Originally published in 1990. Examining epistemic justification, truth and logic, this book works towards a holistic theory of knowledge. It discusses evidence, belief, reliability and many philosophical theories surrounding the nature of true knowledge. A thorough Preface updates the main work from when it was written in 1976 to include theories ascendant in the ‘80s.

The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...) middle or the law of noncontradiction in logic or certainty-reductions to the certainties of probabilist epistemology. The author proposes special and general versions of the MERF principle and uses them to explain the examples, including the reasoning that would lead to thoroughgoing fallibilism—that is, to a state of being certain of nothing. The author responds to the main defenses of probabilism: Dutch Book arguments, Joyce’s potential accuracy defense, and the potential calibration defenses of Shimony and van Fraassen by showing that, even though they do not satisfy the probability axioms, degrees of belief that satisfy the MERF principle minimize expected inaccuracy in Joyce’s sense; they can be externally calibrated in Shimony and van Fraassen’s sense; and they can serve as a basis for rational betting, unlike probabilist degrees of belief, which, in many cases, human beings have no rational way of ascertaining. The author also uses the MERF principle to subsume the various epistemic akrasia principles in the literature. Finally, the author responds to Titelbaum’s argument that epistemic akrasia principles require that we be certain of some epistemological beliefs, if we are rational. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport is a landmark publication in sport studies. It goes further than any book has before in tracing the contours of the discipline of the philosophy of sport and in surveying the core themes, approaches and theories that form its disciplinary fabric. The book explores the ways in which an understanding of philosophy can inform our understanding of important prevailing issues in sport. Edited by two of the most significant figures in the development (...) of the philosophy of sport, Mike McNamee and Bill Morgan, and with contributions from many of the world’s leading sport philosophers, this is an invaluable companion reference volume for any course in the social scientific study of sport, and an essential addition to the bookshelf of any serious scholar of the philosophy and/or ethics of sport. (shrink)

A critical study of John Searle's Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

Stace and others maintain that mystical consciousness reveals the identity of selves and, therefore, provides a justification for altruism. Zaehner argues that some types of mystical consciousness apparently reveal the identity of such opposites as good and evil, and Danto holds that mystical consciousness involves a transcendence of all distinctions, including moral distinctions. Thus, for both Zaehner and Danto mysticism undercuts morality. The author attempts to show that these positions are defective and suggests that there are no important epistemic or (...) logical connections between mystical consciousness and morality. (shrink)

The ‘default mode’ network refers to cortical areas that are active in the absence of goal-directed activity. In previous studies, decreased activity in the ‘default mode’ has always been associated with increased activation in task-relevant areas. We show that the induction of hypnosis can reduce anterior default mode activity during rest without increasing activity in other cortical regions. We assessed brain activation patterns of high and low suggestible people while resting in the fMRI scanner and while engaged in visual tasks, (...) in and out of hypnosis. High suggestible participants in hypnosis showed decreased brain activity in the anterior parts of the default mode circuit. In low suggestible people, hypnotic induction produced no detectable changes in these regions, but instead deactivated areas involved in alertness. The findings indicate that hypnotic induction creates a distinctive and unique pattern of brain activation in highly suggestible subjects. (shrink)

Symbols in computer programs are not necessarily isomorphic in form or capability to neural processes. Representations in our models are stored descriptions of the world and human behavior, created by a human interpreter; representations in the brain are neither immutable forms nor encoded in some language. Although the term " symbol " can be usefully applied to describe words, smoke signals, neural maps, and graphic icons, a science of symbol processing requires distinguishing between the structural, developmental, and interactive nature of (...) different forms of representing. (shrink)

In this comment I discuss the role of an ethics case consultant in an institutional setting, in contrast to situations when an ethics consultant serves an individual client. In the former situation, I believe the case consultant should articulate ethical issues, options, and arguments, but not recommend a particular course of conduct. In the latter situation, the role of the ethics consultant can be defined and determined in negotiations with the client.

The purpose of this study is to assess the intention of typically developing peers towards learning in the classroom with students with Autism Spectrum Disorder. In developing countries, such as Ghana, the body of literature on the relationship between students with disabilities and typically developing peers has been sparsely studied. Using Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour as a theoretical framework for this study, 516 typically developing students completed four scales representing belief constructs, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural controls, hypothesised (...) to predict behavioural intention. The data were subjected to a t-test, analysis of variance, and structural equation modelling. The modelling confirmed the combining ability of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural controls to predict intention. We conclude by revealing the need for policymakers to consider designing programmes aimed towards promoting social relationships between students with ASD and typically developing peers. (shrink)

Whether we are morally obligated to obey the law is the central question addressed by Joseph Raz in his most recent work entitled, The Authority of Law. It is a question which divides positivists from natural law adherents. Professor Raz, a self-proclaimed positivist, concludes that “there is no general moral obligation to obey [the law], not even in a good society.” Rather, for Raz he individual must obey the law only if he respects it. “His respect,” says Raz, “is the (...) source of obligation,” leading one to conclude that for Raz the authority of law is the individual. The question of whether we are morally bound to obey the law is not a novel one; foremost among those who have addressed it are Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Each does so, it is important to note, in terms of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of government, which, in turn, is based upon a correct understanding of the nature of man and human happiness. The law of an illegitimate government, argues St. Thomas, “since it is not in accordance with reason, is not a law absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law.”. (shrink)

Vernunft und Glaube, Wissenschaft und Religion stehen keineswegs in einem Gegensatz. Trotz der abweisenden Haltung, die Säkularität gegenüber der Religion an den Tag legt, sind fundamentale Überzeugungen des säkularen Bewusstseins unverkennbar theologischer Natur, viele haben gar eine spezifisch christliche Prägung: Begriffe wie Verantwortung, Gewissens- und Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Toleranz und Volkssouveränität, Menschenwürde und Wirklichkeit beispielsweise tragen eine religiöse Signatur. Wenn uns auch heute oft verborgen, so steht doch die aufgeklärte Vernunft auf einem theologischen Fundament, das diese trägt. Genauere begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen belegen das. (...) Nur durch solche Vergewisserungen, die den Sinn von Begriffen erschließen, erlangt der Mensch inmitten der Brave New World seine innere Freiheit. (shrink)

Lachen ist eine alltägliche und doch zugleich rätselhafte Erscheinung. In ihr verbirgt sich ein tieferer Sinn, der sich bei näherem Hinsehen mit dem von Religion deckt. Das ist den meisten Menschen kaum bewusst. Lachen hebt den Widerspruch, der sich im Komischen zeigt, auf eine höhere Ebene. Es löst den Widerspruch nicht auf, aber stellt ihn mit Wohlwollen in den Zusammenhang eines umfassenden Ganzen, wobei Negatives, auch das Leid, darin eingeschlossen wird. Als Leitmotiv der in diesem Buch durchgeführten Auseinandersetzung mit Denkern (...) der Geschichte und Gegenwart dient die originelle Eschatologie Dantes in der Göttlichen Komödie, insbesondere das Lachen der Beatrice. Dostojevskis 'Idiot' Fürst Myshkin wird als Narr um Christi willen untersucht. Themen wie Karneval, das Osterlachen, der Narr, Drolerien, die Carmina burana und das Narrenschiff werden u. a. behandelt. (shrink)

Im Folgenden werde ich die These darlegen, dass die Idee von der ‚Verantwortung für das Ganze‘ fast zwangsläufig Gewalt hervorbringt. Die Wirklichkeit lässt sich nicht auf diese Weise einfangen. Richard Schaeffler hat es zutreffend gesagt: „Der ‚je größere‘ Anspruch des Wirklichen wird sich dadurch geltend machen, dass keine Weise des Anschauens, des Wahrnehmens, des Erfahrens und Begreifens ihm endgültig Genüge tut.“.

Locus equations fail to provide adequate abstraction to capture the English phoneme /g/. They also cannot characterize final consonants or their relation to pre-vocalic consonants. However, locus equations are approximately abstract enough to define the upper limit on phonological distinctions for place of articulation. Hence, locus equations seem to mediate phonetic and phonological perceptual abilities.