Of course it is necessary to distinguish clearly between statements which actually purport to be about non-existents and seemingly similar statements in which the question of non-existents is not in fact broached at all. These latter statements are to be distinguished from statements about non-existents, not in not being about non-existents and therefore being about existents, but in being distinct from the questions both of existence and nonexistence. They deal with another question altogether, namely that of the various predicative uses (...) of the substantive verb. The statement "fairies have wings," for instance, is a statement falling within this latter category: it is not concerned with the existential status of the objects of reference designated by the subject term nor indeed with any designation whatever; merely with the signification and analysis of the concept "fairy"; whether having wings is a subsidary and implicit description within the signification "fairy.". (shrink)

The dilemma about "unknown things-in-themselves" makes it clear that something is as a matter of fact known about them: namely, that whatever they are like, they do exist. So that what is at fault in the description is not obviously the very idea of things-in-themselves but the idea "unknown" as applied to them. The first question therefore is, "What is there in the idea of a thing's being unknown which allows this idea to issue in a descriptive dilemma?".

It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

The defining of 'image' as essentially that class of idea to which there is no object corresponding, springs from a commend able desire not to allow analysis to result in an incorrect conceptual multiplication of physical objects or situations. This result would be likely if the thinker succumbed to the temptation to consider that for every idea entertained there is somehow an objective physical situation corresponding. The simple calling of attention to the type of mental state signified by the word (...) 'imagining' is reckoned to be sufficient to guard against this danger. And so it is. But at the same time,- concentration upon this danger may easily lead to the consequent temptation to consider that there are some ideas which have no objects of reference whatever. This is just not the case. The true insight that some ideas have no objective physical situations corresponding to them does not imply that some ideas have no objects of reference unless it be assumed that all situations or states of affairs are physical. But then if this is true there can be no specific meaning at all for the word 'idea' since by it we imply at the very least some distinction from the physical as such; and in this case all attempts to distinguish 'idea' as over against 'object' break down. The presence of this dilemma is enough to demand a re-analysis of the original distinction. (shrink)

The criterion of reality is variable, and is as non-exclusive as reality itself. So that if freedom from contradiction, for example, be used as such a criterion, it has only to be asked if real muddles, or real chaos, or real contradictions are not possible?

First it will be necessary to examine the argument, and the meaning of the argument, by which Mr. Ingram-Pearson is led to uphold such an unusual position. Using the statement, "fairies do not exist," as his example, he observes: "In order to achieve its obvious status as a denial this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all." What, then, is (...) the designate of the term "fairies"? It is, we are told, "an existent [italics mine] which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there." To say that "fairies do not exist" is therefore to say that "certain entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are not present in the world," or "specific entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are really absent from the world." The latter statement is positive, and Mr. Ingram-Pearson tells us explicitly that positive statements cannot "succeed in making intelligible" something made intelligible by negative statements about non-existents; but he has in mind such "ordinary" positive statements as "fairies are imagined beings." In other words, it is not that negative statements about. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism. Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the objections stick.

A new edition of this bestseller, the only book to cover this range of ethical issues with attention both to the roundedness and individual integrity of each religious tradition and to focused issues which are of contemporary interest. The format of the book has not changed. It provides for parallel study of the values held by different communities, exploring the ethical foundations of Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Each section introduces a different religion and sets the wider context (...) within which more specific questions can be asked. Individual topics can be accessed and understood not only within a tradition as a whole but also across traditions through careful indexing. The following topics are then addressed as appropriate to the given traditions: Religious Identity and Authority Personal and Private? Marriage and Family Influence on and Use of Time and Money Quality and Value of Life Questions of Right and Wrong Equality and Difference National Divisions, War and Peace Global Issues Key features * Each section is written by a specialist in that religious tradition, who in some cases is also an 'insider' and in the other cases has worked closely and in a respected and respectful way with members of that tradition. * Individual topics can be accessed and understood not only within a tradition as a whole but also across traditions through careful indexing * Additions to the text include subsections on reproduction, vegetarianism, just war and terrorism; and new material on weapons of mass destruction and pre-emptive strikes and genetic modification. (shrink)

The authors aim to reinstate a spirit of philosophical enquiry in physics. They abandon the intuitive continuum concepts and build up constructively a combinatorial mathematics of process. This radical change alone makes it possible to calculate the coupling constants of the fundamental fields which? via high energy scattering? are the bridge from the combinatorial world into dynamics. The untenable distinction between what is?observed?, or measured, and what is not, upon which current quantum theory is based, is not needed. If we (...) are to speak of mind, this has to be present? albeit in primitive form? at the most basic level, and not to be dragged in at one arbitrary point to avoid the difficulties about quantum observation. There is a growing literature on information-theoretic models for physics, but hitherto the two disciplines have gone in parallel. In this book they interact vitally. (shrink)

Competition is pervasive in modern society, affecting work, education, and recreation. The question arises whether competition is consistent with scriptural teaching. The context for this enquiry is that Christians today disagree among themselves about whether Scripture has any normative content relating to competition. Some view competition as incompatible with Scripture, while for others it is compatible. On the basis of a given definition of competition, Christian contributions to the debate in the last decade are reviewed. Only six inputs were discovered, (...) with five arguing that Scripture takes no normative position toward competition. Most of this article is taken up with evaluating their cases that are found to be unpersuasive. A sixth paper claims that Scripture is incompatible with competition, examined in the penultimate section. From reviewing the six contributions to the debate, the conclusion is that that Scripture does not have a favorable attitude toward competition. (shrink)

The “Open Air Laboratories” (OPAL) is a large, England-wide environmental public engagement (PE) project based on the “citizen science” model. It is designed to involve people of all backgrounds and abilities in the production of environmental science and in the process to educate and raise awareness and enthusiasm about nature and its importance. This article draws on a series of interviews with scientists and science communicators involved in the project to explore their motivations and aims for the project and what (...) they see as the goals of public engagement generally. We find a varied and nuanced array of motivations and aims that interviewees cite for taking part in the project, pointing toward a reevaluation of traditional ways of understanding the value of public engagement, policy relevance, and dialogue within public engagement. Especially relevant in relation to thinking about the policy relevance of PE is our conclusion that there are many different ways of thinking about the value of PE, characterized in this article as “the neglected middle.”. (shrink)

It is shown that the lattice-theoretic distributive law does not fail to hold in the two slit-experiment for the general case offinite slit widths and for a position measurement which localizes the observed particle to afinite region of the screen. Comments are made on previous and less general discussions of the case considered.

In Word and Object, W.V. Quine dismisses connotations that result from the work of explicating expressions as “don’t-cares.” This paper traces the history of this phrase to an algorithm that Quine developed in the 1950s, which became important in early computer engineering. Computer programmers eventually came to realize that it was in their best interests to abandon the “don’t-care” attitude. Similarly, I argue that naturalists who properly appreciate the communal nature of their inquiries have reason to adopt a more careful (...) approach when they propose and evaluate explications. (shrink)

Thomas Elsaesser claims the late Haneke as a director of ‘mind-game’ films, but his diagnosis of the appeal of such films fails to account for The White Ribbon . In this paper, I draw on the theory of radical interpretation developed by American philosopher Donald Davidson to uncover the film’s power. I argue that the focus on charity in Davidson’s account of the conditions under which an interpreter is able to find a foreign community intelligible illuminates the exquisite discomfort the (...) spectator experiences as she begins to understand the disturbed community that the film portrays. In addition, the film exposes that Davidson’s transcendental argument that language is a condition of mindedness ought to be extended along emotional and moral dimensions. We should not only hold that every rational mind is a language-user, but that every rational mind is an appropriate language-user, so as to account for minds that have true, justified beliefs but which are, nevertheless, disturbed. (shrink)

Despite government policy and initiatives for remote areas, indigenous people are amongst the most disadvantaged and do exhibit higher levels of unemployment in the Australian community. A number of commentators have suggested that better educational opportunities for this minority group will considerably improve their socio-economic status and employment opportunities. This myth is exposed in this article, which reports evidence from an educational–vocational programme for Yolngu who are the indigenous people of East Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory of Australia. The (...) Arnhem Learning Education and Regional Training programme is conducted, mainly at Nhunlunbuy, in partnership with Rio Tinto Alcan and the Charles Darwin University, with the primary objective of preparing indigenous people for mainstream sustainable jobs. The presented content suggests that while higher educational status is important, this sole strategy is unlikely to comprehensively address outstanding issues that are confronting indigenous people and their labour market concerns. (shrink)

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour (...) or not . Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters . Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived. (shrink)

This special issue should go a long way towards increasing the understanding of Peirce’s semeiotic and its applicability for solving problems in legal studies. In fact, the New Science of Semiotics should result in developing a rigorous and systematic methodology for legal studies making it a true semiotic science which I suggest calling “jurisology.”.

In this essay I contest the view that evolution can be conceived as a cosmic entity working out a plan of increasing negentropic complexification. The problems associated with this view, characteristic of a great deal of contemporary speculation, are outlined in section I. In section II I go on to further problematise current constructions of technics and machines and provide an alternative ‘machinic’ model of the play of entropy and evolution. In section III I examine the aesthetic praxis of Stelarc (...) as a site in which the ‘meaning’ of post‐human evolution can be productively contested and illuminated. (shrink)

Attention to the question of whether testimony is a distinctive source of knowledge is a comparatively recent development in Western epistemology. Does being told that p constitute reason for you to believe that p, independently of what you empirically establish about the speaker’s reliability, sincerity, and evaluative position? Still more recently — in just the last decade — Western epistemologists have become occupied with related problems concerning disagreement. What is the rational response, for instance, to discovering that an epistemic peer (...) disagrees with you about p? In the battery of new articles that explore this question, various fine-grained distinctions have been proposed to accommodate cases where it.. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth, and, more specifically, the metaphysical tradition, is inextricable from both his philosophy of language and his turn to physiology. Though the way in which Nietzsche conceived of the intertwinement of language, reason, and the body developed through the course of his philosophical maturation, it is nonetheless a recurrent motif spanning the breadth of his oeuvre. As the editors state in their introduction to Nietzsche on Instinct and Language (NIL), the volume aims at being (...) a “fresh look” at Nietzsche’s repeated attempts to bridge these domains (xv). Beyond this singular and broad explicit aim, however, the volume intimates a number of other more specific aspirations. .. (shrink)