Le constat est maintenant partout: la puissance du fondamentalisme religieux, la montee des populismes de droite comme de gauche, le discredit de la classe politique, le rejet de la construction europeenne, rendent caducs les schemas anciens. En particulier l'idee que la democratie, a force de bienveillance, peut tolerer toutes les differences, toutes les croyances. Oui! Il y a des croyances insupportables et intolerables. Non! Le populisme n'est pas une illusion qui se dissipera d'elle-meme avec un peu de pedagogie et de (...) bonne volonte. Non! La politique internationale n'obeit pas aux chartes du droit international. Il faut denoncer la tyrannie des bons sentiments, la politique de l'emotion et de la compassion. Non que la bienveillance soit un sentiment indigne, mais nous devons cesser de croire qu'on peut batir sur elle une communaute politique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

Les hommes ont toujours agi sur eux-mêmes, et pris en charge leur propre évolution. Avec aujourd'hui deux traits absolument nouveaux. D'une part, les capacités d'action de l'espèce humaine sur elle-même sont incomparablement plus puissantes que par le passé, notamment dans le domaine des technologies de la vie. D'autre part, nous contrôlons si bien notre milieu et l'avons si parfaitement aménagé pour notre survie que nous avons mis en danger notre environnement. Le philosophe Peter Sloterdijk conduit une réflexion peu conventionnelle sur (...) ce double déséquilibre, déséquilibre de la domestication de l'homme par lui-même, déséquilibre de l'environnement par la mobilisation infinie des ressources. En prolongeant ses réflexions, il s'agit ici de réfléchir à cette situation. Faut-il poursuivre et même accélérer sur la voie de la mutation, en inventant le nouvel homme, c'est-à-dire le surhomme? Ou faut-il à nouveau penser la nature humaine dans sa finitude et, contre la mobilisation infinie, en appeler à la dé-mobilisation et à la voie du Tao, mais au risque de l'étouffement dans la mesure, la sagesse et l'ennui? (shrink)

Mélissa Thériault,Dominique Sirois-Rouleau | : Bien connu pour ses prises de positions tranchées et polémiques sur le fonctionnement des institutions culturelles et des milieux artistiques, le philosophe français Yves Michaud est aussi un observateur assidu des nouvelles tendances de consommation. L’objectif de cette étude critique est d’ouvrir une discussion critique qui s’impose sur certaines affirmations dont le caractère polémique est aussi manifeste que fertile : la notion de vaporisation de l’art, le statut « orphelin » du design et (...) son rapprochement avec l’art et le luxe et, finalement, la question de l’authenticité. Nous discuterons chacun de ces éléments afin de répondre aux zones grises de l’analyse présentée dans l’essai de Michaud. Nous conclurons par une discussion sur la possibilité même de considérer l’art comme un luxe en montrant dans quelle mesure la conception du luxe telle que défendue par Michaud correspond en fait à un concept bien différent. | : Well known for his controversial positions on the functioning of cultural institutions and artistic communities, French philosopher Yves Michaud is also a fine observer of new consumer trends. The aim of this study is to open a critical discussion on polemic statements made by Michaud in Le nouveau luxe. Expérience, arrogances, authenticité : the notion of vaporization of the art, the “orphan” status of design and the connexion between art and luxury and, finally, authenticity. We discuss each of these elements to clarify the gray areas of the analysis presented by Michaud. We conclude with a discussion on the relevance to consider art as a luxury by showing how design, as understood by Michaud, matches a very different concept. (shrink)

According to the French philosopher Alain, art must regain its existence as a real and solid object to counteract deceitful imagination. In line with this view is Yves Michaud’s description of the “gaseous” state of contemporary art. Paradoxically, the wide circulation of many ‘artistic’ products, destined to be consumed and invoke emotions, does not indicate that we are in presence of an important affirmation of ethical and aesthetical values. As it were, the proliferation of aesthetic objects has destroyed (...) the symbolic value of art. The Italian philosopher Gianni Carchia has underlined how the disappearance of the axiological dimension has led art towards imposture and under the yoke of imagination, which both assist the strategies of the demonic. At this point a question arises: is it possible to eradicate the power of the demonic and evil from our existential condition? According to Jung it’s impossible. In Castelli’s view, the union between art, evil and the demonic has characterized the artistic panorama of the sixteenth century. In the twentieth-century, we owe to Hermann Broch – who brought the raising power of kitsch under philosophical scrutiny − the idea of a complicity between degraded art and evil. Not all scholars agreed that Kitsch represented evil. Many philosophers argued that the growing popularity of Kitsch among the masses posed a problem concerning the demand for art. For this reason, philosophical speculation had better not take a Manichean attitude and reject Kitsch outright, on the contrary, Kitsch should be studied with the aim of transforming the “hunger for art”, of which it is a manifestation, into a desire for ethical and artistic values. (shrink)

This article examines the antecedents and background of the antithesis between art and beauty. It also considers if this confrontation, typical in modern aesthetics, provides necessary conceptual categories to comprehend the situation of art in the communication era, characteristic of a generalised aesthetisation. Departing from the ideas posed by Yves Michaud, Mateu Cabot, Didi-Huberman and Mario Perniola, the author dismantles the false opposition between art and beauty; she proposes a strategy to avoid an antithetical position and exhorts the (...) readers to recover a different experience from beauty. (shrink)

t.l. Introduction à une anthropologie philosophique.

With the meaning of trust, good faith and respect for promises made, protection, or assistance, fides in the non-exclusively religious sense of the word comes from the demand for ethical perfection: as such, it is omnipresent in human relations and in the dynamic of societies in the Middle Ages.

Im Folgenden stellen wir drei aktuelle Forschungsbereiche zur formalen Logik bei Kant allgemeinverständlich dar und greifen dabei auf die trans zendentale Logik nur dann zurück, wenn sie ein besseres Verständnis der formalen Logik ermöglicht: Zunächst wird Kants Beitrag zur Rezeption und Weiterentwicklung von Euler-artigen Diagrammen dargestellt. Diese Diagramme wurden in den 1990er Jahren wiederentdeckt, als formales System interpretiert und werden heute insbes. in der Didaktik, in den Kognitionswissenschaften, in der Linguistik, in KI-Bereichen wie der (Logik-basierten) Wissensrepräsentation eingesetzt, und auch in (...) der Philosophie verwendet (Kapitel 2). Mehrere Studien haben in den letzten Jahren gezeigt, dass Kant in weiten Teilen seines Systems Oppositionsverhältnisse verwendet, die der Struktur des logischen Quadrats entsprechen. Das logische Quadrat ist heute Gegenstand intensiver Forschung, da es neben der klassischen, auch die paravollständige und parakonsistente Negation abbildet (Kap. 3). Jüngst wurde zudem die Implementierbarkeit der kantischen Logik in ein formalisiertes deduktives System bewiesen. Die Bedeutung dieses Ergebnisses wird insbesondere im Hinblick auf die formalisierte Umsetzung der Sätze vom Widerspruch, vom zureichenden Grund und der Ausschließung des Mittleren erläutert (Kap. 4). Abschließend möchten wir ein paar Perspektiven für die Forschung zur formalen Logik bei Kant nennen (Kap. 5). -- -/- Note: No financial support acknowledged by the second autor (S. Kovač). (shrink)

Après avoir écarté l’idée que des traits innés de personnalité prédisposeraient à être religieux, une théorie de l’identité comme résultant d’un processus de construction est esquissée à l’aide de trois approches : des travaux en psychologie sociale et en sociologie, un modèle noyau-périphérie de l’identité et le concept d’identité narrative. Le rôle que peut jouer le recours à des références religieuses dans la construction identitaire est ensuite illustré par des recherches empiriques dans trois domaines : la formation de l’identité religieuse (...) dans le passage à l’âge adulte, les ressources sur lesquelles prendre appui lors de passages difficiles dans un parcours de vie, le rôle des récits dans la construction de l’identité religieuse. L’exposé se conclut sur les responsabilités sociales qui en découlent, montrant quel impact une gouvernance publique dans ces domaines peut avoir sur le vécu psychologique. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteur présente de façon synthétique ce qui définit l’approche de la planétarité qu’il a mise en œuvre au sein de son programme triannuel The Terraforming mené au Strelka Institute de Moscou. Son approche accélérationniste contraste avec les sensibilités actuellement dominantes dans les pensées écologistes européennes.

Les débats académiques autour de la montée des mouvements définis comme populistes s’interrogent rarement sur ce à quoi renvoient les tensions qui traversent les démocraties représentatives aujourd’hui. Le « déficit démocratique » ou la « crise de la démocratie » sont autant d’expressions qui supposent le caractère non structurel de ce moment. Nous y voyons plutôt une rupture structurelle, issue de la désarticulation progressive du principe représentatif d’avec le principe démocratique. Alors que ces deux principes ont défini la démocratie représentative (...) à partir du XIXe siècle, leur désarticulation suscite des interrogations et produit des réponses au sein du champ politique : le retour de la nation, l’évocation de possibles assemblées constituantes ainsi que la défense d’un régime représentatif dépourvu de ses traits démocratiques sont autant de possibilités politiques qui naissent de cette désarticulation. Le présent article développe cette thèse et la propose à la discussion théorique autour de la situation actuelle des démocraties représentatives, et du moment dit populiste. (shrink)

For many years, M. Jean d'Ormesson has been doing me the honor of asking me to write for Diogenes. More recently, he suggested that I should coordinate an issue of this review that would be devoted to my extended discipline, History, but history in the way in which I understand it. It was certainly not for lack of interest that I did not reply to the first request but, no doubt, because of the sense of a chronic lack of time (...) - almost a pleonasm - from which I, like everyone else, suffer. It was not because I was cured that I accepted the second invitation but probably because I allowed myself, with full knowledge of the facts, to entertain the idea that editing an issue would take up less time than simply contributing. … In fact, as everyone knows, the opposite is true, especially when the occasional editor also volunteers to be one of the contributors. This issue is now completed and I sincerely thank M. Jean d'Ormesson for having wished to entrust me with this task that I have enjoyed very much. (shrink)

Dans son pamphlet contre Napoléon, intitulé De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, Benjamin Constant écrivait, en 1814 : « Un gouvernement qui voudrait aujourd’hui pousser à la guerre et aux conquêtes un peuple européen commettrait donc un grossier et funeste anachronisme. Il travaillerait à donner à sa nation une impulsion contraire..

On sait le rôle que jouent les représentations dans la conscience de soi d’un peuple ou d’une nation. Dans ces représentations, l’histoire occupe une place décisive. C’est en effet dans la mémoire collective, réelle ou mythique, réelle et mythique, que se forgent les revendications de légitimité, de souveraineté ou d’indépendance, la conscience de la justice d’une cause ou..

Il y a deux arguments principaux avancés par ceux, et ils sont nombreux à l’Université et hors d’elle, qui prétendent que la période proprement nazie de Carl Schmitt se limite à une courte période et que ses textes antisémites n’affectent en rien les aspects principaux de sa pensée. Le premier argument consiste à dire que les textes antisémites sont strictement limités..