We investigate how weak square principles are denied by Chang’s Conjecture and its generalizations. Among other things we prove that Chang’s Conjecture does not imply the failure of ${\square_{\omega_1, 2}}$ , i.e. Chang’s Conjecture is consistent with ${\square_{\omega_1, 2}}$.

It has been reported as a robust effect that people are likely to select a matching case in the Wason selection task. For example, they usually select the 5 case, in the Wason selection task with the conditional "if an E, then a not-5". This was explained by the matching bias account that people are likely to regard a matching case as relevant to the truth of the conditional (Evans, 1998). However, because a positive concept usually constructs a smaller set (...) than its negative one does (a rarity assumption), it is more effective to get information on the truth of the conditional in a positive set than in a negative set. Thus the optimal data selection account can also explain the effect. The set size of Q and matching by introducing negation were manipulated independently in four experiments. From the results it was inferred that the so-called matching bias was an amalgam of two different cognitive components-relevance judgement by matching and optimal data selection. (shrink)

We study the relationship between the semistationary reflection principle and stationary reflection principles. We show that for all regular cardinals Λ ≥ ω₂ the semistationary reflection principle in the space [Λ](1) implies that every stationary subset of $E_{\omega}^{\lambda}\coloneq \{\alpha \in \lambda \,|\,{\rm cf}(\alpha)=\omega \}$ reflects. We also show that for all cardinals Λ ≥ ω₃ the semistationary reflection principle in [Λ](1) does not imply the stationary reflection principle in [Λ](1).

In this paper, we study the relationship among classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and quantum logic . These logics are related in an interesting way and are not far apart from each other, as is widely believed. The results in this paper show how they are related with each other through a dual intuitionistic logic . Our study is completely syntactical.

We give simple proofs of the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis from the Weak Reflection Principle and the Fodor-type Reflection Principle which do not use better scales.

The development of robots that closely resemble human beings can contribute to cognitive research. An android provides an experimental apparatus that has the potential to be controlled more precisely than any human actor. However, preliminary results indicate that only very humanlike devices can elicit the broad range of responses that people typically direct toward each other. Conversely, to build androids capable of emulating human behavior, it is necessary to investigate social activity in detail and to develop models of the cognitive (...) mechanisms that support this activity. Because of the reciprocal relationship between android development and the exploration of social mechanisms, it is necessary to establish the field of android science. Androids could be a key testing ground for social, cognitive, and neuroscientific theories as well as platform for their eventual unification. Nevertheless, subtle flaws in appearance and movement can be more apparent and eerie in very humanlike robots. This uncanny phenomenon may be symptomatic of entities that elicit our model of human other but do not measure up to it. If so, very humanlike robots may provide the best means of pinpointing what kinds of behavior are perceived as human, since deviations from human norms are more obvious in them than in more mechanical-looking robots. In pursuing this line of inquiry, it is essential to identify the mechanisms involved in evaluations of human likeness. One hypothesis is that, by playing on an innate fear of death, an uncanny robot elicits culturally-supported defense responses for coping with death’s inevitability. An experiment, which borrows from methods used in terror management research, was performed to test this hypothesis. [Thomson Reuters Essential Science Indicators: Fast Breaking Paper in Social Sciences, May 2008]. (shrink)

In this paper, I will investigate Wittgenstein’s idea about the context-sensitivity of utterance. It is the idea that there is a big gap between understanding a sentence in the sense of knowing the idioms and discerning the grammar in it, and what is said by using it in a particular context. Although context-sensitivity in this moderate sense is a familiar idea in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it has mainly been studied as an idea in “Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.” However, Wittgenstein’s interest in (...) language is always connected with his interest in the treatment of philosophical problems. Therefore, what is lacking in those preceding studies is the study of the relation between Wittgenstein’s engagement with the idea of context-sensitivity and his philosophical therapy. Therefore, I shall investigate that relation and show that Wittgenstein’s philosophical method cannot be intelligible without taking context-sensitivity into consideration and Wittgenstein’s focus on context is deeply connected with his method for treating philosophers’ “pictures.” Below, I will examine recent debates on grammar, and argue that the standard interpretation is untenable once proper consideration is given to context-sensitivity. Next, I will argue that context-sensitivity is important because it gives us a good grasp of the process of a philosopher’s being caught in a picture by citing the discussion about mental process and about the Augustinian picture and rule-following in Philosophical Investigations. Finally, I will talk about the significance of my interpretation for contemporary arguments about philosophical methods. (shrink)

The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500?1800, ed. J. G. A. Pocock with the assistance of Gordon J. Schochet and Lois G. Schwoerer (Cambridge University Press, 1993), x. + 373 pp., £40.00/$59.95 H.B.

In this paper, I will investigate Wittgenstein’s idea about the context-sensitivity of utterance. It is the idea that there is a big gap between understanding a sentence in the sense of knowing the idioms and discerning the grammar in it, and what is said by using it in a particular context. Although context-sensitivity in this moderate sense is a familiar idea in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it has mainly been studied as an idea in “Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.” However, Wittgenstein’s interest in (...) language is always connected with his interest in the treatment of philosophical problems. Therefore, what is lacking in those preceding studies is the study of the relation between Wittgenstein’s engagement with the idea of context-sensitivity and his philosophical therapy. Therefore, I shall investigate that relation and show that Wittgenstein’s philosophical method cannot be intelligible without taking context-sensitivity into consideration and Wittgenstein’s focus on context is deeply connected with his method for treating philosophers’ “pictures.” Below, I will examine recent debates on grammar, and argue that the standard interpretation is untenable once proper consideration is given to context-sensitivity. Next, I will argue that context-sensitivity is important because it gives us a good grasp of the process of a philosopher’s being caught in a picture by citing the discussion about mental process and about the Augustinian picture and rule-following in Philosophical Investigations. Finally, I will talk about the significance of my interpretation for contemporary arguments about philosophical methods. (shrink)

Yama (2001) argued that the matching bias effect was an amalgam of a genuine matching effect and a set size effect. However, Evans (2002) pointed out some problems with Yama's argument. One was on the matching index used in Yama (2001). The others concerned a gap between Yama's (2001) interpretation of matching bias and Evans' (1998) recent discussions that had placed emphasis on the problem of implicit negation. I reply to these claims taking Oaksford (2002) into consideration. Further, I propose (...) a framework connecting context, goal, utility, and relevance, and including a hierarchical structure of goals. I argue that theories of reasoning can be developed and extended with the framework. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of a proper opponent (phyi rgol yang dag) in debate from the standpoint of the Tibetan Buddhist theory of argumentation. A proper opponent is a person who is engaged in the process of truth-seeking. He is not a debater who undertakes to refute the tenets of a proponent. But rather, he is the model debater to whom a proponent can teach truth by using a probative argument in the most effective way. A proper opponent is (...) thus the model thinker conceived by Tibetan Buddhist scholars, especially by the dGe lugs pa exegetes, to explain the idea of “inference for others.” The term phyi rgol yang dag figures in many text books of the dGe lugs pa school. And the germ of the dGe lugs pa's idea of ``proper opponent'' is found in early Tibetan tshad ma literature, too. The present paper shows that the dGe lugs pa scholars are largely concerned with the process by which one obtains an inferential knowledge about the unknown object, and also that they, when talking about a proper opponent, emphasize the pedagogical role of dialectic conversation rather than the competitive feature of debates. (shrink)

The present work, which was inspired by Kripke and McCarthy, is about a non-classical predicate logic system containing a truth predicate symbol. In this system, each sentence A is referred to not by a Gödel number but by its quotation name 'A'.

In this paper, we move toward offering psychological benchmarks to measure success in building increasingly humanlike robots. By psychological benchmarks we mean categories of interaction that capture conceptually fundamental aspects of human life, specified abstractly enough to resist their identity as a mere psychological instrument, but capable of being translated into testable empirical propositions. Nine possible benchmarks are considered: autonomy, imitation, intrinsic moral value, moral accountability, privacy, reciprocity, conventionality, creativity, and authenticity of relation. Finally, we discuss how getting the right (...) group of benchmarks in human–robot interaction will, in future years, help inform on the foundational question of what constitutes essential features of being human. (shrink)

In this paper we will study a formal system of intuitionistic modal predicate logic. The main result is its semantic completeness theorem with respect to algebraic structures. At the end of the paper we will also present a brief consideration of its syntactic relationships with some similar systems.

This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account (...) of self-deception. The account offered is independently plausible and avoids the main problems that plague other views. It also yields the result that some delusional subjects are self-deceived. The conclusion is not, however, that those subjects are blameworthy. Rather, a distinction is made between blameworthiness and ‘attributability’. States or actions can be significantly attributable to a subject—in the sense that they are expressions of their wills—without it being the case that the subject is blameworthy, if the subject has an appropriate excuse. Understanding delusions within this framework of responsibility and excuses not only illuminates the ways in which the processes of delusional belief formation and maintenance are continuous with ‘ordinary’ processes of belief formation and maintenance, it also provides a way of understanding the innocence of the delusional subject that does not involve the denial of agency. (shrink)

SummaryThe fertility of Japanese agricultural immigrants settled in eastern Bolivia was studied in comparison with Japanese populations in South Brazil and in Japan. The fertility of the Japanese in Bolivia was found to be high compared with the contemporary Japanese living in Japan, and lay between the levels for South Brazil in 1952 and for Japan in 1970. It is supposed that the Japanese immigrant women in Bolivia maintained the high level of fertility which was prevailing in Japan at the (...) time when they had emigrated, while the level of fertility in Japan had declined remarkably. (shrink)

The genesis for this volume was in the bombing of Japan during World War II, where the author, as a young boy, watched the bombers overhead, speculating about the lives of the pilots and their relationship with those huddled on the ground._ From this disturbing diorama, Professor Hiroshi Kojima, the translator of Martin Buber into Japanese, unfolds a new approach to Buber's “I-Thou” relation, drawing upon insights from Husserl, Heidegger, and others in the tradition of continental philosophy to extend (...) and deepen Buber's thought. In chapters that reflect upon a wide range of phenomena—from religion, science, and technology, to imagination, embodiment, and power—Professor Kojima articulates a conception of what it means to be a human being that stands as an alternative to atomism and alienation of the modern world. Analyses of haiku and other aspects of Japanese culture demonstrate how Kojima's theory can illuminate the spiritual traditions of both East and West. Original in its thought and revealing in its insight into Japanese thought and culture, _Monad and Thou__ represents the life's work of one of Japan's great thinkers. (shrink)

: In his book Monad and Thou: Phenomenological Ontology of the Human Being, Japanese philosopher Hiroshi Kojima proposes to redefine the I-Thou relation, first extensively investigated by Martin Buber, and to reconcile the notions of ‘individuality’ and ‘community’ in terms of his new phenomenological ontology of the human being as monad. In this essay, Kojima’s ideas are examined concerning the monad and intersubjectivity, and it is shown how these ideas can be extended and brought to bear on issues concerning (...) human encounters with the environment and, in particular, to nonhuman animals. (shrink)