Although Brandom is critical of some features of narrowly conceived classical pragmatism, at the same time he explicitly embraces a version of pragmatism, both in his overall philosophical outlook, and in his philosophy of language. Brandom’s distinctive theoretical approach is based on what he calls rationalist pragmatism, which is a version of fundamental pragmatism. Within the philosophy of language it takes the form of semantic pragmatism. The paper briefly discusses Brandomian version of fundamental pragmatism and its semantic underpinning, and subsequently (...) formulates a basic dilemma it encounters there. (shrink)

Spirituality and spiritual well-being are connected with many areas of human life. Thus, especially in secular countries, there is a need for reliable validated instruments for measuring spirituality. The Spiritual Well-Being Scale is among the world’s most often used tools; therefore, the aim of this study was its psychometrical evaluation in the secular environment of the Czech Republic on a nationally representative sample (n = 1797, mean age: 45.9 ± 17.67; 48.6% men). A non-parametric comparison of different sociodemographic groups showed (...) a higher disposition for experiencing spirituality among women, older people, and divorced persons. Based on confirmatory factor analysis, negatively worded items were excluded using a polychoric correlation matrix. The new version of the scale consisting of 11 items had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.85; McDonald’s ωt = 0.91). The two-factor model of this shortened version, with factors corresponding to the Religious and the Existential subscales of the Spiritual Well-Being Scale, shows a satisfactory fit with the data, where the loadings of all items ranged from medium to high. Thus, this study offered a new version of the tool, convenient for measuring spiritual well-being in secular conditions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of inconsistencies in the metaphorical conceptualizations of time that involve motion within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). It demonstrates that the TIME AS A PURSUER metaphor contrasts with the reverse variant TIME AS AN OBJECT OF PURSUIT, just as the MOVING TIME metaphor contrasts with the MOVING OBSERVER variant. Such metaphorical conceptualizations of time functioning as pairs of minimally differing variants based on Figure-Ground reversal are, strictly speaking, inconsistent with one another. Looking at (...) these inconsistencies from a wider perspective suggests that time may belong to a separate category of conceptual phenomena. This paper puts forward a proposal to approach time from the perspective of “phenomena of the third kind”, which according to Keller’s thesis include conceptual establishments resulting from human cognition, but not of human design. (shrink)

Ramowy Katalog Kompetencji Cyfrowych Justyna Jasiewicz, Mirosław Filiciak, Anna Mierzecka, Kamil Śliwowski, Andrzej Klimczuk, Małgorzata Kisilowska, Alek Tarkowski & Jacek Zadrożny Centrum Cyfrowe Projekt: Polska (2015) .

The Framework Catalogue of Digital Competences Justyna Jasiewicz, Mirosław Filiciak, Anna Mierzecka, Kamil Śliwowski, Andrzej Klimczuk, Małgorzata Kisilowska, Alek Tarkowski & Jacek Zadrożny Centrum Cyfrowe Projekt: Polska (2015) .

Henryk Elzenberg, a Polish axiologist, existentialist wrote about loneliness in the 30 contexts of the soul, virtues, protection, culturalization and personality, etc. He bases the negative image of loneliness on the identification of deficits, and the positive one on the identification of their transcendence (love, freedom, salvation). My text is an attempt to reconstruct the philosophy of loneliness on the basis of the book Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu, 1907–1963 [Trouble with Existence. Aphorisms in the Order of Time].

Artykuł dotyczy rozumienia pojęć „zdrowie” i „choroba” w medycynie, psychologii i kulturoznawstwie. Jest próbą odejścia od technicznego sposobu analiz chorób jako zjawisk deficytowych, powstających w strukturze ciała i psychiki ludzkiej oraz w relacjach społecznych i wzorach kulturowych opartych na eliminacjonistycznej teorii. Autor traktuje zdrowie jako wynik gry między procesami życiowymi, w których suma jest dodatnia, a chorobę jako grę tych samych procesów, w których suma jest ujemna. Zdrowie i choroba są traktowane jako trwałe składniki kondycji ludzkiej, jednakowe dla wszystkich, różnicują (...) je tylko indywidualne dyspozycje i warunki życia biologicznego, psychologicznego czy społecznego. (shrink)

Tekst dotyczy trzech koncepcji doświadczenia religijnego: K. Dąbrowskiego, J. Fowlera i K. Osera. Swoje uzasadnienie znajdują one w psychologii rozwoju osobowości i nie są zależne od konkretnej historycznej religii lub teorii religii. Doświadczenie religijne opisywane jest za pomocą modelu rozwoju wielopoziomowego, rozwoju stadialnego i rozwoju orientacji religijnej. Ich kryteriami są postawy, wartości i świadomość, które kształtują się wraz z rozwojem poznawczym i moralnym człowieka, natomiast źródeł metodologicznych można szukać w teoriach rozwoju osobowości J. Piageta i E. Eriksona, L. Kohlberga.

Autor przedstawia poglądy Hazimierza Dąbrowskiego na temat charakteru narodowego jako kategorii określającej strukturę i cechy tożsamości jednostkowej i zbiorowej. Polski psychiatra i psychoterapeuta egzystencjalny H. Dąbrowski wyodrębnił pozytywne i negatywne cechy „charakteru narodowego” Polaków w oparciu o typologie charak- terów E. Kretschmera i własna koncepcje typów nadpobudliwości psychicznej. Autor tek- stu za pomocą pojęcia „człowieczeństwo” weryfikuje przedstawiane tezy psychologiczne, dochodząc do wniosku, ze pojęcie „charakter narodowy” można zaliczysz do zespołu mechanizmów obronnych ego w takim sensie, jak rozumie je współczesna psychoanaliza.

Mój tekst przedstawia koncepcję twórczości polskiego neuropsychiatry, Kazimierza Dąbrowskiego (1902-1980), twórcy teorii dezintegracji pozytywnej. Autor ten zakładał, że rozwój psychiczny człowieka ma charakter twórczy. Podmiotem twórczości jest jaźń (osobowość), która jest wynikiem rozwoju pięciu się pięciu typów wrażeń i percepcji – sensytywnej, ruchowej, wyobrażeniowej, intelektualnej i emocjonalnej. Typ wzmożonej pobudliwości psychicznej decyduje o rodzaju twórczości. Niektóre tezy teorii dezintegracji pozytywnej konfrontuję z badaniami mózgu dokonanymi przez Antonio Damasio.

Henryk Elzenberg, a Polish axiologist, existentialist wrote about loneliness in the 30 contexts of the soul, virtues, protection, culturalization and personality, etc. He bases the negative image of loneliness on the identification of deficits, and the positive one on the identification of their transcendence (love, freedom, salvation). My text is an attempt to reconstruct the philosophy of loneliness on the basis of the book Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu, 1907–1963 [Trouble with Existence. Aphorisms in the Order of Time].

In the book Kłopot z istnieniem.[The Trouble with the Existence (1963).Ed. Toruń 2002] Henryk Elzenberg formulates valuable philosophical remarks about suffering. I present them here as “statements”. They provoke many questions defining here as „problems”.At the end in appendix I confront briefly the epistemological position of Elzenberg with that postulated by Jan Srzednicki in the book Kłopoty pojęciowe [Notional Troubles], Warszawa 1993.

The incidence of obesity, defined as the fraction of persons with BMIs exceeding 30·0, was examined in two birth cohorts of 401996 decade obesity increased dramatically among males with trade school education only; concomitant shifts were much smaller or absent in the college-educated groups. The contrast in obesity between the opposite ends of the educational scale has widened markedly in both genders; and the between-gender gap has declined somewhat.

Целью работы является дискуссия одного иа основных моральных аспектов проблематики этичных ценностей: вопросы самооценки человека. Статья начинается о короткого обсуждения различных способов иоаиманкя ценности, после чего автор говорит об основных проблемах поддавая их дальнейшему обсуждению. Прйдстпелена экспликация понятия самооценки человека и связанных с ним дел с особым учётом творческой активности, благодаря которой человек самореализуется, морально утверждается и совсра<истeyeтая.

Most current theories of meaning and mental content accept externalism. One of its forceful exponents is Ruth Garrett Millikan. She argues that externalism leads to the abandonment of "the last myth of the given", that is, of the idea that identity of meaning and mental content is somehow unproblematically given to us, and that we can easily recognize the sameness of meaning and mental content. If one refuses such a "mythical" giveness or meaning rationalism, one has to admit that there (...) is no logical possibility known a priori . The paper tries to show that even if one abandons meaning rationalism one can still hold that there are logical possibilities known a priori . The claim is defended by arguing that a priori knowledge is not completely independent from experience and does not demand the absolute transparency of meaning from the first-person point of view. A priori knowledge requires only a priori justification, that is, such a justification that is based merely on relations between meanings or contents. (shrink)

One of the main differences between Quine’s and Davidson’s theories of knowledge and mind lies in their accounts of the content of perception and the way in which it contributes to our knowledge of the external world. Both thinkers are very sensitive to these differences and it has been the subject of discussion between them in recent publications. To put it very roughly, Quine holds firmly to the position that although we finally manage to get veridical knowledge of the external (...) world, the content of our perceptions are just the triggerings of our sense receptors that give us reliable clues about the objects and happenings in our environment. Davidson considers this view to be a naturalized successor of an older defective empiricism which should be abandoned. In its place he proposes an externalist theory of perceptual content, according to which content is fully determined or constituted by the objects and events in the external world. This move, among other things, bypasses many of the troubles that Quine’s approach faces and gives a solid ground for our intersubjective communication. In other words, if the central concern of Quine’s epistemological project is epistemology naturalized, so the central concern of Davidson’s corresponding project is epistemology externalised. (shrink)

It is quite widely assumed that at the beginning of his career Richard Rorty was an orthodox analytic philosopher, working in its then current mainstream, and especially fascinated by the linguistic turn taken by this tradition. Subsequently he supposedly radically and dramatically changed his views, turning himself from a staunch analytic philosophers into a vigorous critic of the analytic tradition and ultimately paradigmatically postmodern and continental thinker. It is argued in the paper that this common picture exaggerates changes in Rorty’s (...) philosophical views. He certainly has never become fully postmodern and continental philosopher, whatever it means. And what seems more important, he always had a lot of reservations about analytic philosophy and had less hopes of it than one or two passages from his early writings suggest. (shrink)

One of the most interesting forms of antirealism developed in recent years is the irrealism of Nelson Goodman. According to that position, the widely held belief that there is one real world and one way the world is, and that the aim of our inquiry is to provide a true description of that world, is mistaken. We should not envisage our cognitive activity as involving recognition and description of the unique structure of the world, but rather as engaged in construction (...) of various world versions. It should also be admitted that in this process we, in some important and nontrivial sense, make worlds corresponding to those versions. That is to say, this version of irrealism combines a constructionalist account of our knowledge with radical ontological pluralism. Such a view certainly leads to a relativism of some sort, but Goodman thinks that this is not the relativism of “anything goes” type, since construction and acceptance of world versions is constrained by some standards of rightness. (shrink)

Terry Horgan has put forward an original account of truth as correct assertibility. That statement suggests that he defends some version of the epistemic conception of truth. However, this is not his intention. Horgan wants to overcome the familiar opposition between the robust correspondence theories of truth and the epistemic theories of truth by elaborating an intermediate or middle-of-the-road position. After presenting the main ideas of that position, I argue that it is less distinctive than Horgan maintains, and may be (...) accommodated to the epistemic theories of truth, provided they are construed widely enough. (shrink)

The realism debate concerns the relationship of our beliefs, thoughts and language to the world or universe, and hence involves a number of fundamental questions ranging from metaphysics through epistemology to semantics and philosophy of language. While a few philosophers take it as an inevitable feature of the debate and try to advance it by coping simultaneously with all those questions, a number of others insists that the approach of this kind leads merely to confusions and misunderstandings. They usually suggest (...) that the metaphysical or ontological aspects of it should be kept separate from such epistemological and semantic issues as the possibility of absolute knowledge, the correspondence theory of truth, or the truth-conditional theory of meaning. In other words, there is such a thing as pure or simple metaphysical realism that may be endorsed and defended, or undermined and rejected. The aim of the paper is to raise some doubts about that metaphilosophical strategy, and to argue that the comprehensive approach to the realism debate, in which the metaphysical issues are combined with - at least - some epistemological matters, is not so much caused by confusions and misunderstandings, but forced, as it were, by its subject matter and the philosophical nature of the debate. (shrink)

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by (...) the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis. (shrink)