Nicolas d'Autrécourt (c. 1298-1369) is one of the most daring thinkers in the history of philosophy, and Zénon Kaluza, who has devoted to him nearly thirty years of study, presents him to us through his sources, his doctrines and his manuscripts. The reader will find studies on some of the most relevant philosophical doctrines (such as perception, the final causality, the categories and the eternity of the world) as well as a new edition of the Prologues of the Exigit ordo, (...) enriched with a running commentary. The texts gathered here-some of which have been published previously but are difficult to access and others which have been unpublished until now-reveal a philosopher who wished to free philosophy from institutional constraints and dared to criticize Aristotle's metaphysics, at the risk of upsetting traditions and contradicting the dogmas of the faith, and who was condemned by the theological authorities of his time. Nicolas d'Autrécourt (c. 1298-1369) est l'un des penseurs les plus audacieux de l'histoire de la philosophie, et Zénon Kaluza, qui lui a consacré près de trente ans d'études, nous le fait découvrir par ses sources, ses doctrines et ses manuscrits. Ce livre propose notamment des analyses sur des thèmes importants (tels que la perception, la causalité finale, les catégories ou l'éternité du monde) ainsi qu'une nouvelle édition des Prologues de l'Exigit ordo, enrichie d'un commentaire suivi. Les études-dont certaines sont parues mais difficiles d'accès et d'autres sont inédites-dévoilent la figure d'un philosophe désirant de libérer la philosophie des contraintes institutionnelles et de critiquer la métaphysique d'Aristote, au risque de bouleverser les traditions, de contredire les dogmes de la foi et se voir condamner par les autorités théologiques de son temps. (shrink)

Certains penseurs médiévaux jugeaient la philosophie incapable de juger et d'interpréter la parole révélée donc supérieure. Pour d'autres, elle gardait son prestige antique et pouvait les mener à la perfection et à la félicité. Ces contributions étudient non pas la philosophie du Moyen âge dans son ensemble, ce qui n'est pas possible, mais des personnalités particulières, dont des théologiens.

Reseñado por JUAN JOSÉ HERRERA Universidad del Norte Santo Tomás de Aquino San Miguel de Tucumán, AR [email protected].

Cet article propose d’identifier le fragment anonyme du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ff. 1‑73v avec les questionnes sur les Sentences de Nicholas Aston, connu grâce aux travaux pionniers de Zenon Kaluza. Une analyse des détails techniques de ce texte permet également d’avancer l’hypothèse que les Articuli d’Aston peuvent être lus comme des traces des principia. En annexe, nous éditons la liste des questions du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ainsi qu’une concordance entre ce manuscrit et les autres témoins manuscrits d’Aston, (...) afin de démontrer que ce nouveau témoin contient la tradition la plus complète du texte d’Aston. (shrink)

Nicolas d’Autrécourt (c. 1298-1369) est l’un des penseurs les plus audacieux de l’histoire de la philosophie, et Zénon Kaluza, qui lui a consacré près de trente ans d’études, nous le fait découvrir par ses sources, ses doctrines et ses manuscrits. Ce livre propose notamment des analyses sur des thèmes importants (tels que la perception, la causalité finale, les catégories ou l’éternité du monde) ainsi qu’une nouvelle édition des Prologues de l’Exigit ordo, enrichie d’un commentaire suivi. Les études—dont certaines sont parues (...) mais difficiles d’accès et d’autres sont inédites—dévoilent la figure d’un philosophe désirant de libérer la philosophie des contraintes institutionnelles et de critiquer la métaphysique d’Aristote, au risque de bouleverser les traditions, de contredire les dogmes de la foi et se voir condamner par les autorités théologiques de son temps. Nicolas d'Autrécourt (c. 1298-1369) is one of the most daring thinkers in the history of philosophy, and Zénon Kaluza, who has devoted to him nearly thirty years of study, presents him to us through his sources, his doctrines and his manuscripts. The reader will find studies on some of the most relevant philosophical doctrines (such as perception, the final causality, the categories and the eternity of the world) as well as a new edition of the Prologues of the _Exigit ordo_, enriched with a running commentary. The texts gathered here—some of which have been published previously but are difficult to access and others which have been unpublished until now—reveal a philosopher who wished to free philosophy from institutional constraints and dared to criticize Aristotle's metaphysics, at the risk of upsetting traditions and contradicting the dogmas of the faith, and who was condemned by the theological authorities of his time. (shrink)

The papers presented in this volume in honour of Alfonso Maieru cover some of the major topics of his research area. The institutional and intellectual life of university training in the Middle Ages, including the peculiar tradition of related works, is the focus of the papers by Louis Jacques Bataillon, William J. Courtenay, Jacqueline Hamesse, Zenon Kaluza, Loris Sturlese and Olga Weijers. Three papers, by Jacopo Costa, Pasquale Porro and Thomas Ricklin, deal with philosophical problems in Dante'sMonarchia and Convivio. (...) The complex interrelations between logic and the other main aspects of medieval philosophy, with a particular attention to theology, metaphysics and natural philosophy, are the core of the other papers by Stefano Caroti, Sten Ebbesen, Barbara Faes de Mottoni, Simo Knuuttila, Alain de Libera, Olga Lizzini, Costantino Marmo, Claude Panaccio, Ivan Bendwell, Irene Rosier-Catach, Lambert Marie de Rijk, Leonardo Sileo, Luisa Valente, and Albert Zimmermann. A larger number of friends and colleagues of Alfonso Maieru than those who appear as contributors and editors of this volume have warmly welcomed its publication. We could say, therefore, that it is absolutely contingent that the Editors are: Stefano Caroti (Universita degli Studi di Parma), Ruedi Imbach (Universite de Paris-Sorbonne), Zenon Kaluza (Centre d'Etudes des Religions du Livre, C.N.R.S), Loris Sturlese (Universita degli Studi di Lecce) and Giorgio Stabile(Universita degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"). (shrink)

"Philosophy -- The Later Middle Ages: Zenon Kaluza.Conceived as an hommage for Edouard Jeauneau -- "mantre par excellence -- the volume is introduced by a ...

This systematic investigation of computation and mental phenomena by a noted psychologist and computer scientist argues that cognition is a form of computation, that the semantic contents of mental states are encoded in the same general way as computer representations are encoded. It is a rich and sustained investigation of the assumptions underlying the directions cognitive science research is taking. 1 The Explanatory Vocabulary of Cognition 2 The Explanatory Role of Representations 3 The Relevance of Computation 4 The Psychological Reality (...) of Programs: Strong Equivalence 5 Constraining Functional Architecture 6 The Bridge from Physical to Symbolic: Transduction 7 Functional Architecture and Analogue Processes 8 Mental Imagery and Functional Architecture 9 Epilogue: What is Cognitive Science the Science of? (shrink)

This article discusses the topic of algorithmic personalization and the creation of the so-called “filter bubble” effect, which is often understood as one of the most problematic influences of artificial intelligence on democratic social order. The author suggests that focusing on the issue of information diversity, which had far-reaching effect on the empirical research that tried to quantitatively measure and systematically prove the existence of the filter bubbles, was the wrong starting point for the discussion on the application of algorithmic (...) personalization. It has drawn our attention away from the deeper issue: habit. Habitual adaptation of algorithmic personalization, namely, stands in essential contradiction to the ideal image of a non-adaptive public sphere, upon which democratic societies should be based. Focusing on habitual adaptation could also explain why users addictively stick to certain kinds of information, even if they are not caught in an isolated chamber. (shrink)

The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...) human functioning that can be addressed exclusively in terms of a formal symbolic or algorithmic vocabulary or level of analysis. Much of the paper elaborates various conditions that need to be met if a literal view of mental activity as computation is to serve as the basis for explanatory theories. The coherence of such a view depends on there being a principled distinction between functions whose explanation requires that we posit internal representations and those that we can appropriately describe as merely instantiating causal physical or biological laws. In this paper the distinction is empirically grounded in a methodological criterion called the " cognitive impenetrability condition." Functions are said to be cognitively impenetrable if they cannot be influenced by such purely cognitive factors as goals, beliefs, inferences, tacit knowledge, and so on. Such a criterion makes it possible to empirically separate the fixed capacities of mind from the particular representations and algorithms used on specific occasions. In order for computational theories to avoid being ad hoc, they must deal effectively with the "degrees of freedom" problem by constraining the extent to which they can be arbitrarily adjusted post hoc to fit some particular set of observations. This in turn requires that the fixed architectural function and the algorithms be independently validated. It is argued that the architectural assumptions implicit in many contemporary models run afoul of the cognitive impenetrability condition, since the required fixed functions are demonstrably sensitive to tacit knowledge and goals. The paper concludes with some tactical suggestions for the development of computational cognitive theories. (shrink)

How we see and how we visualize: why the scientific account differs from our experience.

In "Things and Places," Zenon Pylyshyn argues that the process of incrementally constructing perceptual representations, solving the binding problem (determining which properties go together), and, more generally, grounding perceptual ...

Nowożytna nauka nie dysponuje adekwatnymi narzędziami opisu i interpretacji geniuszu oraz szaleństwa. Metody obiektywne i statystyczne oraz racjonalistyczna analiza gubią specyfikę tych zjawisk. Geniusz i szaleństwo można badać i interpretować w oparciu o teorię archetypów Junga, według której są one elementami procesu jakościowej transformacji świadomości (inicjacji), ale ich znaczenie w kontekście procesu kształtowania osobowości (indywiduacja) jest odmienne. W kontekście procesu twórczego oraz kultury jako takiej zagadnienie nabiera dodatkowej rangi. Geniusz i szaleństwo można interpretować konstruktywnie (syntetycznie) w oparciu o metaforę drogi (...) okrężnej, która ujmuje złożoną naturę zarówno aktywności symbolicznej człowieka, procesu twórczego, jak i kultury. Podobnie pomocna jest tu koncepcja circumambulatio (okrążania) Junga. (shrink)

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it (...) is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...) ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look. (shrink)

Few areas of study have led to such close and intense interactions among computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers as the area now referred to as cognitive science. Within this discipline, few problems have inspired as much debate as the use of notions such as meaning, intentionality, or the semantic content of mental states in explaining human behavior. The set of problems surrounding these notions have been viewed by some observers as threatening the foundations of cognitive science as currently conceived, and (...) by others as providing a new and scientifically sound formulation of certain classical problems in the philosophy of mind. The chapters in this volume help bridge the gap among contributing disciplines-computer science, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience-and discuss the problems posed from various perspectives. (shrink)

This book examines Plato's most puzzling dialogue, Hippias Minor, in detail, treating Socrates' engagement with both Homer and the sophist Hippias over human excellence as at once playful and deadly serious.

The article presents the concept of evil, as developed in the literary as well as philosophical works of Albert Camus. After a short, preliminary notice on the relationship between literature and evil, the article presents two spheres, in which the problem of evil was grasped by the author of The Rebel. In the main part of the article, the complexity of the problem of evil, as represented by Jean-Baptiste Clamence from The Fall is shown. It is seen as a development (...) of the concept of evil from The Plague, with the potency to disseminate onto others. It is also perceived, as something resulting from severe trauma of the main character. In conclusion, I claim, that the problem of evil, as experienced by Clamence may be understood as a still relevant metaphor of contemporary culture, struggling with passivity against the rise of social evil. (shrink)

In the presented essay, I would like to focus on the relationship between force and power. The idea that power, without resorting to forceful, even violent solutions, is less problematic, is both deceitful and dangerous. Once accepted, it can cause an oversight of violence‐free but possibly harmful forms of power. My focus in the article will be on the two reinterpretations of Master‐Slave dialectics, as presented by Alexandre Kojève and Albert Camus. This will be presented with reference to the position (...) of Hannah Arendt and her remarks on power and force. In conclusion, I will be abstemious: my goal is rather to diagnose and bind the existentialist judgement with the contemporary situation and suggest that thinking outside the force‐power relationship may be continuously fruitful and an important part of reflection on the nature of political power. (shrink)

Each of the chapters in this volume devotes considerable attention to defining and elaborating the notion of the frame problem-one of the hard problems of artificial intelligence. Not only do the chapters clarify the problems at hand, they shed light on the different approaches taken by those in artificial intelligence and by certain philosophers who have been concerned with related problems in their field. The book should therefore not be read merely as a discussion of the frame problem narrowly conceived, (...) but also as a general analysis of what could be a major challenge to the design of computer systems exhibiting general intelligence. (shrink)

Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning represents a close collaboration between a wide range of disciplines and countries. Fourteen papers, together with a long analytical introduction by the editors, were selected from the contributions of legal theorists, computer scientists, philosophers and logicians who were members of an International Working Group supported by the European Commission. The Group was mandated to work towards determining how far the law is amenable to formal modeling, and in what ways computers might assist legal (...) thinking and practice. The book is the result of discussions held by the Group over two and half years. It will help students and researchers from different backgrounds to focus on a common set of topics of increasing general interest. It embodies the results of work in progress and suggests many issues for further discussion. A stimulating text for undergraduate and graduate courses in law, philosophy and computer science departments, as well as for those interested in the place of computers in legal practice, especially at the international level. (shrink)

In the past decade there has been renewed interest in the study of mental imagery. Emboldened by new findings from neuroscience, many people have revived the idea that mental imagery involves a special format of thought, one that is pictorial in nature. But the evidence and the arguments that exposed deep conceptual and empirical problems in the picture theory over the past 300 years have not gone away. I argue that the new evidence from neural imaging and clinical neuropsychology does (...) little to justify this recidivism because it does not address the format of mental images. I also discuss some reasons why the picture theory is so resistant to counterarguments and suggest ways in which non-pictorial theories might account for the apparent spatial nature of images. (shrink)

This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as `this' or `that') this direct connection allows entities to be (...) referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconcep- tual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empiri- cal phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is brie. (shrink)

Marr (1982) may have been one of the rst vision researchers to insist that in modeling vision it is important to separate the location of visual features from their type. He argued that in early stages of visual processing there must be “place tokens” that enable subsequent stages of the visual system to treat locations independent of what specic feature type was at that location. Thus, in certain respects a collinear array of diverse features could still be perceived as a (...) line, and under certain conditions could function as such in perceptual phenomena like the Poggendorf illusion. (shrink)