In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the (...) claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show ‐ with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e. von Wright's Truth Logic ‐ that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth‐values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting‐point for analyzing the relationships among norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

Heidegger ha ejercido una crítica constante de la fenomenología de Husserl desde el momento en que empezó a impartir sus primeras lecciones académcias. Uno de los momentos culminantes de este proceso es "prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs", el curso del verano de 1925. Haciendo un análisis detallado de la fenomenología de la conciencia de Husserl, Heidegger denuncia que los presupuestos en los que aquélla se apoya la acercan a la filosofía tradicional y la alejan de sus pretensiones iniciales. La "fascinación (...) por la tradición" y el predominio de la teoría son los resultados principales de esta crítica inmanente. (shrink)

RESUMENHeidegger ha ejercido una crítica constante de la fenomenología de Husserl desde el momento en que empezó a impartir sus primeras lecciones académicas. uno de los momentos culminantes de este proceso es Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, el curso del verano de 1925. Haciendo un análisis detallado de la fenomenología de la conciencia de Husserl, Heidegger denuncia que los presupuestos en los que aquella se apoya la acercan a la filosofía tradicional y la alejan de sus pretensiones iniciales. La "fascinación (...) por la tradición" y el predominio de la teoría son los resultados principales de esta crítica inmanente,PALABRAS CLAVEFENOMENOLOGÍA-CONCIENCIA-HUSSERL-HEIDEGGERABSTRACTAs from his early lectures in the university, Heidegger has been criticizing the phenomenology of Husserl. A critical moment of this process is Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, the summer of 1925 course. By examining Husserl's phenomenology of conscience, Heidegger denounces that its assumptions lean it towards traditional philosophy and keep it away from its initial pretensions. The main outcomes of the critique are both the "fascination with tradition"and the primacy of theoryKEYWORDSPHENOMENOLOGY-CONSCIENCE-HUSSERL-HEIDEGGER. (shrink)

Los amplios y detallados estudios de Scheler sobre lo afectivo constituyen uno de los capítulos más relevantes de su obra. Contienen una elaborada crítica a la interpretación tradicional de los afectos y sentimientos, habitualmente denigrados como modos de conocimiento. El presente trabajo presenta someramente algunos de los presupuestos filosóficos fundamentales de este proyecto al hilo de los textos más importantes y quiere pensar en última instancia si este intento rupturista con respecto a la tradición se ha llevado satisfactoriamente a cabo (...) o si aún sigue enredado en algunos presupuestos tradicionales de los que nuestro autor se quería separar de modo tan decidido. (shrink)

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to extend the knowledge about why procedural justice has behavioral implications within organizations. Since prior studies show that PJ leads to legitimacy, the author suggests that, when formal regulations are unfairly implemented, they lose their validity or efficacy. This “rule deactivation,” in turn, leads to two proposed destructive work behaviors, namely, workplace deviance and decreased citizenship behaviors. The results support this mediating role of RD, thus suggesting that it forms part of the generative mechanism (...) through which unfair procedures influence ethical behavior within organizations. The author ends the article by discussing behavioral ethics and managerial implications as well as suggestions for future research. (shrink)

The model emphasizes the ethical dynamics of compassion in hospitality settings by suggesting that under an organizational ethical climate, the hotel staff will be more morally aware of peers’ pain and suffering, and motivated to participate in delivering compassion. Based on the positive psychology focus on compassion as individual states and traits supporting interpersonal dealings, the paper operationalizes compassion based on four individual factors involved in the compassionate process: empathic concern, or an other-oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with (...) the perceived welfare of a person in need; mindfulness, a state of consciousness in which attention is focused on present-moment phenomena occurring both externally and internally; kindness, or understanding the pain or suffering of others; and common humanity, or seeing others’ experiences as part of the larger human experience. Data were collected from 280 employees at ten hotels in the Canary Islands. With the exception of self-interest, results of multiple linear regressions demonstrate that each of the six interpreted factors of ethical climate has substantive effects on any of the studied elements of staff compassion. The egoistic-related and principle-related climate factors generated a more consistent and intense compassionate reaction, suggesting that the staff is moved to act out of compassion either to assure that the team succeeds or to support each other out of moral obligation. (shrink)

Este artigo trata das críticas, elaboradas por Albrecht Wellmer, ao tipo de teoria moral baseada em princípios universalistas. Inicialmente, é abordada sua tentativa de uma reelaboração da própria idéia de universalismo moral, para depois esboçar a radicalidade de sua crítica a qualquer moral universalista. Nesse ponto, a Ética do Discurso de Jürgen Habermas, é que lhe serve de objeto. Por fim, também a partir de Wellmer, apontam-se possíveis alternativas a esse tipo de ética, sobretudo, a formulação de um ponto de (...) vista moral fundamento numa teoria do reconhecimento social. (shrink)

Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable; that such relationships give rise to “underived” special responsibilities; that there is a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities; and that we must consequently strike a balance between the two. We argue that there is no such tension and propose an alternative approach to the relation between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities. First, while some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable, no relationship is unconditionally valuable. Second, whether such relationships (...) give rise to special responsibilities is conditional on those relationships not violating certain moral constraints. Third, these moral constraints arise from within cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. Thus the value of relationships and the special responsibilities to which they give rise arise within the parameters of cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. The real tension is not between cosmopolitan equality and special responsibilities, but between special responsibilities and the various general duties that arise from the recognition, demanded by cosmopolitan egalitarianism, of a multiplicity of other basic goods. Indeed, even the recognition of special relationships itself gives rise to general duties that may condition and/or weigh against putative special responsibilities. (shrink)

Grounded in a will to adapt to dangers, and espouse both responsibility and resilience, voluntary measures have largely replaced one of the oldest public health strategies, quarantine. The Covid-19 pandemic, however, elicited a broad sweep of tactics from the archive of public health armoury. On a general level, this review essay addresses the common measures rolled out by various authorities against the pandemic - the lock-downs, reopening process, financial support and vaccination. By relating these measures to 1) the “plague-stricken town”, (...) deployed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe by the Polizeistaat; 2) the “self-regulation strategy” that emerged with liberal ideas at the end of the eighteenth century; and 3) the “minimum security” programmed by neoliberal governmentality in the second half of the twentieth century, it is suggested that tensions between freedom and security during, and after, the pandemic can be better understood. To end, the essay noticed that the pandemic has enforced tensions in the administration and calibration of individual wishes and collective wellbeing, creating a fragile “freedom-security relationship” and new problem space for self-regulation. (shrink)

La historiografía ecuatoriana recoge tres formas de interpretar el proceso la independencia y fundación de Ecuador. Entre ellas, se encuentra la escuela patriótica, la materialista y la denominada escuela atlántica. Los dispositivos en el pensamiento foucaultiano pueden ser instituciones, normas, leyes, discursos, o simplemente posiciones respecto a temas históricos trascendentales. Estos dispositivos no son patrimonio de un sujeto político específico; por el contrario, tienen la capacidad de constituir o fortalecer a aquellos sujetos. Los dispositivos hallados con una mayor influencia en (...) la historiografía de la independencia son el sistema educativo y las conmemoraciones independentistas. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo busca reconstruir los principios metodológicos de la “arqueología de la política” que Foucault introduce hacia el final de L’archéologie du savoir aunque nunca desarrolla de manera explícita. La exposición se organiza en tres ejes. En primer lugar, explora los puntos de cruce y las posibles diferencias entre la arqueología del saber y la arqueología de la política. En segundo lugar, examina el lugar que podrían ocupar los “programas” y las “racionalidades de gobierno” en la arqueología de la (...) política. Por último, propone a la razón de Estado, el liberalismo y el neoliberalismo como posibles campos de investigación para el desarrollo de esa arqueología. Con ello se pretende obtener una “grilla de inteligibilidad” cuyo punto de partida no sean las categorías universales habitualmente utilizadas por el análisis jurídico-político procedente de los siglos XVI y XVII, sino las prácticas de los gobernantes y los gobernados.This article proposes to reconstruct the methodological principles of the “archaeology of politics” mentioned by Foucault at the end of L’archéologie du savoir, although never explicitly continued. The text is organized in three complementary axes. First, it explores the crossing points and possible differences between the archaeology of knowledge and the archaeology of politics. Second, it investigates the place that “programs” and “government rationalities” might take in the archeology of politics. Finally, it porposes the reason of State, liberalism and neoliberalism as possible research fields for the development of said archeology. Therefore, this article seeks to obtain a “grid of intelligibility” whose basis are not the universal categories usually used by legal-political analysis from the 16th and 17th centuries, but the practices of the governing and governed. (shrink)

El examen de los actores, instituciones y materiales implicados en el Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) remite inmediatamente al contexto de los macroproyectos científicos que suelen caracterizarse con el expresivo rótulo de «Big Science». Como es bien sabido, la afortunada expresión fue acuñada por el sociólogo de la ciencia Derek de Solla Price en 1936 quien elaboró su concepción considerando, principalmente, a la física de su época. Sin embargo, las ciencias biológicas tardaron varios decenios más en adquirir las dimensiones de la (...) Big Science. En el caso del PGH se presenta un panorama muy distinto al contexto en el que surgió la estructura de la doble hélice. El investigador aislado no tiene cabida en este contexto, y los grandes científicos son ahora directores de proyectos y el caso de James Watson es de nuevo paradigmático. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se estudia la génesis del Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) desde un enfoque filosófico. A la vista de la cuantiosa bibliografía sobre el tema, quizá las siguientes páginas pudieran parecer impertinentes, pero no pretendemos elaborar una mera paráfrasis, más o menos afortunada, de varios ensayos previos porque este trabajo supone una reacción crítica frente a esos mismos ensayos. Nuestro proceder es, desde un primer momento, dialéctico, pues supone una rectificación de las distintas exposiciones acerca de la génesis (...) del PGH. Por ello, hemos de tomarlas en consideración como contenidos del propio trabajo. El análisis pormenorizado sería excesivo; una breve reseña, casi a título inventarial, de los ejemplares más destacados permitirá ejemplificar los problemas mencionados, además de ofrecer un primer bosquejo de los contenidos y contornos de la investigación. (shrink)

La dimensión científica del Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) remite a un conjunto de entidades de orden biológico: bases nitrogenadas, genes, enzimas, SNP’s1, etc., sobre las cuales se ejercitan las operaciones tecnológicas que dan lugar a la secuenciación del genoma. Un examen más atento muestra que todos los cuerpos, morfologías y estructuras que forman parte constituyente del PGH pueden circunscribirse al campo de la biología molecular, con lo cual están dados a la misma escala, lógicamente. Esta primera suposición, que habrá que (...) constatar en la reconstrucción ulterior, permite regresar hacia el curso de la constitución de la biología molecular, como factor del contexto histórico determinante del PGH, sin tener que retrotraerse a procesos anteriores de la historia de la biología para dar razón de la conformación y conexión de los trazos que forman parte de la figura de referencia. (shrink)

Scholars have considered that Spinoza’s difficulties in dealing with the objections raised by Tschirnhaus against his physical approaches were the spur that led the latter to dissociate himself from the former in the field of natural philosophy. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to refute this misjudgment and, on the other, to show that the cause of it lies in having dismissed a significant post-Cartesian current of thought, buried in oblivion by the triumph of Newtonian mechanics, (...) which intended to develop a physics in purely relational terms. In turn, this will allow us to read the physical proposals of Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as paradigmatic examples of this relational physics. (shrink)

This article offers a short biography of Kant and explains why his work was so important.

Against the charge that Kant's doctrine of radical evil is inconsistent and alien to his practical philosophy, my aim is to show its necessity within the critical system. First, I undermine the alleged vacuity of Kant's notion of evil by showing that, already in the Groundwork, an evil will is the necessary conceptual correlate of a good will. "Good" and "evil" characterize the agent's form of willing and represent the source of value of right and wrong actions. Then, I show (...) how the doctrine of radical evil derives from Kant's notion of evil. That evil lies at the level of an individual Gesinnung is the result of Kant's radicalizing the use of transcendental freedom. That there is a propensity to evil in the whole species is the result of Kant's naturalizing the principles of his moral psychology. Although Kant is not clear about this distinction, the consistency of his doctrine depends on indicating that an "evil Gesinnung" and the "propensity to evil" are not equivalent concepts. Rather, they refer to different units of moral analysis, the individual and the whole species, and represent a failure to comply with different types of moral obligation: the duty to realize the good and the duty to realize the highest good. The correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation explains the isomorphism that Kant detects between them, as well as their logical independence, without which the individual's choice of Gesinnung would be analytically contained in the species' choice of moral nature . Finally, to account for the problem of moral self-constitution I argue for the necessity of assuming a transcendental volitional structure, the unity of acknowledgement or "I will". At the different levels of analysis, this structure organizes the will's manifold intentions according to unifying principles that allow it to recognize them as its own. Although Kant does not mention it, the "I will" is a necessary assumption to account for the continuity of choice and for its possible imputation to an agent. (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende examinar las relaciones entre derecho, ideología y discurso. Para ello se asume la teoría sociocognitiva de la ideología de Teun van Dijk y el enfoque institucional acerca de la naturaleza del derecho de Joseph Raz explorando la posibilidad de la existencia de ideologías legales. A partir de un ejemplo, se muestra la imbricación del campo político con el campo de la justicia y se concluye que los jueces adhieren al menos a dos grupos ideológicos, uno de carácter (...) político y otro de carácter profesional. This paper aims to examine the relationship between law, ideology and discourse. To do this, the sociocognitive theory of Teun van Dijk’s ideology is ascribed together with Joseph Raz’s institutional approach to the nature of law by exploring the possibility of existence of legal ideologies. Starting from an example, we show the overlap between the political field with the field of justice and conclude that judges adhere to at least two ideological groups, one of a political nature and the other of a professional nature. (shrink)

Este trabajo quedó segundo en la IV Olimpiada de filosofía que organiza FICUM en la modalidad de secundaria y bachillerato para promocionar la filosofía entre los jóvenes.

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

La cuestión de la traducción, como afirma Derrida, es «la» cuestión de la deconstrucción. En este sentido, comprende Derrida que la traducción no consiste en la «transferencia» de significantes entre las lenguas, proceso que respetaría los significados ideales-inmateriales. Por el contrario, Derrida apunta hacia una traducción de un «original» que nunca ha sido, un texto que necesita esencialmente de la traducción y, por tanto, afirma la traducción como una tarea «im-posible», como la continua creación del otro y de lo otro, (...) como recepción de la herencia e imposible afirmación del duelo. En este sentido, cabría plantear la posibilidad de «traducir» los textos de Derrida hacia el pensamiento heideggeriano, donde también se establecería de manera explícita el rechazo a la noción de traducción en cuanto «intercambio», es decir, como tarea técnica o mecánica, apuntando así hacia la traducción como la verdadera esencia del pensamiento y del lenguaje. No obstante, se comprueba en esta aproximación la im-posibilidad de traducir los textos de Derrida al corpus heideggeriano. (shrink)

On 20 December 1973, an attack by ETA put an end to the lives of Franco's head of government, his chauffeur and his bodyguard. This had important consequences for both the dictatorship and the terrorist group. Based on the existing sources, historians have developed a fairly credible account of the events. Nevertheless, the fact that ETA had managed to assassinate such a prominent politician, combined with some loose ends in the police investigation and the absence of a sentence gave rise (...) to all kinds of speculation. Furthermore, the case of Carrero Blanco has inspired narratives of uneven quality. In this paper we examine the interrelationship between history, conspiracy theories and fiction surrounding the attack. (shrink)

This paper proposes a conceptual model that fosters interdisciplinary thinking and critical thinking by connecting the three main philosophical traditions that impact modern thinking – British empiricism, Continental Europe subjective idealism, and realism – with their epistemological foundations and in combination with modern social disciplines: ethics, social responsibility, and political economy. Through a statistical analysis this paper shows which of the three epistemologies produces better social outcomes.

The colonial model imposed in Cuba by the creole oligarchy and the cabinet in Madrid. Thwarted every possibility of an economy diversificied development and doonet the isle to a story where the slavery supergroning production with all its social and political implications prevailed. This system, that implied a crisis in itself, was absolutely artificial: it was a creator of richness for a very small group, and of course, it was unable to correct the tremendous condetions thas implied. The system hastered (...) in the underdevelopment and in the independency to Cuba at the same time that morgatet its future as a nation. (shrink)