The author criticizes a divine command theory of moral obligation offered by Glenn C. Graber. Reeder opposes Graber's claim that divine righteousness can be understood independent of standards of moral obligation and questions the plausibility of basing moral obligation on unchecked command, even the commands of God. Speaking historically, he discusses the relation of this theory to the moral theory of Ockham.

Frank Palmer, Richard Eldridge, and Martha Nussbaum explore the contributions that imaginative literature can make to ethics. From three different moral philosophical perspectives, they argue that reading literature can help persons to achieve greater moral understanding. This essay examines how each author conceives of moral understanding, particularly in its emotional dimension, and how each thinks that reading literature can promote moral understanding. The essay also considers some implications of this work for religious ethics.

AUTHOR: The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript. Please answer the queries by making the necessary corrections on the CATS online corrections form. Once you have added all your corrections, please press the SUBMIT button.

The author discusses the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation as a human rights movement. The Reformation not only laid the groundwork for religious human rights but also created the platform for the more expansive conceptions of individual liberty that shaped the political development of the West. The continuing importance of the churches in the human rights movement is affirmed.

What have recently published books in Christian ethics produced in the way of ethical theory or the foundations of ethical reasoning? This essay surveys works by several major figures, including Curran, Gustafson, and Winter, and a number of younger and less well known authors who have contributed to contemporary discussion of Christian ethical foundations, exploring their particular orientations and arguments and setting them in a context of debate reaching back over the past twenty years.

The author reviews recent books by Alasdair MacIntyre and Garrett Barden that critique the impulse to foundational theory and transhistorical argumentation in moral theory; these arguments are then set in relation to books by Franklin Gamwell and Karl-Otto Apel that seek, in new ways, to defend that impulse. Although far more sympathetic to the latter perspective, the author maintains that all four of these second-order theoretical discussions lack an appropriate understanding of and engagement with the post-Enlightenment tradition of (...) moral theorizing. (shrink)

This paper defends Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis , a proposed empirical methodology for explicating philosophical concepts. This methodology attributes to our shared concepts whatever application conditions they would need to have in order best to continue delivering benefits in the ways they have regularly delivered benefits in the past. In the first stage of my argument I argue that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has what I call normative authority : we have practical and epistemic reason to adopt the explications that it delivers (...) even if we think doing so requires stipulative revisions in the meanings of our concepts. I then use this normative authority to argue that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis also has what I call descriptive authority : when we understand concept-meaning in the way we ought to understand it (in the way licensed by the normative authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis) we see that, rather than being revisionary, Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis is a semantically conservative tool that uncovers (what we should think of as being) the meanings our concepts already have. (shrink)

A critical discussion of the literature in theological ethics by and/or about blacks, divided into three parts. The first part treats the author's view of what constitutes black theological ethics and the resources relevant to understanding its concerns. The second section focuses on the black religious heritage. And in the final section the author develops his own constructive statement of black theological ethics by means of comment on recent literature.

Most philosophers believe that for a moral principle to be valid one must be able to allow others to follow the same principle. There is a question whether the principle of "agape" which enjoins placing the good of others above one's own can meet this test. The author argues that a qualified form of agapism can meet this test, and that the test in fact provides a means of arriving at an acceptable form of the ethics of love. It (...) also provides a way of justifying some of the qualifications that some agapists have placed on the love principle. (shrink)

It has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one’s action and inferred effect seem closer in time than they otherwise would (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Using a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis and examine the relationship between binding and self-reported authorship. In both experiments, an important authorship indicator – consistency between one’s action and a subsequent event – was manipulated, and (...) its effects on binding and self-reported authorship were measured. Results showed that action-event consistency enhanced both binding and self-reported authorship, supporting the hypothesis that binding arises from an inference of authorship. At the same time, evidence for a dissociation emerged, with consistency having a more robust effect on self-reports than on binding. Taken together, these results suggest that binding and self-reports reveal different aspects of the sense of authorship. Ó 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

3 Please specify whether it is Meaney (2001a or 2001b) throughout the article. 4 Please provide location of the publisher for reference Ariew (2006). 5 Please update the following reference: Griffiths et al. (submitted); Jones..

Automated knowledge management techniques critically depend on the availability of semantically enhanced documents which are hard to come by in practice. Starting from a detailed look at the motivations of users to produce semantic data, we argue that the authoring problem experienced by MKM is actually an author’s dilemma. An analysis of the content authoring process suggests that the dilemma can partially be overcome by providing authoring tools like invasive editors aimed specifically at supporting the content creator. We present (...) the CPoint application, a semantic, invasive editor for Microsoft PowerPoint, geared towards the OMDoc MKM format. (shrink)

Metaphysical dialetheism is the belief that there are contradictions in the world. I will argue that metaphysical dialetheism is, rightfully understood, the most controversial form of dialetheism, and further that it remains an open possibility. Dialetheism can come in many different forms, but all share the same belief in “dialethas”. Depending on how we understand what it means to be a contradiction, we will develop correspondingly different understandings of dialetheism. I will explore what different versions of the position might look (...) like, and how some of these versions of dialetheism could be more plausible than others, and argue that metaphysical dialetheism is the most interesting form of dialetheism. While few authors have considered the possibility of metaphysical dialetheism, there are some important arguments against the position to consider. Frederick Kroon argued in his 2004 article, _Realism and Dialetheism_, that in so far as we find arguments for dialetheism persuasive, we also have good reason to reject realism. Tumoas Tahko argued against the possibility of metaphysical dialetheism by explicitly arguing for a metaphysical definition of contradiction, and a metaphysical version of LNC. Graham Priest also challenged the idea of a “consistent” metaphysics in principle. This paper will take up all of these challenges, and defend the possibility of a metaphysical dialetheist position. (shrink)

If you are puzzling whether to read this book, the main claim is right there in the clever title: The Open Secret. 'Ihe tensions — the contradictions, some will say — are built into the governing metaphor. An open..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14.1 (2000) 79-81 [Access article in PDF] Books Received July 1999 through December 1999Asmuth, Christoph. 1999. Das Begriefen des Unbegreiflich. Abt. II, Band 41 of Spekulation and Erfahrung. Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog. 411 pp.Badiou, Alain. 1999. Manifesto for Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Norman Madarasz. Albany: SUNY Press. 181 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4219-5, $14.95 pbk. 0-7914-4220-9.Barwise, Jon, and John Perry. 1999. Situations and Attitudes. New York: Cambridge UP. (...) lxxxviii + 352 pp. $22.95 pbk. 1-57586-193-3.Benson, Bruce L. 1998. To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice. New York: New York UP. xxviii + 372 pp. $37.50 h.c. 1-8147-1327-0.Bonsdorff, Pauline von, and Arto Haapala, eds. 1999. Aesthetics in the Human Environment. Lahti, Finland: International Institute of Applied Aesthetics. 204 pp. h.c. 952-5069-07-09.Bratman, Michael E. 1999. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. vi + 200 pp. $22.95 pbk. 1-57586-192-5.Brencick, Janice M., and Glenn A. Webster. 2000. Philosophy of Nursing: A New Vision for Health Care. Albany: SUNY Press. ix + 247 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4379-5, $19.95 pbk. 0-7914-4380-9.Clendenning, John. 1999. The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce. 2d ed. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt UP. xvii + 446 pp. $49.95 h.c. 0-8265-1312-3, $24.95 pbk. 0-8265-1322-0.Curtis, Kimberley. 1999. Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xv + 197 pp. $39.95 h.c. 0-8014-3577-3, $16.95 pbk. 0-8014-8640-8.Frederick, Robert E., ed. 1999. A Companion to Business Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. xvi + 464 pp. $99.95 h.c. 0-631-20130-0.Gallois, André. 1996. The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP. xii + 213 pp. h.c. 0-521-56093-4.Gracia, Jorge J. E. 1999. Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press. xix + 247 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4213-6, $17.95 pbk. 0-7914-4214-4.Grosz, Elizabeth, ed. 1999. Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. vi + 250 pp. $45.00 h.c. 0-8014-3632-X, $18.95 pbk. 0-8014-8590-8.Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xii + 138 pp. $24.95 h.c. 0-253-33507-8.Heyde, Ludwig. 1999. The Weight of Finitude: On the Philosophical Question of God. Trans. Alexander Harmsen and William Desmond. Albany: SUNY Press. xviii + 177 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4265-9, $17.95 pbk. 0-7914-4266-7.Lang, Berel. 1999. The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xiv + 198 pp. $45.00 h.c. 0-8014-3588-9, $17.95 pbk. 0-8014-8569-X.Levinas, Emmanuel. 1999. Alterity and Transcendence. Trans. Michael B. Smith. New York: Columbia UP. xxiv + 195 pp. $29.50 h.c. 0-231-11650-0.Lorraine, Tamsin. 1999. Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xiv + 272 pp. h.c. 0-8014-3623-0, $19.95 pbk. 0-8014-8586-X.Margolis, Eric, and Stephen Laurence, eds. 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. x + 652 pp. h.c. 0-262-13353-9, $37.50 pbk. 0-262-63193-8.McCumber, John. 1999. Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xiv + 338 pp. $49.95 h.c. 0-253-33473-X, $24.95 pbk. 0-253-21316-9.McWhorter, Ladelle. 1999. Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xx + 260 pp. $39.95 h.c. 0-253-33558-2, $18.95 pbk. 0-253-21325-8.Raposa, Michael L. 1999. Boredom and the Religious Imagination. Charlottesville, VA: UP of Virginia. xiii + 199 pp. $40.00 h.c. 0-8139-1898-7, $13.95 pbk. 0-8139-1925-8.Redding, Paul. 1999. The Logic of Affect. Ithaca, NY: Cornell... (shrink)

The mechanism by which humans perceive others differs greatly from how humans perceive inanimate objects. Unlike inanimate objects, humans have the distinct property of being “like me” in the eyes of the observer. This allows us to use the same systems that process knowledge about self-performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and self-experienced emotions to understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others. The authors propose that internal simulation mechanisms, such as the mirror neuron system, are necessary for normal development of recognition, imitation, (...) theory of mind, empathy, and language. Additionally, the authors suggest that dysfunctional simulation mechanisms may underlie the social and communicative deficits seen in individuals with autism spectrum disorders. (shrink)

Received by the IRE, October 24, 1960. The author's work summarized here—which was done at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a center for research operated by MIT at Lexington, Mass., with the joint Support of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force under Air Force Contract AF 19-5200; and at the Res. Lab. of Electronics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., which is supported in part by the U. S. Army Signal Corps, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the ONR—is (...) based on earlier work done by the author as a Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University. (shrink)

The name of Aëtius is linked to a compendium of physical opinions discovered and reconstructed by Hermann Diels in his Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879). Diels was able to show that a very complex doxographical tradition derives from a single work to be dated to the first century CE, which he attributed to an otherwise unknown person called Aëtius. Diels' reconstruction of this lost work provided the basis for his immensely influential collection of fragments, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin 1903). (...) Diels' discovery and reconstruction is currently being re-examined by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia in a multi-volume editorial project entitled Aëtiana. The first volume of Aëtiana appeared in 1997.1 That volume deals with the hypothesis that a number of later authors derived their doxographical information from a common source to be identified with a work composed in about 100 CE by Aëtius. The upshot is that the Aëtius-hypothesis is sound but is also in need of revision and refinement. This second volume carries forward the investigation begun in the first volume. It is divided into two parts. The first part consists of a structural analysis of the compendium, and the second offers a reconstruction of its best preserved section, namely book 2. (shrink)

In 1934 a most singular event occurred. Two papers were published on a topic that had (apparently) never before been written about, the authors had never been in contact with one another, and they had (apparently) no common intellectual background that would otherwise account for their mutual interest in this topic.1 These two papers formed the basis for a movement in logic which is by now the most common way of teaching elementary logic by far, and indeed is perhaps all (...) that is known in any detail about logic by a number of philosophers (especially in North America). This manner of proceeding in logic is called ‘natural deduction’. And in its own way the instigation of this style of logical proof is as important to the history of logic as the discovery of resolution by Robinson in 1965, or the discovery of the logistical method by Frege in 1879, or even the discovery of the syllogistic by Aristotle in the fourth century BC. (shrink)

This paper argues that “covert” operations like Quantifier Raising (QR) can precede “overt” operations. Specifically we argue that there are overt operations that must take the output of QR as their input. If this argument is successful there are two interesting consequences for the theory of grammar. First, there cannot be a “covert” (i.e. post-spellout) component of the grammar. That is, what distinguishes operations that affect phonology from those that do not cannot be an arbitrary point in the derivation (“spellout”) (...) before which the former apply and after which the latter do; all syntactic operations apply in the same component (henceforth ‘single component grammar’). Second, there must be some alternative means for distinguishing “overt” from “covert” operations. One such alternative, which we can call the ‘phonological theory of QR’, was suggested by Bobaljik (1995), Pesetsky (1998), Groat and O’Neil (1994). These authors proposed that the distinguishing property has to do with principles of the syntax-phonology interface. Assume that movement is a copying operation with phonology targeting one copy in a chain for pronunciation. The distinction between “overt” and “covert” movement, these authors suggest, is this: “overt” movements are the result of phonology targeting the head of a chain for.. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was (...) severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-. (shrink)

The original text, written in the language and style of 1909, is almost completely unreadable in 2011. I have taken the liberty of editing it and paraphrasing it for the sake of readability; I have made every effort to preserve the author’s original meaning. Section headings and tables have been added by Prof. Steinhart. Note that Figure 1 is by Adams.

Learners are able to use 2 different types of knowledge to perform a skill. One type is a conscious mental model, and the other is based on memories of instances. The authors conducted 3 experiments that manipulated training conditions designed to affect the availability of 1 or both types of knowledge about an artificial grammar. Participants were tested for both speed and accuracy of their ability to generate letter sequences. Results indicate that model-based training leads to slow accurate responding. Memorybased (...) training leads to fast, less accurate responding and highest achievement when perfect accuracy was not required. Evidence supports participants’ preference for using the memory-based mode when exposed to both types of training. Finally, the accuracy contributed by model-based training declined over a retention interval. (shrink)

By combining a flanker task and a cuing task into a single paradigm, the authors assessed the effects of orienting and alerting on conflict resolution and explored how normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) modulate these attentional functions. Orienting failed to enhance conflict resolution; alerting was most beneficial for trials without conflict, as if acting on response criterion rather than on information processing. Alerting cues were most effective in the older groups— healthy aging and AD. Conflict resolution was impaired only (...) in AD. Orienting remained unchanged across groups. These findings provide evidence of different life span developmental and clinical trajectories for each attentional network. (shrink)

Gallileo described the universe in his most famous line: "This grand book is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures." Why should the laws of nature be subject to statement in such elegantly basic algebra? Why does gravity work by the principle of inverse squares? Why do simple geometrics pervade nature--from the hexagons of the honeycomb, to the complex architecture of crystals? D'Arcy Thompson, author of Growth and Form and my (...) earliest intellectual hero (along with my father and Charles Darwin), wrote that "the harmony of the world is made manifest in Form and Number, and the heart and soul and all the poetry of Natural Philosophy are embodied in the concept of math ematical beauty." Many scientists, if only to coin a striking metaphor, depict a creating God as a mathematician from the realm of Plato or Pythagoras. The physicist James Jeans wrote: "From the intrinsic evidence of his creation, the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician.". (shrink)

The unknown author of Genesis portrayed God as first creating the animals and then making man in his own image. Ever since, western tradition has tried to draw a sharp divide between ourselves and other animals. Even after Darwin had shown the continuities between ourselves and other apes, we have tried to cling to the idea that there is something quite unique to human beings, some way in which we differ, not only in degree, but also in kind, (...) from animals. The most popular candidate for that unique distinction is our use of language. (shrink)

The question of freedom in the modern German tradition is not just a metaphysical question. It concerns the status of a free life as a value, indeed, as they took to saying, the “absolute” value. A free life is of unconditional and incomparable and inestimable value, and it is the basis of the unique, and again, absolute, unqualifiable respect owed to any human person just as such. This certainly increases the pressure on anyone who espouses such a view to tell (...) us what a free life consists in. Kant’s famous answer is “autonomy,” where this means first or minimally freedom from external constraint, coercion and intimidation (“thinking for yourself”), but even more importantly, being in a certain specific sort of self-relation. I can only be said truly to be “ruling myself” when the considerations that determine what I do are reasons. But if, finally, in exercising reason I am merely rationally responsive to inclinations and desires and aversions, I am letting such contingent impulses “rule” my life, however strategically rational or hierarchically ordered my plans for satisfaction turn out to be. So, Kant concludes, I am only truly autonomous, self-ruling, when the one consideration of importance (that is, normatively authoritative) in what I do is, as he says so frequently if still mysteriously, the “ form of rationality” as such. The more familiar name for such a necessary condition of autonomy is the Categorical Imperative. To make clear that this subjection to the “form” of rationality counts as autonomy, Kant also insists that this moral law be understood as “self-legislated,” that we must be able to regard ourselves as its “author,” and that we are bound to such a law because we bind ourselves to it. (shrink)

The Frankfurt School had a highly ambivalent relation to Judaism. On one hand, they were part of that Enlightenment tradition that opposed authority, tradition, and all institutions of the past -- including religion. They were also, for the most part, secular Jews who did not support any organized religion, or practice religious or cultural Judaism. In this sense, they were in the tradition of Heine, Marx, and Freud for whom Judaism was neither a constitutive feature of their life or work, (...) nor a significant aspect of their self-image and identity. (shrink)

International array of contributors, bringing together both traditional and more recent approaches to provide valuable insights into the poets’ use of language.Covers authors from Lucilius to Juvenal.Of the peoples of ancient Italy, only the Romans committed newly composed poems to writing, and for 250 years Latin-speakers developed an impressive verse literature.The language had traditional resources of high style, e.g., alliteration, lexical and morphological archaism or grecism, and of course metaphor and word order; and there were also less obvious resources in (...) the technical vocabularies of law, philosophy and medicine.The essays in this volume show how the poets in the classical period combined these elements, and so created a poetic medium that could comprehend satire, invective, erotic elegy, drama, lyric, and the grandest heroic epos. (shrink)

Notations are central for understanding mathematical discourse. Readers would like to read notations that transport the meaning well and prefer notations that are familiar to them. Therefore, authors optimize the choice of notations with respect to these two criteria, while at the same time trying to remain consistent over the document and their own prior publications. In print media where notations are fixed at publication time, this is an over-constrained problem. In living documents notations can be adapted at reading time, (...) taking reader preferences into account. We present a representational infrastructure for notations in living mathematical documents. Mathematical notations can be defined declaratively. Author and reader can extensionally define the set of available notation definitions at arbitrary document levels, and they can guide the notation selection function via intensional annotations. We give an abstract specification of notation definitions and the flexible rendering algorithms and show their coverage on paradigmatic examples. We show how to use this framework to render OpenMath and Content-MathML to Presentation-MathML, but the approach extends to arbitrary content and presentation formats. We discuss prototypical implementations of all aspects of the rendering pipeline. (shrink)

This book constitutes the best history of post-positivist philosophy and sociology of science we are likely ever to get. To a large extent, the power of the narrative derives from its being restricted to broadly epistemological issues. Thus the title, which mimics the title of a paper by the philosopher of language, Donald Davidson, someone little known among members of the science studies community (Davidson, 1986). The restriction to epistemological issues is surely well justified since among the founding themes of (...) contemporary science studies were ‘the sociology of scientific knowledge’ (SSK) and ‘the manufacture of knowledge’. The opposition to positivist, particularly Popperian, accounts of the nature of scientific knowledge in these early sociological studies was explicit. Of course, as science studies has broadened into science and technology studies (STS) and includes major contributions from many others, including historians and anthropologists of science, many in the broader STS community are now not much concerned with epistemological issues. Nevertheless, this book should be required reading for all graduate students beginning their studies in the history, philosophy, or social study of science, for there is no better account of the debates about the nature of scientific knowledge that have taken place since the 1950s. Part of what makes this a good history is that the author has not been a participant in these past debates. He is neither a philosopher nor sociologist, but an intellectual historian whose previous books include: The Great Debate: ‘Bolshevism’ and the Literary Left in Germany, 1917–1930.. (shrink)

Can we base the whole of logic solely on the concept of incompatibility? My motivation for asking this is two-fold: firstly, a technical interest in what a minimal foundations of logic might be; and secondly, the existence of philosophers who have taken incompatibility as the ultimate key to human reason (viz., e.g., Hegel's concept of determinate negation). The main aim of this contribution is to tackle two related questions: Is it possible to reduce the foundations of logic to the mere (...) concept of incompatibility? and Does this reduction lead us to a specific logical system? We conclude that the answers, respectively, are YES and a qualified NO (qualified in the sense that basing semantics on incompatibility does make some logical systems more natural than others, but without ruling out the alternatives.) A search for the bare bones of logic generally leads one to the relation of inference (or consequence). This way is explored meticulously by Koslow (1992). He defines an implication structure as, in effect, an ordered pair , where S is a set and | f Pow(S)HS fulfilling certain (relatively simple) restrictions. And obviously if we reduce incompatibility to inference, which is achievable by the well known ex contradictione quodlibet principle, we reach a logic based on incompatibility. The kind of logic flowing most straightforwardly from this setting is the intuitionist one. However, there is also the approach taken by R. Brandom and A. Aker (2008), who have set up a logic based directly on incompatibility. They define an incompatibility structure as an ordered pair such that S is a set and z f Pow(S) (again fulfilling certain restrictions). The authors introduce logical operators in such a way that they reach classical logic. Does this mean that inference 'naturally' leads to intuitionist logic, whereas incompatibility leads to the classical one? Myself, I have argued that it is indeed intuitionist logic that is the logic of inference (see Peregrin, 2008).. (shrink)

of L ATEX2 and essentially1 all commands of the AMS-L ATEX documentclass amsart are recognized by the documentclass asl, and so manuscripts prepared for those versions of TEX can be processed by the ASL Typesetting Office practically as-they-are.2 This brief guide is aimed at those authors who are reasonably..

This paper tackles foundational issues regarding the justification of logical rules. It is argued that standard accounts from both proof-theoretical and semantical points of view do not su ffi ce to account for the justification of basic logical rules. By way of response, an analysis of logical inference as acts taking place in dialogical situations is provided. In turn, this makes way for an internal justification of logical rules at the termination of dialogue, that can be formalized in terms of (...) co-constructive logic for proof and refutation [author reference omitted]. (shrink)

There has been growing interest in, and scholarly attention to, issues and questions that arise within the subject matter domain we may call "human rights theory". See, in particular, Amartya Sen, "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights," 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315 (2004); James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (rev. ed. 2006); Michael J. Perry, Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts (2007); James Griffin, On Human Rights (2008); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (...) (2008). This essay - a version of which will appear in a multi-authored collection of essays to be published by Oxford University Press in 2009 - is intended as a contribution to human rights theory. These are the principal questions, or sets of questions, I address in the essay:1. What is the morality of human rights - by which I mean the morality that, according to the International Bill of Human Rights, is the principal warrant for the law of human rights?2. How does the morality of human rights warrant the law of human rights?3. Some human-rights-claims are legal claims, but some are moral claims, and some are both. What does a human-rights-claim of the legal sort mean? A human-rights-claim of the moral sort? And when does it make sense to think of a right that only some human beings have - children, for example - as a human right?4. Is there a plausible secular ground for the morality of human rights?5. At the end of the proverbial day, what difference does it make - why should we care - if there is no plausible secular ground for the morality of human rights?Comments and questions welcome. (shrink)

February 1, 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................... .......................ii STATEMENT OF INTEREST............................................................................................ ................. v..

for both introductory courses in philosophy, or philosophical methodology, as well as independent study for anyone interested in the methods of argument, assessment and criticism used in contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in approach, and written in a pleasant and considerate tone. Its authors are both competent philosophers, and the book visibly reflects their deep sympathy to the discipline and their appreciation of its unique character. This book will help one to get going to do philosophy, but more advanced (...) students might find this text helpful too. I wish I had had access to this book as an undergraduate. The book has six chapters. It presents instances of a certain kind of philosophical tool in each of these. These are: Basic Tools, Further Tools for Argument, Tools for Assessment, Tools for Conceptual Distinctions, Tools for Radical Critique, and Tools at the Limit. The tools presented get increasingly sophisticated, and the chapters are more or less explicitly built on the preceding ones. Characteristic entries are, in the first chapter, concepts such as “Arguments, Premises and Conclusions”; “Abduction” and “Intuition Pumps” in chapter 2; “Ockham’s Razor” and “Paradoxes” in chapter 3; “Knowledge by Acquaintance/Description” and “Realist/Non-Realist” in chapter 4; “Foucaultian Critique of Power” and “Pragmatist Critique” in chapter 5; and “Gödel and Incompleteness” and “Self-evident Truths” in chapter 6. All in all there are eighty-seven entries, usefully cross-referenced. (shrink)

The first edition of The Mismeasure of Man appeared in 1981 and was quickly praised in the popular press as a definitive refutation of 100 years of scientific work on race, brain-size and intelligence. It sold 125,000 copies, was translated into 10 languages, and became required reading for undergraduate and even graduate classes in anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The second edition is not truly revised, but rather only expanded, as the author claims the book needed no updating as any (...) new research would only be plagued with the same philosophical errors revealed in the first edition. Thus it continues a political polemic, whose author engages in character assassination of long deceased scientists whose work he misrepresents despite published refutations, while studiously witholding from his readers fifteen years of new research that contradicts every major scientific argument he puts forth. Specific attention in this review are given to the following topics: the relationship between brain size and IQ, the importance of the scientific contributions of Sir Francis Galton, S. G. Morton, H. H. Goddard, and Sir Cyril Burt, the role of early IQ testers in determining U.S. immigration policy, The Bell Curve controversy and the reality of g, race /sex/social class differences in brain size and IQ, Cesare Lombroso and the genetic basis of criminal behavior, between-group heritabilities, inter-racial adoption studies, and IQ why evolutionary theory predicts group differences, and the extent to which Gould's political ideology has affected his scientific work. (shrink)

I argue that the recent debate about the role disgust deserves in ethical thought has been impoverished by an inadequate understanding of the emotion itself. After considering Kass and Nussbaum’s respective positions in that debate, and the implausible views of the nature of disgust on which their arguments rest, I describe my own view, which makes sense of the wealth of recent, often puzzling, empirical work done on the emotion. This view sees disgust as being primarily responsible for protecting against (...) toxins and infectious diseases, but as also having been recruited to play auxiliary roles in the cognition of social norms and group boundaries. I argue that this view provides new and more plausible foundations for skepticism about the idea that disgust deserves some kind of special epistemic credit or moral authority, that the emotion is a trustworthy guide to justifiable moral judgments, or that there is any deep wisdom in repugnance. (shrink)

Peer Review and Copyright each have a double role: Formal refereeing protects (R1) the author from publishing and (R2) the reader from reading papers that are not of sufficient quality. Copyright protects the author from (C1) theft of text and (C2) theft of authorship. It has been suggested that in the electronic medium we can dispense with peer review, "publish" everything, and let browsing and commentary do the quality control. It has also been suggested that special safeguards and (...) laws may be needed to enforce copyright on the Net. I will argue, based on 20 years of editing Behavioral and Brain Sciences, a refereed (paper) journal of peer commentary, 8 years of editing Psycoloquy, a refereed electronic journal of peer commentary, and 1 year of implementing CogPrints, an electronic archive of unrefereed preprints and refereed reprints in the cognitive sciences modeled on the Los Alamos Physics Eprint Archive, that (i) peer commentary is a supplement, not a substitute, for peer review, (ii) the authors of refereed papers, who get and seek no royalties from the sale of their texts, only want protection from theft of authorship on the Net, not from theft of text, which is a victimless crime, and hence (iii) the trade model (subscription, site license or pay- per-view) should be replaced by author page-charges to cover the much reduced cost of implementing peer review, editing and archiving on the Net, in exchange for making the learned serial corpus available for free for all forever. (shrink)

The authors examined how a perceiver’s identification of a target person’s actions covaries with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target’s action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study (...) 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target’s perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the.. (shrink)

Messages sorted by: [ date ][ thread ][ subject ][ author ] Next message: Jim Yates: "Creativity in Conservative Org LO12888" Previous message: Nicole Coughlin: "HR ON-LINE FORUMS LO12886 -Linkage, Inc." Next in thread: John Paul Fullerton: "Maturana - Epistimology LO12908" Reply: John Paul Fullerton: "Maturana - Epistimology LO12908" Reply to [ author only ][ Learning-Org list ].

Tench Coxe, a member of the second rank of this nation's Founders and a leading proponent of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, wrote prolifically about the right to keep and bear arms. In this Article, the authors trace Coxe's story, from his early writings in support of the Constitution, through his years of public service, to his political writings in opposition to the presidential campaigns of John Adams and John Quincy Adams. The authors note that Coxe described the (...) Second Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right, and believed that an individual right to bear arms was necessary for self-defense and hunting, as well as for militia purposes and protection against oppression by large standing armies. The views of this important Founding Era political commentator and public servant inform the ongoing Second Amendment debate. The authors argue that Coxe's depiction of an individual right to bear arms encompassing hunting, self-defense, and the public militia power supports the "Standard Model" of the Second Amendment prevalent in the legal literature. This Article also discusses Coxe's important role as an economic scholar in early America, and in the creation of the protectionist system of the early Republic, as both an journalistic advocate and as an executive branch official. One of his executive branch positions involved heading the federal government program to give guns to militiamen who could not afford their own. (shrink)

The document before you is by a member of a fanatical sect of heretical Ludwig scholars. Through a twist of fate it has fallen into my hands. I hesitate to make it public, since its circulation may do more harm than good. What speaks against publication is that it has the power to corrupt young minds. I do not take a light view of the dangers it poses in this regard. What speaks in favor of publication is the fact that (...) these people must be stopped. Through their pamphlets and brochures they continue to attract more converts everyday. The importance of this document lies in the fact that it brings to light some of the more esoteric doctrines of the sect, revealing the vulnerable theological underbelly of their creed. It also speaks of quar- relling within the infidel camp. There are even suggestions that the author fears that he himself may be excommunicated by an up-and-coming generation of zealots. He pleads here for a mild interpretation of their creed. (Oblivious to the stench of his own blasphemies, he even imagines entering into dialogue with mainstream Ludwig scholars!) My main aim in making this text generally available is that more learned men than I may make a study of it. A sound theological thrashing of the author’s own (according to him, mild!) version of the creed is devoutly to be wished. But my fondest hope is that, in the hands of one of our finer Ludwig scholars, it might become a weapon that can be turned against the infidel camp. I have a Trojan horse maneuver in mind here. A cunningly crafted pseudonymous publication, addressing some of the niceties of their more peculiar doctrines, under the pretence of attempting to heal the looming schism in their sect, ought to be able to bust it wide open. One particularly confusing feature of the document is that the author occasionally adopts a heavily ironical tone, actually going so far as to refer to himself as an infidel, etc., though without apparently the least appreciation of the fact that the heavier he allows his irony to become, the closer he comes finally to speaking the truth.. (shrink)

hen I was an undergraduate in the early 1970s, I was assigned a classic paper published in Scientific American that began: "There is an experiment in psychology that you can perform easily in your home. ... Buy two presents for your wife, choosing things ... she will find equally attractive." Just ten years after those words were written, the author's blithe assumption that his readers were male struck me as comically archaic. By the early '70s, women in science were (...) no longer an oddity or a joke but a given. Today, in my own field, the study of language development in children, a majority of the scientists are women. Even in scientific fields with a higher proportion of men, the contributions of women are so indispensable that any talk of turning back the clock would be morally heinous and scientifically ruinous. (shrink)