Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries (...) and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics. (shrink)

The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this (...) norm lacks normative force, that it violates the principle that ‘ought implies can,’ and that it is viciously circular. I defend the view that we should distinguish the statement of the objective norm and the way it is regulated, and that this distinction can answer most of the criticisms of the norm of truth for belief. (shrink)

Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.

Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...) differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief. (shrink)

Previous research on reactivity—defined as changing organizational behaviour to better conform to the criteria of measurement in response to being measured—has found significant variation in company responses toward sustainability metrics. We propose that reactivity is driven by dialogue, motivation, and capacity in a configurational way. Empirically, we use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to analyze company responses to the sustainability index FTSE4Good. We find evidence of complementary and substitute effects between motivation and capacity. Based on these effects, we develop a (...) typology of reactivity to sustainability metrics, which also theorizes the use of metrics as tools for performance feedback and the building of calculative capacity. We show that when reactivity is studied configurationally, we can identify previously underacknowledged types of responses. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications for studying and using sustainability metrics as governance tools for responsible behaviour. (shrink)

This paper tries to say in what sense truth is a norm, a thesis that Donald Davidson, whose view are examined, denies. After skteching his conception of rationality, it is argued that truth is a norm in only the sense that we ought to believe what we believe is true, not that we all to believe everything which is true. This minimal norm of truth is isolated and defended.

The doxastic zoo contains many animals: belief, acceptance, belief in, belief that, certainty, conjecture, guess, conviction, denial, disbelief in, disbelief that, judgment, commitment, etc. It also contains belief’s “strange bedfellows”: credences, partial beliefs, tacit beliefs, subdoxastic states, creedal feelings, feelings of knowing, in-between believings, pathological beliefs, phobias, aliefs, delusions, biases, besires. How to order the zoo? I propose to distinguish doxastic attitudes from non-doxastic epistemic attitudes. The criterion is the existence of correctness conditions. Most bedfellows do not have such normative (...) conditions. So they should not be allowed in the Doxastic Club. (shrink)

There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in (...) a sense in which our reasons for actions are not. Epistemic agency is possible in the weak sense that we can be active, but not in the strong one in which we could have some elbow room for our epistemic reasons in reasoning leading to beliefs and other epistemic states. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

I raise a dilemma for an epistemology based on the idea that there are hinge propositions or primitive certainties: either such propositions are norms or rules in the 'grammatical' sense, but they cannot regulate our inquiries since they are not genuine propositions obeying truth or evidential standards, or they are epistemic norms, but compete with the classical norms of belief and knowledge. Either there are hinges, but they have nothing to do with epistemology, or hinges are part of our knowledge, (...) and their epistemology is part of ordinary epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes stupidity as a problem for epistemology. Its proper home belongs to virtue epistemology, as a specific epistemic vice, which has to be studied along the lines of both reliabilist virtue epistemology and of responsibilist virtue epistemology. The author distinguishes between two kinds of stupidity: stupidity proper and foolishness. The former is a defect in the competence of an agent, as well as in the performance of judgment, and it is generally studied as a failure of rationality along (...) intellectualist lines. The second is a failure to evaluate properly the nature of the epistemic goal, and is a form of epistemic indifference, which involves an insensitivity to epistemic values and norms. This chapter analyzes their varieties, and suggest that the boundaries between stupidity and foolishness are often less clear than it is suggested by the author’s taxonomy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...) their own thoughts. (shrink)

Elaboramos una versión del disposicionalismo experimental que esclarece la relación entre capacidades y leyes fenomenológicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, presentamos el disposicionalismo experimental en vistas de las nociones de modalidad física y ambiente de estímulo. Trazamos las líneas generales para una epistemología experimentalista de las capacidades y esclarecemos la modalidad física e invariancia de las leyes fenomenológicas. Luego examinamos las generalizaciones físicas y extrapolaciones de las leyes fenomenológicas y exponemos el caso de la ley de Fresnel, que ilustra aspectos de (...) nuestro argumento. Concluimos con algunas consideraciones sobre los límites del disposicionalismo experimental. (shrink)

Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas (...) the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je défends la position évidentialiste à propos des croyances religieuses, à la suite de la fameuse maxime de Clifford et contre l'interprétation pragmatiste de l'éthique des croyances. Je défends, en suivant Shah que le test de transparence est mieux expliqué par l'existence d'une norme de correction de la croyance. Les croyances religieuses, si elles sont des croyances, doivent obéir à cette norme. Si elles n'y obéissent pas, ce ne sont pas des croyances. Et la non croyance est (...) une attitude parfaitement légitime. (shrink)

La figure de l'individu, qui a dominé la philosophie et les sciences sociales au cours des trois dernières décennies, semble à bout de souffle. Partout, singuliers et collectifs cherchent à dépasser la simple adaptation au monde fluide imposé par le capitalisme mondialisé et à redevenir les agents de leur propre vie. Au nord comme au sud, un immense désir de subjectivation est en train de gagner nos sociétés. Pourtant, la figure du sujet reste confuse. Longtemps identifiée à une entité naturelle, (...) hors de l'histoire, elle pâtit aujourd'hui également des représentations, tout aussi néfastes, qui concluent de l'historicité radicale du sujet à sa relativité éthique et politique, voire à son inexistence. Ce livre reprend, à la racine, la réflexion sur les relations entre sujet et histoire, en y réintroduisant une tradition oubliée, sinon refoulée par la philosophie : celle qui commence avec Humboldt, se poursuit chez Saussure, Benveniste et Meschonnic. En définissant le langage comme activité et comme mise en circulation de puissances poétiques, cette tradition fournit les bases d'une nouvelle anthropologie historique du sujet. (shrink)

The author recalls some of the reasons why analytical philosophy has been foreign to contemporary fre philosophical tradition. Presenting some recent work by contemporary fre philosophers influenced by analytic philosophy, He shows that most of them share the view that philosophy is a kind of transcendental inquiry on the nature and limits of language, And that recent trends in analytical philosophy, Such as scientific realism and "naturalised epistemology" are not well represented in france.

In this paper I want to show that, although it is a common thread of many pragmatist or pragmatist-inspired doctrines, the belief-as-disposition-to-act theme is played on very different tunes by the various philosophical performers. A whole book could be devoted to the topic. I shall limit myself here to the views of Peirce, James, Ramsey, contemporary functionalists, and Isaac Levi. Depending on how they interpret this theme, the pragmatist philosophers can emphasise more or less the role of theory and practice (...) in their respective account of thought, truth and inquiry. When they stress the former pragmatists are what I shall call theoria-pragmatists, when they put the stress on the latter, I'll call them the praxis pragmatists. I suggest that the first variety is much more appealing than the other, and I side with the theoreticist pragmatists. (edited). (shrink)

What is the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? That the former has not withdrawn norms of justification and truth, whereas the latter has bred suspicion about them.

L’une des raisons pour lesquelles la vérité et la démocratie ne semblent pas faire bon ménage est qu’on a tendance à confondre, d’une part, la liberté d’opinion et de parole avec l’égale vérité des opinions, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de relativisme, et, d’autre part, la règle de majorité avec une règle de vérité, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de théorie de la vérité comme consensus. Parce que la démocratie libérale repose sur le principe de la (...) pluralité des valeurs et sur la neutralité axiologique, on a tendance à penser qu’elle exige de traiter toutes les opinions comme également respectables et, moyennant une confusion de plus, comme également vraies. Parce que la démocratie suppose la règle selon laquelle, en matière de décisions, la majorité doit l’emporter, on suppose que les opinions majoritaires ont le plus de chances d’être vraies, et qu’elles sont vraies parce qu’elles sont celles de la majorité. (shrink)

A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...) there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social. (shrink)

This paper analyses Davidson's conception of the norms of rationality which govern, according to him, the interpretation of mind and action. While I accept Davidson's thesis that there are norms of the mental, I disagree with him on their scope. It is argued that there are much more specific norms for concepts, and that belief in partiuclar is governed by a norm of truth.

Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.

Dans un roman d’anticipation qu’il situe en 19201, Alfred Jarry invente le personnage d’André Marcueuil, capable d’aller « au-delà des forces humaines », tant sexuelles que cyclistes. Durant la futuriste « course des dix mille milles »2, une quintuplette, sur laquelle pédalent cinq champions cyclistes, distance, grâce à un développement de « cinquante-sept mètres trente-quatre »,..

Tiré d’un mémoire de maîtrise soutenue à l’Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, sous la direction de Jean-Clément Martin, ici préfacier, Marie-Antoinette et ses biographes. Histoire d’une écriture de la Révolution française, possède les qualités et les défauts de ce type d’exercice. Le titre en est ainsi trompeur, puisqu’il laisse envisager une enquête reposant sur l’ensemble des travaux portant sur la figure historique de Marie-Antoinette. En fait, cinq biographes ont été convoqués et fo...

Les sociologues donnent souvent l’amour comme simple idéalisation. Pourtant si la croyance en l’autre s’appuie dans le temps sur l’imagination, elle requiert aussi la reconnaissance et la narration, c’est la complémentarité de ses trois modes d’entretien de la croyance qui la distingue d’un masquage délibéré ou d’un aveuglement subi.

Le discours social du XIXe siècle fait un usage abondant du mot de «peuple». Les définitions qui en sont données - de Michelet à Larousse -, les représentations qui en sont construites - de Balzac à Zola -tendent cependant à vider le peuple de toute substance historique ou à le placer à la frontière de la civilisation. Une sociologie, une anthropologie, une physiologie, une raciologie s'additionnent en ce sens au fil du siècle, dont les schémas pèseront durablement sur l'imaginaire des (...) classes dominantes.The word "peuple" is one of the most frequent in the social discourse of the 19th century. From Michelet to Larousse, from Balzac to Zola, its definitions and literary representations tend however to drain the people of any historical substance. Moreover, from one text to another, a complex blending of sociology, anthropology, physiology and raciology seems to lead the popular classes outside the very border of civilization. (shrink)

Pouvons-nous emprunter à Michel Foucault sa thèse selon laquelle il y a des régimes de vérité et l’appliquer à certains développements récents de notre univers médiatique et numérique? On peut parler de régimes de fausseté, mais il faudra partir sur de tout autres bases que celles du projet généalogique de Foucault pour envisager une « politique de la vérité » dans le contexte contemporain.