Peirce considered the principal business of logic to be the analysis of reasoning. He argued that the diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs, which he had invented in 1896, carries the logical analysis of reasoning to the furthest point possible. The present paper investigates the analytic virtues of the Alpha part of the system, which corresponds to the sentential calculus. We examine Peirce’s proposal that the relation of illation is the primitive relation of logic and defend the view that this idea (...) constitutes the fundamental motive of philosophy of notation both in algebraic and graphical logic. We explain how in his algebras and graphs Peirce arrived at a unifying notation for logical constants that represent both truth-function and scope. Finally, we show that Shin’s argument for multiple readings of Alpha graphs is circular. (shrink)

This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council, Grant Number 681404.

Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as “ex-concrete.” It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties.

I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.

Research indicates that religious values and ethical behavior are closely associated, yet, at a firm level, the processes by which this association occurs are poorly understood. Family firms are known to exhibit values-based behavior, which in turn can lead to specific firm-level outcomes. It is also known that one’s family is an important incubator, enabler, and perpetuator of religious values across successive generations. Our study examines the experiences of a single, multigenerational business family that successfully enacted their religious values in (...) their business. Drawing upon intergenerational solidarity and values-based leadership theory, and by way of an interpretive, qualitative analysis, we find that the family’s religious values enhanced their cohesion and were manifested in their leadership style, which, in turn, led to outcomes for the business. Our findings highlight the processes that underlie the relationship between religious values and organizational outcomes in family firms and offer insights into the role of solidarity in values-based leadership. (shrink)

Modal Meinongianism is the most recent neo-Meinongian theory. Its main innovation consists in a Comprehension Principle which, unlike other neo-Meinongian approaches, seemingly avoids limitations on the properties that can characterize objects. However, in a recent paper A. Sauchelli has raised an objection against modal Meinongianism, to the effect that properties and relations involving reference to worlds at which they are instantiated, and specifically to the actual world or parts thereof, force a limitation of its Comprehension Principle. The theory, thus, is (...) no better off than other neo-Meinongian views in this respect. This article shows that the notion part of actuality in Sauchelli’s paper is ambiguous from the modal Meinongian viewpoint. Accordingly, his objection splits into two, depending on its disambiguation. It is then explained how neither interpretation forces modal Meinongianism to limit its Comprehension Principle. A third problem connected to Sauchelli’s objection is addressed: how to account for our felicitously referring to nonexistent objects via descriptions that embed reference to properties not actually instantiated by the objects. Overall, the replies to these difficulties provide good insights into the workings of the new Meinongian theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that Umberto Eco had a sophisticated theory of abductive reasoning and that this theory is fundamentally akin to Peirce’s both in the analysis and in the justification of this kind of reasoning. The first section expounds the essentials of Peirce’s theory of abduction, and explains how Peirce moved from seeing abduction as a kind of reasoning to seeing it as a stage of the larger process of inquiry. The second section deals with one of Eco’s paradigmatic examples (...) of abduction, i.e., William of Baskerville’s abduction concerning the horse Brunellus in the overture of The Name of the Rose, and shows that, just like in Peirce’s three-stages model of inquiry, William’s abductions are verified by means of deduction and induction. The third section examines the problem of the justification of abductive reasoning, and argues that both Peirce and Eco solved this problem through the idea that the justification of abduction is itself abductive (meta-abduction in Eco, ur-abduction in Peirce). (shrink)

According to Chomsky, creativity is a critical property of human language, particularly the aspect of ?the creative use of language? concerning the appropriateness to a situation. How language can be creative but appropriate to a situation is an unsolvable mystery from the Chomskyan point of view. We propose that language appropriateness can be explained by considering the role of the human capacity for Mental Time Travel at its foundation, together with social and ecological intelligences within a triadic language-grounding system. Our (...) proposal is based on the change of perspective from the analysis of individual sentences to the flux of speech in which the temporal dimension of language is much more relevant. (shrink)

In Soph. 237b7–239a11 Plato lays out a sequence of arguments that are generally considered homogenous. An analysis of each argument can shed light on the need to differentiate their respective nature. Firstly, it will be shown that the arguments do not work only at the linguistic level, contrary to the way these passages are interpreted by most of commentators. The meta–linguistic nature of the third argument will be particularly emphasised. Secondly, it will be argued that the three arguments follow each (...) other according to a crescendo. The implications of this argumentative structure will be specifically appreciated. Both these results of the analysis induce to attribute a crucial importance to the notion of medamos on: the arguments do not aim to definitively exclude the possibility of a Parmenidean non–being; they play a positive role within the inquiry of the Stranger of Elea, inasmuch the thematisation of Parmenidean non–being is seriously taken into account and embraced at this stage of the dialogue. In fact it is only through this dialectical step that the Stranger gains the chance to proceed in the direction of a relational ontology and a new concept of non–being. The positive role played by the medamos on presupposes that this expression and the equivalent ones are not mere absurdities and can find place in the Platonic use of language; this implies that the notion of medamos on must have a justification in the framework of Platonic relational ontology and conception of language. The consideration of this aspect eventually gives the opportunity to return to the three arguments and present an explanation of their positioning in that stage of the dialogue. (shrink)

Expressively equivalent logical languages can enunciate logical notions in notationally diversified ways. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Peirce’s Existential Graphs, and the notations presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus all express the sentential fragment of classical logic, each in its own way. In what sense do expressively equivalent notations differ? According to recent interpretations, Begriffsschrift and Existential Graphs differ from other logical notations because they are capable of “multiple readings.” We refute this interpretation by showing that there are at least three different kinds (...) of such multiple readings. While readings of the first kind do not capture any essential difference among notations but only among vocabularies, corresponding to readings of the second and the third kind two general parameters according to which notations may differ are defined: linearity vs. non-linearity, and tabularity vs. non-tabularity. This answers the question of how there can be substantially different but expressively equivalent logical notations. (shrink)

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

The present paper argues that substantialist metaphysics are in tension with the physicalist idea that the universe is causally closed. The argument is a rather specific one and proceeds through three steps. The first step consists in arguing that monistic substance metaphysics allow for the existence of entities that cannot belong to the intended first order domain. This result sensitively depends on the nature of substances as invariant entities. The second step concludes that, if further domains are to be admitted, (...) then they are inhabited by “higher” or (systematically) “nonstandard” entities and that, in both cases if not made somehow innocuous, such entities may take part on the metaphysical construction of the world through their own distinctive properties and causal powers. However, this latter claim is in contradiction with causal closure. But closure is the principle that mainly characterizes physicalist approaches in metaphysics and as such physicalist metaphysics cannot get rid of it. Who attempted making exotic properties and causal powers innocuous usually appealed to the Supervenience Argument. Unfortunately, as the third step proves, this argument is invalid. Finally, the paper looks forward and toward alternative models for physicalist metaphysics, like processbased models. Keywords: Metaphysics of Quantities, Abstraction Principles, Locationism. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a narrative hypothesis on the nature of language and a proto-discursive hypothesis on the origin of our communicative abilities. Our proposal is based on two assumptions. The first assumption, concerning the properties of language, is tied to the idea that global discourse coherence governs the origin of our communicative abilities as well the functioning of these abilities. The second assumption, concerning processing devices, is connected to the idea that the systems of spatial and temporal navigation (...) are implicated in discourse coherence processing. Analysis of the relationship between these two assumptions allows us to integrate the model of language based on clues proposed by Sperber and Wilson with Relevance Theory with the discursive foundation of human communication. In this respect, our proposal can be considered as a tentative extension of Relevance Theory. (shrink)

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back to (...) Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the epistemological and practical role played bypathe/affections in Epicurus’ philosophy. Epicurus firstly considered the affections not as emotional/passional conditions, but as firm criteria of truth and more specifically as the third criterion of the canonic (i.e. the epistemological part of his philosophical system). In this article the critical reactions (in particular by the Peripatetic side: Aristocles of Messene) against the Epicurean position about the function of the affections will be investigated too. (...) Finally, two parts of this paper are devoted to the Cyrenaic tripartition ofpathe(in all likelihood, a subject criticized by Epicurus) and to the probable doctrinal relationship between Epicurus’patheand Aristotle’sNicomachean EthicsBook 2. (shrink)

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes more and more pervasive in our everyday life, new questions arise about its ethical and social impacts. Such issues concern all stakeholders involved in or committed to the design, implementation, deployment, and use of the technology. The present document addresses these preoccupations by introducing and discussing a set of practical obligations and recommendations for the development of applications and systems based on AI techniques. With this work we hope to contribute to spreading awareness on the (...) many social challenges posed by AI and encouraging the establishment of good practices throughout the relevant social areas. As points of novelty, the paper elaborates on an integrated view that combines both human rights and ethical concepts to reap the benefits of the two approaches. Moreover, it proposes innovative recommendations, such as those on redress and governance, which add further insight to the debate. Finally, it incorporates a specific focus on the Italian Constitution, thus offering an example of how core legislations of Member States might contribute to further specify and enrich the EU normative framework on AI. (shrink)

This article intends to read the profound dynamics that characterise the current war in the light of certain classical philosophical categories such as the relationship established by Hegel between substance and subject, the difference between the concept of substance and the concept of function as it was discussed by Cassirer, and finally the binomial power over life and right of death reread by Foucault in a biopolitical key. In the light of these polarities, it is in fact possible to identify (...) two opposing worldviews – on which depend two completely different ways of understanding the function of the state, the weight to be ascribed to rights, and even two different ways of conceiving and conducting war – that do not necessarily coincide with the two opposing sides in the field. (shrink)

1. Da Leibniz a Kant.--2. L'algebra della logica.

Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in (...) them. This in turn seems to imply that there exist past and perhaps even future static events. Therefore, there is a problem for presentism. A possible way out for the presentist is proposed, based on allowing for time-indexed past-oriented and future-oriented properties. One may raise objections regarding the ontological status of these properties and the commitment to past and future objects and times that they seem to bring with them, but these objections can be put to rest. (shrink)

In Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (I, §48), Frege introduces his rule of the fusion of horizontals, according to which if an occurrence of the horizontal stroke is followed by another occurrence of the same stroke, either in isolation or “contained” in a propositional connective, the two occurrences can be fused with each other. However, the role of this rule, and of the horizontal sign more generally, is controversial; Michael Dummett notoriously claimed, for instance, that the horizontal is “wholly superfluous” in (...) Frege's logical system. In this paper, we challenge Dummett's view by providing a comprehensive analysis of the significance of the horizontal stroke. After some preliminary remarks, we argue that even if Frege's connectives in some sense “contain” the horizontal, yet they are total functions. Then, we take up the question of the sense expressed by the horizontal, and we claim that, unlike other sentential operators, the horizontal is not sense‐compositional. Finally, we consider the semantic and pragmatic aspects of Frege's horizontal in connection to his judgment stroke and the double judgment stroke. Contra Dummett, we argue that the horizontal is a special and indispensable element of Frege's logic. (shrink)

"Questo volume esamina la dottrina epicurea dei minimi che rappresenta un nodo cruciale della filosofia di Epicuro e un autentico punto di svolta rispetto all'atomismo di Leucippo e Democrito. Il libro è organizzato in tre capitoli dedicati rispettivamente: all'analisi filologica e teorica delle fonti primarie, alla ricostruzione del contesto storico-filosofico a cui la dottrina dei minimi verosimilmente fa riferimento, e, infine, all'approfondimento dello sviluppo della teoria dei minimi in ambito prevalentemente geometrico all'interno della scuola di Epicuro. L'esame critico delle fonti (...) antiche, anche attraverso l'attenta analisi della letteratura secondaria, conferma il ruolo decisivo giocato dai minimi nella scienza della natura epicurea. Si tratta della prima monografia interamente consacrata allo studio di questa significativa dottrina in tutta la sua ampiezza storica e teorica."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

By addressing social issues, rather than maximizing profits, social enterprises are said to contribute to the well-being of societies. In this paper, we test whether social enterprises fulfil this expectation. The paper applies regression analysis to a unique dataset obtained by merging survey data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor with official statistics on social enterprises in Luxembourg. Results suggest that social enterprises contribute to subjective well-being, which is an encompassing measure of people’s satisfaction with their own life. We find that (...) when the share of social enterprises in a city increases, the ill-being of poor and unemployed people declines. Therefore, policy makers who seek to increase the well-being of economically disadvantaged people could adopt policies to promote the creation of social enterprises. (shrink)