Social enterprises are hybrid organizations that primarily pursue social missions while also seeking economic gains. Drawing on workplace diversity and conflict theories, this article addresses recent calls for further research to explore how employees within social enterprises experience internal conflicts arising from the organizational pursuit of dual, competing missions (i.e., social and economic), and how social enterprises manage, and potentially overcome, these challenges. In the context of Korean social enterprise, we conducted a quantitative study that built on an initial explorative (...) qualitative study. Our research examined whether perceived participatory human resource management practices and diversity climate increase employees’ affective commitment by reducing their relational conflict. We further explored a boundary condition, perceived social impact, which strengthened this mediation relationship. Our results offer significant insights into social enterprise, business ethics, and broader management literature. Implications for future research and practice are also discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationships among corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate brand credibility, corporate brand equity, and corporate reputation. Structural equation modeling analysis provided support for the hypotheses from a sample of 867 consumers in South Korea. The results showed that CSR has a direct positive effect on corporate brand credibility and corporate reputation. In addition, the results indicate that corporate brand credibility mediates the relationship between CSR and corporate reputation. Moreover, corporate brand credibility mediates (...) the relationship between CSR and corporate reputation. Finally, the relationship between CSR and corporate brand equity is sequentially and fully mediated by corporate brand credibility and corporate reputation. The theoretical and managerial implications of the results and limitations are discussed, and future research directions are suggested. (shrink)

Social enterprises, promising organizations for solving societal problems with innovative approaches, rely upon their members’ active roles for workplace innovation. However, we still have a limited understanding about how social enterprises can foster employees’ endeavors for innovation. By focusing on employee learning and innovative behavior, we investigate the influences of perceived social mission, value congruence, and human resource management (HRM) practices in social enterprises. We conducted two complementary studies to answer our research questions. In Study 1, with a survey of (...) 369 employees from 68 social enterprises, we examined a multilevel moderated mediation model with firm‐level and individual‐level data. We found that perceived social mission promoted learning and innovative behavior by increasing value congruence, and that commitment‐based HRM practices enhanced the overall process from mission to employee efforts for innovation. In Study 2, with 300 daily surveys from 60 employees participating in an experience sampling study, we found that those with high‐value congruence showed a significantly more stable pattern with less variance in innovative behavior than in learning behavior. Our study adds novel implications to the underdeveloped literature on employee innovation and HRM in social enterprises by uncovering the positive effects of social mission and value facets for boosting learning and innovative behaviors. Our research also suggests that social enterprises should benefit from pursuing and emphasizing the social mission and commitment‐based HRM bundle together, which will promote the prosperity and well‐being of business and society. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 702-717, July 2022.

This study investigated the clinical application of the 2006 Third Revised Korean Nurses’ Code of Ethics and the moral sensitivity of nurses. A total of 303 clinical nurses in South Korea participated in the survey in May and June 2011. As instruments of this study, we used the 15 statements of the Korean Nurses’ Code of Ethics and Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire. The mean score for application was 3.77 ± 0.59, and the mean score for moral sensitivity was 5.14 ± (...) 0.55. The correlation coefficient of the application and moral sensitivity was 0.336. Nurses who scored high on moral sensitivity also scored high on application. In clinical settings, educational programmes to develop the moral sensitivity of nurses are necessary for improving the application of the code of ethics. (shrink)

This study examines the challenges of humanism and education in the 21st century as addressed by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk in his Elmau Speech (1999). In this lecture, titled _Rules for the Human Zoo_, Sloterdijk argues that the traditional notion of humanism, specifically “humanism as a literary society,” has reached its conclusion, necessitating the development of a new humanism appropriate for the contemporary era. However, the new concept of humanism emerging from what Sloterdijk terms the “anthropotechnic turn” appears to (...) align with the discourses surrounding human enhancement that have emerged in the 21st century, thereby influencing the realm of education. The first half of this article reports on the significant concerns and criticisms expressed by the media at that time regarding this new humanism, which seems to be associated with eugenicist ideas. Taking a step further, this study critically examines the nature of the challenges around education implied by Sloterdijk, specifically the conflict between “friend of humans and friend of Übermensch”, and explores the potential roles and responsibilities of education in the latter part of the paper. (shrink)

The positive reception of Buber’s philosophy does not fully match Buber’s intention in terms of overcoming the problem of the subject–object binary. In other words, a number of authors have remained within the traditional way of thinking by merely replacing the subject and object with Buber’s I and You, establishing a more dogmatic normative subjectivity, paradoxically going against Buber’s intent and even seemingly not noticing this problem. In this article, we will investigate the reasons for these paradoxical readings of Buber. (...) By focusing on the structure and significance of Buber’s ontology of between-humane, we will study the concept of I–You and I–It, suggesting that these are not intentionality-oriented concepts, but a radically relationship-centered one. The theoretical problem caused by Buber himself in the process of adaptation of his dialog-philosophy to his dialog-pedagogy, namely the impossibility of complete mutuality in the educational relationship will be critically examined, based on Buber’s own declaration in his “Afterword” (1957) in I and Thou (1923). With this, we will reflect on the problematic situation of post-Buberian literature in contemporary pedagogy to pave a way to modernize Buber’s dialog-pedagogy. (shrink)

The contemporary age is approaching the downfall of human civilization due to the rapid collapse of the global ecology. As the popular obsession with industrial development, triggered by the Western modernization of the 18th century, expands across the entire world, minor regional environmental crises have merged intoan irremediable global ecological crisis. This suggests that human society has lost its ability to harmonize with nature and is driving itself to a crisis of survival, dangling on the brink of a fatal cliff. (...) The resolution of the global ecological crisis, which has been exacerbated primarily by Western civilization, requires an alternative thought paradigm that appeared in Korea over 100 years ago, one that can be characterized as ‘the ideology of Gaebyeok.’ This ideology proclaimsthat the global ecological crisis of our times is not simply a crisis of civilization sparked by energy over-consumption, but is rather an inevitable cyclical phenomenon stemming from a change in the universe’s natural order. The ideology of Gaebyeok, refined by a Korean Philosopher, Gim Il-Bu (1826-1898) in his work Jeongyeok (Right Change) and eventually brought to full blossom by Gang Jeung-San (1871-1909), suggests an excellent alternative way of thinking which offers a new hope to the citizens of the contemporary world who cannot ind an escape from their risky societies. My paper will discuss this enlightened vision of global hope. (shrink)

Orbis Sensualium Pictus by Comenius is historical evidence of the revolutionary development of language didactic in the seventeenth century. However, this book is not only a simple encyclopedic Latin study book with pictures, but a little theology work containing Christian cosmological universalism as well as a pedagogy which provides principles for educational practice and social realizations of a theological ideal in a very new and creative form of iconography. While studying Latin seems to be the main purpose of his work, (...) the authentic intention of the author lies in a panpedagogical call to a religious-educational mission for rebuilding humanity and society during and after the 30 Years War. In this article, we will show the historical and pedagogical meaning of this book through component analysis, framework analysis and iconographical interpretation. In addition, we will also approach Comenius’ concept of Pampaedia through an iconographical shortcut, highlighting a picture in “Invitatio” and “Clausula”, which is presented twice in this book. (shrink)

In understanding Peirce's unique system of pragmatism following three theories are helpful: first, Herakleitos' saying that 'one can never step into a same river twice', second, Protagoras' saying that 'men are the measure of the world', and third, Darwin's theory of evolution. It is always the case that epistemology takes place on top the metaphysical and cosmological bases. Peirce's metaphysics and cosmology is considered to line up with above three theories. It is interesting fact that Peirce who started up his (...) work in science ended up with such somehow unscientific cosmology. Peirce believes that the world is constantly changing. Inknowing the world Peirce says that the subject of knowing takes a part doing a certain role. Peirce says that 'to believe A', 'to think of A' and 'to think of A as true' are all same sort of mental act. Therefore, to Peirce, truth is only a kind of 'opinion'. This means that the subject of knowing has something to do with truthfulness. In this kind of knowing process 'knowing truth' can only be acquired when possibility of 'inaccuracy' and 'onesideness' are opened. Thus, Peirce's definition of knowing or truth is quite indefinite definition. According to Peirce, we only know the world partially, and moreover, even we get the total sum data about the world,the world will move on forward changing. On this ground, it might be helpful that we look in to current matters in philosophy of mind in different angle. (shrink)

This paper draws on MacIntyre’s ethical thought to illuminate a hitherto underexplored religious context for business ethics, that of the Amish. It draws on an empirical study of Amish settlements in Holmes County, Ohio, and aims to deepen our understanding of Amish business ethics by bringing it into contact with an ethical theory that has had a signifcant impact within business ethics, that of Alasdair MacIntyre. It also aims to extend MacIntyrean thought by drawing on his neglected critique of modernity (...) in the context of business ethics. The Amish context allows us to appreciate the relationship between MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, his conception of practices and communities, and his distinctive approach to the virtues. It also helps us to better understand how the ethical life is possible within our emotivist culture. (shrink)

The aporia of violence is probably the single most important issue that defines the failure of the leftist revolutionary politics as was experienced in modern history. It is what prevented it from ultimately achieving its goal by entrapping it in the perverse effect of the sovereign violence. As is well known, Slavoj Žižek in his book, Violence, proposes us to return to the practice of messianic or divine violence that Walter Benjamin conceptualized in contrast to that of mythical violence. But, (...) such an idea of messianic violence was not just Benjamin’s, but in fact, a predominant one in the long tradition of Marxism including Marx himself. It is then hard to see how a simple return to the practice of messianic violence will assist us better than it used to in discovering alternative ways to think about violence. In this paper, I would like to engage myself in a close reading of Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser’s discussions of violence, hoping to find such alternatives. On the issue of violence Lacan and Althusser both converge and diverge. While examining such a crossroad of sive— in both senses of the term: identity and difference—I will in the end emphasize the need to reconsider the notion of representation, which one may no longer easily put aside as opportunistic. (shrink)

The author of this paper aimed to understand the early Buddhism community in its entirety by examining the individual episodes in the "Mahavagga". There is a remarkable experience of the psychic power between the Buddha and the Brahmins. They are both aware of coming across of psychic forces that entered the way to the Buddhist Community. Using the brahmins mythology as a instrument for missionary work, the early Buddhism brings people close to Buddha's community. The Buddha visited Uruvela-Kassapa and took (...) lodging for the night where the sacred fire was kept, in spite of Kassapa's warning that the spot was inhabited by a fierce Naga. The Buddha, by his magical powers, overcame, first this N ganad then another, both of whom vomited fire and smoke. Kassapabeing pleased with this exhibition of iddhi-power, undertook to provide the Buddha with his daily food. The Buddha spent the whole rainy season there, performing, in all, three thousand five hundred miracles of various kinds, reading the thoughts of kassapa, splitting firewood for the ascetic sacrifices, heating stoves for them to use after bathing in the cold weather, etc. Still Kassapa persisted in the thought, "The great ascetic is of great magic power, but he is not anarahant like me." Finally the Buddha decided to startle him by declaring that he was not an arahant, neither did the way he followed lead to arahantship. Thereon kassapa owned defeat and reverently asked for ordination. The Buddha asked him to consult with his pupils, and they cut off their hair and threw it with their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained. Nadi Kassapa and Gaya Kassapa were ordained with their pupils. At Gay sisa the Buddha preached to them the Fire Sermon, and they all attained arahantship for the early Buddhist Community. The episode of Uruvela Kassaps in the Mahavagga text ultimately idealizes the power of psychic and the start of the community. It is probable, even at the time when the episode were written, that as a matter of fact every one, in ordinary daily life, spoke imply the vernaculars in a much more simple and natural state of society. It is the Mahavagga authors, when addressing a cultured public at a date when the vernaculars had become the paramount literary language. Another point is that though brahmins take part in the religious and philosophical conversations of those early tims, and in the accounts of them are always referred to with respect, and threaten with the same courtesy that they always themselves extended also to others, yet they hold no predominant position. The majority of the ascetic, and the most influential individuals among them, are not brahmins. That is only a matter of course will be the obvious subjection. The Mahavagga texts I quotes, if not the work of bitter opponents, were at leastcomposed under India bramins influence, and are prejudiced against the brahmins. (shrink)

The author of this paper aimed to understand the early Buddhism community in its entirety by examining the individual episodes in the "Mahavagga". There is a remarkable experience of the psychic power between the Buddha and the Brahmins. They are both aware of coming across of psychic forces that entered the way to the Buddhist Community. Using the brahmins mythology as a instrument for missionary work, the early Buddhism brings people close to Buddha's community. The Buddha visited Uruvela-Kassapa and took (...) lodging for the night where the sacred fire was kept, in spite of Kassapa's warning that the spot was inhabited by a fierce Naga. The Buddha, by his magical powers, overcame, first this N ganad then another, both of whom vomited fire and smoke. Kassapabeing pleased with this exhibition of iddhi-power, undertook to provide the Buddha with his daily food. The Buddha spent the whole rainy season there, performing, in all, three thousand five hundred miracles of various kinds, reading the thoughts of kassapa, splitting firewood for the ascetic sacrifices, heating stoves for them to use after bathing in the cold weather, etc. Still Kassapa persisted in the thought, "The great ascetic is of great magic power, but he is not anarahant like me." Finally the Buddha decided to startle him by declaring that he was not an arahant, neither did the way he followed lead to arahantship. Thereon kassapa owned defeat and reverently asked for ordination. The Buddha asked him to consult with his pupils, and they cut off their hair and threw it with their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained. Nadi Kassapa and Gaya Kassapa were ordained with their pupils. At Gay sisa the Buddha preached to them the Fire Sermon, and they all attained arahantship for the early Buddhist Community. The episode of Uruvela Kassaps in the Mahavagga text ultimately idealizes the power of psychic and the start of the community. It is probable, even at the time when the episode were written, that as a matter of fact every one, in ordinary daily life, spoke imply the vernaculars in a much more simple and natural state of society. It is the Mahavagga authors, when addressing a cultured public at a date when the vernaculars had become the paramount literary language. Another point is that though brahmins take part in the religious and philosophical conversations of those early tims, and in the accounts of them are always referred to with respect, and threaten with the same courtesythat they always themselves extended also to others, yet they hold no predominant position. The majority of the ascetic, and the most influential individuals among them, are not brahmins. That is only a matter of course will be the obvious subjection. The Mahavagga texts I quotes, if not the work of bitter opponents, were at least composed under India bramins influence, and are prejudiced against the brahmins. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affective Foundation of Society in Nietzsche's PhilosophyJihun JeongIntroductionNietzsche believes that the different human types should be allowed to thrive and not be reduced into uniformity, as he says "nothing should be banished more than... the approximation and reconciliation" of the different types (KSA 12:10[59]).1 He sees the approximation as a reflection of democratic values and monolithic morality that he opposes. Instead, he believes that humans should be naturalized and (...) allowed to live in accordance with their own nature. To achieve this, Nietzsche proposed "the great politics," which "makes physiology into the ruler over all other questions" to "breed humanity as a whole" so that "one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not" (KSA 13:25[1]). In this way, Nietzsche thinks the different types should live in accordance with their respective nature.In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that "every healthy society" consists of different physiological types.2 He repeatedly says that "Nature, not Manu," separates these physiological types of the hierarchical order,3 which is "merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank." While each type has "its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery" (A 57), this rank order is "the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types," which are "determined and best developed for different activity," like "division of labor" (KSA 13:14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as "differently gravitating" and "mutually conditioning" types (A 57). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organized structure together. This structure is "opposed to an atomistic anarchy." A "human community is a unity [Einheit]," and "all unity is unity only as organization and co-operation." In [End Page 1] this way "a ruling structure," which does not exist as one, "means one [Eins]" (KSA 12:2[87]).However, what is it that produces this unity? Nietzsche's envisioned "naturalization of human beings" (KSA 9:11[211]) involves a society where different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. However, the existence of different types does not ensure the formation of society as a whole. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to form a society if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed "by accident," as Hobbes understands (42). What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? This article explores the social aspect of Nietzsche's understanding of nature, particularly with attention to his idea of affects, which will lead us to the idea of the affective foundation of society in his philosophy.4Nietzsche often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncertain, indifferent to human affairs, and without purpose and mercy. Thus, he writes, "how could you live according to this indifference? Living—is that not precisely wanting to be different than this nature? Is living not assessing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?" (BGE 9) In this regard, the first point to note is that the "nature" of which Nietzsche speaks involves human nature strong enough to play with chaos and even to defy nature's indifference and brutality. As Conway points out, "the 'return to nature' that he envisions thus involves a return to human nature as the sole authority or justification for the nomothetic preferences required by the restricted economy of Life" (42–43). It is human nature to impose order on the natural world, transforming its amorphous state into a structured form of life, and to create a hierarchy of values in nature's indifference—this is perfectly natural and is the task of the philosophers. Therefore, rather than settling in "the infinite domain of Chaos" as Seung argues (292), Nietzsche reminds us of human nature: "We speak of nature and, in doing so, forget ourselves: we ourselves are nature" (WS 327). In this respect, the affirmation of nature... (shrink)

Pirie's new book attempts a long-awaited Marxist analysis of the contemporary Korean state. It seeks to go beyond the binary opposition between neoliberal market-fundamentalism and Keynesian statism by persuasively demonstrating the indispensability of the state's role in the establishment of neoliberalism in Korea. It also provides an original and insightful analysis of the neoliberal regulation of finance in Korea. However, Pirie's central argument that the stable neoliberal régime of accumulation was established in Korea after the 1997 crisis can be questioned (...) in view of the trend in profitability, the same empirical evidence on which his argument rests. Pirie also needs to provide a more consistent Marxist class-analysis of capitalism in Korea. (shrink)

In this essay, I qualify Jean-Luc Marion's anti-ontological interpretation of Anselm's argument. Marion claims that the argument is not ontological but in line with Dionysian apophatic theology. To substantiate his anti-ontological reading, Marion suggests that the main regulative idea of the Proslogion is bonum. The final regulative idea, however, is gaudium, since gaudium, not bonum, leads the argument to the beatific vision. If we reformulate the Proslogion focusing on gaudium, we find that Marion's analysis misses the evident ontological aspects of (...) the argument, such as the tradition of prayer and hermeneutics. Since Anselm promulgated the argument within the Benedictine tradition of Bec, the practice of prayer or meditation is the legitimate context of the argument. However, because of his emphasis on the structure of call and response over the ontological and hermeneutical aspects of revelation, his analysis neglects the importance of the hermeneutic relation within which the Proslogion is born. (shrink)

Are the first principles in the philosophy of Thomas Reid derived inductively from particular experience, or are they self-evident? Is Reid an epistemic particularist, or a methodist? Some scholars interpret him as an epistemic particularistic, while others hold that he is a methodist like other philosophers of his time. This debate was central to an exchange between Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer. Taking the general belief in personal identity as an example, this paper aims to show which interpretation is more (...) consistent with Reid's whole philosophical system. Although Reid believes that the general belief is self-evident without reasoning, it is not self-evident in the way that beliefs in particular cases are. Reid's overall philosophical method makes the self-evidence of particular beliefs more basic, the self-evidence of general beliefs being transferred from particular beliefs by means of habit. I conclude that the particularistic interpretation is more consistent with his whole philosophical sys.. (shrink)

This article reexamines Jeong In-bo’s lifelong studies and achievements from the perspective of understanding him as a statesman. Keenly empathizing the pain of the people who lost their nation, he recognizes that it was the task of the times to reclaim national sovereignty and relieve the people from suffering. He finds the cause of the collapse of Joseon inside Joseon, and diagnoses that all problems originated from ‘thinking of promoting one’s own interests (自私念)’. What he suggested to resolve these (...) problems is ‘to awaken the sincere mind’. He believes that separation can be turned into oneness, conflict into love, and slaughter into revitalization only when ‘thinking of promotion of one’s own interest’ is overcome by awakening the sincere mind of all Joseon people. While studying Yangming studies, Jeong In-bo realized that the sincere mind has the ability to empathize, and verified this realization by his own experience. Through this experience, he submitted ‘empathy of the sincere mind’ as a statecraft principle that can save the world. All of his activities including educational, academic, media and political activities, aim at ‘governing a nation and saving the people’ according to the statecraft principle of ‘empathy of the sincere mind’. Jeong In-bo paved the way for advancing Korean Studies by awakening the importance of Korean Studies to his colleagues and students who worked at Yonhee College. Furthermore, with a deep understanding of Joseon’s reality after liberation, he adopted ‘strengthening and raising the national spirit’, which was the spirit of the times, as his educational ideology, and suggested a way for the nation to move forward by seeking detailed practical plans. He also brought the thoughts and works of Silhak scholars in the late Joseon dynasty into light; from his view, these scholars related to the nation and its people through the sincere mind and academically explored the way to save the nation and its people. He inspired the sense of subjectivity of the people by exploring Joseon’s spirit of 5,000 years in his research on Joseon history, enhancing the sense of identity of our nation. He struggled to solve the problems of the times by spreading his academic achievements through the media and carrying out an enlightenment movement to awaken the sincere mind of the people. Even in his short political term in Syngman Rhee’s government, he tried to correct the bureaucracy. All these academic works and activities of Jeong In-bo were motivated by the determination to save the world. (shrink)

Jeong Jae-gyu (鄭載圭, 1843-1911) was a scholar in the late Joseon Dynasty who contributed to the solidification and formation of the Nosa school (蘆沙學派) through the publication of Nosajib (蘆沙集) and active lecture activities based on the independent acceptance of his teacher, Ki Jeong-jin (奇正鎭). He explained the concept of intelligence based on the definitions of Shen Gui-bao (沈貴珤), an early scholar of the Yuan Dynasty, and even though the volume was not large, he presented a deep analysis (...) and a unique interpretation. Few Joseon Neo-Confucian scholars had explained the concept of intelligence based on Shen Gui-bao, so his attempts are unique. Shen Gui-bao explained, “the Intelligence includes the axis of change in the real world where the heavenly principles are inherent and has a mirror to judge the conflicts of human affairs”. Hu Bing-wen (胡炳文) used the explanation to justify his concept of intelligence. However, since intelligence is a principle, and the “axis of change in the real world” is also a principle, an unreasonable proposition of ‘principle includes principle’ can be established according to Shen Gui-bao’s definitions. Therefore, Kim Chang-hyeop (金昌協) and others criticized Shen Gui-bao, saying that such a proposition cannot be accepted. However, in the 19th century, Lee Hang-ro (李恒老) and Lee Jin-sang (李震相) showed a positive attitude toward Shen Gui-bao’s definitions. Jeong Jae-gyu, who partially accepted the influence of Lee Jin-sang, reaffirmed the fundamental position of intelligence through the phrase “Intelligence includes the axis of change in the real world”, and emphasized that intelligence is the basis for both moral judgment and the principle of perception. Furthermore, in the Neo-Confucian system, intelligence corresponds to a quiet virtue, so Jung Jae-gyu’s emphasis on it might lead to a theory of cultivation centered on solitude (靜), which can be confirmed in questions and answers shared with Ki Jung-jin, his writings, and poems. (shrink)

Ki Jeong-jin proposed a distinctive perspective in which the unified li 理 transforms into individual li by itself, and these individual li subsequently become the natures of distinct species. This viewpoint starkly contrasts with the Yulgok school’s theory, which posits that the unified principle differentiates through qi 氣. In response, Jeon Woo critiqued Ki Jeong-jin by adhering to the doctrines of the Yulgok school. According to him, a species’ nature is wholly attributed to the influence of qi. Ki (...) Jeong-jin’s disciple, Jeong Eui-rim, defended his teacher’s doctrine by embracing the organic model. He likened the relationship between Heaven and all things to that of the body and its limbs, contending that it embodies a ‘whole-part’ connection. Just as the parts coalesce to constitute the whole, the whole is omnipresent within the parts; similarly all things come together to form Heaven, and Heaven is omnipresent within all things. Based on this, Jeong Eui-rim concluded that all things ‘originally existed’ alongside Heaven, and further postulated that the li of all things originated from this ‘original existence.’ Consequently, his contention is not that the unified li differentiates into the li of all things through qi but that the li of all things inherently existed and evolved into the natures of various species. (shrink)

This essay investigates Dasan Jeong Yak‐yong's (1762–1836) account of human‐nature‐as‐taste, by comparing his commentaries on significant chapters in the Mengzi to Zhu Xi's commentaries. Dasan argues that human nature is understood through giho, taste sentiments and desires, and not as Principle (li). I first introduce Dasan's account of human‐nature‐as‐taste in his commentaries to 3A1 and 7A4. Next, I argue that giho is most appropriately translated as “taste,” because this term captures the dispositional characteristics of giho as a mental faculty (...) as well as its mental effects, such as desires, sentiments, and preferences. I then examine Dasan's and Zhu Xi's commentaries on 6A7 and 6A6, to illustrate how Dasan's view of human‐nature‐as‐taste interprets the chapters differently from Zhu Xi's metaphysical account of human‐nature‐as‐Principle, which Dasan considers as unsupported by the philological and contextual grounds. This exploration of Dasan's empirical account of human‐nature‐as‐taste, serving as a preliminary for a philosophical study of his reinterpretation of the Confucian Classics and his performative account of moral self‐cultivation, will provide us with an alternative perspective to the Neo‐Confucian metaphysic‐epistemic account of human nature. (shrink)

This essay offers an introduction to Jeong Yakyong’s ethical philosophy as revealed by his commentary on the Mengzi. Following Mengzi, Dasan insisted that the Confucian Way was grounded in the will of Heaven but looked back to early views about the Lord on High and described ethical life in terms of an everyday, natural order decreed by the Lord on High. Not only did he see a wide range of human emotions as indispensable and central to the good life, (...) he also insisted that Heaven and the Way must be understood in terms of their manifestations in this world. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the ethical philosophy of the late Joseon dynasty Korean Confucian philosopher Jeong Yakyong 丁若鏞 (1762–1836), more commonly known as Dasan茶山, as revealed in his comprehensive commentary on the Mencius孟子 (K. Maengja). Dasan sought to rescue Mencius’s philosophy from what he saw as the metaphysical excesses of Song-Ming neo-Confucians, whose interpretations of this and other Chinese classics had become orthodox in Jeoson Korea, and return to the letter and spirit of Mencius’s original teachings.

The primary aim of Jeong Do-jeon’s criticism of Buddhism is, like Mencius, to promote both political and moral actions based on the virtues of Confucianism. In a similar way to Mencius’ denouncement of heretical discourses, Jeong Do-jeon thinks that the disapproval of Buddhism is indispensable for accomplishing the ways of Sages-that is, for effectuating the virtues of Confucianism. Rather than an intellectual debate against Buddhism, Jeong Do-jeon’s criticism of Buddhism is done in the context of political movement, (...) to incorporate Neo-Confucianism as a national ideology. His disapproval, followed and enhanced the discourses of former Confucianists - Zhang Zai, Cheng Brothers, and Zhu Xi - displays both distinctive criticism of Buddhism and better understanding of Neo-Confucianism than other relevant Neo-Confucianists of the Joseon Dynasty. In his book Bulsi-japbyeon 佛氏雜辨, Jeong underlines that Neo-Confucianism, which is based on the concrete facts unlike Buddhism, has realistic practicality, and maintains that the ontological foundation of human morality exists by showing the distinction between the nature(性) and the mind(心). Jeong’s argument has two implications: first, it sheds light on the living moral agent even in fluctuating political conditions; second, it shows that Jeong did not simply reiterate Zhu Xi’s criticism of Buddhism but, based on his particular systematic understanding of overall aspects of Neo-Confucianism, Jeong did criticize Buddhism in his own way. From this point of view, it could be understood that Jeong Do-jeon’s disapproval of Buddhism focuses on the realistic value of the virtues of Confucianism and its actual practice, unlike his predecessors of the Song dynasty who focused on human nature, mind and self-cultivation. (shrink)

The Neo-Confucian writings of Bangye Yu Hyeong-won, the pioneer of Shilhak, did not remain, and he himself confessed his conversion from a ‘Qi centered view’ to 'Shilli theory', resulting in a variety of interpretations, making the whole aspect of his Neo-Confucian philosophy difficult to figure out. From that time on, as interpreted in his conversion from ‘anti Zhuzi Studies’ to ‘Zhuzi Studies’, he has been recognized as a Juri-theorist with a Li-centered thinking. Nevertheless, many scholars who paid attention to Yu's (...) 'The Theory of Governing Society' evaluated him as a reality-oriented Qi-theorist and experientialist. In this article, through analyzing the content and character of his Shilli theory expressed by Yu himself, and exploring the content, inclination degree, motive and purpose of the conversion he confessed at the age of 37, I examine whether his confession really meant a turn to Juri. I point out that even if he recognized Li's substance and developed Shilli theory, which emphasized Li’s independence and Superintendence Character, he still did not give up 'Qiwaiwuli' and 'Qizhili' and maintained a reality-oriented perspective that focuses on things and practice. I also point out that his Shilli theory has a light inclination that just adds reinforcement of the essential nature to the existence that is already firmly established in his philosophy. The trigger or purpose of the turn to Shilli theory was to secure absolute moral standards that could not be solved by Qi-centered theory, and to lay the cornerstone of his lifelong work, Bangyesurok, on the absolute principle of Tianli. Through this, I develop the argument that his Shilli theory was not a conversion to Juri. (shrink)

I’m avoiding Mr. G’s room. I shouldn’t have read the emergency room notes from the other hospital, where this middle‐aged man raised a stink about the wait. What type of person calls the triage nurse a bitch? From the timestamps on the electronic medical record notes, he stormed from that ER and drove his abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, and discontent directly across town to us.I’m reminded of this oft‐quoted aphorism from Sir William Osler: “The good physician treats the disease; the (...) great physician treats the patient who has the disease.” It’s cited by medical educators as an invocation to never forget the humanistic heart at the center of clinical care. But what if the patient is a jerk? That I haven’t met Mr. G, only read briefly about him, doesn’t stop these ugly feelings from surfacing. (shrink)

In their recent and influential book Rethinking Innateness, Jeffrey Elman and his co‐authors argue that evidence from neurobiology provides us with grounds to reject representational nativism (RN). I argue that Elman et al.’s argument fails because it makes a series of unwarranted assumptions about RN and about the extent to which neurobiological data constrain claims about the innateness of mental rep‐resentations. Moreover, I briefly discuss how we ought to understand RN and argue that on two prima facie plausible approaches, far (...) from refuting nativism, the evidence from neurobiology may not even be relevant to the question of whether or not RN is true. (shrink)

Jerry Walls has attempted to make the case that no orthodox Christian should embrace compatibilism. We responded to his arguments, challenging four key premises. In his most recent response, Walls argues that none of our rebuttals to these premises succeed. Here we clarify aspects of our previous arguments and show that Walls has not in fact undermined our defense of Christian compatibilism.

Ki Jeong-jin is the one of the most famous Neo-Confucian theorists of the late Joseon Dynasty, and he is well known as a proposer of the theory of statements that there is only one Principle although the phenomena vary. He particularly emphasizes the role and authority of Principle. His arguments related to the theory were mainly raised in the work of Napryangsaeui. He, in this work, explicitly reveals the intention to resolve the issues of the nature of humans and (...) things in the Ho-hak debate. But he has never directly participated in the debate. Instead, after his death, some debates over Napryangsaeui arose between his students and Jeon Woo. This paper aims to analyze Ki Jeong-jin’s theory by comparison with the view of Han Wonjin who represents the theory of nature of humans and things in the Ho-hak school, and with the issues of debate between Ki Jeong-jin’s students and Jeon Woo. Particularly, we focused on the matter of relation between ‘completeness and incompleteness’ and ‘original nature’. Through this analysis, we could expand the understanding of the aspects discussed in the theory on the similarities and differences in nature of humans and things, and the significance of Ki Jeong-jin’s theory. Furthermore, in the history of Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty, we could shed light on the reconstruction process of the philosophical statements that there is only one Principle but the phenomena vary. (shrink)

In their recent and influential book Rethinking Innateness, Jeffrey Elman and his co‐authors argue that evidence from neurobiology provides us with grounds to reject representational nativism (RN). I argue that Elman et al.’s argument fails because it makes a series of unwarranted assumptions about RN and about the extent to which neurobiological data constrain claims about the innateness of mental rep‐resentations. Moreover, I briefly discuss how we ought to understand RN and argue that on two prima facie plausible approaches, far (...) from refuting nativism, the evidence from neurobiology may not even be relevant to the question of whether or not RN is true. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne significant feature of Jeong Yakyong’s丁若鏞 thought is his deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 moral universe based on li 理 and qi 氣. For Zhu Xi, the world in its entirety was a moral place, but Jeong Yakyong distinguished nonmoral domains from the moral domain. One question that follows in pursuing a comparison of their philosophies on this topic is what each thinker meant by ‘moral’ and, in particular, whether they meant the same thing. In this paper, I (...) delve deeper into this topic by comparing their respective perspectives on whether nonhuman animals are moral. Interestingly, they held exactly opposite views: Zhu Xi believed that certain actions on the part of nonhuman animals manifest moral values, whereas Jeong Yakyong claimed that none of the actions of nonhuman animals has moral value. In comparing their views, I introduce Mark Rowlands’ distinction between ‘moral subjects’ and ‘moral agents.’. (shrink)

Three years ago Robert Saltonstall, Jr., Associate Vice President for Operations at Harvard University, faced an increasingly common problem in business and institutions today when he severed 68 long-service, wage employees to solve a problem of low productivity in a particular trade group. He did this using relatively conventional and creative techniques. But now three years later, he asked Nona Lyons of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, who is researching the ethical dimensions of executives' decisions, to assist him in (...) evaluating how these employees felt about the process. The employees' loyalty in spite of everything has caused Saltonstall to rethink the ethics of both his decision and its execution. In this article Saltonstall asks and answers many of the questions executives face when challenged to handle work reduction decisions in a more ethical way. And Lyons assists him with commentary on some of the current research on moral decision-making which will help executives to understand why they find some of their decisions to be moral dilemmas. The article challenges executives to think about reorganization decisions in a participative way and suggests seven central issues executives should consider before commencing a participative approach. The article reaches no specific conclusion, but introduces some new ways to think about lay-off decisions and their ethical implications for those affected. (shrink)

Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95:58–69, work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits the error (...) theorist from adopting epistemic reductionism. I use Jonas Olson’s work as exemplary of moral error theory. I demonstrate that Olson’s argument that the rhetorical authority of moral claims is best explained by the error theorist’s conceptual claim applies equally in the epistemic case. Olson attempts to avoid this by claiming that epistemic claims are reducible to claims about whether our doxastic attitudes live up to their functions. There are two problems with Olson’s argument. Firstly, functional reasons are a species of a common genus – standards reasons – and since Olson’s authority argument against moral reductionism applies to standards reasons, it applies to functional reasons. Secondly, Olson’s claim that we cannot also cast moral reasons as functional is under-supported. I suggest that there is plausible evidence that we can and undermine his arguments against this claim. I do not argue that the epistemic companions in guilt strategy demonstrates the falsity of moral error theory. Rather, I argue that the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy fails. (shrink)