1. Jugendschriften 1835-1841. Mit einem Essay "Zum Verständnis der Texte," Erläuterungen und Bibliographie hrsg. von G. Hillmann. DM 3.80 (GDB 66-A49-92)--2. Pariser Manuskripte 1844.--3. Der Mensch in Arbeit und Kooperation (Aus den Grundrissen der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 1857/58).

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. (...) Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason . Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.Esse artigo examina a relação entre intuição e conceito em Kant à luz da posição neokantiana de John McDowell de que intuições estão conceitualmente "carregadas". 1 O foco é sobre o duplo pronunciamento de Kant, segundo o qual pensamentos sem conteúdo são vazios e intuições sem conceitos são cegas. Mostro que intuições como representações singuares não são casos de introdução passiva de dados, mas o resultado da unificação sintética do múltiplo dado dos sentidos pelo poder da imaginação sob a orientação do entendimento. Contra McDowell, defendo que a amabilidade das intuições para com a determinação conceitual não é devida a alguma conceitualidade pré-existente, absoluta do real, mas ao "trabalho do sujeito".2 Num nível mais programático, o presente artigo visa demonstrar as limitações de uma apropriação seletiva de Kant e o potencial filosófico de uma análise mais abrangente e aprofundada de sua obra. A seção 1 aborda o equilíbrio único na filosofia de Kant entre o trabalho com problemas particulares e a orientação em direção a um todo sistemático. A seção 2 descreve a posição de McDowell acerca da distinção kantiana entre intuição e conceito no contexto das leituras de Kant por Sellars e Strawson. A seção 3 expõe a reincidência de McDowell no "mito do dado". A seção 4 propõe uma leitura da filosofia teórica de Kant como uma epistemologia do conhecimento metafísico. A seção 5 detalha a explicação original de Kant sobre a intuição sensível na "Dissertação de 1770". A seção 6 apresenta a transição do múltiplo dos sentidos para a síntese na imaginação e para a unificação por meio das categorias na Crítica da razão pura . A seção 7 aborda o formalismo de Kant na epistemologia e na metafísica. (shrink)

Categorie -- De interpretatione -- Analitici primi -- Analitici secondi -- Topici -- Confutazioni sofistiche.

The contribution examines the aesthetic aspect of cognition in Kant by exploring the central function of the power of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Kant’s critical epistemology, first featured in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 1787) and revisited in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). First, the focus will be on the relationship between the power of the imagination and the two main sources of (theoretical) cognition in Kant, viz., sensibility and the understanding. Second, special attention will be (...) devoted to the distinction between schema and symbol, as alternative products of the power of the imagination in the service of rendering discursive concepts intuitive – with schemata serving to make sensible the concepts of the understanding (Verstand) and symbols suited to provide intuitional counterparts to the concepts of reason (Vernunft). (shrink)

This essay seeks to present Fichte as a political thinker of European significance. To this end, the first section elucidates the basic political profile of Fichte’s philosophy. The second section further investigates the political character of Fichte’s philosophy by recourse to the triple motto of the French Revolution – „Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” – and its correlation with Fichte’s trinity of „I”, „You” and „We“. The final section addresses the mediating and transitional role and function of the political in Fichte, for (...) whom the state is not a final end but always only a means.Der Beitrag mochte J. G. Fichte als politischen Denker von europaischem Format vergegenwartigen. Zu diesen Zweck exponiert der erste Abschnitt den politischen Grundzug von Fichtes Philosophieren. Der zweite Abschnitt verfolgt die politische Pragung von Fichtes Philosophieren im Ruckgriff auf das triplizitare Motto der Franzosischen Revolution – „Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite“ –, dem die Fichtesche Triade von „Ich“, „Du“ und „Wir“ zugeordnet wird. Der abschliesende Abschnitt behandelt die mediale und transitorische Stellung und Funktion des Politischen bei Fichte, fur den der Staat niemals Selbstzweck und immer nur Mittel zum Zweck ist. (shrink)

Beginning in the 1970s and culminating in the first two decades of the 21st century, there has been a marked shift in the sciences from a predominantly reductionist and mechanistic approach to a broader and more holistic viewpoint. It goes without saying that such a shift in point of view will have significant implications, not only for the sciences but for our concepts of nature and of human beings. The present essay is an attempt to assess the significance of this (...) change in the focus of the sciences and to describe the nature of its components. Originally, it had a far more limited scope, that of comparing two of the parts of the new nonreductionist stance: brain plasticity and biological systems theory. Unfortunately, my understanding of one of these factors (systems theory) turned out to be incorrect, while the section on brain plasticity was incomplete. The result of this dual realization is an essay of far greater scope, taking in both new developments in the sciences far beyond that of plasticity, and reassessing the content and impact of systems theory, which is greater than I had thought. I will begin with a study of systems theory, dealing first with the unexpected mathematics which made its present status possible. Then I will deal with its history, which reaches back over a century. One of the confusions into which we are liable to fall is to fail to distinguish the old systems theory from the new. This is even more likely because the two versions of the theory have many features in common. (shrink)

The contribution places Hegel‘s political philosophy, chieflypresented in Elementsof the Philosophy of Right from 1820 but already adumbrated in The GermanConstitution from 1799-1802, intothe context of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns about the relation between thecitizen andthe stateand the corresponding differentiation of political freedom and civil liberty. In particular, the contribution attributes to Hegel a third, conciliatory position beyond the establishedopposition between the ancient republican ideal of civic commitment and service and the modern emphasis on individual choiceand (...) personal self-fulfillment. (shrink)

In this contribution, a scientific interpretation of musical harmony is understood as a description in an adequate frame of symbolic forms (in the sense of Cassirer), rather than as a final explanation. I describe different interpretations of musical harmony from the time of the Pythagoreans until the present times. It is noted that a symbolic interpretation of Helmholtz (in the sense of his theory of signs), which was criticized as incomplete by Ernst Mach, is recognized as adequate by Arnold Schönberg.

The problem of the Rota Aristotelis deals with the unrolling of two tightly connected concentric circles with different radii. It is to be found in Chapter 24 of the text Mechanica of the Aristotelian corpus (today generally no longer attributed to Aristotle) and has bothered many authors until the modern age. All these scholars agree that the solution given there is not satisfactory. We conclude that Chapter 24 is close to Aristotle, at least, both from a philological and philosophical point (...) of view. The solution of the problem given in the ancient text can very well be transferred into a modern physical phenomenological explanation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 2 Seiten: 903-932.

In his essay the author draws attention to two 16th century humanists who engaged in the debate on Cicero the Man. In 1534, Ortensio Lando, a man of letters, published Cicero relegatus & Cicero revocatus, which was a collection of objections to Cicero’s character and habits brought forward in an imaginary conversation, as well as of arguments in his defence proposed in an equally fictitious public hearing, thus producing an apparent equilibrium. Lando, however, did not leave us guessing about his (...) meaning, but gave us hints about his own attitude to Cicero. In 1537, Sebastiano Corrado, an editor and commentator of various Ciceronian writings, published In M. T. Ciceronem Quaestura, a collection of textual emendations to his œuvres. In order to make it more attractive reading, he wrote it in dialogue form and called the readings he approved of, ‘gold coins’, those he rejected, ‘false coins’, thus building a stock of allegedly reliable readings. The coin metaphor recurred in Corrado’s Egnatius, sive Quaestura which was an attempt to lay, in form of dialogue, the foundations of a reliable biography of Cicero. Here three scholars discuss all the information provided by Cicero himself, his contemporaries and later sources on his life and work. Information they approve of is treasured as gold coin, the rest is rejected as false coin. It turns out, however, that Corrado was strongly prejudiced against Greek sources shedding an unfavourable light on Cicero. The result was an apology rather than a biography of Cicero. (shrink)