Just last week (October 4, 2022), the U.S. White House released a blueprint for an A.I. Bill of Rights, consisting of “five principles and associated practices to help guide the design, use, and de...

The entrenchment of a bill of rights, and the consequent removal of the matters covered in the bill from the domain of the legislature, is commonly thought to constitute a transfer of power from the legislature to the courts. Yet the simple answer to this thought is that, strictly speaking, no such transfer takes place, for in acquiring power to determine the content of a bill of rights the courts do not acquire the power to (...) legislate that the bill denies to the legislature. The more complex response is that what the courts acquire when a bill of rights is entrenched is the power to set a constitutional agenda, a power that the legislature may never have had and so has not necessarily lost, a power the political significance of which depends on the form and content of what is entrenched and the value and character of the power it leaves in the hands of the legislature. In particular, the entrenchment of a project of governance (as typified by the positive duties conventionally associated with economic and social rights) raises concerns about the power exercised by courts that are not raised by the entrenchment of a project of non-governance (as typified by the negative duties conventionally associated with civil and political liberties). Non-governance may be objectionable, but not because the courts secure it. Governance, however, may be objectionable just because the courts secure it. (shrink)

In a recently published article, R. N. McLaughlin argues for what he calls an “open form” of bill of rights, in preference to the standard closed form. Such an open form would consist of a directive to the courts “to invalidate laws which offend fundamental morals by depriving citizens of basic rights, or by forcing them to deprive others of basic rights.” A standard form consists, of course, of a list of rights which are not (...) to be violated. His reason for making this proposal is that he does not think the standard form is capable of keeping pace with the changing moral codes which such a bill is supposed to reflect, whereas the open form would by its very nature do so. I should like, in what follows, to argue that the open form presents a number of serious problems which the standard form does not, and that a standard form is in the end to be preferred, both because it does not present these new problems and because it need not be as inflexible in the face of changing moral standards as McLaughlin thinks. (shrink)

RESUMOO artigo científico visa esclarecer a fundamentação kantiana da doutrina da incorporação do Bill of Rights. A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos estendeu o Bill of Rights aos Estados. Neste trabalho pretendemos demonstrar a fundamentação kantiana na doutrina da incorporação do Bill of Rights, abordando a corrente filosófica do utilitarismo e do contratualismo. Em primeiro lugar, examinaremos o precedente da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) e em seguida analisaremos filosoficamente o (...) precedente. Em relação aos procedimentos metodológicos esta pesquisa caracteriza-se como qualitativa e descritiva, uma revisão de literaturas por meio de livros, revistas especializadas e periódicos.Palavras-Chave: Bill of Rights; Doutrina da Incorporação; Utilitarismo; Contratualismo; Imperativo categórico kantiano. ABSTRACTThe scientific article aims to clarify the Kantian foundation of the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights. The United States Supreme Court has extended the Bill of Rights to the states. In this paper we intend to demonstrate the Kantian grounding in the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights, addressing the philosophical current of utilitarianism and contractualism. First, we will examine the precedent of the United States Supreme Court Gideon v. Wainwright and then we will philosophically analyze the precedent. Regarding the methodological procedures this research is characterized as qualitative and descriptive, literature review through books.Keywords: Bill of rights; Doctrine of Incorporation; Utilitarianism; Contractualism; Kantian categorical imperative. (shrink)

Many of us assume that all the free editing and sorting of online content we ordinarily rely on is carried out by AI algorithms — not human persons. Yet in fact, that is often not the case. This is because human workers remain cheaper, quicker, and more reliable than AI for performing myriad tasks where the right answer turns on ineffable contextual criteria too subtle for algorithms to yet decode. The output of this work is then used for machine learning (...) purposes to generate algorithms constructed from large data sets containing thousands of correctly coded observations. The fact that ghost workers are treated as consumers distorts the basic logic of the employment relationship, effectively placing the worker-as-consumer in the worst of both worlds, in which they hold the legal rights of neither group. This puts them in a regulatory limbo position in which they have little or no protection, control, or guarantee of return on investment. This is because the platforms that facilitate ghost work have orchestrated a three-way virtual relationship that absolves all parties of responsibility, while placing nearly all the risks and opportunity costs squarely on the shoulders of the workers. As a result, we believe such a work arrangement as it stands, does not uphold basic standards of Rawlsian justice as fairness. (shrink)

One of the chief arguments against a constitutional Bill of Rights is that it gives judges too much power. The courts interpret the constitution, and from the highest court there is no appeal (though the Constitution can be amended -- a difficult process). As Americans sometimes say, "The US Constitution is whatever the Supreme Court says it is". In many cases the Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of Rights by means of wire drawn reasoning, reflecting (...) the judges' political and social views. For a survey of Supreme Court Cases on the Bill of Rights see M. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People . The Supreme Court's power to interpret the constitution has made the appointment of judges a political issue, and in 1937 President Roosevelt sought to appoint additional judges (to "pack" the Court) so as to change the court's attitude (the US Constitution does not fix the number of judges). A President is expected to nominate judges ideologically acceptable to his supporters, and the Congress scrutinises these nominations in a partisan way. See article on George W. Bush's nominations. Since judges hold office for life, a President's nominations may make a long term difference to the interpretation of the constitution. (shrink)

On September 25, 2002, California Governor Gray Davis approved the Health Care Providers’ Bill of Rights. The legislation, which went into effect January 1, 2003, outlaws several practices by insurers that physicians complained represented an imbalance of power. Insurers are now unable to compel doctors to take more patients than they feel they can handle, and managed care companies cannot unilaterally change the terms of their contracts with doctors without notice. Governor Davis praised the legislation, stating, “in order (...) to provide patients with world-class care, we must ensure that our doctors have world-class rights.”California has one of the highest levels of health maintenance organization penetration in the nation, at 52 percent. Seventy-eight percent of HMO patients are enrolled in five HMOs. As a result of these practice conditions, doctors reportedly often felt pressured to comply when HMOs “ordered [them] to take on additional patients,” “changed contracts without warning,” and were “lax in payments.”. (shrink)

On September 25, 2002, California Governor Gray Davis approved the Health Care Providers’ Bill of Rights. The legislation, which went into effect January 1, 2003, outlaws several practices by insurers that physicians complained represented an imbalance of power. Insurers are now unable to compel doctors to take more patients than they feel they can handle, and managed care companies cannot unilaterally change the terms of their contracts with doctors without notice. Governor Davis praised the legislation, stating, “in order (...) to provide patients with world-class care, we must ensure that our doctors have world-class rights.”California has one of the highest levels of health maintenance organization penetration in the nation, at 52 percent. Seventy-eight percent of HMO patients are enrolled in five HMOs. As a result of these practice conditions, doctors reportedly often felt pressured to comply when HMOs “ordered [them] to take on additional patients,” “changed contracts without warning,” and were “lax in payments.”. (shrink)

The US is promoting a new vision of a “Good AI Society” through its recent AI Bill of Rights. This offers a promising vision of community-oriented equity unique amongst peer countries. However, it leaves the door open for potential rights violations. Furthermore, it may have some federal impact, but it is non-binding, and without concrete legislation, the private sector is likely to ignore it.

In this paper I argue, from the point of view of a legal positivist conception of law and its associated approach to legal interpretation, that having a ‘democratic Bill of Rights’ as a basis for enacting ‘human rights legislation’ is more legitimate and likely to be more effective with respect to promoting human rights than the contemporary model of using ‘juridical Bills of Rights’ as a basis for modifying or overriding enacted legislation.Resumen:Desde una concepción positivista (...) del derecho y su respectivo enfoque hacia la interpretación jurídica, en este artículo se argumenta que el tener un “Bill of Rights democrático” como base para expedir una “legislación de derechos humanos” resulta ser más legítimo y más efectivo para la promoción de los derechos humanos, que el modelo contemporáneo de “Bill of Rights jurisdiccionales” que sirve para modificar o invalidar la legislación promulgada. (shrink)

In June 2020, representatives of eight photography organizations addressed ongoing challenges to the industry by introducing the “Photo Bill of Rights,” asserting “the rights of all lens-based workers and defining actions that build a safer, healthier, more inclusive, and transparent industry.” The bill centers what “lens-based workers” are owed by the media organizations that employ them. This study analyzes the bill’s contents and the explicit and implicit values within it, finding that the bill presents (...) a normative view of the work environment lens-based workers should expect as a baseline. In so doing, the bill connects what lens-based workers owe their respective publics to what their employers owe those same workers. The bill highlights the enabling environment that these workers need to satisfy their obligations to the public. The bill reminds employers of their duty to create an equitable environment that can enable the fulfillment of public responsibility. (shrink)

Presents, with interpretative comments, the concurring and dissenting opinions in 71 recent crucial court decisions. All but seven are supreme court cases, relating to constitutional provisions for civil and political liberties.--R. H.

Presents, with interpretative comments, the concurring and dissenting opinions in 71 recent crucial court decisions. All but seven are supreme court cases, relating to constitutional provisions for civil and political liberties.--R. H.

Writers on jurisprudence often stress that conflict between positive laws and morality does not invalidate the positive laws. A law which requires me to compensate another for an injury caused by a dangerous object kept on my property is not invalidated by the fact that I have not been negligent and have no moral obligation to compensate the injured person. And although I have a moral obligation to keep my promises, positive laws may validly imply that I need not keep (...) promises not made for a consideration or under seal. Thus positive law may permit acts not permitted by morals and may forbid acts permitted by morals. The lesson drawn from these thoughts is that to establish a positive law as valid we need not consider the relationships it bears to the rules of morals. A valid law is simply a law created in accordance with the constitutional conventions or ‘rules of recognition’ of the society in which it is to be applied. It is the manner of its establishment, not its relationship to morals, which makes a law valid. (shrink)

REASON, SKEPTICISM, REVOLUTION, AND COMMON SENSE--these are the four characteristics which Henry F. May has found to designate the four categories, or stages, in the development of the Enlightenment in Europe and America. These categories, useful for the classification, description, and analysis of the copious intellectual and cultural materials which comprise the Enlightenment, overlap in the formulation of basic documents--the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Bill of Rights, which are fundamental American laws. (...) The interweaving of reason and revolution in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States has been examined by direct references to the European philosophers whose ideas were employed, with modifications, and implemented by means of newly invented institutions on the part of the American founders. The ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, Burlamaqui, Hutcheson, Hume, and many other thinkers, became instruments of political change in the hands of the Americans. Revolution, moderated by reason and common sense, led to constitution, in order to secure the gains of revolution. (shrink)

The Patient's Charter has been in effect for nearly five years. This article considers the purpose and value of the document through a comparison with the New Jersey Patient Bill of Rights. Patient rights statements have been posted in American hospitals for more than twenty years. However, the New Jersey document and the patient rights programme it established seven years ago, have proven to be economically effective, successful in their representation of patients and enforceable, due to (...) the adoption of state legislation and regulation to oversee the process. Several examples of how the programme works are included in the comparison, with a similar review of The Patient's Charter. In the comparison the author argues that for the programme to succeed as it has done in New Jersey, the government will need to develop legislative backing to ensure enforcement, and an efficient system for monitoring compliance. The programme will need to become credible in the eyes of the health service user. The author suggests this may be best achieved by developing an efficient, accessible and user-friendly means of redress, should the patient consider his or her rights have been violated. A "mish-mash" of quality assurance standards and levels of care which patients can "expect" from the health service providers only serves to distract the health service user from the government's failure to commit the resources that would empower the patients rights portion of The Patient's Charter. (shrink)

Introduction -- What is journalism for? -- Truth: the first and most confusing principle -- Who journalists work for -- Journalism of verification -- Independence from faction -- Monitor power and offer voice to the voiceless -- Journalism as a public forum -- Engagement and relevance -- Make the news comprehensive and proportional -- Journalists have a responsibility to conscience -- The rights and responsibilities of citizens.

This paper presents and discusses a recent Israeli proposal to legislate on the rights of the dying patient. A gap exists between elitist biases of the committee proposing the law, and popular values and sentiments. The proposed law divides the dying patients into two groups: “those who wish to go on living” and “those who wish to die”. The former will have a right to life prolonging extraordinary care. It is not clear who would foot the bill for (...) this care. Also it is hard to see how this munificence could fail to discriminate against all other patients. Both the secular ethicists and the rabbis involved in drawing up the proposal accepted the assumption that it is good for some terminal patients to die. The rabbis objected, however, to direct and active interventions that shorten life. The solution arrived at was to install timers in the ventilators so as to allow them to expire automatically unless the patient wishes for their resetting. (shrink)

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Thomas Pogge has argued, famously, that ‘we’ are violating the rights of the global poor insofar as we uphold an unjust international order which provides a legal and economic framework within which individuals and groups can and do deprive such individuals of their lives, liberty and property. I argue here that Pogge’s claim that we are violating a negative duty can only be made good on the basis of a substantive theory of collective action; and that it can only (...) provide substantive ethical guidance when combined with an account of how collective action gives rise to forward-looking responsibility and/or accountability on an individual level. I consider accounts of these two topics given in work by Peter French and Christopher Kutz; and I argue that neither of them give Pogge what he needs. Although there is a sense in which 'we' can be said to be violating the rights of the worst off, the sense in which this is true does not generate any plausible action-guiding claims for individuals. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a well-known objection to subsistence rights developed by Onora O'Neill - namely, that such rights would generate obligations without an obligation-bearer, can be answered if we take such rights to impose an obligation on the world's population, taken collectively.