The lifting of lockdown is a typical case of the tragedy of the commons, and as such should be regulated by public authority, instead of being left to the ethics and responsibility of single individuals. I would therefore argue that we should think about an intermediate phase between the lockdown and the opening of shops (which in the Italian case is the transition from the red zone to the orange zone): diversified access to commercial activities, on an hourly basis, for (...) different population groups. This can be achieved either by creating different opening hours for different commercial activities and offices, or by opening them all at the same time but introducing free entrance hours based on age groups of clients. Both solutions would imply an extension of business and office hours, contrary to what has happened in most countries, where an attempt has been made to shorten the days and in some cases, such as in Italy, a curfew has even been introduced at a certain time of the day (in Italy, at 10 pm). (shrink)

Resumen: Husserl propone una teoría sobre la intersubjetividad que parte de la conciencia trascendental como inserta en el mundo de la vida donde están los otros y donde la comunidad se construye bajo una estructura de esencias que garantiza la comunalidad. El mundo de la vida es dado y compartido por todas las conciencias intencionales y trascendentales, es condición para intuiciones empíricas y eidéticas, la epoché y las reducciones eidética y trascendental. Cada momento del método fenomenológico se basa en la (...) existencia de un mundo de la vida independiente de la subjetividad. En este mundo, hay objetos reales y, entre estos, los otros, reconocidos por analogía a través de la empatía. Desde una perspectiva metodológico-epistemológico, el yo es anterior al mundo y a los otros yos. El yo constituye, en sentido fenomenológico, la realidad. La conciencia es el lugar de evidenciación de la realidad. No obstante, en la perspectiva ontológica, es lo contrario. El mundo de la vida es anterior a la conciencia individual. El mundo de la vida está ahí, disponible, existente, independiente del sujeto, funcionando con su propio orden, con sus leyes y reglas. Es el yo el que esta insertado en el mundo de la vida y que se esfuerza por desvendarlo. La realidad se impone y el yo es, sobre todo, miembro de una comunidad de otros yos. Aun así, ¿cómo compartir las experiencias? Las vivencias pueden ser diferentes, pero hay un límite en las variaciones, un límite dado por la esencia del objeto vivido y por las leyes que rigen las relaciones de tal objeto. Así, la constitución del mundo y de sus objetos está permanentemente en progreso. Es posible donarles nuevos sentidos, en los límites de su esencia. Para Husserl, la constitución comunal del mundo es la condición de posibilidad para la existencia de sujetos separados unos de los otros, y este entendimiento recíproco solo es posible a través de la constitución trascendental de la objetividad. Así, no hay una separación entre la intersubjetividad y la constitución del mundo, es la comunidad de yos la que dona sentidos a las objetividades. En el mundo de la vida con los otros en comunidad. -/- Abstract: Husserl proposes a theory on intersubjectivity that starts from transcendental consciousness as inserted in the lifeworld where the others and where the community are built under a structure of essences that guarantees communality. The lifeworld is given and shared by all intentional and transcendental consciousnesses, it is a condition for empirical and eidetic intuitions, the epoché and the eidetic and transcendental reductions. Every moment of the phenomenological method is based on the existence of a lifeworld independent of subjectivity. In this world, there are real objects and, among these, the others, recognized by analogy through empathy. From a methodologicalepistemological perspective, the self is prior to the world and the other selves. The self constitutes, in a phenomenological sense, reality. Consciousness is the locus of evidence of reality. However, from the ontological perspective, it is the opposite. The lifeworld is prior to individual consciousness. The lifeworld is there, available, existing, independent of subjectivity, functioning with its own order, with its laws and rules. It is the self that is inserted in the lifeworld and that strives to unveil it. Reality prevails and the self is, above all, a member of a community of other selves. Even so, how to share the experiences? The experiences can be different, but there is a limit in variations, a limit given by the essence of the lived object and by the laws that govern the relation of the object. Thus, the constitution of the world and its objects is permanently in progress. It is possible to give them new meanings, within the limits of their essence. For Husserl, the communal constitution of the world is the condition of possibility for the existence of subjects separated from each other, and this reciprocal understanding is only possible through the transcendental constitution of objectivity. therefore, there is no separation between intersubjectivity and the constitution of the world, it is the community of selves that gives meaning to objectivities. (shrink)

En este trabajo consideramos los discursos políticos y económicos actuales proponiendo el fenómeno start-up como el síntoma de un cambio profundo en la gubernamentalidad neoliberal y un nuevo episodio en la larga historia de las prácticas de organización de la fuerza de trabajo, de su gobierno y movilización. Nos basamos en los textos de Michel Foucault y en la literatura neomanagerial actual para analizar las recientes transformaciones de la racionalidad neoliberal. Con este punto de partida, proponemos que el emprendedor neoliberal (...) del yo, el empresario de sí mismo, tal y como lo concibió Foucault, se está transformando, además, en una especie de inversor de sí mismo administrando permanentemente sus activos personales y buscando constantemente la autoevaluación y la autovalorización en la lógica del rendimiento.In this paper we consider the political and economic discourses hyping the «start-up phenomenon» as the symptom of a deep change in neoliberal governmentality and a new episode in the long history of the practices of workforce government and mobilisation. After pointing out the recent transformations of neoliberal rationality of government, we concentrate on the forms of subjectification implied by what could be defined as the start-up subject: the typically neoliberal entrepreneur of the self is thus transforming into a sort of investor of the self permanently managing his personal assets and incessantly searching for self-evaluation and self-valorisation. (shrink)

E n e l a r tícul o s e aborda n lo s pro b lema s d e l e gitimació n qu e plantea n la s nu ev a s fo r mas d e r e gulació n qu e s e asocia n co n l a “gobe r nanza ” com o model o d e ejercici o de l poder distint o a l “gobie r no” . Ant e l a crisi (...) s d e lo s criterio s tradicionale s d e l e gitimida d anclados e n e l model o representat ivo d e la s democracia s d e lo s Estado-nación , l a gobe r nanz a se reclam a com o un a fo r m a d e gobie r n o n o sol o má s e f ica z e n té r mino s d e gobe r nabilida d de l a complejida d d e l a socieda d globalizad a d e nuestro s días , sin o tambié n má s democrática po r e l pape l qu e atribu ye a l a deliberació n y a l a pa r ticipació n d e actore s pr iv ado s y pa r tes interesada s e n e l proces o d e tom a d e decisiones . E n pa r ticula r , s e analiza n la s apo r taciones pr o v eniente s d e Estado s Unido s de l llamad o “ e xperimentalism o democrático ” o “polia r quía deliberat iva directa ” y s u pa r ticula r influenci a e n e l ámbit o d e l a Unió n Europea , e n cu yo sen o la s nu ev a s fo r ma s d e gobe r nanz a y d e e xperimentalism o democrátic o —cas o del “métod o abie r t o d e coordinación” — s e ha n presentad o com o l a estrat e gi a má s adecuada par a afronta r e l pro b lem a crónic o de l dé f ici t democrátic o d e l a polític a y de l derech o co- munitario . A pesa r d e la s sugerente s promesa s democráticas , e l auto r present a la s paradojas y riesgo s e n té r mino s d e l e gitimida d democrátic a d e esta s nu ev a s fo r ma s d e r e gulació n y conclu ye qu e s u llamad a a l a pa r ticipació n d e l a socieda d e n l a tom a d e decisione s puede se r considerad a má s u n mit o qu e un a realidad. (shrink)

『三太郎の日記』による栄光の後に襲ってきた波乱。同時代の知識人との関係や教育制度から、大正教養派の代表者に迫る社会史的評伝。.

v. 1. T'oegye, Kobong Yulgok, Ugye ŭi Sadan ch'ilchŏng nonjaeng ŭl chungsim ŭro -- v. 2. Sach'il nonbyŏng ihu Chŏng Kae-ch'ŏng esŏ Chŏng Yag-yŏng kkaji.

According to Mednick’s (1962) theory of individual differences in creativity, creative individuals appear to have a richer and more flexible associative network than less creative individuals. Thus, creative individuals are characterized by “flat” (broader associations) instead of “steep” (few, common associations) associational hierarchies. To study these differences, we implement a novel computational approach to the study of semantic networks, through the analysis of free associations. The core notion of our method is that concepts in the network are related to each (...) other by their association correlations - overlap of similar associative responses (“association clouds”). We began by collecting a large sample of participants who underwent several creativity measurements and used a decision tree approach to divide the sample into low and high creative groups. Next, each group underwent a free association generation paradigm which allowed us to construct and analyze the semantic networks of both groups. Comparison of the semantic memory networks of persons with low creative ability and persons with high creative ability revealed differences between the two networks. The semantic memory network of persons with low creative ability seems to be more rigid, compared to the network of persons with high creative ability, in the sense that it is more spread out and breaks apart into more sub-parts. We discuss how our findings are in accord and extend Mednick’s (1962) theory and the feasibility of using network science paradigms to investigate high level cognition. (shrink)

Im Blickpunkt dieses Bandes steht das Wechselverhältnis zweier prägender Traditionen moderner deutschsprachiger Philosophie: der Kritischen Theorie und der Philosophischen Anthropologie. Über das gesamte 20. Jahrhundert hinweg blieb der Austausch zwischen diesen Ansätzen, wo er überhaupt zu Stande kam, von Vorbehalten geprägt. Gegenwärtig allerdings lässt sich, jenseits überkommener schulpolitischer Gräben, ein neuartiges Interesse beider Strömungen füreinander wahrnehmen. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes treffen sich in dem Versuch, die jeweiligen Hauptanliegen und Gegenstandsfelder der Kritischen Theorie respektive der Philosophischen Anthropologie über deren direkten Dialog (...) produktiv zu aktualisieren: Inwiefern lassen sich die genuinen Themen der einen Tradition auf Seiten der je anderen rekonstruieren? Und worin bleiben sich beide Denkweisen letztlich doch fremd? Das vorliegende Buch stellt in der Forschung den ersten systematischen Versuch dar, diese Fragen für gesellschaftstheoretische und anthropologische Problemstellungen fruchtbar zu machen. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of skinniness for subsets of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ and its variants, namely skinnier and skinniest. We show that under some cardinal arithmetical assumptions, precipitousness or $2^\lambda$-saturation of $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$, where $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}$ denotes the non-stationary ideal over $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$, implies the existence of a skinny stationary subset of $X$. We also show that if $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, then there is no skinnier stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Furthermore, if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, there (...) is no skinny stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Combining these results, we show that if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, then $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$ can satisfy neither precipitousness nor $2^\lambda$-saturation for every stationary $X \subseteq \mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. We also indicate that $\diamondsuit_\lambda(E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa})$, where $E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \{\alpha < \lambda \mid \mathrm{cf}(\alpha) < \kappa\}$, is equivalent to the existence of a skinnier (or skinniest) stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ under some cardinal arithmetical hypotheses. (shrink)

Our reply to Fabian Freyenhagen’s article “Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?” (DZPhil 65.3 [2017], 456-469) raises the question whether his proposal that Critical Theory only “be adequately and appropriately critical” without a program of justification spares the search for any general criteria. Answering negatively we conversely want to recall, particularly with regard to Horkheimers’s and Adornos’s Dialectic of Enlightment as well as Habermas‘s concept of an emancipatory interest, that such a criterion as a normative foundation of critique is crucial not (...) only for systematical purposes, but also recognised as necessary in this respect by Adorno, who Freyenhagen wants to play off against programs of justification. Critical Theory needs to be clear in this respect. Against this background we are questioning Freyenhagen‘s recourse to an “interest in abolishing social injustice” as the “only criterion for Critical Theory.” Because Freyenhagen ignores the fact that Critical Theory has been understood by its representatives in a twofold manner – as a theoretical program of justification for one and secondly as a cultural diagnosis – his plea for an orthodox Critical Theory is endangered by decisionism. (shrink)

We show that if κ is an inaccessible cardinal then P κ λ splits into $\lambda^{ many disjoint stationary subsets. We also show that if P κ λ carries a strongly saturated ideal then the nonstationary ideal cannot be λ + -saturated.

1. Pitʻŭgenstʻain kwa ŏnŏ -- 2. Hyŏndae ŏnŏ chʻŏrhak.

오영환 교수 회갑기념 논문집. 과학과 형이상학의 관 계를 공동주제로 한 논문들이다.