Haartman responds to points made by Malony and Carroll. Malony suggests that Methodist repentance was characterized by "devotion" and "joyous possession" rather than fear. Haartman argues that the hysterical crises and the persecutory ideation that accompanied Methodist conversion was often triggered by Wesley's invitation to accept God's love. The data points to a conflict model involving rage and anxiety, as well as devotion. Haartman concedes to Carroll's argument that the majority of Methodists hailed from the lower working class and that (...) the psychology of evangelical nurture does not apply to this constituency. However, the authors of the official autobiographies were drawn from the middling ranks and revealed struggles with authoritarian parenting. Haartman challenges Carroll's emphasis on orality and regression as the primary psychoanalytic explanation for Methodist spirituality. (shrink)

This article examines the phenomenological structures of the homo temporalis filtered through Augustine's illuminating, if unsystematic, insights on temporality and the imago Dei. It situates such a phenomenological interpretation of the Augustinian self in view of current interpretations that polarize or split the Augustinian self into an either/or scheme—either an “interior” self or an “exterior” self. Given this imbalance, the article suggests that a phenomenological evaluation of Augustine brings to light how interior and exterior spheres are deeply integrated. (...) The article elaborates this position by contending that the self's temporal streaming within the exterior world‐horizon is inescapable because it reflects basic constituents of a self created by God which is nevertheless capable of contemplating a God who transcends time. This seeming paradox is resolved by recourse to what is described as the “double entry” of the self. The temporal streaming of the self in the world‐horizon is porous to the eternal inwardly ; the eternal entry is thus interior and analyzable in terms of a non‐reflective self‐awareness on display in Augustine's De Trinitate; and finally Augustine's understanding of the temporality of faith indicates how the self of faith can be lived in light of Heidegger's emphasis on the future and Husserl's emphasis on the past. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual WomanCatharine Savage BrosmanSimone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, by Toril Moi; xii & 324 pp. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, $54.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.Eschewing linear patterns and other conventional ways of writing lives, feminist critic Toril Moi has undertaken instead to construct a “personal genealogy” of Beauvoir, using notions derived partly from Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (Jacques Lacan (...) and Freud are cited likewise). This manner of understanding what the French existentialists called the human project seeks “to achieve a sense of emergence or production and to understand the complex play of different kinds of power involved in social phenomena” (p. 7). The human subject is viewed as a product of forces; individual choice—emphasized continually, and probably excessively, by existentialists—is secondary. All types of evidence, not only writing, are considered germane: social institutions and the subject herself are “text,” part of a “discursive network” (p. 5). The point is to illuminate Beauvoir’s “speaking position” (p. 9) and what it means, for herself and others, and concurrently to explain the rather low disregard in which she appears to be held in France presently.The chief social factor identified is, not surprisingly, what is called the patriarchal order, which Moi sees even today as powerful enough to threaten thinking women’s chances for fulfillment. “Displaying a pernicious imagery of ugly bluestockings and dried-up spinsters, patriarchal ideology seeks to enforce the split between body and mind with particular rigor in the case of intellectual women” (p. 256). Cited in this connection are novels by Germaine de Staël and George Eliot; but, although Eliot influenced the young Beauvoir, these nineteenth-century models pertain little to today’s situation in America and England, for instance (where Moi, a Norwegian, has resided). But Moi needs to believe that such strictures still operate, in order to argue for Beauvoir’s unique position as “a mythological figure, an imago that has made its presence felt in the thoughts and dreams of every intellectual woman in the Western world since the early 1950s” (p. 5)—a claim no less absurd for being unoriginal.The study investigates three “moments” or crucial questions. The first is Beauvoir’s discovery in 1929 (justified or not, and made chiefly perhaps through sexual desire) that she was intellectually inferior to Sartre, despite her stellar academic performance; this led to her positioning herself as second among equals. Moi explores this momentous choice in personal and sociological terms, examining the French academic establishment that formed her and asking what it meant to be a woman agrégée in philosophy, in love with a brilliant man.The second major topic is Beauvoir’s writing itself, as it springs from and refers to her self-image, especially in She Came to Stay and The Second Sex. The former provides telling evidence of what happens when an intelligent woman persuades herself that her lover considers her an equal, whereas actually the [End Page 417] authority remains his. Moi views this novel as more revealing, although oblique, because it is more affectively nuanced and apparently genuine, than direct accounts in Beauvoir’s memoirs of the triangle involving her, Olga Kosakiewicz, and Sartre. The Second Sex—said to be unrivaled in any field in this century, in terms of influence—is examined in light of Beauvoir’s tardy revelation in the 1940s (if one believes her) that being a woman meant something different from being a man. Beauvoir’s understanding of woman’s position is compared to Sartre’s (expressed in fiction and essays, and deduced from his behavior) and to Frantz Fanon’s concept of racial oppression.Lastly, Moi focuses on the bitter conclusion to Force of Circumstance, in which Beauvoir confesses, in her fifties, feeling cheated by life. The problematic quality of this admission can escape no one, in light of her repeated assertions elsewhere that her relationship with Sartre—central to her self-image—constituted an unreserved success, involving utter transparency and union of thought. Moi studies this in terms of other statements—some by Sartre—and Beauvoir’s true accomplishments, and shows how Beauvoir’s... (shrink)

There is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between (...) contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out. (shrink)

This article considers the imago Dei from the perspective of paleoanthropology. We identify structural, functional, and relational elements of the imago Dei that emerged mosaically during human evolution. Humans are unique in their ability to relate to each other and to God, and in their membership of cultural communities where shared attention, the transmission of moral norms, and symbolic behavior are important elements. We discuss similarities between our approach and the concept of theosis adopted in the Eastern Orthodox (...) Church. (shrink)

The article studies the shift of Enlightment in the interpretation of enjoyment, which led to the construction of a particular ethos/nomos enjoyment and transformation in the model of be-ing/thinking. Thus, constituted the transition from the metaphysics of mind, grounded by Des-cartes, to physic of body, presented by Marquis de Sade. This shift or meta/physical gap is carried out at the intersection of two lines: the reason and enjoyment. Given line of reason, the article specifically actualized line of enjoyment, allowing to (...) explore the transformation of the identity of being and thinking which is fundamental to Western philosophy. It sets the place of enjoyment in Cartesian concept of the identity of being and thinking, and the distinc-tion of soul and body. Hence it formulates the maxim of the subject of cogito: it is in thinking that I enjoy being. Approach of Descartes is opposed by the materialistic definition of enjoy-ment and pleasure worked out by de Sade. This conceptualization of the enjoyment enables the transition to physics of body, which recognizes only bodily/physical being hypertrophi-cated by the imagination. Hence the Sadian subject imago constitutes the maxim: it is only by enjoying being that I think. (shrink)

Obraz jako pojęcie filozoficzne ma długą i złożoną historię, która ma swój początek już w starożytności. Uczeni chrześcijańscy włączyli je do swoich badań filozoficznych w postaci imago Dei. W niniejszej pracy autor dokonał analizy dzieł św. Tomasza z Akwinu w celu ustalenia, jakie konsekwencje antropologiczne wynikają z idei stworzenia człowieka na obraz Boży. W pierwszej kolejności ustalono, że człowiek jako istota stworzona na obraz Boga uczestniczy poprzez swój intelekt w naturze Bożej. Dodatkowo przedstawione zostały trzy etapy uczestnictwa człowieka w (...) Bogu. Następnie autor bronił klasycznej teorii Akwinaty przeciwko współczesnym reinterpretacjom jego myśli. Argumentowano, iż Akwinata słusznie utrzymuje, że jedynie intelektualna część duszy ludzkiej jest, ściśle rzecz biorąc, stworzona na Obraz Boży, natomiast ciało ludzkie (i inne stworzenia irracjonalne) upodabnia się do Boga na podobieństwo śladu. (shrink)

Most contemporary theologians have distanced themselves from views that identify the image of God with a capacity or a set of capacities that humans have. This article examines three arguments against the structural view and finds them wanting. The first argument is that the structural view entails mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary philosophy. Against this, I argue that contemporary forms of dualism are able to circumvent such worries and are at least prima facie (...) plausible. The second claim is that structural views end up disvaluing the human body and our relatedness. Here, I argue that neither the structural view nor dualism has such consequences. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries that have to do with the lack of a clear-cut boundary between human capacities and the capacities of nonhuman animals. As a response, the article argues that although there might not be a clear-cut set of capacities that all humans share, we could still have a notion of human distinctiveness that is sufficient for the structural image of God. (shrink)

The article surveys and analyzes the roles in Judaism of the value of imago Dei/human dignity, especially in bioethical contexts. Two main topics are discussed. The first is a comparative analysis of imago Dei as an anthropological and ethical concept in Jewish and Western thought (Christianity and secular European values). The Jewish tradition highlights the human body and especially its procreative function and external appearance as central to imago Dei. The second is the role of imago (...) Dei as a moral value relative to others. In rabbinic Judaism, respect for human dignity is not the primary moral maxim; it is secondary to the value of neighborly love and sometimes to other moral laws and values. (shrink)

El concepto de la forma divina del ser humano es mencionado en varias descripciones en las tres religiones abrahámicas mayores. El enfoque tradicional judeocristiano de Imago Dei (La imagen de Dios) tiene tres perspectivas principales: sustantiva, funcional y relacional. Ibn ‘Arabī, como pensador y místico musulmán, explicó esta idea a través del concepto de espejo y otros dos conceptos, a saber, el ‘Hombre Perfecto’ y la vicegerencia de Dios. Consideró la forma divina del ser humano como un espejo a (...) través del cual Dios se manifiesta. Este artículo ofrece una visión general comprensiva de la interpretación de Ibn ‘Arabī a la luz de los enfoques judeocristianos. La explicación de Ibn ‘Arabī incluye tres enfoques. A través del concepto del hombre perfecto, la explicación de Ibn ‘Arabī se acerca a la interpretación sustantiva, y a través del concepto de vicegerencia, revela la interpretación funcional. El artículo reconoce una interpretación relacional de la forma divina a través de algunas explicaciones contradictorias que pueden hallarse en sus libros. Este análisis de su explicación también arroja bastante luz sobre aspectos de su perspectiva antropológica. (shrink)

This short article provides an introduction to a special section, consisting of six papers on human evolution and the imago Dei. These papers are the result of dialogue between theologians and philosophers of religion at the University of Oxford and the Catholic University of Leuven. All contributors focus on the imago Dei, and consider how this theological notion can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, looking at a variety of disciplines, including the psychology of reasoning, cognitive science of (...) religion, paleoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

This article presents an exploratory analysis of the metaphoric structure of five artistic paintings within “Think aloud” protocols, in which a group of 14 English speakers with a low self-rated level of expertise in art and history of art expertise were asked to verbalize all their thoughts, ideas and impressions of the artworks. The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows: (1) multiple interpretations for the same artwork are possible, (2) the interpretations of the metaphorical structures described (...) by the participants often diverge from those advanced by the researchers. These findings challenge the methods by which metaphor identification and analysis in pictorials is currently approached. As a matter of fact, most of the research in pictorial metaphors tends to reduce stimuli such as artistic paintings to unique metaphoric interpretations generally produced by a single researcher by means of introspection. By addressing this methodological problem in metaphor research, this article contributes to the development of a theoretical and operational participant-based framework that takes into account the role of metaphoric conceptualization within the domain of art and art cognition. (shrink)

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I (...) make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement. (shrink)

The question of how human beings are to understand their role in creation is of particular interest in our current time of extreme exploitation of the earth and severe environmental degradation. Historically, critiques have been raised against the Judeo-Christian interpretation of the biblical command to subdue the earth and rule over the animals. In all sincerity, the question then needs to be asked what Christian theology has to offer in response to these critiques. Having considered the various interpretations of the (...) meaning of the biblical command to subdue and rule, and with the understanding that the spiritual gifts of wisdom, understanding, knowledge and an ability to perform work have been bestowed by God on human beings, the proposition that this article offers is an alternative understanding of the role of human beings tendered in terms of ‘the justice of the peace’. The Hebrew understanding of peace is used as a basis; shalom does not refer to an absence of war but points to life and maintaining the balance and harmony in creation for life in all its varied forms to prosper. In the context of the imago mundi, it is proposed that human beings have been divinely appointed to uphold justice in creation and rule by keeping the peace.Contribution: The metaphor of ‘the justice of the peace’, used concomitantly with the verbs ‘subdue’ and ‘rule’ within ecotheology, offers a viable alternative to the idea of ‘stewardship’ of creation. This article focuses attention on possible alternative interpretations of the two verbs, contributing to an understanding of our relationship with creation. (shrink)

Is it time to take a break from feminism? In this pathbreaking book, Janet Halley reassesses the place of feminism in the law and politics of sexuality. She argues that sexuality involves deeply contested and clashing realities and interests, and that feminism helps us understand only some of them. To see crucial dimensions of sexuality that feminism does not reveal--the interests of gays and lesbians to be sure, but also those of men, and of constituencies and values beyond the realm (...) of sex and gender--we might need to take a break from feminism. Halley also invites feminism to abandon its uncritical relationship to its own power. Feminists are, in many areas of social and political life, partners in governance. To govern responsibly, even on behalf of women, Halley urges, feminists should try taking a break from their own presuppositions. Halley offers a genealogy of various feminisms and of gay, queer, and trans theories as they split from each other in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. All these incommensurate theories, she argues, enrich thinking on the left not despite their break from each other but because of it. She concludes by examining legal cases to show how taking a break from feminism can change your very perceptions of what's at stake in a decision and liberate you to decide it anew. (shrink)

We investigate the pair-splitting number $\germ{s}_{pair}$ which is a variation of splitting number, pair-reaping number $\germ{r}_{pair}$ which is a variation of reaping number and cardinal invariants of ideals on ω. We also study cardinal invariants of F σ ideals and their upper bounds and lower bounds. As an application, we answer a question of S. Solecki by showing that the ideal of finitely chromatic graphs is not locally Katětov-minimal among ideals not satisfying Fatou's lemma.

This article is about the imago Dei, proceeding from an ecotheological perspective. Both the ‘image of God’ and the ‘likeness of God’ are examined based on the understanding that God is a relational God. It approaches the question of the imago Dei in terms of God’s incorporeal nature, and what it is that human beings have in common with God apart from the human being’s capacity for personal and interpersonal relationships. It addresses the question of the imago (...) Dei in terms of God’s spiritual nature and the human being’s ‘earthly’ nature by utilising the metaphor of ‘shadow’. This metaphor was investigated in terms of its meaning in Hebrew (tselem), and Genesis 2:7–8 where the creation of the human being is described in terms of God breathing the breath of life into the human being. A distinction has been drawn between the ‘image of God’ and the ‘likeness of God’, with the ‘likeness of God’ (demuth) that was investigated in the context of Exodus 31:1–5, and the various spiritual gifts conferred to Bezalel by the Spirit of God. Based on this investigation the article posits that the imago Dei as the Shadow of God (life) has been bestowed on all living creatures and not only human beings.Contribution: The suggestion that the imago Dei as the Shadow of God is present in all of the creation urges us to seek further and look deeper into the issue of imago Dei in the sense that such an understanding pointedly has far-reaching implications for the current understanding of the place of human beings in creation. In consideration of this, it bears on our understanding of the meaning of life within the bigger picture of creation and how we respond to the living environment with which we share life. (shrink)

Two events, apparently distant one from the other and without any direct link between them, but nevertheless strictly connected by a common spiritual legacy, constitute the subject of this paper. The first one, took place in 1971, when a very special «ecumenical chapel» opened its doors to the public. It is known under the name of «Rothko Chapel», due to the general project, undertaken by the painter Mark Rothko. Since that time, it has become one of the most precious artworks (...) that represent the contemporary religious aesthetics. The black Rothko’s paintings, the Greek-cross building designed by the architect Philip Johnson, the Broken Obelisk of the artist Barnett Newman standing right out of the Chapel and the music composed for this ambient by the composer Morton Feldman, have replaced what traditionally has been called an «imago templi»; but contrary to all Christian tradition they represent (literally) no-thing. The second event, took place in 1795, when two young friends, Hegel and Schelling, were making a kind of oath under the sign of an Invisible Church, actualizing an ambiguous concept that, even if rooted in the Holy Scriptures, it had been condemned for its consequences as heretical. The relationship between these two events is given by contemporary art historians which have established that modern abstract painting, from a formal point of view, is rooted in the Romantic tradition. With this paper I would like to contribute to the establishment of this connection, not only by formal means, but by showing a common spiritual attitude towards images. Christianity, essentially figurative in its religious aesthetics, has always had to deal with the Jewish prohibition of image-making. This difficulty has been inherited to contemporary debates in which artist with classical readings and education, often of Jewish origins but active in Christian societies, try to create a new kind of art, above all traditions and free of dogmas. According to my suggestion, Rothko Chapel should be considered as the realization of a fragile balance in which both «aniconism» and «need of images» have simultaneously sublated their one-sidedness, producing a higher spiritual stage. Thus, such a chapel would not be a simple space where all religions could only meet and undertake a dialog, but should be considered as something more surprising: a unique realization of what logically appears as a pure contradiction: the realization of an Imago Templi for an Invisible Church. (shrink)

Según L. Polo la libertad es un trascendental de carácter donal; esa índole donal significa que se ejerce entendiendo y aceptando el don recibido. Se reconoce entonces que ser libre implica saberse uno mismo enteramente dependiente de Dios. Desde estas tesis mantenidas al final de La libertad trascendental, se expondrá la concepción poliana de la criatura en consonancia con esa condición de la libertad. Se mostrará que la teoría poliana acerca de la libertad así entendida encuentra algunos antecedentes en la (...) noción de libertad que fue desarrollada por Nicolás de Cusa en su doctrina acerca de la imagen; doctrina que entiende la libertad como posesión de sí en el autoconocimiento y profunda unión con la trascendencia. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the study of the Muchnik and Medvedev lattices of non-empty Π01 subsets of 2ω. In both these lattices, any non-minimum element can be split, i. e. it is the non-trivial join of two other elements. In fact, in the Medvedev case, ifP > MQ, then P can be split above Q. Both of these facts are then generalised to the embedding of arbitrary finite distributive lattices. A consequence of this is that both lattices (...) have decidible ∃-theories. (shrink)

This short article provides an introduction to a special section, consisting of six papers on human evolution and the imago Dei. These papers are the result of dialogue between theologians and philosophers of religion at the University of Oxford and the Catholic University of Leuven. All contributors focus on the imago Dei, and consider how this theological notion can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, looking at a variety of disciplines, including the psychology of reasoning, cognitive science of (...) religion, paleoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary ethics. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to propose a unified approach to the split scope readings of negative indefinites, comparative quantifiers, and numerals. There are two main observations that justify this approach. First, split scope shows the same kinds of restrictions across these different quantifiers. Second, split scope always involves low existential force. In our approach, following Sauerland, natural language determiner quantifiers are quantifiers over choice functions, of type <<,t>,t>. In split readings, the quantifier over choice (...) functions scopes above other operators (such as intensional verbs like must or can). Determiner quantifiers leave a choice-function trace when they move and this trace combines with the noun restriction, which is interpreted low. That split scope always involves low existential force is derived, without stipulation, from Kratzer’s idea that low existential force can be achieved via binding (into the noun restriction). (shrink)

Dos eventos, aparentemente distantes uno del otro y sin vínculos directos entre ellos, pero sin embargo estrictamente relacionados por un legado espiritual común, constituyen el tema de este trabajo. El primero, tuvo lugar en 1971, cuando una «capilla ecuménica» muy especial abrió sus puertas al público. Es conocida bajo el nombre de «Rothko Chapel», debido al proyecto general, realizado por el pintor Mark Rothko. Desde entonces, se ha convertido en una de las obras de arte más valiosas que representan la (...) estética religiosa contemporánea. Las pinturas negras de Rothko, la planta del edificio de «cruz griega» diseñado por el arquitecto Philip Johnson, el obelisco del artista Barnett Newman y la música compuesta para este ambiente por el compositor Morton Feldman, han reemplazado lo que tradicionalmente ha sido llamado «imago templi»; pero, contrariamente a toda tradición cristiana, representan nada (literalmente: no-thing). El segundo evento, tuvo lugar en 1795, cuando dos jóvenes amigos, Hegel y Schelling, estaban haciendo una especie de juramento bajo el signo de una Iglesia Invisible, actualizando un concepto ambiguo que, incluso arraigándose en las Sagradas Escrituras, ya había sido condenado por las iglesias oficiales por sus consecuencias heréticas. La relación entre estos dos eventos está dada por historiadores del arte moderno que han establecido que la pintura abstracta, desde un punto de vista formal, tiene sus raíces en la tradición romántica. Con este trabajo me gustaría contribuir al establecimiento de esta conexión, no solo por medios formales, sino también mostrando una actitud espiritual común hacia las imágenes. El cristianismo, esencialmente figurativo en su estética religiosa, siempre ha tenido que lidiar con la prohibición judía de la creación de imágenes. Esta dificultad ha sido trasferida a los debates contemporáneos en los que artistas con lecturas y educación clásicas, a menudo de origen judío pero activos en sociedades cristianas, intentan crear un nuevo tipo de arte, fuera de toda tradición y sin dogmas. Según mi sugerencia, Rothko Chapel debería considerarse como la realización de un equilibrio frágil en el que tanto el «aniconismo» como la «necesidad de imágenes» han superado su mutua unilateralidad, produciendo una etapa espiritual más elevada. Por lo tanto, tal capilla no sería un simple espacio donde todas las religiones podrían solo reunirse y dialogar, pero debería considerarse algo más sorprendente, es decir, una realización única de lo que lógicamente aparece como una pura contradicción: la realización de un Imago Templi para una Iglesia Invisible.Key words: Rothko; Hegel; Arte Abstracto; Idealismo; Iglesia Invisible. (shrink)

Theologians and Old Testament scholars have been at odds with respect to the best interpretation of the imago Dei. Theologians have preferred substantialistic (e.g., image as soul or mind) or relational interpretations (e.g., image as relational personhood) and Old Testament scholars have preferred functional interpretations (e.g., image as kingly dominion). The disagreements revolve around a number of exegetical questions. How do we best read Genesis 1 in its literary, historical, and cultural contexts? How should it be read theologically? How (...) should we read Genesis 1 as a canonical text? This book charts a path through these disagreements by offering a dogmatically coherent and exegetically sound canonical interpretation of the image of God. Peterson argues that the fundamental claim of Genesis 1:26-28 is that humanity is created to image God actively in the world. "Made in the image of God" is an identity claim. As such, it tells us about humanity's relationship with God and the rest of creation, what humanity does in the world, and what humanity is to become. Understanding the imago Dei as human identity has the further advantage of illuminating humanity's ontology. Canonically, knowledge of the contours and purpose of human existence develops alongside God's self-revelation. Tracing this development, Peterson demonstrates the coherence of the OT and NT texts that refer to the image of God. In the NT, Jesus Christ is understood as the realization of God's image in the world and therefore the fulfillment of the description of humanity's identity in Genesis 1. In addition to its specific focus on resolving interdisciplinary tensions for Christian interpretation of the imago Dei, the argument of the book has important implications for ethics, the doctrine of sin, and the doctrine of revelation. (shrink)

The essay considers the cultural, religious and historical attitudes that are woven together in the narrative of the famous illustrated book, Imago primi saeculi of 1640, and focuses on several important Jesuits from Belgium and Rome, such as Bollandus.

Autorka artykułu podejmuje temat mistyki spekulacyjnej dotyczącej tego, czy istoty ludzkie mogą osiągnąć pełną jedność z zasadą bytu w kontekście koncepcji imago repraesentationis Mikołaja z Kuzy. U Mikołaja z Kuzy to pytanie pojawia się w kontekście zachowania wolności człowieka,jako imago imitationis creata, dzięki unii personalnej z Absolutem.Dans cet article l’auteur traite un thème de la spéculation mystique qui concerne la question de savoir si l’etre humain peut atteindre une union complete avec l’origine ou principe de l’être dans le (...) contexte de la notion repraesentationis imago de Nicolas de Cues. Chez Nicolas de Cues cette question se pose en termes de déroulement de la liberté de l’être humain, comme imago imitationis creata, à travers cette union personnelle avec l’Absolu.In this article the author deals with a theme of mystical speculation that regards the question of whether the human being can reach a complete union with the origin or principle of being within the context of Nicholas of Cusa’s notion of imago repraesentationis. In Nicholas of Cusa, this question is posed in terms of the unfolding of the human being’s freedom, as imago imitationis creata, through that personal union with the Absolute. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine Seneca’s self-portrait as depicted in his Letters to Lucilius. The first part deals with the place this collection of letters occupies in the context of ancient epistolary literature. It shows how it contributed to the introspective character of ancient philosophical prose. Introspection as a method of self-knowledge and self-creation is analyzed in the second part. The resulting vision of the identity of the author of Letters is neither unified, nor consistent: Seneca is (...) presented as a “man of many faces” in his life as well as in literature. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-splitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

Reverse mathematics is a program in the foundations of mathematics founded by Friedman and developed extensively by Simpson and others. The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms needed to prove a theorem of ordinary, that is, non-set-theoretic, mathematics. As suggested by the title, this paper deals with two RM-phenomena, namely, splittings and disjunctions. As to splittings, there are some examples in RM of theorems A, B, C such that A↔, that is, A can be split into (...) two independent parts B and C. As to disjunctions, there are examples in RM of theorems D, E, F such that D↔, that is, D can be written as the disjunction of two independent parts E and F. By contrast, we show in this paper that there is a plethora of splittings and disjunctions in Kohlenbach’s higher-order RM. (shrink)

This study aims at showing how at the basis of Nikolai Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism and Marxism lays the concept of Imago Dei. The Russian religious philosopher puts forward the Imago Dei as fundamental to the Christian understanding of human dignity. Berdyaev believes that in both capitalism and Marxism an objectification of the person takes place, and therefore a denial of basic human dignity. Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism refers to its internal principles, partly building on Marx’s early criticism (...) of capitalism. Although he shared some of the same concerns with Marx and other Marxist theorists, ultimately his was a critique from a Christian perspective that was deeply humanistic, whereas Marxism in its Hegelian orientation had failed in achieving what Berdyaev understands as true humanism. Having confronted and engaged both systems of thought during his own life, Berdyaev’s insights are most interesting, and I argue in this paper that they are also relevant for our own reflections on these subjects today. (shrink)

A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a sin- gular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: (a) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain different sets of relevant phenomena; (b) concepts split (...) because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain responses to different kinds of category. Whether these arguments are sound remains an open empirical question, to be resolved by future empirical and theoretical work. (shrink)

Starting with Marx and Freud, scholars have attempted to identify the primary ethical challenge of capitalism. They have named injustice, inequality, repression, exploitative empires, and capitalism psychic hold over all of us, among other else. Nimi Wariboko instead argues that the core ethical problem of capitalism lies in the split nature of the modern economy, an economy divided against itself. Production is set against finance, consumption against saving, and the future against the present. As the rich enjoy their lifestyle, (...) their fellow citizens live in servitude. The economy mimics the structure of our human subjectivity as Saint Paul theorizes in Romans 7: the law constitutes the subject as split, traversed by negativity. The economy is split, shot through with a fundamental antagonism. This fundamental negativity at the core of the economy disturbs its stability and identity, generating its destructive drive. The Split Economy develops a robust theoretical framework at the intersection of continental philosophy, psychoanalytic theory, theology, and political economy to reveal a fundamental dynamic at the heart of capitalism. (shrink)

Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection (...) or even unreflective causal interactions. But a soul theorist can allow neurological events to keep some conscious thoughts unavailable to others. (shrink)

"Man does not live by bread alone ... " Human life embraces more than just 'living' (material survival); the human soul thrives on many ambiguous metaphysical elements. One of these elements is beauty. The question motivating this article is the ubiquitous 'why'; why do people find beauty in various elements of their environment? Put another way, what is it that enables one to appreciate beauty? The thesis of this article is that a person's ability to appreciate beauty is a result (...) of being created in the image of God. (shrink)