The first volume in the In Focus series to examine the work of a nineteenth-century photographer, this beautiful volume examines Cameron's passion for the "divine art" and her "deeply seated love of the beautiful" that are clearly revealed ...

"Spirit into Matter is published to coincide with the first major retrospective of Teske's work.

According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by (...) someone. It must have mineness built into it if it is to feel a particular way. The question I take up in this paper asks how mineness might have arisen out of processes of free energy minimisation, given that many systems that keep themselves alive lack mineness. The hypothesis I develop in this paper is that the life of an organism can be seen as an inferential process. Every living system embodies a probability distribution conditioned on a model of the sensory, physiological, and morphological states that are highly probably given the life it leads and the niche it inhabits. I argue for an ecological and enactive interpretation of free energy. I show how once the life of an organism reaches a certain level of complexity mineness emerges as an intrinsic part of the process of life itself. (shrink)

Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne’s paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S’s claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, (...) which we have called skilled intentionality. Skilled intentionality is the individual’s selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances.A second issue we take up concerns the distinction between ur-intentionality and content-involving intentionality. We will argue that our notion of skilled intentionality as it is found in humans cuts across these two categories. Instead of distinguishing between different forms of intentionality we recommend focusing on how skilled intentionality takes different forms in different forms of life. (shrink)

DNA databases have significant commercial value. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies have built databanks using samples and information voluntarily provided by customers. As the price of genetic analysis falls, there is growing interest in building such databases by paying individuals for their DNA and personal data. This paper maps the ethical issues associated with private companies paying for DNA. We outline the benefits of building better genomic databases and describe possible concerns about crowding out, undue inducement, exploitation, and commodification. While certain (...) objections deserve more empirical and philosophical investigation, we argue that none currently provide decisive reasons against using financial incentives to secure DNA samples. (shrink)

We develop and test a model of pseudo-transformational leadership. Pseudo-transformational leadership is manifested by a particular combination of transformational leadership behaviors, and is differentiated from both transformational leadership and laissez-faire -leadership. Survey data from senior managers show differential outcomes of transformational, pseudo-transformational, and laissez-faire leadership. Possible extensions of the theoretical model and directions for future research are offered.

In Markets Without Limits and a series of related papers, Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski argue that it is morally permissible to buy and sell anything that it is morally permissible to possess and exchange outside of the market. Accordingly, we should open markets in “contested commodities” including blood, gametes, surrogacy services, and transplantable organs. This paper clarifies some important aspects of the case for market boundaries and in so doing shows why there are in fact moral limits to the (...) market. I argue that the case for restricting the scope of the market does not turn on the idea that some things are constitutively non-market goods; it turns instead on the idea that treating some things according to market norms would threaten the realization of particular kinds of human interests. (shrink)

Genomic research can reveal ‘unsolicited’ or ‘incidental’ findings that are of potential health or reproductive significance to participants. It is widely thought that researchers have a moral obligation, grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to return certain kinds of unsolicited findings to research participants. It is less widely thought that researchers have a moral obligation to actively look for health-related findings. This paper examines whether there is a moral obligation, grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to actively hunt (...) for genomic secondary findings. We begin by showing how the duty to disclose individual research findings can be grounded in the duty of easy rescue. Next, we describe a parallel moral duty, also grounded in the duty of easy rescue, to actively hunt for such information. We then consider six possible objections to our argument, each of which we find unsuccessful. Some of these objections provide reason to limit the scope of the duty to look for secondary findings, but none provide reason to reject this duty outright. We argue that under a certain range of circumstances, researchers are morally required to hunt for these kinds of secondary findings. Although these circumstances may not currently obtain, genomic researchers will likely acquire an obligation to hunt for secondary findings as the field of genomics continues to evolve. (shrink)

An innovative program recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center allows people to donate a kidney in exchange for a voucher that a loved one can redeem for a kidney if and when needed. As a relatively new practice, the ethical implications of advanced kidney donation have not yet been widely discussed. This paper reflects on some of the bioethical issues at stake in this new donation program, as well as some broader philosophical issues related to (...) the meaning and moral salience of commodification. I first consider whether the literature on commercial markets in organs––a longstanding topic of bioethical debate––can meaningfully inform ethical analysis of kidney voucher programs. Specifically, I consider whether and to what extent common objections to the exchange of kidneys for cash also apply to the exchange of kidneys for “kidney vouchers.” Second, I argue that the contrast between the ethical issues raised by these two practices highlights the need to understand commodification as existing on a continuum, with different degrees of commodification giving rise to different ethical issues. Doing so can help sharpen our understanding of commodification as a moral concept, as well as its relevance to broader debates about the moral limits of markets. (shrink)

Genomic sequencing technologies (GS) pose novel challenges not seen in older genetic technologies, making traditional standards for fully informed consent difficult or impossible to meet. This is due to factors including the complexity of the test and the broad range of results it may identify. Meaningful informed consent is even more challenging to secure in contexts involving significant time constraints and emotional distress, such as when rapid genomic testing (RGS) is performed in neonatal intensive care units. In this article, we (...) propose that informed consent matters not for its own sake, but because obtaining it furthers a range of morally important goals, such as promoting autonomy, well‐being, and trust in medicine. These goals form the basis of a new framework [PROmoting Morally Important Consent Ends (PROMICE)] for assessing the ethical appropriateness of various informed consent models. We illustrate this framework with two examples: (a) a tiered and layered consent model for obtaining consent for GS, and (b) consent for RGS in critically ill newborns. We conclude that appropriately—rather than fully—informed consent provides the correct standard for genomic medicine and research. (shrink)

Scepticism about the possibility of machine consciousness comes in at least two forms. Some argue that our neurobiology is special, and only something sharing our neurobiology could be a subject of experience. Others argue that a machine couldn't be anything else but a zombie: there could never be something it is like to be a machine. I advance a dynamic sensorimotor account of consciousness which argues against both these varieties of scepticism.

ABSTRACT This article elaborates a concept of localization through interpreting key arguments in Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez’s early works grouped by the author under the name “genealogies of coloniality.” Following the role localization in his genealogies of coloniality reveals what Castro-Gómez calls “heterarchic articulations.” Heterarchic articulations delineate an analytic model of power that traces how multiple technologies and formations of power operating at different levels, from colonial geopolitics to individual “corpopolitics” of desire, converge and configure radically localized processes of subjectivation. (...) Localization understood in these terms, the author argues, allows Castro-Gómez to radicalize, transform, and combine Foucault’s genealogical approach and decolonial theory. The article concludes by showing that, besides radicalizing and combining genealogy and decoloniality, the localization at work in Castro-Gómez’s genealogies of coloniality serves to interpret theorizations and phenomena of contemporary violence by turning to Mexican transfeminist philosopher Sayak Valencia’s analysis of “gore capitalism.”. (shrink)

As a first approximation, it may be said that the central issue in the correspondence concerns whether semantical statements are essentially, albeit implicitly, mentalistic or psychological in character. In the language of the protagonists themselves, it concerns whether statements of the form.

Greely’s target article outlines six categories of ethical issues associated with human brain surrogate research. Some of these issues are familiar from other research contexts; others, less...

El silogismo práctico o razonamiento de la acción (EN VI, 12, 1144ª 31, “oigar sillogismoi tvn praktvn”) es presentado por muchos estudiososde la obra aristotélica como un esquema de explicación, que intenta darcuenta del movimiento que realiza el alma humana desde el apetito o deseopuro hasta la acción concreta. El punto de vista que aquí se argumentapuede ser presentado en dos tesis articuladas: 1) el razonamiento prácticono es un silogismo, comprende muchos más aspectos que son irreductiblesa la estructura formal de (...) un silogismo perfecto; 2) el silogismo práctico sebasa sobre todo en razonamientos retórico-dialécticos, bien sea un entimema,un paradigma, o un epiquerema; es un proceso discursivo de deliberacióncon silogismos imperfectos o cadenas de silogismos probables que orientanla deliberación a manera de sorites e inducciones retóricas. No se trata deuna demostración sobre cosas que son necesariamente y no pueden ser deotra forma, sino que se trata de lo posible y contingente, aquello que puedeo no puede ser, puesto que sólo se delibera sobre lo posible y esto se hacecon opiniones probables. Corresponde entonces a la retórica y la dialécticarazonar con este tipo de premisas. La regla de conducta en un silogismo práctico utiliza como premisa una opinión generalmente aceptada (a manerade hipótesis o conjetura), cuya aplicación al caso particular es contingente ysu resultado, la acción, también lo es, ya que puede ser o no realizada. Laacción como consecuencia del razonamiento desborda el marco lógico formaldel silogismo. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta los resultados obtenidos a través del uso de herramientas informáticas (Provalis Research), también conocidas como CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software), para el análisis de los escritos de Peirce, las bases estadísticas de una cronología para su último periodo intelectual y la justificación de una posible periodización del Pragmaticismo, además de la descripción de ciertos descubrimientos realizados en nuestro trabajo de archivo sobre los documentos y manuscritos originales de Peirce. Este trabajo es una parte de nuestra (...) investigación en la Universidad de Quebec en Montreal (UQAM) y la Biblioteca Houghton de la Universidad de Harvard. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyze the ideas about commercial society among Spanish and Spanish American intellectuals from the second half of the eighteenth century to the first decades of the following century. Special attention is paid to some relevant concepts like “amor propio” or “interés”. We are also specially interested in the knowledge of political economy and its moral implications for the idea of commercial society. My proposal is to consider the possibilities of a Catholic enlightenment as (...) the expression of the combination of some intrinsic principles of the enlightened thought with Catholic confessionalism. This is significant not only for the understanding of the enlightenment in the Spanish World but also for a correct interpretation of the first constitutionalism. (shrink)

Between 1934 and 1942 Heidegger delivered three series of lectures on Hölderlin's poetry. The discussion of “Der Ister” was the last of these, although Heidegger continued to think and write about Hölderlin into the 1960s (see GA 4). William McNeill and Julia Davis's recent translation of the “Ister”—volume (GA 53)—is the first of the Hölderlin lectures to appear in English.

This paper surveys and critically assesses existing theories of evidence with respect to four desiderata. A good theory of evidence should be both a theory of evidential support (i.e., be informative about what kinds of facts speak in favour of a hypothesis), and of warrant (i.e., be informative about how strongly a given set of facts speaks in favour of the hypothesis), it should apply to the non-ideal cases in which scientists typically find themselves, and it should be ‘descriptively adequate’, (...) i.e., able to adequately represent typical episodes of evidentiary reasoning. The theories surveyed here—Bayesianism, hypotheticodeductivism,satisfaction theories, error statistics as well as Achinstein’s and Cartwright’s theories—are all found wanting in important respects. I finally argue that a deficiency all these theories have in common is a neglect or underplaying of the epistemic context in which the episode of evidentiary reasoning takes place.Este artículo describe y valora críticamente diversas teorías de la evidencia en relación a cuatro desiderata. Una buena teoría de la evidencia debería ser tanto una teoría sobre el apoyo evidencial [evidential support] (ser informativa sobre qué tipos de hechos hablan a favor de la hipótesis) como sobre la justificación [warrant]; debería aplicarse en las situaciones no ideales en las que normalmente se encuentran los científicos; y debería ser ‘descriptivamente adecuada’, esto es, capaz de representar correctamente episodios típicos de razonamiento evidencial. Las teorías aquí revisadas—bayesianismo, hipotético-deductivismo, teorías de la satisfacibilidad, la estadística del error, así como las propuestas de Achinstein y Cartwright—se consideran deficientes en aspectos básicos. Argumentaré que un defecto común en todas ellas es que olvidan, o minusvaloran, el contexto epistémico en el que el episodio de razonamiento evidencial tiene lugar. (shrink)

Preemption is a powerful strategy used by special interest groups to undermine strong, local public health standards. Currently, 20 states in the U.S. have preemption ordinances in place related to clean indoor air initiatives. These preemption laws are the direct result of an ongoing and aggressive campaign of tobacco companies to thwart clean indoor air initiatives, which ultimately, according to tobacco industry internal documents, cause significant reductions in their annual revenues. Clean indoor air policies have arisen from a greater understanding (...) of the documented health risks associated with exposure to secondhand smoke and action by local government to protect the public from these hazards. The efforts of the tobacco industry undermine local authority and seek to shift policy action to the state and federal levels, where the industry has greater political influence. (shrink)

This is the first instalment of a two-part paper on the counterfactual theory of causation. It is well known that this theory is ridden with counterexamples. Specifically, the following four features of the theory suffer from problems: it understands causation as a relation between events; counterfactual dependence is understood using a metric of similarity among possible worlds; it defines a non-discriminatory concept of causation; and it understands causation as transitive. A number of philosophers have recently proposed that causation is contrastive (...) because making contrasts explicit defuses counterexamples. A contrastive causal claim has the following form: C rather than C* causes E rather than E*, where C* and E* are alternative or contrast events. In this paper, I show that making contrasts explicit does indeed defuse some counterexamples. However, I also argue that the examples discussed in the literature all share a common feature, viz. that the original causal judgement is ambiguous in one way or another. Contrasting does not help with counterexamples that do not have this feature. Part II of this paper then takes up the hard cases. (shrink)

1.1 ContextIn the period following the demise of logicism, formalism, and intuitionism, contributors to the philosophy of mathematics have been divided. On the one hand, there are those who tend to focus on such issues as: Do mathematical entities exist? If so, what type of entities are they and how do we know about them? If not, how can we account for the role that mathematics plays in our everyday and scientific lives? Contributors to this school—let us call it the (...) analytic school—do not, on the whole, concern themselves with careful analyses of important historical developments in mathematics. On the other hand, there are those who contribute to an historical school in the philosophy of mathematics. Contributors to this school tend to concern themselves almost exclusively with detailed historical analyses of important developments in mathematics. They are typically interested in answering questions concerning the growth of mathematical knowledge.In recent years, interest in the historical school has been growing, as has its influence on the analytic school. This book marks another stride in this direction. Oliveri aims to employ tools developed for use within the historical school to address one of the major issues investigated by the analytic school, i.e., whether we should be realists or anti-realists about mathematics. This is a laudable objective, since even a successful partial integration of these two schools would be valuable to contributors within both.1.2 Noteworthy ContributionsIn attempting a partial integration of these two schools, Oliveri makes several noteworthy contributions. The most significant is his development of a new type of argument for structural realism about mathematics. This argument exploits tools for theorizing about mathematics that were developed by Imre Lakatos [1978] in his work on scientific research programs . It focuses attention on the progressive mathematical research program that started with …. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar algunos aspectos ideológicos de la concepción de la tecnología y del ser humano que subyacen en el transhumanismo. Se intentan demostrar estos aspectos a la luz de la antropología filosófica de Scheler, Plessner y otros autores mediante los siguientes argumentos: la crítica a la concepción neutral de la tecnología, el rechazo de la idea del ser humano como homo faber y la errónea comprensión transhumanista de la vida y la muerte. A partir de (...) una puesta en discusión de este movimiento con la antropología filosófica se comprueba que no hay ningún cambio de paradigma dentro del transhumanismo y que las viejas concepciones del ser humano que habían sido defendidas por la Modernidad siguen estando presentes. (shrink)