Is it possible to establish a line of research that brings Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre closer together? With this article, we will positively support this idea, by distancing ourselves from the overly rigid interpretations that exclusively focus on antinomic elements sliding into a reductionist and nowadays “canonical” presentation of the relationship between these philosophers. Beyond the undeniable and, fortunately, unmediated differences between the two philosophers, this article aims to investigate their positions regarding the concept of “relationship”. In doing (...) so, we will highlight how Gabriel Marcel’s “coesse” and Jean-Paul Sartre’s “being-for-others” have numerous points of contact that place both philosophers, beyond their personal positions in the religious sphere, within the common ground of “existentialism”. (shrink)

M A B Degenhardt; Sartre, Imagination and Education1, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 72–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

The article tries to show that both resolution of the mind-body problem and adequate description of the phenomenal body depend upon the ontology presupposed in offering such a resolution or description. a detailed analysis of sartre's treatment of the body demonstrates that his failures are a result of his neo-cartesian ontology. both the critique and the resolution proposed toward the end take their departure from merleau- ponty's thesis of the ontological primacy of phenomena.

Obiettivo di questo articolo sarà presentare l’analisi fenomenologica e teoretica che Sartre propone del concetto di malafede, a partire dal romanzo La Nausea fino all’opera L’essere e il nulla. Ricostruendo il procedimento sartriano, che dall’atteggiamento interrogativo dell’uomo di fronte all’essere porta alla posizione del non-essere, giungeremo alla libertà e all’angoscia, quali caratteri costitutivi dell’essenza umana. Il tentativo di fuggire dalla libertà, a cui per Sartre siamo condannati, e dall’angoscia che da essa deriva, condurrà l’uomo sartriano all’autoinganno, ad una (...) vita inautentica… alla malafede. (shrink)

Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and subject of modern Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not? Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental history of the idea of Cogito (...) from Descartes to Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Sartre rationalizes sexuality much like Plato. Rationalization here refers to the way Sartre tries to facilitate explanation by changing the terms of the discussion from sexual to nonsexual concepts. As a philosophy which, above all, highlights those features of human existence which seem most resistant to explanation, one would expect existentialism to highlight sexuality as a category that is crucial for considering human existence. Descartes comes immediately to mind when one focuses on Sartre's major categories. In (...) class='Hi'>Sartre's case however, it is not mind and matter but consciousness and its opposite: "nothingness" and "being." This irreducible dualism is the key to the trouble human beings have with existence. Humans try to deal with the tensions implied by this dualism by trying to pretend people are not subjects but objects. Sartre calls this "bad faith." He begins by attempting to take human sexuality seriously as a fundamental category, but ends by abandoning the effort in favor of other substitutes. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is aimed to show the specificity and heuristic value of the humanism of the French existentialist J.-P. Sartre, represented both in his early works, where the isolationist position prevailed, and considering his evolution to various types of collective responsibility and attempts to build a universal morality on the basis of ontological integral humanity. Theoretical basis. Taking into account the relevance of the topic of person’s searching for authentic existence in the modern world, the author analyzes the (...) concept of Sartre’s humanism, which remains poorly researched in the Ukrainian philosophical space, since most of his works of the later period remained untranslated and unknown to the Ukrainian community. That is, there is a need to consider the phenomenon of a human and his/her basic characteristics, which ultimately determine what type of humanism deserves further support and development. The author places the existentialist dimension of a human being, which is one of the most important determinants of human behavior and the ways of human self-determination of his/her existence, in the context of the general development of the humanistic tradition of modern anthropology. Originality. The article substantiates the thesis that Sartre’s position concerning humanism is conditioned by the specificity of his understanding of the authentic human existence as a constant self-transcendence, the person’s realization of the project that makes a person the creator of the values. Therefore, Sartre’s humanism can only be understood in the context of this self-construction and responsibility of a person for his/her choice. The author proved that although this concept was subsequently changed, the basic intention of the Sartre’s approach remains the same. Thus, having combined the existentialism and Marxist understanding of the historical process, Sartre nevertheless emphasizes that the primal intentionality of human existence is decisive in all subsequent actions and doings, despite the fact that real practice may demonstrate deviations and even regression concerning humanity. Having defined the universality of the human situation in the world as the presence of certain a priori restrictions, the philosopher comes to the recognition of intersubjectivity, which allows him to reach a new type of morality, which defines "integral humanity" or "full-fledged human" as its goal. Conclusions. The interpretation of humanism by early Sartre relied on the idea of a person as such, who is in constant transcendence, constantly constructing him/herself; he/she is oriented towards the future. In this case, a person is the creator of the values and their legislator in this world. At the same time, the late Sartre emphasized that since a person exists in a society where he/she is usually in a state of alienation, the question under which conditions and by what means is it possible to reproduce and realize a truly humanistic dimension is inevitable. Sartre’s position is based on the fact that there is a primal need for self-realization, to be human. (shrink)

This article explores the Sartrean concept of the spirit of seriousness so as to better understand contemporary sightseeing tourism. Sartre's spirit of seriousness involves two central characteristics: the first understands values as transcendent, fixed objects, and the second—less acknowledged—understands material, physical objects as instantiating these transcendent values. I interpret the behavior of at least some contemporary tourists who travel to “mustsee” destinations as a subscription to both aspects of the spirit of seriousness and to a belief that the objects (...) and destinations of tourist sites contain these transcendent, immutable values, such as “Art,” “Culture,” “Liberty,” etc. These “must-see” objects and destinations can thereby be understood to make “obligatory demands” of tourists, compelling them to visit. I argue that this serious mode of traveling to “must-see” sites is a form of Sartrean bad faith, as well as an evasion of the potential existential anguish that travel can evoke. (shrink)

Hartmann gives a careful, succinct, clear exposition, and, integral to it, a criticism of the main systematic outlines of Sartre's L'être et le néant. He interprets Sartre as attempting to use a phenomenological base for an "objective" ontology. He suggests that Sartre's highly formal dialectic, unlike its Hegelian model, is external to its "content" of concrete existential insights. The comparisons of the en-soi and pour-soi with Hegel's Sein, Dasein, Fürsichsein, and the more developed Begriff and Geist go (...) far to challenge the adequacy and richness of Sartre's determinations. The author discusses Husserl's subject-oriented epistemology, and refers to the Heideggerian contributions to Sartre's phenomenological base. A first rate job of opening up serious questioning in the area.--J. M. (shrink)

The absence of French criticism on À la recherche du temps perdu1 until the mid-nineteen-fifties has left a gap in the study of literature influenced by Marcel Proust in the period following his death and the publication of Le temps retrouvé in 1927. Studies of Jean-Paul Sartre have focused mainly on his philosophical predecessors. Scholars of both authors have failed to note the similarities between their works, especially in regard to intersubjective relationships. Sartre was famously derisive toward his (...) progenitors. In his “Présentation des Temps modernes” (1945) he referred to Proust as a propagandist of the bourgeois, a “nefarious” psychologist, and a “pederast” guilty of conflating “the secretive .. (shrink)

The main object of this paper is to examine the new philosophical frame proposed by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek and to show that it implies some traces of Sartre's philosophical and political heritage. According the project of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek one should no longer accept today's constellation of freedom, particularistic truth and democracy, but to inscribe the issues of freedom and universal truth into a political project that attempts to re-activate a thinking of revolution. Their thinking (...) consists in the wager that it is still possible to provide a philosophical frame for this leftist emancipatory position that claims the dimension of the universal against the vicious circle of capitalist globalization-cum-particularization and, by following Marx's claim that there are formal affinities between the ambitions of emancipatory politics and the working mode of capitalism, takes up the struggle of universalism against globalization. It is only through this struggle for the universal that the intertwined processes of a constant expansion of the automatism of capital and "a process of fragmentation into closed identities," accompanied by "the culturalist and relativist ideology" can be suspended. It is precisely this constellation of revolutionary act, universal truth, subject, and militant community, that reveal some similarities with Sartre's concepts of the subject, the revolutionary action, the militant community a.o. (shrink)

On Sartre's own admission, his account of the emotions discloses them as functional. As such, the emotions aim to serve a particular purpose for which he provides the phenomenology. Sartre's phenomenology discloses consciousness as being-in-the-world in two ways, actually as having two worlds. One is a deterministic world, the other magical. Emotion is the drop from the deterministic world to the magical. In order for emotion to perform the function Sartre has in mind it performs, it is (...) crucial there be a certain tension between the deterministic world and the magical world. I argue that given what Sartre himself says about the magical world, the necessary tension can never arise; hence, no functional thesis of emotion is possible if it is formed along Sartre's lines. (shrink)

At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in the following way: “The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of ‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” My aim in this paper is to show how Sartre is susceptible to a tu quoque in terms of how he describes the threataspect of the world (...) of objects. That is, in works such as Nausea, Sartre appears to regard the world of objects as inherently threatening, and thus he has transferred the quality of threatening from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution. (shrink)

At the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in the following way: “The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of ‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” My aim in this paper is to show how Sartre is susceptible to a tu quoque in terms of how he describes the threataspect of the world (...) of objects. That is, in works such as Nausea, Sartre appears to regard the world of objects as inherently threatening, and thus he has transferred the quality of threatening from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution. (shrink)

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self – a self-experience – whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of (...) the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called “mineness”, “for-me-ness”, “pre-reflective self-awareness” and “subjective character”, among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a “sense of self” might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones. (shrink)