Uma exegese filosófica da problemática do niilismo na obra de Cioran, partindo de uma análise lexicográfica dos usos discursivos deste conceito, mas sem se limitar a ele (que está longe de ter um estatuto privilegiado no discurso cioraniano). Levando em conta a reviravolta que marca uma cisão no âmago da obra de Cioran, na transição entre seus escritos romenos e franceses, e combinando à lexicografia um procedimento propriamente hermenêutico do tema do niilismo, conclui-se com uma reflexão sobre o nexo entre (...) niilismo e humor na obra francesa de Cioran, notadamente em Silogismos da amargura (1952), em contraste com o niilismo da “seriedade infinita” (sinônimo de desespero) que caracteriza a sua obra romena. (shrink)

The choice of coping style of recruits under psychological stress in the process of military task execution has been an important topic in the promotion of military operations and cohesion of military forces. Taking a positive coping style under psychological stress can help recruits overcome the negative effects of stress and improve military morale and group combat effectiveness. Although soldiers' psychological stress in the process of military mission execution having an impact on coping style has been studied by a large (...) body of literature, very little literature has focused on the mechanism of self-efficacy and social support between recruits' psychological stress and coping style from the person-environment fit perspective. Therefore, this study was conducted to analyze the impact of recruits' psychological stress on coping style through a chain mediation model and to discuss the role of self-efficacy and social support in this relationship. Two waves of survey data were utilized to test the research hypotheses on a sample of 1028 Chinese recruits performing military tasks. The results indicated that recruits' psychological stress negatively impacted positive coping styles and positively correlated with negative ones. In addition, self-efficacy and social support mediated the relationship between psychological stress and positive coping style, and self-efficacy mediated the relationship between psychological stress and negative coping style. More importantly, self-efficacy and social support play the chain mediating effect between psychological stress and positive coping style. (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was active during the Renaissance, developing adventurous ideas even while serving as a churchman. The religious issues with which he engaged - spiritual, apocalyptic and institutional - were to play out in the Reformation. These essays reflect the interests of Cusanus but also those of Gerald Christianson, who has studied church history, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The book places Nicholas into his times but also looks at his later reception. The first part addresses institutional (...) issues, including Schism, conciliarism, indulgences and the possibility of dialogue with Muslims. The second treats theological and philosophical themes, including nominalism, time, faith, religious metaphor, and prediction of the end times. (shrink)

Volume 1. Muqaddimāt fī al-tazkiyah -- volume 2. Tazkiyat al-ʻaql wa-al-fikr -- volume 3. Tazkiyat al-jasad -- volume 4, part 1-2. al-Akhlāq wa-al-ādāb -- volume 5. Tazkiyat al-qalb --.

Memoirs of Saʻīd Pīshdād, 1955 or 1956-; school administrators professional ethics, Iran.

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modeled as a propositional function, that is, (...) the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself, but rather the vehicle of content, that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of experience (...) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are _transparent_ in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, I aim to show (...) that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads, after we learn of what is going on outside. In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no _de re_ awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation-words; for example, I am never aware _of _the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensation is always _de dicto_. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned _that _ blue is the color that usually causes in us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by constraints of content-attribution that pull in opposite directions, namely, the so-called cognitive significance requirement and what I would like to call here the same representing constraint. The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism. In CPR, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather is a term of art that semanticists use, as a matter (...) of theoretical convenience, to classify mental states. What follows from CPR is Content-pluralism : there is no such a thing as the content of experience. Because both criticisms and the defense of SNC overlook CPR and CP, they are ineffective. In this paper, I will argue that the opposition between SNC and CNC is a real one, but only a relative one, that is, relative to the opposite constraints to be met, namely CSR and SRR. If we want to meet CSR, the best we can do is to let the content of experience be modeled as neo-Fregean content, namely a compound of non-conceptual modes of presentation of objects and properties. In this case, CNC prevails. In contrast, if we want to meet SRR, the best we can do is let the content of experience be modeled either as a Russellian compound of objects and properties or as a function from possible worlds to truth-values. In this case, SNC prevails. (shrink)

Duas questões fundamentais do pirronismo serão abordadas, a primeira é de natureza histórica: seria tal Neopirronismo congruente com o espírito e a letra do Pirronismo original? Nesse particular a resposta não poderia ser mais afirmativa. Distinguindo-se tanto chamada leitura dita “Urbana” quanto da leitura dita “Rústica,” não há como negar originalidade à leitura Neopirrônica. Ora, mas uma vez que Neopirronismo se assume como projeto filosófico próprio, ele enfrenta uma segunda questão premente: ele se sustentaria pelas suas próprias pernas? A tentativa (...) de apresentar uma resposta negativa no artigo encontra inspiração em três grandes fontes, são elas: Kant, Wittgenstein e Kripke/Putnam. (shrink)

The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it. In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume another (...) bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and non-mental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates non-linguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Self-consciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the so-called phenomenal-concept strategy, based on a new view of phenomenal concepts as special de re modes of presentation of the phenomenal character of experience. Phenomenal concepts can be explained in physical terms as mental particulars created in the individual's mind to pick out the phenomenal character of experience by representing certain physical properties as those represented by the experiences themselves . They are individuated by two fundamental relations: the perceptual relation the creature bears (...) to the physical properties represented by its own experience and the relation the creature bears to itself as the subject undergoing those experiences. Mary's newly acquired phenomenal le presents the phenomenal character of her new experience of red by means of the new relation she bears to herself as the creature standing in the experiential relation to the color red. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint, that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans, which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to support in this (...) paper is the following: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue--based on Evans’s Generality Constraint--that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguistic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I maintain--relying on Bermudez’s Constraint--that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self-reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke, I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, between self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of nonconceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states. (shrink)

A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.

As members of the Working Group on Genetic Testing in Disability Insurance, the authors of this alternative opinion describe their areas of disagreement with some of the conclusions in the paper written by Susan M. Wolf and Jeffrey P. Kahn.

Bringsjord and Licato provide a general meta-argument that cyberwarfare is so different from traditional kinetic warfare that no argument from analogy can allow the just war theory of Augustine and Aquinas to be pulled over from traditional warfare to cyberwarfare. I believe that this meta-argument is sound and that it applies not just to cyberwarfare: in particular, on my reading of the meta-argument, argument from analogy has never been adequate to allow JWT to be applied to the kind of warfare (...) that we are familiar with now. (shrink)

In Testo Junkie, Preciado briefly introduces the figure of the ‘techno-Barbie’. Contrasted with his own Testogel-fuelled pornographic experiments, the possibilities of oestrogen or progesterone seem somewhat uncharitably foreclosed upon. Though Preciado draws our attention to the gendered politics of chemical enhancement and hormonal justice, it begs the question: where do we draw the line between experimentation and chemical domination? We engage with the figure of the techno-Barbie to explore our own experiments with hormones and gendered agency in the boundaries of (...) advanced biocapitalism. Drawing on a range of allied texts, we explore the ambivalences of our own hormonal experimentation. What kinds of hormonal experiments are allowed to be cast as such? In response to this all-encompassing theory of domination, we ask: how might the techno-Barbie speak back? (shrink)

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was one of the most original thinkers of the Renaissance. This collection examines, from several viewpoints, his speculative thought and reviews his ideas on dialogue with non- Christians in the light of his theories. The articles originated in papers presented at several conferences sponsored by the American Cusanus Society, 1981-1988. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This article discusses the disability insurance industry in order to provide context regarding the potential impact of genetic testing on disability insurance. It describes disability income insurance, exploring both the protection it offers and its main contract provisions. It goes on to describe the private insurance market and the differences between group and individual insurance, and concludes with implications of genetic testing with respect to the private disability insurance market.