Ginev - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (1):17-43.
    My aim in this paper is to re-examine Arthur Fine’s concept of the natural ontological attitude. Whereas earlier critical interpretations focus on the compatibility of NOA with scientific realism, I argue that Fine’s conception is to be recast in terms of an interpretative theory of scientific research. Specifically, I make the case that the hermeneutic reformulation of NOA is unavoidable when at stake are the issues of the structural, conceptual, and experimental articulation of scientific domain. The paper concludes by considering (...)
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  6. The Controversy Over Res in Philosophy of Science and the Mysteries of Ontological Neutrality.M. Baç - 2011 - Filozofia 66:141-153.
    Clarification of the terms ‘realism’ and ‘antirealism’ has always been a challenging task for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and metaphysicians. The first part of my paper offers a certain classification and critical exposition of realisms in philosophy of science. Next, I take up the issue of finding a middle or natural ground between realism and antirealism. Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude is generally considered as a highly interesting and promising attempt at combining the strengths of the two sides of the (...)
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  7. Relativism, Pragmatism, and the Practice of Science.Arthur Fine - 2007 - In Cheryl Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. pp. 50--67.
    "But science in the making, science as an end to be pursued, is as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other branch of human endeavor-- so much so that the question, What is the purpose and meaning of science? receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people" (Einstein 1934, p. 112).
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  8. Deflationary Metaphysics, Social Constructivism, and the Natural Ontological Attitude.Dan McArthur - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:221-234.
  9. The NOAer’s Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.
    Faced with interminable combat over some piece of philosophical terrain, someone will inevitably suggest that the contested ground is nothing more than a philosophically manufactured mirage that is therefore not worth fighting for. Arthur Fine has long advocated such a response—the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude,’ or NOA—to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding the prima facie incompatibility between the realist’s and anti-realist’s positions, Fine suggests that there is in fact enough common ground for NOA to stand on its (...)
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  10. The Quest for Natural Attitudes Within Ontological Limits.Myron A. Penner - 2002 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:103-116.
    In “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” Arthur Fine attempts to provide a way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy in philosophy of science. Says Fine, the natural way of treating the ontological status of theoretical entities is not to form speculative metaphysical theories, be they realist or antirealist, but instead is to apply a homely version of Tarskian semantics. I argue that Fine’s position depends on two deficient maxims, and therefore does not provide a compelling way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy. Fine’s (...)
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  11. The Quest for Natural Attitudes Within Ontological Limits.Myron A. Penner - 2002 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:103-116.
    In “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” Arthur Fine attempts to provide a way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy in philosophy of science. Says Fine, the natural way of treating the ontological status of theoretical entities is not to form speculative metaphysical theories, be they realist or antirealist, but instead is to apply a homely version of Tarskian semantics. I argue that Fine’s position depends on two deficient maxims, and therefore does not provide a compelling way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy. Fine’s (...)
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  12. How Natural Can Ontology Be?Sharon L. Crasnow - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical (...)
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  13. Realism, Antirealism, and NOA.James R. Brown - 1999 - In Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 338.
  14. California Unnatural: On Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude.E. P. Brandon - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):232-235.
    Abela accepts Fine’s account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela’s attitudes are vulnerable to Fine’s criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full‐blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine’s position. He cannot tell (...)
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  15. California Unnatural: On Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude. E. Brandon - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):232-235.
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  16. Is Less Always More? An Argument Against the Natural Ontological Attitude.Paul Abela - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):72-76.
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  17. Getting Ontologically Natural.Sami Pihlström - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256.
    Abstract It is argued that Arthur Fine's ?natural ontological attitude? (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti?realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to ?speak for itself?, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non?question?begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on ?explanationist? grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific (...)
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  18. Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude.André Kukla - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...)
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  19. Comment: Selective Anti-Realism.Ernan McMullin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):97 - 108.
    Comment on A Fine: "Piecemeal Realism." Fine's critique of scientific realism derives its force from a selective focus on mechanics. But what does the antirealist have to say about evolutionary theory or astrophysics? Furthermore, the circularity objection to the "explanationist" defence of realism can be countered. Fine's own position (NOA) reduces either to instrumentalism or to an unargued-for realism, depending on where the stress is laid.
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  20. The Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science.Joseph Rouse - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):607-627.
    Modernism in the philosophy of science demands a unified story about what makes an inquiry scientific (or a successful science). Fine's "natural ontological attitude" (NOA) is "postmodern" in joining trust in local scientific practice with suspicion toward any global interpretation of science to legitimate or undercut that trust. I consider four readings of this combination of trust and suspicion and their consequences for the autonomy and cultural credibility of the sciences. Three readings take respectively Fine's trusting attitude, his emphasis upon (...)
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  21. Fine’s “Shaky Game‘.Richard H. Schlagel - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):307-.
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  22. Noa's Ark--Fine for Realism.Alan Musgrave - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):383-398.
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  23. Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude.Joseph Rouse - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:294 - 301.
    Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine's arguments for a "no-theory" of truth, has (...)
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  24. The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory. Arthur Fine.Paul Teller - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (1):155-156.
  25. Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science.Arthur Fine - 1986 - Mind 95 (378):149-179.
    The realist programme has degenerated by now to the point where it is quite beyond salvage. A token of this degeneration is that there are altogether too many realisms. It is as though by splitting into a confusing array of types and kinds, realism has hoped that some one variety might yet escape extinct. I shall survey the debate, and some of these realisms, below. Here I would just point out the obvious; that in so far as the successes of (...)
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  26. And Not Anti-Realism Either.Arthur Fine - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):51-65.
    This paper develops lines of criticism directed at two currently popular versions of anti-realism: the putnam-rorty-kuhn version that is centered on an acceptance theory of truth, and the van fraassen version that is centered on empiricist strictures over warranted beliefs. the paper continues by elaborating and extending a stance, called "the natural ontological attitude", that is neither realist nor anti-realist.
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  27. The Natural Ontological Attitude.Arthur I. Fine - 1984 - In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press. pp. 261--77.
  28. Chronicle of a Death Foretold.Amit Hagar - manuscript
    Scientific realism is dead, or so many philosophers believe. Its death was announced when philosophers became convinced that one can accept all scientific results without committing oneself to metaphysical existence claims about theoretical entities (Fine 1986, 112). In addition, the inability of self–proclaimed scientific realists, despite recurrent demands, to distinguish themselves from their rival anti–realists (Stein 1989) didn’t exactly help their cause. If realists cannot identify the key feature or features that set them apart from their opponents, then there is (...)
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  29. The Natural Ontological Attitude From a Physicist's Perspective: Towards Quantum Realism.Daniel James Robertson - unknown
    The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and (...)
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  30. On the Very Idea of a Style of Reasoning.Alexandra Bradner - unknown
    Although Ian Hacking’s meta-concept is frequently applied to historical cases, few theorists have questioned the very idea of a style of reasoning. Hacking himself considers Donald Davidson’s conceptual scheme argument to be the most formidable challenge to the style idea, but Hacking has set up a straw man in Davidson. Beyond Hacking’s own conclusion, that Davidson's narrow concern with meaning incommensurability does not apply to styles, which are not incommensurable in that way, there is the more obvious point that styles, (...)
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