Este volumen colectivo se suma al 150 aniversario del fallecimiento de Arthur Schopenhauer, cuyo pensamiento tiene una enorme vigencia siglo y medio después, acaso entre otras muchas cosas por haber querido tender puentes entre categorías occidentales y orientales −una suerte de Buda de Occidente−, al no desdeñar ninguna tradición y oficiar como buen escanciador de autores clásicos e inmisericorde crítico del academicismo carpetovetónico. Este autor figura de manera inequívoca entre los grandes pensadores del ayer con proyección para el mañana. Fue (...) a la par un tábano punzante contra la vulgaridad pública y un promotor de la paideia de la excelencia. El Encuentro internacional celebrado en el Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC propició que se publiquen aquí las contribuciones aportadas por especialistas alemanes, italianos y españoles. La Colección de Clásicos europeos (que dirige Roberto R. Aramayo) pretende rescatar del olvido algunos textos fundamentales para comprender mejor nuestro presente, al poner en valor la impronta que han legado a Europa y al mundo determinados pensadores europeos. Como complemento a esa colección de textos, este volumen sobre Schopenhauer inaugura la serie de Diálogos con Clásicos europeos, que quisiera cumplir en castellano un papel similar al jugado por los Companions filosóficos de Cambridge. Conviene seguir dialogando con ciertos autores que forman parte del entramado de nuestro acervo cultural, pues no en vano el diálogo es condición sine qua non del filosofar. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perelmanian Universal Audience and the Epistemic Aspirations of ArgumentScott F. AikinIThe notion of universality in argumentation is as fecund as is it is controversial. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of universal audience (UA), given their requirement that all arguments be evaluated in terms of their audiences, clearly promises a rich account of argumentative norms. It equally yields a variety of questions. For the most part, the questions come (...) in three forms: what, precisely, is the universal audience; whether it is, in the end, a coherent notion; and how its norms actually constrain argument. Many objections to the notion claim that it is either incoherent or too empty to constrain. My objective here is to provide an account of Perelman’s notion of UA that avoids these objections. I will argue that the UA can be clarified with a distinction between two functions it plays in argumentation— one pragmatic and another epistemic. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not explicitly disambiguate these roles themselves, though they do use the notion in two distinct ways in The New Rhetoric (TNR [1969]), and so it seems clear that although the view in the end may be Perelmanian, it is arguably not Perelman’s. No matter. The purpose of this essay is not to exhume Perelman but to resurrect and exercise his views. That is, historical work in philosophy must straddle the demands of two distinct goals— fidelity to the author in question and defensibility of the views developed. My case [End Page 238] will jointly depend on the comparative plausibility of my account as an interpretation of Perelman’s universal audience and of the view as correct regarding argumentative norms in relation to the other competing interpretations of Perelman’s UA. So if my argument for a divided universal audience is at least Perelmanian in spirit, and if it survives the objections to UA that other interpretations do not survive, it should be the philosophically preferable interpretation.IIThe first principle of Perelmanian rhetoric is that arguments are addressed to audiences for the purpose of inducing or increasing adherence to a view (TNR, 14). Consequently, the less reliant arguments are on a specific audience’s idiosyncratic commitments, the more effective the arguments will be in generating assent and resolving disagreements in wider and wider groups of people. Perelman describes the universal audience in The Realm of Rhetoric (RR [1982]) as “itself... made up of an infinite variety of particular audiences” (14). The UA is the regulative ideal of maximal intersubjective agreement. That is, we see both the relative weakness of arguments that depend on the commitments of particular audiences and “the value attached to opinions that enjoy unanimous approval” (TNR, 31). This unanimity is reached at its highest point in the universal audience. As such, UA is an agglomerative notion that functions as a criterion for how widely an argument may be given credence. Call this trajectory toward unanimity the pragmatic element of UA.However, the universal audience’s assent is used to define facts for arguments, and as such, it is a marker of the objectivity of a conclusion, not just the breadth of the effectiveness of an argument. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca stipulate that “from the standpoint of argumentation, we are confronted with a fact only if we can postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it” (TNR, 67). Facts and truths are defined in terms of the “agreement of the universal audience” (TNR, 67). This, of course, is not to say that arguments make facts but, instead, that their universal acceptability is a criterion for whether some purported fact is or is not the case. Agreement on this level does not play a metaphysical role of explanation but, rather, a cognitive role of justification for taking a commitment as a premise for further argument. The agreement in a universal audience, further, must be uncontroverted, which means that this UA must have some shared commitment that survives scrutiny (or at least is [End Page 239] not defeated): “The agreement of a universal audience is... a matter, not of fact, but of right” (TNR, 31). And further, this right has a very powerful normative element: “Argumentation... (shrink)

Objective To evaluate the modes of death and treatment offered in the last 24 h of life to patients dying in 10 Brazilian intensive care units (ICUs) over a period of 2 years. Design and setting Cross-sectional, multicentre, retrospective study based on medical chart review. The medical records of all patients that died in seven paediatric and three adult ICUs belonging to university and tertiary hospitals over a period of 2 years were included. Deaths in the first 24 h of (...) admission to the ICU and brain death were excluded. Intervention Two intensive care fellows of each ICU were trained in fulfilling a standard protocol (κ=0.9) to record demographic data and all medical management provided in the last 48 h of life. The Student t test, Mann–Whitney U test, χ2 test and RR were used for data comparison. Measurements and main results 1053 medical charts were included (59.4% adult patients). Life support limitation was more frequent in the adult group (86% vs 43.5%; p<0.001). A ‘do not resuscitate’ order was the most common life support limitation in both groups (75% and 66%), whereas withholding/withdrawing were more frequent in the paediatric group (33.9% vs 24.9%; p=0.02). The life support limitation was rarely reported in the medical chart in both groups (52.6% and 33.7%) with scarce family involvement in the decision making process (23.0% vs 8.7%; p<0.001). Conclusion Life support limitation decision making in Brazilian ICUs is predominantly centred on the medical perspective with scarce participation of the family, and consequently several non-coherent medical interventions are observed in patients with life support limitation. (shrink)

The text of the treatise “The Propositional Logic of Boethius” was finished in 1939. Prof. Jan Lukasiewicz wished at that time to issue it in the second volume of “Collectanea Logica”; as a result of political events, he was not able to carry out his plan. In 1938, I published an article in “Erkenntnis” entitled “AUS- sagenlogik im Mittelalter”; this article included the contents of a paper which I read to the International Congress for the Unity of Science in Cambridge, (...) England, in 1938 (Cf. Erkenntnis, vol. 7, pp. 160-168). The subject matter of this paper touched upon that of the above-mentioned treatise. Recently an article of Mr. Rend van den Driessche, “Sur le ‘de syllogismo hypothetico’ de Boece”, was published in the journal “methodos” (vol. I, no. 3). Mr. van den Driessche referred in this article to the article on propositional logic in the middle ages, which had appeared in “Erkenntnis”. This reminded me of my yet-unpublished treatise on the propositional logic of Boethius. (shrink)

La lectura de Rousseau imprime un “giro político” en el pensamiento kantiano y las cuestiones políticas no solo atraviesan toda la “década del silencio”, sino que se hallan presentes en la primera y tercera de sus Críticas. De hecho, Kant dedicará la tercera de sus célebres preguntas a dilucidar esta problemática con su “historia filosófica” o filosofía de la historia. En este contexto se acuña lo que he llamado un imperativo elpidológico, porque la confianza en sí mismo resultará fundamental para (...) no sucumbir al desánimo que suscita el absurdo espectáculo de la historia humana. Los conflictos de nuestras inclinaciones egoístas, el antagonismo de la insociable sociabilidad, servirán para desplegar nuestras mejores disposicio-nes naturales, como si se guiaran por un plan establecido indistintamente por la Naturaleza, la Providencia o el Destino. En definitiva, la política es vista como una condición de posibilidad de nuestra vida moral y no como su corolario. (shrink)

Así como Hume despertó a Kant del sueño dogmático y Rousseau le descubrió el mundo moral, Diderot le habría hecho acceder al universo de la política. El último Kant podría estar muy influido, sin saberlo, por el Diderot que convirtió la Historia de las dos Indias en la "Biblia de las revoluciones", así como por el de la Enciclopedia. Se defiende la tesis de que todo el proyecto ilustrado tendría una índole radical, y conviene matizar la distinción entre Ilustración moderada (...) e Ilustración radical, toda vez que los puntos en común parecen superar a las discrepancias. Spinoza y Heine podrían resultar útiles para enfatizar este parecer. (shrink)

This article describes a descriptive-qualitative method for analyzing and reviewing several textbooks for high school as samples commonly used by teachers and students in their teaching–learning to reveal possible misconceptions. This study focused on the subjects of quantum numbers and electronic configuration. From the advanced literature review to analyze the samples the occurrence of various misconceptions was noted. All textbooks described correctly the four symbols of quantum numbers, but none correlates correctly the magnetic-angular quantum number to the Cartesian labeled orbitals. (...) All textbooks consider mistakenly the meaning of aufbau as the building-up energy of orbitals by following (n + ℓ, n) rules on describing the electronic configuration for all atoms. Only one textbook states that the electronic configuration of transition metal atoms (3d series) can be described in the following order of shell (n), thus giving rise to two types of electronic configurations, [Ar] 3d 4s (Type I) beside [Ar] 4s 3d (Type II), leading further misconception. All textbooks described favorably an unpaired electron of ms = + ½ due to the specific agreement, which is a potential misconception in applying Hund’s rule. In drawing the diagram boxes of orbitals, they are arranged in increasing or decreasing the numeric mℓ, due to the specific agreement, and again leading to a potential misconception on describing the quantum number of electrons issued. Three textbooks introduced the terms of the last and the xth electron associated with the quantum numbers, leading to serious further misconceptions. No books stated that the ordering energy of the (n + ℓ, n) rule is true only for the first twenty atoms. (shrink)

It has often been claimed that without drastic conceptual innovations a genuine explanation of quantum interference effects and quantum randomness is impossible. This book concerns Bohmian mechanics, a simple particle theory that is a counterexample to such claims. The gentle introduction and other contributions collected here show how the phenomena of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle to non-commuting observables, emerge from the Bohmian motion of particles, the natural particle motion associated with Schrödinger's equation. This book will be of (...) value to all students and researchers in physics with an interest in the meaning of quantum theory as well as to philosophers of science. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

The Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides an in-depth article-by-article analysis of all of the Vienna Convention's provisions. Each provision's analysis consists of (I) Purpose and Function of the Article, (II) Historical Background with Negotiating History, (III) Elements of the Article and finally (IV) Treaties of International Organizations. In short, the present Commentary contains a comprehensive legal analysis of all aspects of the international law of treaties. Furthermore, where the law of treaties reaches into other (...) fields of international law, e.g. the law of state responsibility, the relevant interfaces are discussed and contextualized. With its focus on international practice, the Commentary is an invaluable reference for both academia and practitioners of international law. (shrink)

Si no estoy equivocado, nuestro acervo cultural nos hace asociar casi automáticamente a la culpa con un concepto religioso, de raigambre judeocristiana para ser más precisos, mientras que al mismo tiempo tiende a identificar la responsabilidad con una categoría eminentemente jurídica. La culpa se presenta como algo estrechamente vinculado con el pecado y la religión o, a lo sumo, con el psicoanálisis, en tanto que la responsabilidad suele circunscribirse de oficio al ámbito del derecho penal o relacionarse protocolariamente con la (...) esfera política. Sin embargo, aunque las palabras «culpa» y «responsabilidad» no se prodiguen demasiado en los diccionarios consagrados a la ética, sí constituyen conceptos claves de la reflexión moral. Mi propósito aquí es presentarlos como dimensiones o vertientes complementarias de nuestra conciencia. Desde luego, cualquiera puede asumir una determinada responsabilidad sin sentirse culpable y, a la inversa, siempre hay quien prefiere regodearse con su sentimiento de culpabilidad sin sentirse responsable por la causa del mismo, pero lo suyo es que ambas nociones vayan de consuno y la culpa sea un síntoma de responsabilidad o que atender a las propias responsabilidades ahuyente cualquier asomo de culpabilidad por nuestra parte. (shrink)

Aquí se presenta la primera traducción española del texto kantiano Sobre el mal radical tratado como el artículo que fue originalmente publicado en una revista y, por consiguiente, no tanto como el primer capítulo de La Religión dentro de los límites de la sola razón. Se intenta hacer ver que, tal como cuando trata el argumento moral sobre la existencia de Dios, Kant nos habla del ateo virtuoso como héroe moral de su formalismo ético, aquí la religión sólo sirve para (...) dibujar mejor los contornos de las piezas claves del pensamiento ético kantiano: la libertad y la responsabilidad o imputabilidad moral, que constituyen el auténtico credo kantiano y sólo se dejan asociar con una fe “reflexiva”. (shrink)

We trace here the layout of Cassirer’s intellectual itinerary, highlightning the growing political commitment in his thought as he faces the national socialist ideology from the vantage point of history of ideas and his philosophy of the symbolic forms, invoking in this sense the spirit of Enlightenment in general and Kant in a very particular way as well. Cassirer’s ideological rebuttal of Nazism begins in 1928 with his hommage to the Weimar Republic and reaches up to 1945 with The Myth (...) of State. Here however it is presented an interpretation of the dangerously moral meaning that Judaism had for the totalitarian ideology of National Socialism. (shrink)