This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In a series of reports the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations has emphasized a tripartite framework regarding business and human rights that includes the state “duty to protect,” the TNC “responsibility to respect,” and “appropriate remedies” for human rights violations. This article examines the recent history of UN initiatives regarding business and human rights and places the tripartite framework in historical context. Three approaches to human rights are distinguished: moral, political, and legal. (...) It is argued that the tripartite framework’s grounding of the responsibility of TNCs to respect human rights is properly understood as moral and not merely as a political or legal duty. A moral account of the duty of TNCs to respect basic human rights is defended and contrasted with a merely strategic approach. The main conclusion of the article is that only a moral account of the basic human rights duties of TNCs provides a sufficiently deep justification of “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights” feature of the tripartite framework. (shrink)

Some years ago a collection of historical and philosophical essays on sex was advertised under the slogan: Philosophers are interested in sex again. Since that time the history of sexuality has become an almost unexceptionable topic, occasioning as many books and articles as anyone would ever care to read. Yet there are still fundamental conceptual problems that get passed over imperceptibly when this topic is discussed, passed over, at least in part, because they seem so basic or obvious that it (...) would be time badly spent to worry too much about them. However, without backtracking toweard this set of problems, one will quite literally not know what one is writing the history of when one writes a history of sexuality.An excellent example of some of the most sophisticated current writing in this field can be found in Western Sexuality, a collection of essays that resulted from a seminar conducted by Philippe Ariès at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1979-80.1 As one would expect, Western Sexuality is characterized by a diversity of methodological and historiographical approaches—social history, intellectual history, cultural history , historical sociology, the analysis of literary texts, and that distinctive kind of history practiced by Michel Foucault and also in evidence in the short essay by Paul Veyne. One perspective virtually absent from this collection is the history of science, and since I believe that the history of science has a decisive and irreducible contribution to make to the history of sexuality, it is not accident that I am going to focus on that connection. But the history of sexuality is also an area in which one’s historiography or implicit epistemology will stamp, virtually irrevocably, one’s first-order historical writing. It is an arena in which philosophical and historical concerns inevitably run into one another. 1. Philippe Ariès and Adnré Béjin, eds., Western Sexuality: Practice and Percept in Past and Present Times . Arnold I. Davidson, a coeditor of Critical Inquiry, is assistant professor of philosophy and member of the Committees on General Studies in the Humanities and on the Conceptual Foundations of Science at the University of Chicago. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, “How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” appeared in the Winter 1987 issue. (shrink)

For more than sixty years, surgeons have used bioethical strategies to promote patient self‐determination, many of these now collectively described as “informed consent.” Yet the core framework—understanding, risks, benefits, and alternatives—fails to support patients in deliberation about treatment. We find that surgeons translate this framework into an overly complicated technical explanation of disease and treatment and an overly simplified narrative that surgery will “fix” the problem. They omit critical information about the goals and downsides of surgery and present untenable options (...) as a matter of patient choice. We propose a novel framework called “better conversations.” Herein, surgeons provide context about clinical norms, establish the goals of surgery, and comprehensively delineate the downsides of surgery to generate a deliberative space for patients to consider whether surgery is right for them. This paradigm shift meets the standards for informed consent, supports deliberation, and allows patients to anticipate and prepare for the experience of treatment. (shrink)

The complexity class of [Formula: see text]-polynomial local search problems is introduced and is used to give new witnessing theorems for fragments of bounded arithmetic. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, the [Formula: see text]-definable functions of [Formula: see text] are characterized in terms of [Formula: see text]-PLS problems. These [Formula: see text]-PLS problems can be defined in a weak base theory such as [Formula: see text], and proved to be total in [Formula: see text]. Furthermore, the [Formula: (...) see text]-PLS definitions can be skolemized with simple polynomial time functions, and the witnessing theorem itself can be formalized, and skolemized, in a weak base theory. We introduce a new [Formula: see text]-principle that is conjectured to separate [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Abordaré la crítica de Axel Honneth a la primera Escuela de Frankfurt y su aparente omisión de Herbert Marcuse. Defenderé a Marcuse contra algunas de las críticas hechas por Honneth a la teoría crítica temprana de la Escuela de Frankfurt. Luego argumentaré que Marcuse siempre estuvo en busca de una subjetividad radical, incluso cuando advirtió contra los mecanismos unidimensionales en curso de producción de sujetos. Finalmente, mostraré que Honneth también construye su proyecto en torno a la búsqueda de una subjetividad (...) radical, pero aborda el problema a través de una teoría de la intersubjetividad que complementa el proyecto de Marcuse. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot, whose inaugural lecture to the chair of the History of Hellenistic and Roman Through at the Collège de France we are publishing here, is one of the most significant and wide-ranging historians of ancient philosophy writing today. His work, hardly known in the English-reading world except among specialists, exhibits that rare combination of prodigious historical scholarship and rigorous philosophical argumentation that upsets any preconceived distinction between the history of philosophy and philosophy proper. In addition to being the translator (...) and author of monographs on Plotinus, Vitorinus, Porphyry, and many others, Hadot’s most important general philosophical work is entitled Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique.1 Combined with detailed studies of Socrates and Marcus Aurelius, this work presents a history of spiritual exercises from Socrates to early Christianity, an account of their decline in modern philosophy, and a discussion of the different conceptions of philosophy that have companied the trajectory and fate of the theory and practice of spiritual exercises. Hadot’s “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy” provides an overview of his major themes and preoccupations, and gives some indication of the historical scope of his work. This lecture also illuminates the methodological problems one faces in studying the history of thought, especially problems concerning the evolution, reinterpretation, and even misunderstanding of the meaning and significance of philosophical terminology. In this brief introduction, I can do no more than attempt to provide a context for Hadot’s inaugural lecture, by way of summary of his major work, and, more specifically for reader’s of Critical Inquiry, to sketch the profound importance that Hadot’s writings had for the last works of Michel Foucault. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and a member of the Committees on the Conceptual Foundations of Science and General Studies in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He introduced and edited the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism” . He is currently working on the history of horror as it relates to the epistemology of norms and deviations. (shrink)

We investigate the relation between intermediate predicate logics based on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains and Gödel logics. We show that for any such Kripke frame there is a Gödel logic which coincides with the logic defined by this Kripke frame on constant domains and vice versa. This allows us to transfer several recent results on Gödel logics to logics based on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains: We obtain a complete characterisation of axiomatisability of logics based (...) on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains. Furthermore, we obtain that the total number of logics defined by countable linear Kripke frames on constant domains is countable. (shrink)

Few residency training programmes explicitly require substantive exposure to issues in medical ethics and fewer still have a formal curriculum in this area. Traditional undergraduate medical ethics courses teach preclinical students to identify ethical issues and analyse them at a theoretical level. Residency training, however, is the ideal time to establish the critical behavioural link which makes ethics truly useful in clinical medicine. The General Internal Medicine Residency Training Program at Rhode Island Hospital has developed an integrated, three-year curriculum with (...) the goals of helping residents to perceive ethical issues in clinical practice, to utilise basic philosophical principles in resolving ethical dilemmas and to communicate these issues clearly and sensitively to patients. The curriculum has been well received by residents and has had a hospital-wide impact. We believe that training residents in medical ethics and communication skills is an effective approach to developing physicians' humane qualities. (shrink)

I have two primary aims in the following paper, aims that are inextricably intertwined. First, I want to raise some historiographical and epistemological issues about how to write the history of psychoanalysis. Although they arise quite generally in the history of science, these issues have a special status and urgency when the domain is the history of psychoanalysis. Second, in light of the epistemological and methodological orientation that I am going to advocate, I want to begin a reading of Freud’s (...) Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, one whose specificity is a function of my attachment to this orientation, to a particular way of doing the history of psychoanalysis. Despite the enormous number of pages that have been written on Freud’s Three Essays, it is very easy to underestimate the density of this book, a density at once historical, rhetorical, and conceptual. This underestimation stems in part from historiographical presumptions that quite quickly misdirect us away from the fundamental issues.In raising question about the historiography of the history of science, I obviously cannot begin at the beginning. So let me begin much further along, with the writings of Michel Foucault. I think of the works of Foucault, in conjunction with that of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as exemplifying a very distinctive perspective about how to write the history of science. In the English-speaking world, perhaps only the work of Ian Hacking both shares this perspective and ranks with its French counterparts in terms of originality and quality. No brief summary can avoid eliding the differences between Bachelard, Canguilhem, Hacking, and Foucault; indeed, the summary I am going to produce does not even fully capture Foucault’s perspective, which he called “archaeology.”1 But this sketch will have to do for the purposes I have in mind here, whose ultimate aim is to reorient our approach to the history of psychoanalysis. 1. The sketch that follows reproduces, with some omissions and additions, the beginning of my “Archeology, Genealogy, Ethics,” in Michel Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Hoy , pp. 221-34. Arnold I. Davidson is assistant professor in the department of philosophy, the Committee on the Conceptual Foundations of Science, and the Committee on General Studies in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He is currently writing a book on the history and epistemology of nineteenth-century psychiatric theories of sexuality. (shrink)

Through the thickets of recent debates, I take two facts as clear enough starting points. The first is that Heidegger’s participation in National Socialism, and especially his remarks and pronouncements after the war, were, and remain, horrifying. The second is that Heidegger remains of the essential philosophers of our century; Maurice Blanchot testifies for several generations when he refers to the “veritable intellectual shock” that the reading of Being and Time produced in him.5 And Emmanuel Levinas, not hesitating to express (...) his reservations about Heidegger, can nevertheless bring himself to say that a person “who undertakes to philosophize in the twentieth century cannot not have gone through Hiedegger’s philosophy, even to escape it.”6 In this century, perhaps only Ludwig Wittgenstein has had a comparable impact and influence on philosophy. I do not mean to deny that one can reject the over seventy volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe as worthless, that one can, as with Wittgenstein, find that his work is obscure, indulgent, impossible to read, that nothing in it contributes to philosophy. But both Heidegger and Wittgenstein write in anticipation of this reaction, recognizing that their desires, differently articulated, to overcome philosophy will help to determine how their writing is received. Stanley Cavell’s characterization of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations describes Heidegger as well:Philosophical Investigations, like the major modernist works of the past century at least, is, logically speaking, esoteric. That is, such works seek to split their audience into insiders and outsiders ; hence they create the particular unpleasantness of cults ; hence demand for their sincere reception the shock of conversion.7When combined with Heidegger’s political engagement, the particular unpleasantness of cults and indifference are more than joined. Thus it can seem as though one must either exculpate Heidegger, explain away his relation to Nazism as an aberration from the outside, or reject his thought entirely, declare that his books should no longer be read. In an attempt to begin to confront these issues, Critical Inquiry is publishing this symposium. 5. Maurice Blanchot, “Thinking the Apocalypse: A Letter from Maurice Blanchot to Catherine David,” trans. Paula Wissing, p. 479 of this issue.6. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen , p. 42. See also the last line of Gadamer, “ ‘Back from Syracuse?’ “ p. 430.7. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy , p. xvi; hereafter abbreviated CR. Arnold I. Davidson, a coeditor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and member of the Committees on General Studies in the Humanities and on the Conceptual Foundations of Science at the University of Chicago. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality”. (shrink)

Although Kant had to write his Critique of Judgement with an eye to the Prussian censorship, he nevertheless valued in his aesthetic theory the achievements of the French Revolution. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to analyze the underlying political philosophy of Immanuel Kant's third Critique in the context of the aesthetic theories of his time. The paper presents a brief account of his aesthetic theory (especially of his concepts of "harmony" and "free interplay" between the cognitive faculties) and (...) gives special attention to the question why, in Kant's opinion, political speeches were legitimate objects of aesthetic judgments. (shrink)

Marx believed that what most clearly distinguished him and Engels from the nineteenth-century French socialists was that their version of socialism was “scientific” while the latters' was Utopian. What he intended by this contrast is roughly the following: French socialists such as Proudhon and Fourier constructed elaborate visions of a future socialist society without an adequate understanding of existing capitalist society. For Marx, on the other hand, socialism was not an idea or an ideal to be realized, but a natural (...) outgrowth of the existing capitalist order. Marx's historical materialism is a systematic attempt to discover the laws governing the inner dynamics of capitalism and class societies generally. Although this theory issues in a prediction of the ultimate triumph of socialism, it is a commonplace that Marx had little to say about the details of post-capitalist society. Nevertheless, some of its features can be discerned from his critical analysis of capitalism and what its replacement entails. (shrink)

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at the (...) current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory. (shrink)

Commercialism first became a major problem for medicine in the decade of the 1970s, when huge quantities of new money began to flow into the healthcare system, as a result of Medicaid and Medicare, and the rapid expansion of private, employer-based insurance. Of course, physicians benefited, but most of this new money went to insurance plans and medical care delivery institutions, like hospitals, nursing homes, diagnostic services, and ambulatory care facilities of many kinds. Many of these were newly established for-profit (...) businesses. A vast number of satellite enterprises sprang up to serve the growing needs of the new businesses by providing services like marketing and advertising, brokering, consulting, information technology, financial services, case and disease management, billing and collecting, and so forth. (shrink)

This essay is about the moral and political justification of affirmative action programs in the United States. Both legally and politically, many of these programs are under attack, though they remain ubiquitous. The concern of this essay, however, is not with what the law says but with what it should say. The main argument advanced in this essay concludes that most of the controversial affirmative action programs are unjustified. It proceeds in a way that avoids dependence on controversial theories of (...) justice or morality. My intention is to produce an argument that is persuasive across a broad ideological spectrum, extending even to those who believe that justice requires these very programs. Though the main focus of the essay is on affirmative action, in the course of making the case that these programs are illegitimate, I shall defend some principles about the conditions under which it is appropriate for the state to impose on civil society the demands of justice. These principles have broader implications for a normative theory of social change in democratic societies. (shrink)

Corporations have been investing in academia to an extent that could be classified as a corporate takeover of universities. Intra‐university critics see this as an ethical problem, because of the degree of business control over university policies and decisions which accompanies the funding. University critics rarely suggest that the corporate funding be given up, returned, or even limited. What they protest against is corporate control, which they see as threatening university autonomy, and as inimical to the public good. Multi‐university conferences (...) have been held focusing on this problem, and the most serious solution proposed thus far is to construct a relevant code of ethics regulating and limiting corporate involvement, through standards and guidelines which corporations will then have to subscribe to, in order to fund universities. However, there is a conflict of interest here. Universities have a public trust and a fiduciary duty not to compromise education. This implies a covenant not to cede power to outside interests, not to use university resources, or faculty and students, as a means to an educationally irrelevant end. Universities cannot sell out. However, it seems equally dishonest not to offer their students a well‐funded first‐rate, quality education in applied fields with current skills, maximum research opportunity, and the corporate ties that would allow them to obtain jobs. We examine three cases showing errors made by universities in ceding control to corporate investment, and draw some policy conclusions. (shrink)

This paper articulates a psychodynamically informed phenomenological reading of prepsychotic perceptual alterations, which the author calls anti-epiphanies. Several of Carl Jung's experiences of the anti-epiphany, as described in his autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections , are taken as exemplar cases. These anti-epiphanies are viewed through a critical psychobiographical lens, in an interpretationwhich tacks back and forth between Jung's childhood, psychological theories, and later prepsychotic experience. It is claimed that Jung's anti-epiphanies are linked to his use of schizoid-narcissistic forms of transitional selfobjects, (...) referred to as Jungian manikins. Such Jungian manikins, it is argued, function to defend the subject against annihilation anxieties related to psychological engulfment, penetration, and finalization. When these anxieties become especially pronounced, the subject's entire perceptual world may be defensively used as a Jungian manikin, creating an anti-epiphany. The author conjectures that similar patterns of experience may be operative in the prepsychotic perceptual alterations had by those with schizoid-narcissistic character pathology. (shrink)

Throughout the history of philosophy the concept of unity has presented a problem. What does it mean to say that the cosmos is one, that a thing is one, that an organism is one, that a nation is one, that mind and body are one, that knower and known are one? Exactly what is it that is denoted when unity is postulated of anything? And when two or more entities are conceived as subsisting in unity, exactly what is the relation (...) between that unity on the one hand, and its correlative duality or plurality on the other? (shrink)

In the whole theory of the Latin tenses there is no more popular item than this explanation by Roby of the use of the pluperfect indicative in unreal conditional sentences. Far the most familiar instance is that in Horace , ‘me truncus illapsus cerebro sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum dextra leuasset.’.

Historically, critics of capitalism have had a great deal to say about the defects and social ills that afflict capitalist society and correspondingly little to say about how alternative institutional arrangements might solve these problems. One can only speculate about why this has been so. One reason might be a simple matter of priorities. Bertolt Brecht once said that when a man's house is on fire, one does not inquire too closely into alternative arrangements for shelter. The analogy between capitalism (...) and a burning house may seem overwrought today, but in the dark days of the Depression of the 1930s it probably seemed more apt. Another explanation for the scant attention paid to alternatives to capitalism has to do with both the factual and ideological beliefs of capitalism's critics. If one believes that the existing order would be destroyed by a mass movement, that new institutions would be constructed by the people in a democratic spirit, and that furthermore all of this would be a good thing, it would be unwise and counterproductive to try to spell out exactly where history is headed. After all, a genuine mass movement has little use for self-proclaimed prophets of history. Finally, men and women of modest intellectual pretensions might be humbled by the prospects of trying to spell out in any detail social institutions that should exist or might exist but are not as yet found anywhere in the world. (shrink)

At the request of the Classical Journals Board we have undertaken for the present to edit this Journal. In so doing we confidently rely upon the co-operation of those who have hitherto been contributors, as well as of others who may be in a position to assist us.

Define z to be the smallest cardinality of a function f: X → Y with X. Y ⊆ 2ω such that there is no Borel function g ⊇ f. In this paper we prove that it is relatively consistent with ZFC to have b < z where b is, as usual, smallest cardinality of an unbounded family in ωω. This answers a question raised by Zapletal. We also show that it is relatively consistent with ZFC that there exists X ⊆ (...) 2ω such that the Borel order of X is bounded but there exists a relatively analytic subset of X which is not relatively coanalytic. This answers a question of Mauldin. (shrink)

In 1992, the city of Boulder, Colorado, passed an ordinance forbidding discrimination against homosexuals in employment and housing. Two years later, voters in the state of Colorado passed a constitutional amendment forbidding the passage of local ordinances prohibiting this form of discrimination. The constitutional amendment did not mandate discrimination against homosexuals; it merely nullified ordinances such as Boulder's. The amendment was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitutional.

In this paper the Hurwicz decision rule is applied to an adjustment problem concerning the decision whether a given action should be improved in the light of some knowledge on the states of nature or on other actors' behaviour. In comparison with the minimax and the minimin adjustment principles the general Hurwicz rule reduces to these specific classes whenever the underlying loss function is quadratic and knowledge is given by an ellipsoidal set. In the framework of the adjustment model discussed (...) in this paper Hurwicz's optimism index can be interpreted as a mobility index representing the actor's attitude towards new external information. Examples are given that serve to illustrate the theoretical findings. (shrink)

According to recent astrophysical evidence, the present universe has been forming for the past 14 billion years. New kinds of objects have emerged even recently. The reverse side of this creativity is the observed and predicted decay of all objects. Will new structures form in the future? This is a question of hope, which is not a scientific term but originates from experience on the level of personal and religious perceptions requiring participation. Anticipating the future, science and theology of creation (...) meet, and the tension between practical knowledge and visionary hope enters a constructive dialogue. (shrink)

External reality is not moved by our personal dramas; even when our world is collapsing, the world continues its normal course, as if nothing had happened. Of course we know that the most poignant human suffering will not stop the sun from shining or the world from turning. Yet there are moments when the disharmony between objective reality and our own emotional state is painful and even surprising. It seems as if the world is provocatively uninterested in what is most (...) dear to us.The awareness of this rift is evoked in the first sentence of Borges’ well-known story translated into Dutch under the title De Aleph, "On the harrowing morning in February when Beatriz Viterbo died... I saw that the iron poster boards in the Plaza Constitución were being pasted over with some type of advertising for light cigarettes; this struck me, for I understood that the restless, enormous universe was already withdrawing from her, and that this was the first change in an endless series".What is the theoretical relevance of this experience, often roused by poetry and prose, but seldom discussed by philosophers? Is Borges referring to a purely subjective experience from which no conclusion can be drawn, or does he speak of an experience containing an important theoretical insight? Regardless, our ability to undergo this experience is evidently independent of our favourite philosophical concepts. Even someone who adheres to a theory that accepts a meaningful reality can experience this rift when he observes the sun shining triumphantly on a day of mourning. Similarly, someone having no metaphysical belief in a meaningful reality can remain immune to the type of rift Borges describes.Yet it cannot be denied that this rift experience is strengthened and legitimized by an important development in knowledge. The science has evoked a world view that strictly separates objective facts from subjective values. The reality presented by science, is not an inspired relationship or meaningful construction where humanity finds its place and from which it derives its dignity. Laws discovered by science say nothing of good or evil and contain no message on the meaning of life. Science is a source of trustworthy information not elevating, inspiring or comforting concepts. From a scientific viewpoint, knowledge of objective reality has nothing to do with insights people use to orient their lives.This separation of knowledge and wisdom contrasts sharply with a traditional view where knowledge of the most fundamental characteristics of reality also offers an insight in the meaning of human life. Nietzsche described this contrast as follows: while people have always tended to believe that what concerns them most also lies at the heart of reality, they must now realize that their moral, religious or aesthetic values merely form a superficial world of appearances; what elicits wonder or strong emotion is only a blossom on a reality that, in its deeper roots, is not at all beautiful or moving.The disenchantment brought on by science creates a breach or rift. Everything we experience as mysterious, enchanted or moving, appears also to exist as a reality coldly and neutrally described by science. Science demystified the rainbow that once appeared as a mysterious, divine phenomenon: what had always seemed wondrous can apparently be explained by the same natural laws that regulate the most banal or prosaic phenomena. (shrink)

Theoretical reflection on moral disagreement can be pertinent from a practical point of view. When far reaching policies depend on agreement about conflicting moral options, the need may be felt to reflect on strategies for reducing conflict and reaching a consensus. In such a context, it may for instance be useful to study mechanisms that tend to bring about bias and prejudice. In this paper, however, I will not be concerned with whatever might be done to reduce disagreement. My approach (...) will be purely theoretical and will concentrate on the nature of moral disagreement, more particularly on the question how disagreement about conflicting moral claims differs from disagreements about conflicting empirical claims. This will lead me to the defence of a kind of perspectivism. I will argue for the view that moral disagreement is to be expected if morality is intimately associated with the quest for meaning. I will conclude by making a couple of critical remarks about a doctrine that tries to free morality from the quest for meaning and hence also from perspectivism. (shrink)

Influential contemporary thinkers have declared that the belief in individual autonomy rests on an illusion. They have argued that our subjectivity is shaped by the language we speak and the traditions to which we belong. One should not, however, overestimate the impact of these theoretical criticisms. The idea of individual autonomy is part of a larger pattern of belief which has not ceased to exert its influence on our habits of thinking and behaving.The belief that we are fully autonomous subjects (...) is associated with the belief that we should identify ourselves with the detached, objectifying attitude which is an essential element of the scientific outlook. We like to believe that our real self is to be distinguished from any role we happen to fulfill or any position we happen to occupy. Instead of admitting that we are constituted in our deepest self by our commitments and allegiances, we would prefer to see these commitments and allegiances as the expressions of our individual desires and free decisions. The kind of individualism which is related to the idea of individual autonomy need not be amoral or egoistic, but it can easily be combined with a kind of moral universalism. A commitment to an abstract ideal is not incompatible with individual autonomy. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful or (...) valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

Some moral philosophers view conventional morality as an instrument that has a certain function to fulfill, and that we can in principle correct or adjust on the basis of an understanding of that function. This instrumentalist approach to morality is an extension of a familiar pattern of thought constituted by the combination of two different elements. We tend, on the one hand, to believe that we have a clear understanding of what it is that we allow ourselves to be guided (...) by when we are motivated by something moral. We identify this moral motivation with something that is, at first sight, transparent and unproblematic, viz. with some sort of altruism. The willingness to act morally is the willingness to be concerned with the happiness, welfare and interests of others.On the other hand, we are also familiar with the idea that traditional or conventional morality is a culturally dependent product of historical processes which have created in us certain beliefs and patterns of feeling and response. The moral judgments that we are inclined to make on the basis of unexamined intuitions owe their existence and appeal, at least partially, to a contingent cultural and historical context.The combination of these two elements leads to a familiar project: we should view whatever is contingent with a critical eye, by determining towhat extent it can be justified on the basis of insight into what is essential . Or to put in another way, we should check if the unexamined, intuitive judgments that we tend to pronounce actually agree with the explicitly formulated universal principles which we consciously endorse.An illustration of this way of thinking can be found in the current discussion about what might be called ‘moral proximity’. The extent to which we feel involved in the joys and sorrows of others depends, among other things, on how near they are to us. This proximity can be conceived in different ways: familiarity, kinship, proximity in space or time. We feel greater sympathy towards our friends or acquaintances than towards people we have never met and about whom we know very little. The suffering of disaster victims in our own country affects us more deeply than the fate of those who experienced the same thing in some distant country. The tragedies of many centuries ago do not horrify us now, and we cannot easily get worked up over the fate of future generations. (shrink)