Ascorbic acid is a redox regulator in many physiological processes. Besides its antioxidant activity, many intriguing functions of ascorbic acid in the expression of immunoregulatory genes have been suggested. Ascorbic acid acts as a co‐factor for the Fe+2‐containing α‐ketoglutarate‐dependent Jumonji‐C domain‐containing histone demethylases (JHDM) and Ten eleven translocation (TET) methylcytosine dioxygenasemediated epigenetic modulation. By influencing JHDM and TET, ascorbic acid facilitates the differentiation of double negative (CD4−CD8−) T cells to double positive (CD4+CD8+) T cells and of T‐helper cells to different (...) effector subsets. Ascorbic acid modulates plasma cell differentiation and promotes early differentiation of hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) to NK cells. These findings indicate that ascorbic acid plays a significant role in regulating both innate and adaptive immune cells, opening up new research areas in Immunonutrition. Being a water‐soluble vitamin and a safe micro‐nutrient, ascorbic acid can be used as an adjunct therapy for many disorders of the immune system. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. (...) According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Many think it is plausible that agents enjoy freedom and responsibility with respect to their actions in virtue of being reasons-responsive. Extant accounts spell out reasons-responsiveness (RR) as a general modal property. The agent is responsive to reasons for and against ϕ-ing, according to this idea, if they ϕ in accordance with the balance of reasons in a suitable proportion of possible situations. This paper argues that freedom and responsibility are not grounded in such modal properties on the basis of (...) a phenomenon I call ‘rational blind spots’. Agents have highly specific local blockages (or openings) that prevent them from seeing or reacting for a particular type of reason. When these blind spots are triggered, agents fail to be responsive to reasons in the sense relevant to freedom and responsibility. Thus, we judge that they are not free and responsible. But bind spots don’t remove the agent’s possession of general modal RR properties. Thus, extant accounts of reasons-responsiveness render the incorrect result that the agents in these cases remain responsible because they remain responsive to reasons in a general sense. (shrink)

According to a popular idea, freedom is grounded in orthonomy – the ability to be responsive to normative demands. But how exactly must an agent’s action relate to their reasons in order for this orthonomous relationship to hold? In this paper, I propose a novel explanationist answer to this question. I argue that extant answers – causalism and modalism about orthonomy – fail because they fail to account for the fact that intuitions about freedom and orthonomy track facts about explanation. (...) And these facts cannot be reduced to either causal or modal facts. Instead, I propose that we should understand freedom as grounded in special accidentality-dispersing explanations in terms of normative reasons. The resultant view is to be understood as following a Frankfurtian intuition: only factors that explain action can be relevant to whether the action is free. (shrink)

Plausibly, agents act freely iff their actions are responses to reasons. But what sort of relationship between reason and action is required for the action to count as a response? The overwhelmingly dominant answer to this question is modalist. It holds that responses are actions that share a modally robust or secure relationship with the relevant reasons. This thesis offers a new alternative answer. It argues that responses are actions that can be explained by reasons in the right way. This (...) explanationist answer comes apart from the modalist answer. For it holds that actions are responses to reasons if they are explained by those reasons even if they don’t share a modally robust relationship. Explanationism thus offers a novel way of vindicating the intuition that alternative possibilities don’t matter to responding to reasons and (consequently) free agency. The key dialectical position the thesis develops is that both modalism and explanationism constitute attempts to capture he core type of relationship encoded by the notion of a response. Responses to reasons, at core, involve a non-accidental relationship between reason and action. We can either understand non-accidentality as a modal phenomenon – as a modally robust tracking between two facts. Or we can understand non-accidentality as an explanatory phenomenon – as a special explanatory relationship between two facts. According to my rival explanationist proposal, two facts share a non-accidental relationship iff we can give a unified explanation of why both obtain. Unified explanations are explanations of why [p&q] that cannot be decomposed into two (or more) separate independent explanations of p and of q. Consequently, according to explanationism about responding to reasons, actions are responses to reasons iff those reasons offer a rational explanation of the action that cannot be decomposed into separate independent components. (shrink)

Friedrich Heer hat seine 1953 zum ersten Mal erschienene, nun seit Jahrzehnten vergriffene "Europäische Geistesgeschichte" trotz ihres Umfangs von über 700 Seiten einen "Essay" genannt. Bedenkt man den eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes "Essay" - Versuch, Wagnis -, dann entspringt diese Bezeichnung nicht falscher Bescheidenheit. Das Werk zieht einen großen Bogen von Auseinandersetzungen im frühen Christentum bis zur Zeit Goethes und skizzenhaft weiter bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts - immer bemüht, zugleich die gemeineuropäischen geistigen Entwicklungen und die Eigenart (...) der einzelnen Nationen gerecht zu würdigen. Die Perspektive ist eine katholische, nicht in einem engen kirchlichen Sinn, sondern im Bewusstsein der Bedeutung der Kirche für die Herausbildung dessen, was wir als Europa kennen. "Essay" ist das Buch als Versuch, als Wagnis, große (und manchmal verkannte) Linien der europäischen Geistesgeschichte herauszuarbeiten. Zum "Essay" macht es auch die Leidenschaft, mit der es geschrieben ist. Andererseits ist Friedrich Heers "Europäische Geistesgeschichte" ein wissenschaftliches Werk von hohem Rang, in welches das enzyklopädische Wissen seines Autors eingeflossen ist. So werden hier in durchaus spannender Weise Zusammenhänge hergestellt, die ein überzeugendes Bild von Einheit und Unterschiedlichkeit der geistigen Entwicklung dieses Kontinents entstehen lassen. Mit besonderem Engagement werden alle nicht konformen Strömungen dieser Geistesgeschichte vorgestellt. Die Fülle von Anregungen, die dieses Buch bietet, wird kaum von einem anderen übertroffen. Was immer im Einzelnen zu kritisieren sein mag, was immer neue Detailforschungen ergeben haben - die dauernden Tendenzen der geistigen Entwicklung Europas werden nirgends so klar wie hier. Als Ganzes ist das Bild, das Heer von der geistigen Entwicklung Europas zeichnet, nicht überholt. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the period that immediately followed the invention of the Leiden jar. Historians of science have developed narrations that emphasize the role of grounding during the process of charging the jar. In this respect, this episode shows significant aspects that can be used to characterize science, scientific knowledge production, and the nature of science. From our own experimentation, we learned that grounding was not necessary in order to produce the effect. These experiences inspired us to go (...) back to primary sources. In doing so, we came to a new understanding of the early period after Kleist’s and Musschenbroek’s initial creation of the effect. From our analysis, we conclude that it is not the grounding which was perceived as a major innovation during this early period of the discussion but the concept of an electrical circuit. This understanding was fundamental in characterizing the Leiden jar as a new device challenging the then current knowledge of experimental practices in the field of electricity. (shrink)

A fun introduction in comics to deep thinking and the history of philosophy -- Back cover.

Depuis Jules Ferry, l'histoire est la principale arme d'assaut de propagande d'Etat. Par les manuels et les leçons, l'école républicaine n'a cessé de truquer et de tronquer ce que l'honnête citoyen pouvait écrire. La mise en condition et le " formatage " du citoyen se poursuivent tout au long de sa vie par le commun des journaux, les romans et les images, les célébrations nationales, les émissions télévisées, les directives et les interdits. Ces tout derniers temps, l'Etat veut, en France, (...) soumettre la démarche historique à une étroite surveillance et laisse de moins en moins de liberté aux centres de recherche qui n'ont même plus le loisir de choisir en toute indépendance leurs sujets d'enquête et leurs programmes.L'Histoire s'est dévoyée. Elle se dit " science humaine " mais n'étudie souvent que des catégories, des classes et ordres, des conditions sociales où l'individu paraît effacé, inexistant, soumis à la géographie, à l'évolution des techniques, à l'économie ou même au " sens de l'Histoire ". Elle édicte des règles qui ne souffrent ni exceptions ni contradictions. Du Moyen Age à nos jours, Jacques Heers dresse ici un inventaire des manipulations de l'Histoire. (shrink)

Current literature suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect consumers’ attitudes towards an organization and is regarded as a driver for reputation-building and fostering sustained consumer patronage. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of CSR on consumer responses, this research examined the mediating influence of consumer’s perceived organizational motives within an NGO setting. Given the heightened public attention surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, data were collected from consumers of the Games to assess their perceptions of the (...) International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) socially responsible initiatives. We hypothesized that consumers of the Games were likely to cognitively elaborate on CSR messages by way of three specific attribution effects derived from the literature. The results show that, contingent on CSR awareness, consumers responded positively to social efforts judged to be values-driven and stakeholder-driven; and a negative response was seen for efforts judged to be strategic. These attribution effects influenced various types of patronage and perceived organizational reputation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)

Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)

In God existence is the same as essence; or—the same thing ·put differently·—it is essential for God to exist. So God is a necessary being, ·a being who exists necessarily·.

Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle (...) things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up. (shrink)

Georg Simon Ohm's work in the field of electricity led to what is now considered to be the most fundamental law of electrical circuits, Ohm's Law. Much less known is that only months earlier, Ohm had published another law—one that differed significantly from the now accepted one. The latter entailed a logarithmic relation between the length of the conductor and a parameter that Ohm called “loss of force.” This paper discusses how Ohm came up with an initial law that he (...) felt compelled to correct a few months later. We analyze Ohm's publication as well as his laboratory notes, relating them to our own laboratory experiences while using the replication method to study his work. We also discuss the conceptual background of Ohm's work. We conclude that he was significantly influenced by French studies in the field of electricity, most notably the ones by Charles Augustin Coulomb. (shrink)

We investigate what it means for a (Hausdorff, second-countable) topological group to be computable. We compare several potential definitions based on classical notions in the literature. We relate these notions with the well-established definitions of effective presentability for discrete and profinite groups, and compare our results with similar results in computable topology.

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 53 - 65 Grotius’ apologetic work De veritate must be described as traditional, because the author took all his arguments from existing apologetic literature. He allowed himself some freedom to choose from the apologetic works of such disparate authors as the Protestant Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, the Roman catholic Juan Luis Vives, and the anti-trinitarian Faustus Socinus. What was remarkable in this work was the new combination of arguments. He defended a natural theology like in (...) his early, unpublished work Meletius. This work can be viewed as a predecessor of De veritate. Grotius combined his natural theology with a factual proof of Christian religion, the model for which he found in Socinus’ work De auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae. But his really innovative contribution to apologetic literature was his reduction of the material: he refrained from discussing Christian doctrines and thereby detached apologetics from dogmatics. Thus he wished to offer a remedy for the sickness of Christianity of his days, which in his opinion was plagued by dogmatic disputes that had driven out the truth. (shrink)