The challenge of understanding our existence and our place in the universe has perplexed humans for centuries. What we must remember, according to Ronald Dufty, is that the environment of the earth is a very small region of the universe, and that it is continually evolving. From this basis, Dufty assesses commonly held scientific and philosophical beliefs, and seeks to correct the misconceptions they lead to. Dufty considers topical issues such as global warming, religious terrorism and anti-social behaviour with (...) a constant awareness of the bigger picture and a desire to expand our knowledge of the nature of the universe and our role in it. (shrink)

Life's Ultimate Questions is unique among introductory philosophy textbooks. By synthesizing three distinct approaches—topical, historical, and worldview/conceptual systems—it affords students a breadth and depth of perspective previously unavailable in standard introductory texts. Part One, Six Conceptual Systems, explores the philosophies of: naturalism, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Aquinas. Part Two, Important Problems in Philosophy, sheds light on: The Law of Noncontradiction, Possible Words, Epistemology I: Whatever Happened to Truth?, Epistemology II: A Tale of Two Systems, Epistemology III: Reformed Epistemology, God (...) I: The Existence of God, God II: The Nature of God, Metaphysics: Some Questions About Indeterminism, Ethics I: The Downward Path, Ethics II: The Upward Path, Human Nature: The Mind-Body Problem and Survival After Death. (shrink)

Stone argues that religion must be understood in its connections with world politics for the successful conduct of foreign policy. Without peace among religions, there can be no peace, and without understanding the role of religion in politics, there can be neither peace nor successful foreign policy.

Many of the ten practices to abolish war of just peacemaking theory can be appropriated by classical realist thinkers to illumine possibilities of more peace for the post-cold war situation. The optimism of just peacemaking theory about abolishing war, however, does not need to be appropriated. Realist participation in the just peacemaking project can proceed but only with reservations about what seems to be a mixture of optimism and Kantian idealism about the future peacefulness of a capitalist world, and the (...) illusion that war will disappear from the world. Realism, grounded more in the prophets than the just peacemaking project and more in the prophets' moral critique than in Thucydides' cynicism, provides a stronger foundation for policy advice than the Sermon on the Mount which did not focus on international relations. The striking lack of attention by Jesus to questions of the management of the Roman Empire and the ethics of war and peace permits Christians to consult books of the Bible where international relations and foreign policy are prominent for moral wisdom on the subject. (shrink)

The Political Crisis and Christian Ethics addresses themes in political philosophy in the context of a crisis in democracy after the denial of the 2020 election by the Republican candidate for president. The refusal to accept the results of the election divided the electorate and drove the president's followers to fail in their attempted coup attempt in January of 2020. Democracy is defended in Reinhold Niebuhr's writing on politics and in Barack Obama's use of the theologian's thought. It is developed (...) further in the political theory of Paul Tillich. The themes of just peacemaking are reviewed in Paul Tillich's critique of John Foster Dulles' work and in the author's critique of just peacemaking in the work of Glen Stassen. Domestically the issues of race, inequality, ecology, and healthcare are addressed from the perspective of prophetic realism. The book concludes in terms of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of education and religion and a vision of the good president. In summary, The Political Crisis and Christian Ethics is a volume of American, Christian political theory in a period of overcoming the trauma of 2016 with Christian ethics and political philosophy. (shrink)

This first book-length study of Paul Tillich's ethics is drawn from research in the Harvard Archives and fifty years of teaching Tillich's social-political thought. In Ronald H. Stone's fourth work on Tillich's philosophy the ethic is examined from the early ontological to socialist ethics to his own final principled-situationalist ethic in late life. Unique to this study is the in-depth inquiry into Tillich's courageous social action correlated with his own philosophical-theological ethic. The book moves from an early socialist rally (...) in Berlin, through the wars, dialogue with John Foster Dulles about post-war planning, debates about nuclear deterrence, to Buddhist Christian dialogue. The author's own preference for the late ethic of the philosopher informs the inquiries into the earlier radical Tillich. The conclusion provides a synthesis of the vast sources of Tillich's ethics and presents twelve themes summarizing sources and future resources for ethics from his life's work. (shrink)

Electron micrographs of active ribosomal genes from many species show a similar picture in which gene regions covered with nascent transcripts alternate with apparently non‐transcribed spacers. Since the gradients of visible nascent transcripts stop near the 3′ end of the 28S sequence it has often been assumed that transcription by RNA polymerase I also terminates at that point. Recent biochemical studies have shown however, that transcription continues far beyond the 3′ end of the 28S and in some species continues across (...) the entire spacer. In this article we review the evidence for spacer transcription in Xenopus, mouse and Drosophila and discuss possible reasons for its invisibility in the electron microscope. (shrink)

In spite of Stein and Glasier's justifiable conclusion that initial optimism concerning the immediate clinical applicability of neural transplantation was premature, there exists much experimental evidence to support the potential for incorporating this procedure into a therapeutic arsenal in the future. To realize this potential will require continued evolution of our knowledge at multiple levels of the clinical and basic neurosciences.

St. Augustine is the bridge that links ancient philosophy and early Christian theology to the thought patterns of the Middle Ages. But the influence of Augustine's philosophy in general and his epistemology in particular extends far beyond medieval philosophy. Such modern philosophers as Descartes and Malebranche carry the stamp of Augustinism upon their philosophies. What is not so well known is that even some of the most original ideas of Berkeley and Kant can be found anticipated in Augustine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE QUEST FOR AN ADEQUATE PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE RoNALD H. McKINNEY, S.J. U'IWversity of Scranton Scranton, Pennsylvania EDWARD VACEK shrewdly observes that proportionalism attempts to synthesize the crucial insights of both the teleologist and the deontologist.1 Indeed, Vacek provides a fine summary of this achievement. However, he reflects that the most underdeveloped feature of proportionalism is its value theory by which we are enabled to know how (...) to resolve conflict situations.2 Richard McCormick, among others, has attempted to meet this deficiency by ·adopting John Finnis' notion of associated basic goods. In this essay, I will show how such an ·approach fails to remain true to the basic aims of proportionalism. Nor should this come as a surprise, since Finnis is himself indebted to one of McCormick's archopponents, Germain Grisez. Moreover, I will attempt to outline the elements involved in a non-hierarchfoal theory of value which I will argue to be the only adequate alternative to McCormick 's attempted solution. Deontologists argue that certain acts are right or wrong regardless of the ·consequences. Proportionalists, however, are opposed to such notions as an " intrinsically evil " act or an "absolute" duty, since they recognize the existence of moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma arises whenever there is a situation in which pre-moral values •are in conflcit, i.e., whatever choice one makes will result in the omission or harm of one or other of the values at stake. According to the proportionl Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," Theological Studies 46/2 (June, 1985), 289. 2 Va.eek, 302. 56 PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE 57 alist reformulation of the principle of double effect, the permission or oausrution of ontic evil is not necessarily a moral evil as long as there is a proportionate reason justifying,such an action, e.g., when a father shoots an!intruder threatening to harm his family. McCormick's initial description of the requirements of proportionate reason [s ias follows: "a) a v1alue at least equal to that sacrificed is at 1 stake; b) there is no less harmful way of protecting ithe value here and now; c) the manner of its protection here and now will not undermine it in the long run." 8 McCormick argues that it simply will not do to claim that the ontic evil permitted or caused in a conflict situation is always only indirectly intended.4 For, in many instances, this simply is not true. Moreover, he would argue that to intend an end is not necess1arily to desire it as deontologists suppose. What justifies the ontic evil resulting from such actions, then, is solely the proportionate reason for which it is allowed or caused. There are some obvious criticisms that have been hurled at this proportionalist proposal for resolving conflict situations: I) that it leaves itself open to the practical, if not theoretical, difficulty of weighing different values;!2) that it results in the possibility of many resolutions that could go counter to our normal moral intuitions; 8) that there exists an inherent fallibility in the calcul,ation of long-range consequences; and 4) that this uncertainty might easliy promote an undesirable attitude of skeptical relativism. It is perhaps the onslaught of these and other criticisms which prompted McCormick to adopt Finnis' theory of associated basic goods. Lisa Cahill,argues that this new theory constitutes an "abandonment" of McCormick's prior proposal.5 To understand how this new theory leads to inevitable s Richard McCormick, ".Ambiguity in Moral Choice," Doing Evil To Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Oonfiict Situations, eds. R. McCormick and P. Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1978), 45. 4 McCormick, 35-38. 5 Lisa Cahill, "Theology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics," Theologica,I Studies 42/4 (Dec., 1981), 618-24. 58 RONALD H. MCKINNEY, S.J. inconsistency for McCormick, we must first examine Finnis' position itself. Finnis' Theory of Basic Goods By "value," Finnis refers to any " general form of good that oan be participated iin or realized in indefinitely many ways on indefinitely many occasions." 6 Basic values, moreover, refer to ·intrinsic goods that are desired for their own sake (NL, 62, 65). They are good not because they are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE QUEST FOR AN ADEQUATE PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE RoNALD H. McKINNEY, S.J. U'IWversity of Scranton Scranton, Pennsylvania EDWARD VACEK shrewdly observes that proportionalism attempts to synthesize the crucial insights of both the teleologist and the deontologist.1 Indeed, Vacek provides a fine summary of this achievement. However, he reflects that the most underdeveloped feature of proportionalism is its value theory by which we are enabled to know how (...) to resolve conflict situations.2 Richard McCormick, among others, has attempted to meet this deficiency by ·adopting John Finnis' notion of associated basic goods. In this essay, I will show how such an ·approach fails to remain true to the basic aims of proportionalism. Nor should this come as a surprise, since Finnis is himself indebted to one of McCormick's archopponents, Germain Grisez. Moreover, I will attempt to outline the elements involved in a non-hierarchfoal theory of value which I will argue to be the only adequate alternative to McCormick 's attempted solution. Deontologists argue that certain acts are right or wrong regardless of the ·consequences. Proportionalists, however, are opposed to such notions as an " intrinsically evil " act or an "absolute" duty, since they recognize the existence of moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma arises whenever there is a situation in which pre-moral values •are in conflcit, i.e., whatever choice one makes will result in the omission or harm of one or other of the values at stake. According to the proportionl Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," Theological Studies 46/2 (June, 1985), 289. 2 Va.eek, 302. 56 PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE 57 alist reformulation of the principle of double effect, the permission or oausrution of ontic evil is not necessarily a moral evil as long as there is a proportionate reason justifying,such an action, e.g., when a father shoots an!intruder threatening to harm his family. McCormick's initial description of the requirements of proportionate reason [s ias follows: "a) a v1alue at least equal to that sacrificed is at 1 stake; b) there is no less harmful way of protecting ithe value here and now; c) the manner of its protection here and now will not undermine it in the long run." 8 McCormick argues that it simply will not do to claim that the ontic evil permitted or caused in a conflict situation is always only indirectly intended.4 For, in many instances, this simply is not true. Moreover, he would argue that to intend an end is not necess1arily to desire it as deontologists suppose. What justifies the ontic evil resulting from such actions, then, is solely the proportionate reason for which it is allowed or caused. There are some obvious criticisms that have been hurled at this proportionalist proposal for resolving conflict situations: I) that it leaves itself open to the practical, if not theoretical, difficulty of weighing different values;!2) that it results in the possibility of many resolutions that could go counter to our normal moral intuitions; 8) that there exists an inherent fallibility in the calcul,ation of long-range consequences; and 4) that this uncertainty might easliy promote an undesirable attitude of skeptical relativism. It is perhaps the onslaught of these and other criticisms which prompted McCormick to adopt Finnis' theory of associated basic goods. Lisa Cahill,argues that this new theory constitutes an "abandonment" of McCormick's prior proposal.5 To understand how this new theory leads to inevitable s Richard McCormick, ".Ambiguity in Moral Choice," Doing Evil To Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Oonfiict Situations, eds. R. McCormick and P. Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1978), 45. 4 McCormick, 35-38. 5 Lisa Cahill, "Theology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics," Theologica,I Studies 42/4 (Dec., 1981), 618-24. 58 RONALD H. MCKINNEY, S.J. inconsistency for McCormick, we must first examine Finnis' position itself. Finnis' Theory of Basic Goods By "value," Finnis refers to any " general form of good that oan be participated iin or realized in indefinitely many ways on indefinitely many occasions." 6 Basic values, moreover, refer to ·intrinsic goods that are desired for their own sake (NL, 62, 65). They are good not because they are... (shrink)

This book provides the reader with an introduction to important philosophical ideas of Jewish philosophers throughout history.

The title of this book can be understood in at least two ways. First of all, The Word of God and the Mind of Man is an exploration of the extent to which the human mind can receive and understand divine revelation, insofar as this revelation is understood to include the communication of truth. On a second and more fundamental level, the phrase the word of God recalls its classical context -- the prologue to John's Gospel and the classical Logos (...) doctrine of the early church fathers: all human knowledge is possible because of the unique human participation in the eternal Logos of God, Jesus Christ. - Preface. (shrink)

"In an age when objective moorings are being cut loose and experience reigns supreme, we need more than ever to reiterate that the distinctive feature of Christianity is its grounding in history. In this concise, well-written work, a noted philosopher and committed evangelical enables thoughtful readers to grapple with key questions in the relationship between faith and historical understanding and leads them to the awareness of a necessity for commitment to the One who stands behind as well as in history." (...) ? Richard V. Pierard, Professor of History, Indiana State University "Highly recommended." ? Calvin Theological Journal "Professor Nash has given us a lucid exposition of an important subject that should concern both Christian and serious inquirers into the basis of Christianity. He has the gift of making very profound philosophical issues comprehensible to the average reader. His use of quotations and illustrations is most illuminating. I appreciated especially his clear analysis of the existential and naturalistic presuppositions of a key New Testament scholar, Rudolf Bultmann. I will be glad to recommend this volume to undergraduates, graduates, and faculty colleagues." ? Edwin Yamauchi, Former President, Conference on Faith and History Professor, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. (shrink)