We study the decidability of k-provability in \—the relation ‘being provable in \ with at most k steps’—and the decidability of the proof-skeleton problem—the problem of deciding if a given formula has a proof that has a given skeleton. The decidability of k-provability for the usual Hilbert-style formalisation of \ is still an open problem, but it is known that the proof-skeleton problem is undecidable for that theory. Using new methods, we present a characterisation of some numbers k for (...) which k-provability is decidable, and we present a characterisation of some proof-skeletons for which one can decide whether a formula has a proof whose skeleton is the considered one. These characterisations are natural and parameterised by unification algorithms. (shrink)

We prove that every computably enumerable random real is provable in Peano Arithmetic to be c.e. random. A major step in the proof is to show that the theorem stating that “a real is c.e. and random iff it is the halting probability of a universal prefix-free Turing machine” can be proven in PA. Our proof, which is simpler than the standard one, can also be used for the original theorem. Our positive result can be contrasted with the case (...) of computable functions, where not every computable function is provably computable in PA, or even more interestingly, with the fact that almost all random finite strings are not provably random in PA. We also prove two negative results: a) there exists a universal machine whose universality cannot be proved in PA, b) there exists a universal machine U such that, based on U, PA cannot prove the randomness of its halting probability. The paper also includes a sharper form of the Kraft-Chaitin Theorem, as well as a formal proof of this theorem written with the proof assistant Isabelle. (shrink)

The dissertation under comment is a contribution to the area of Set Theory concerned with the interactions between the method of Forcing and the so-called Large Cardinal axioms.The dissertation is divided into two thematic blocks. In Block I we analyze the large-cardinal hierarchy between the first supercompact cardinal and Vopěnka’s Principle. In turn, Block II is devoted to the investigation of some problems arising from Singular Cardinal Combinatorics.We commence Part I by investigating the Identity Crisis phenomenon in the region comprised (...) between the first supercompact cardinal and Vopěnka’s Principle. As a result, we generalize Magidor’s classical theorems [2] to this higher region of the large-cardinal hierarchy. Also, our analysis allows to settle all the questions that were left open in [1]. Finally, we conclude Part I by presenting a general theory of preservation of $C^{}$ -extendible cardinals under class forcing iterations. From this analysis we derive several applications. For instance, our arguments are used to show that an extendible cardinal is consistent with “ $^{\mathrm {HOD}}<\lambda ^+$, for every regular cardinal $\lambda $.” In particular, if Woodin’s HOD Conjecture holds, and therefore it is provable in ZFC + “There exists an extendible cardinal” that above the first extendible cardinal every singular cardinal $\lambda $ is singular in HOD and $^{\textrm {{HOD}}}=\lambda ^+$, there may still be no agreement at all between V and HOD about successors of regular cardinals.In Part II and Part III we analyse the relationship between the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis with other relevant combinatorial principles at the level of successors of singular cardinals. Two of these are the Tree Property and the Reflection of Stationary sets, which are central in Infinite Combinatorics.Specifically, Part II is devoted to prove the consistency of the Tree Property at both $\kappa ^+$ and $\kappa ^{++}$, whenever $\kappa $ is a strong limit singular cardinal witnessing an arbitrary failure of the SCH. This generalizes the main result of [3] in two senses: it allows arbitrary cofinalities for $\kappa $ and arbitrary failures for the SCH.In the last part of the dissertation we introduce the notion of $\Sigma $ -Prikry forcing. This new concept allows an abstract and uniform approach to the theory of Prikry-type forcings and encompasses several classical examples of Prikry-type forcing notions, such as the classical Prikry forcing, the Gitik-Sharon poset, or the Extender Based Prikry forcing, among many others.Our motivation in this part of the dissertation is to prove an iteration theorem at the level of the successor of a singular cardinal. Specifically, we aim for a theorem asserting that every $\kappa ^{++}$ -length iteration with support of size $\leq \kappa $ has the $\kappa ^{++}$ -cc, provided the iterates belong to a relevant class of $\kappa ^{++}$ -cc forcings. While there are a myriad of works on this vein for regular cardinals, this contrasts with the dearth of investigations in the parallel context of singular cardinals. Our main contribution is the proof that such a result is available whenever the class of forcings under consideration is the family of $\Sigma $ -Prikry forcings. Finally, and as an application, we prove that it is consistent—modulo large cardinals—the existence of a strong limit cardinal $\kappa $ with countable cofinality such that $\mathrm {SCH}_\kappa $ fails and every finite family of stationary subsets of $\kappa ^+$ reflects simultaneously. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate Rosser provability predicates whose provability logics are normal modal logics. First, we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly the normal modal logic \. Secondly, we introduce a new normal modal logic \ which is a proper extension of \, and prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic includes \.

Big Data is a large-sized and complex dataset, which cannot be managed using traditional data processing tools. Mining process of big data is the ability to extract valuable information from these large datasets. Association rule mining is a type of data mining process, which is indented to determine interesting associations between items and to establish a set of association rules whose support is greater than a specific threshold. The classical association rules can only be extracted from binary data where (...) an item exists in a transaction, but it fails to deal effectively with quantitative attributes, through decreasing the quality of generated association rules due to sharp boundary problems. In order to overcome the drawbacks of classical association rule mining, we propose in this research a new neutrosophic association rule algorithm. The algorithm uses a new approach for generating association rules by dealing with membership, indeterminacy, and non-membership functions of items, conducting to an efficient decision-making system by considering all vague association rules. To prove the validity of the method, we compare the fuzzy mining and the neutrosophic mining. The results show that the proposed approach increases the number of generated association rules. (shrink)

The paraconsistent system CPQ-ZFC/F is defined. It is shown using strong non-finitary methods that the theorems of CPQ-ZFC/F are exactly the theorems of classical ZFC minus foundation. The proof presented in the paper uses the assumption that a strongly inaccessible cardinal exists. It is then shown using strictly finitary methods that CPQ-ZFC/F is non-trivial. CPQ-ZFC/F thus provides a formulation of set theory that has the same deductive power as the corresponding classical system but is more reliable in that non-triviality is (...) provable by strictly finitary methods. This result does not contradict Gödel's incompleteness theorem because the proof of the deductive equivalence of the paraconsistent and classical systemss use non-finitary methods. (shrink)

We investigate the provability or nonprovability of certain ordinary mathematical theorems within certain weak subsystems of second order arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the Cauchy/Peano existence theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, in the context of the formal system RCA 0 whose principal axioms are ▵ 0 1 comprehension and Σ 0 1 induction. Our main result is that, over RCA 0 , the Cauchy/Peano Theorem is provably equivalent to weak Konig's lemma, i.e. the statement that every infinite (...) {0, 1}-tree has a path. We also show that, over RCA 0 , the Ascoli lemma is provably equivalent to arithmetical comprehension, as is Osgood's theorem on the existence of maximum solutions. At the end of the paper we digress to relate our results to degrees of unsolvability and to computable analysis. (shrink)

We show that the theory, consisting of the usual axioms of but with the power set axiom removed—specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well‐ordered—is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of in which ω1 is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet ω1 exists, in which there are sets of (...) reals of every size, but none of size, and therefore, in which the collection axiom fails; there are models of for which the Łoś theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well‐founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding of models that is Σ1‐elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings of models whose cofinal restriction is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in to a Σ1‐formula or a Π1‐formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider certain cardinals in ZF (set theory without AC, the axiom of choice). In ZFC (set theory with AC), given any cardinals C and D, either C ≤ D or D ≤ C. However, in ZF this is no longer so. For a given infinite set A consider $\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)$ , the set of all sequences of A without repetition. We compare $|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)|$ , the cardinality of this set, to |P(A)|, the cardinality of (...) the power set of A. What is provable about these two cardinals in ZF? The main result of this paper is that $ZF \vdash \forall A(|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)| \neq|\mathscr{P}(\mathscr{A})|)$ , and we show that this is the best possible result. Furthermore, it is provable in ZF that if B is an infinite set, then $|\operatorname{fin}(B)| <|\mathscr{P}(B)|$ even though the existence for some infinite set B* of a function f from $\operatorname{fin}(B^\ast)$ onto P(B*) is consistent with ZF. (shrink)

The hard problem of induction is to argue without begging the question that inductive inference, applied properly in the proper circumstances, is conducive to truth. A recent theorem seems to show that the hard problem has a deductive solution. The theorem, provable in ZFC, states that a predictive function M exists with the following property: whatever world we live in, M ncorrectly predicts the world’s present state given its previous states at all times apart from a well-ordered subset. On (...) the usual model of time a well-ordered subset is small relative to the set of all times. M’s existence therefore seems to provide a solution to the hard problem. My paper argues for two conclusions. First, the theorem does not solve the hard problem of induction. More positively though, it solves a version of the problem in which the structure of time is given modulo our choice of set theory. (shrink)

An Abelian group G is strongly λ -free iff G is L ∞, λ -equivalent to a free Abelian group iff the isomorphism player has a winning strategy in an Ehrenfeucht–Fraı̈ssé game of length ω between G and a free Abelian group. We study possible longer Ehrenfeucht–Fraı̈ssé games between a nonfree group and a free Abelian group. A group G is called ε -game-free if the isomorphism player has a winning strategy in an Ehrenfeucht–Fraı̈ssé game of length ε between G (...) and a free Abelian group. We prove in ZFC existence of nonfree ε -game-free groups for many successors of regular cardinals. We also show that the length of the game obtained is very close to the optimal length provable in ZFC alone. On the other hand, assuming existence of a Mahlo cardinal, we sketch a proof that it is consistent to have a very highly game-free still nonfree group. First we present an introduction to basic constructions and then we introduce some results concerning the standard tools for building more complicated groups, namely transversals and λ -systems. It follows that all the constructions generalize to algebras in a fixed variety satisfying the strong construction principle. (shrink)

Martin’s conjecture is an attempt to classify the behavior of all definable functions on the Turing degrees under strong set theoretic hypotheses. Very roughly it says that every such function is either eventually constant, eventually equal to the identity function or eventually equal to a transfinite iterate of the Turing jump. It is typically divided into two parts: the first part states that every function is either eventually constant or eventually above the identity function and the second part states that (...) every function which is above the identity is eventually equal to a transfinite iterate of the jump. If true, it would provide an explanation for the unique role of the Turing jump in computability theory and rule out many types of constructions on the Turing degrees.In this thesis, we will introduce a few tools which we use to prove several cases of Martin’s conjecture. It turns out that both these tools and these results on Martin’s conjecture have some interesting consequences both for Martin’s conjecture and for a few related topics.The main tool that we introduce is a basis theorem for perfect sets, improving a theorem due to Groszek and Slaman. We also introduce a general framework for proving certain special cases of Martin’s conjecture which unifies a few pre-existing proofs. We will use these tools to prove three main results about Martin’s conjecture: that it holds for regressive functions on the hyperarithmetic degrees, that part 1 holds for order preserving functions on the Turing degrees, and that part 1 holds for a class of functions that we introduce, called measure preserving functions.This last result has several interesting consequences for the study of Martin’s conjecture. In particular, it shows that part 1 of Martin’s conjecture is equivalent to a statement about the Rudin-Keisler order on ultrafilters on the Turing degrees. This suggests several possible strategies for working on part 1 of Martin’s conjecture, which we will discuss.The basis theorem that we use to prove these results also has some applications outside of Martin’s conjecture. We will use it to prove a few theorems related to Sacks’ question about whether it is provable in $\mathsf {ZFC}$ that every locally countable partial order of size continuum embeds into the Turing degrees. We will show that in a certain extension of $\mathsf {ZF}$, this holds for all partial orders of height two, but not for all partial orders of height three. Our proof also yields an analogous result for Borel partial orders and Borel embeddings in $\mathsf {ZF}$, which shows that the Borel version of Sacks’ question has a negative answer.We will end the thesis with a list of open questions related to Martin’s conjecture, which we hope will stimulate further research.prepared by Patrick Lutz.E-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

LetZ2,Z3, andZ4denote 2nd, 3rd, and 4thorder arithmetic, respectively. We let Harrington’s Principle, HP, denote the statement that there is a realxsuch that everyx-admissible ordinal is a cardinal inL. The known proofs of Harrington’s theorem “$Det\left$implies 0♯exists” are done in two steps: first show that$Det\left$implies HP, and then show that HP implies 0♯exists. The first step is provable inZ2. In this paper we show thatZ2+ HP is equiconsistent with ZFC and thatZ3+ HP is equiconsistent with ZFC + there exists a (...) remarkable cardinal. As a corollary,Z3+ HP does not imply 0♯exists, whereas Z4+ HP does. We also study strengthenings of Harrington’s Principle over 2ndand 3rdorder arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper concerns modal logics of provability — Gödel-Löb systemGL and Solovay logicS — the smallest and the greatest representation of arithmetical theories in propositional logic respectively. We prove that the decision problem for admissibility of rules (with or without parameters) inGL andS is decidable. Then we get a positive solution to Friedman''s problem forGL andS. We also show that A. V. Kuznetsov''s problem of the existence of finite basis for admissible rules forGL andS has a negative solution. Afterwards (...) we give an algorithm deciding the solvability of logical equations inGL andS and constructing some solutions. (shrink)

We investigate the Friedman–Goldfarb–Harrington theorem from two perspectives. Firstly, in the frameworks of classical and modal propositional logics, we study the forms of sentences whose existence is guaranteed by the FGH theorem. Secondly, we prove some variations of the FGH theorem with respect to Rosser provability predicates.

In the thesis some combinatorial statements are analysed from the reverse mathematics point of view. Reverse mathematics is a research program, which dates back to the Seventies, interested in finding the exact strength, measured in terms of set-existence axioms, of theorems from ordinary non set-theoretic mathematics. After a brief introduction to the subject, an on-line (incremental) algorithm to transitively reorient infinite pseudo-transitive oriented graphs is defined. This implies that a theorem of Ghouila-Houri is provable in RCA_0 and hence (...) is computably true. Interval graphs and interval orders are the common theme of the second part of the thesis. A chapter is devoted to analyse the relative strength of different characterisations of countable interval graphs and to study the interplay between countable interval graphs and countable interval orders. In this context the theme of unique orderability of interval graphs arises, which is studied in the following chapter. The last chapter about interval orders inspects the strength of some statements involving the dimension of countable interval orders. The third part is devoted to the analysis of two theorems proved by Rival and Sands in 1980. The first principle states that each infinite graph contains an infinite subgraph such that each vertex of the graph is adjacent either to none, or to one or to infinitely many vertices of the subgraph. This statement, restricted to countable graphs, is proved to be equivalent to ACA_0 and hence to be stronger than Ramsey's theorem for pairs, despite the similarity of partial order with finite width contains an infinite chain such that each point of the poset is comparable either to none or to infinitely many points of the chain. For each k less than or equal to 3, the latter principle restricted to countable poset of width k is proved to be equivalent to ADS. Some complementary results are presented in the thesis. (shrink)

Two luminaries of 20th century astrophysics were Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington. Both took seriously the view that there is more to reality than the physical universe and more to consciousness than simply brain activity. In his Science and the Unseen World Eddington speculated about a spiritual world and that "conscious is not wholly, nor even primarily a device for receiving sense impressions." Jeans also speculated on the existence of a universal mind and a non-mechanical reality, writing (...) in his The Mysterious Universe "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine." In his book QED Feynman discusses the situation of photons being partially transmitted and partially reflected by a sheet of glass: reflection amounting to four percent. In other words one out of every 25 photons will be reflected on average, and this holds true even for a "one at a time" flux. The four percent cannot be explained by statistical differences of the photons nor by random variations in the glass. Something is "telling" every 25th photon on average that it should be reflected back instead of being transmitted. Other quantum experiments lead to similar paradoxes. To explain how a single photon in the two-slit experiment can "know" whether there is one slit or two, Hawking and Mlodonow write: In the double-slit experiment Feynman's ideas mean the particles take paths that thread through the first slit, back out though the second slit, and then through the first again; paths that visit the restaurant that serves that great curried shrimp, and then circle Jupiter a few times before heading home; even paths that go across the universe and back. This, in Feynman's view, explains how the particle acquires the information about which slits are openŠ. It is hard to imagine a more absurd physical explanation. We can think of no way to hardwire the behavior of photons in the glass reflection or the two-slit experiments into a physical law. On the other hand, writing a software algorithm that would yield the desired result is really simple. A digital reality whose laws are software is an idea that has started to gain traction in large part thanks to an influential paper in Philosophical Quarterly by Oxford professor Nick Bostrom. Writing in the New York Times John Tierney had this to say: Until I talked to Nick Bostrom, a philosopher at Oxford University it never occurred to me that our universe might be somebody else's hobby. But now it seems quite possible. In fact, if you accept a pretty reasonable assumption of Dr. Bostrom's, it is almost a mathematical certainty that we are living in someone else's computer simulation. An alternate view is that there exists a great consciousness whose mind is the hardware, and whose thoughts are the software creating a virtual universe in which we as beings of consciousness live. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

A substantial amount of recent work in natural language generation has focused on the generation of ‘‘one-shot’’ referring expressions whose only aim is to identify a target referent. Dale and Reiter's Incremental Algorithm (IA) is often thought to be the best algorithm for maximizing the similarity to referring expressions produced by people. We test this hypothesis by eliciting referring expressions from human subjects and computing the similarity between the expressions elicited and the ones generated by algorithms. It turns (...) out that the success of the IA depends substantially on the ‘‘preference order’’ (PO) employed by the IA, particularly in complex domains. While some POs cause the IA to produce referring expressions that are very similar to expressions produced by human subjects, others cause the IA to perform worse than its main competitors; moreover, it turns out to be difficult to predict the success of a PO on the basis of existing psycholinguistic findings or frequencies in corpora. We also examine the computational complexity of the algorithms in question and argue that there are no compelling reasons for preferring the IA over some of its main competitors on these grounds. We conclude that future research on the generation of referring expressions should explore alternatives to the IA, focusing on algorithms, inspired by the Greedy Algorithm, which do not work with a fixed PO. (shrink)

A new edge detection technique based on the texture feature coding method is proposed. The TFCM is a texture analysis scheme that is generally used in texture-based image segmentation and classification applications. The TFCM transforms an input image into a texture feature image whose pixel values represent the texture information of the pixel in the original image. Then, on the basis of the transformed image, several features are calculated as texture descriptors. In this article, the TFCM is employed differently (...) to construct an edge detector. In particular, the texture feature number of the TFCM is considered. In other words, the TFN image is used for subsequent processes. After obtaining the TFN image, a simple thresholding scheme is employed for obtaining the coarse edge image. Finally, an edge-thinning procedure is used to obtain the tuned edges. We conducted several experiments on a variety of images and compared the results with the popular existing methods such as the Sobel, Prewitt, Canny, and Canny–Deriche edge detectors. The obtained results were evaluated quantitatively with the Figure of Merit criterion. The experimental results demonstrated that our proposed method improved the edge detection performance greatly. We further implemented the proposed edge detector with a hardware system. To this end, a field programmable gate array chip was used. The related simulations were carried out with the MATLAB Simulink tool. Both software and hardware implementations demonstrated the efficiency of the proposed edge detector. (shrink)

A complete list of Finsler, Scott and Boffa sets whose transitive closures contain 1, 2 and 3 elements is given. An algorithm for deciding the identity of hereditarily finite Scott sets is presented. Anti-well-founded sets, i. e., non-well-founded sets whose all maximal ∈-paths are circular, are studied. For example they form transitive inner models of ZFC minus foundation and empty set, and they include uncountably many hereditarily finite awf sets. A complete list of Finsler and Boffa awf sets (...) with 2 and 3 elements in their transitive closure is given. Next the existence of infinite descending ∈-sequences in Aczel universes is shown. Finally a theorem of Ballard and Hrbáček concerning nonstandard Boffa universes of sets is considerably extended. (shrink)

The dispute between the Fregean and the Neo-Meinongian approach to existence has become entrenched: it seems that nothing but intuitions may be relied upon to decide the issue. And since contemporary analytic philosophers clearly are inclined towards the intuitions that support Frege's approach, it looks as if Fregeanism has won the day. In this paper, however, I try to develop a compromise solution. This compromise consists in abandoning the assumption shared by both Fregeanism and Neo-Meinongianism, namely that the notion (...) of existence adds something to the content of a statement. To the contrary, we should think of existence as a redundant notion. In other words, I will argue that we should be deflationist about existence. Moreover, the kind of deflationism I propose relies on what I call the existence equivalence schema, a schema which follows the blueprint of the well-known truth equivalence schema. From such a perspective, we can say that Fregean philosophers rightly deny the status of a discriminating property to existence; and, conversely, Neo-Meinongians, too, rightly reject the view that existence is captured by quantification or expresses a universal property of objects. Finally, the argument that we should take a deflationist approach to existence builds upon an analysis of natural language (general) existential statements and their intuitive entailment-relations. (shrink)

This article empirically analyzes how victims’ remains were recovered, identified, repatriated, and retained after the World Trade Center terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It does so by asking the question whose body is it. This question brings to the fore issues related to personhood and ownership: how are anonymous and unrecognizable bodily remains given back an identity; and who has ownership of or custody over identified and unidentified human remains? It is in this respect that the article engages (...) with technoscientific and legal, or “technolegal,” trajectories of human remains in the wake of the WTC tragedy. By using the metaphor of “materialization,” it becomes possible to trace how remains are forensically identified and implicated in legal regimes. “Technolegal materialization” as a concept and methodological sensitivity contributes to the current “actor-network theory” -inspired legal scholarship, which tends to focus on legal practices in courtrooms but not those beyond them. In this article, 9/11 victims’ remains are followed from “Ground Zero” to the forensic laboratory and beyond and articulates five instances of technolegal materialization of bodily remains and their past and contemporary existences. (shrink)

The subject of this research is the immersive artistic environments that exist in the modern cultural space. Immersive technologies are used today in educational processes, historical reconstruction, various forms of socialization, in visual arts; immersion is implemented as a special scientific approach in anthropological, ethnographic, art history studies. Interactivity and immersiveness are considered here as complex predictable processes whose algorithms are embedded in the very basis of an artistic work or cultural environment. They make it possible to intensify (...) the entire spectrum of sensory-emotional perception, creating not only a new type of artwork, but also a new type of recipient immersed in the process of unfolding an artistic plot. The classification of functions of immersive spaces is proposed in the study. On the example of Russian and foreign art projects, the essential signs and features of immersive art are analyzed and identified. Immersive projects implemented in recent years are considered on the example of the cultural field of the north-west of Russia, as well as a comparative analysis of foreign and domestic events is carried out. The study concluded that immersive environments have both positive and negative potential: a complex effect on human feelings using special technological techniques that affect perception can lead to both the effect of complete immersion and catharsis, and to destructive hyperstimulation of the psyche. And the artistic immersions themselves are more a form of media communication than finished works. (shrink)

A substantial amount of recent work in natural language generation has focused on the generation of ‘‘one‐shot’’ referring expressions whose only aim is to identify a target referent. Dale and Reiter's Incremental Algorithm (IA) is often thought to be the best algorithm for maximizing the similarity to referring expressions produced by people. We test this hypothesis by eliciting referring expressions from human subjects and computing the similarity between the expressions elicited and the ones generated by algorithms. It turns (...) out that the success of the IA depends substantially on the ‘‘preference order’’ (PO) employed by the IA, particularly in complex domains. While some POs cause the IA to produce referring expressions that are very similar to expressions produced by human subjects, others cause the IA to perform worse than its main competitors; moreover, it turns out to be difficult to predict the success of a PO on the basis of existing psycholinguistic findings or frequencies in corpora. We also examine the computational complexity of the algorithms in question and argue that there are no compelling reasons for preferring the IA over some of its main competitors on these grounds. We conclude that future research on the generation of referring expressions should explore alternatives to the IA, focusing on algorithms, inspired by the Greedy Algorithm, which do not work with a fixed PO. (shrink)

Although the employment situation of disabled people has widely been identified as in need of improvement, progress in this area remains slow. While some progress has been made in including the physically or sensory disabled in the workplace, other types of disability have been largely neglected. This applies particularly to disabled workers in atypical employment, such as those whose workplace is the Digital Economy. In this article, we discuss the case of disabled app developers as a significant example of (...) how the current regulatory framework fails to be inclusive in its attempts to protect the rights of disabled Digital Economy workers. We identify two problems that are at the heart of this: first, a continuing failure to collect relevant and comprehensive data on disability, and second, a lack of accountability towards disabled workers in atypical employment. Consequently, we call for better data collection and argue for urgent policy changes to close the existing accountability gap. (shrink)

We examine what happens if we replace ZFC with a localistic/relativistic system, LZFC, whose central new axiom, denoted by Loc(ZFC), says that every set belongs to a transitive model of ZFC. LZFC consists of Loc(ZFC) plus some elementary axioms forming Basic Set Theory (BST). Some theoretical reasons for this shift of view are given. All ${\Pi_2}$ consequences of ZFC are provable in LZFC. LZFC strongly extends Kripke-Platek (KP) set theory minus Δ0-Collection and minus ${\in}$ -induction scheme. ZFC+ “there (...) is an inaccessible cardinal” proves the consistency of LZFC. In LZFC we focus on models rather than cardinals, a transitive model being considered as the analogue of an inaccessible cardinal. Pushing this analogy further we define α-Mahlo models and ${\Pi_1^1}$ -indescribable models, the latter being the analogues of weakly compact cardinals. Also localization axioms of the form ${Loc({\rm ZFC}+\phi)}$ are considered and their global consequences are examined. Finally we introduce the concept of standard compact cardinal (in ZFC) and some standard compactness results are proved. (shrink)

Teleological theories of reason and value, upon which all reasons are fundamentally reasons to realize states of affairs that are in some respect best, cannot account for the intuition that victims in non-identity cases have been wronged. Many philosophers, however, reject such theories in favor of alternatives that recognize fundamentally non-teleological reasons, second-personal reasons that reflect a moral significance each person has that is not grounded in the teleologist’s appeal to outcomes. Such deontological accounts appear to be better positioned to (...) identify the wrong committed against non-identity victims because a person wrongs another on such accounts if she violates his second-personal claims -- overall benefit to victims presents no obstacle to the identification of second-personal wrongdoing. Derek Parfit argues that non-identity is a problem for these deontological theories as well because the alleged victims are properly understood as consenting to the action in question, thereby waiving any such second-personal claim. But his arguments misrepresent the role of consent on such theories by articulating it through appeal to the very teleological theory of reasons that their advocates dismiss as inadequate. Properly understood, Parfit’s appeal to consent understood as retroactive endorsement only provides the answer on such deontological accounts to the question of whether, given that the non-identity victim is second-personally wronged, he is nonetheless better off existing. Indeed, it becomes clear that it is teleological theories for which non-identity poses a particular problem: they cannot -- while their deontological counterparts can – account for the intuition that non-identity victims have been wronged. (shrink)

We show that under the assumption of the existence of the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal$M_1$, there is a model of$\mathsf {ZFC}$in which$\mbox {NS}_{\omega _{1}}$is$\aleph _2$-saturated and${\Delta }_{1}$-definable with$\omega _1$as a parameter which answers a question of S. D. Friedman and L. Wu. We also show that starting from an arbitrary universe with a Woodin cardinal, there is a model with$\mbox {NS}_{\omega _{1}}$saturated and${\Delta }_{1}$-definable with a ladder system$\vec {C}$and a full Suslin treeTas parameters. Both results rely (...) on a new coding technique whose presentation is the main goal of this article. (shrink)

Until recently, dance was not considered to warrant copyright protection because it existed only as a live performance that was not fixed in a ‘tangible medium of expression’. Not being an object, it could not be property. But the more we try to fold dance into existing modes of copyright and conventional notions of property, the more it resists, upsetting the core assumptions of Locke's social contract theory. Legal scholars argue that the expansion of copyright protection shrinks the public domain. (...) While copyright has become more important for dancers and choreographers who wish to control the appropriation of their work that is now made available to millions of end-users online, it also potentially restricts them from engaging in a dialog with other dancers or building on inspiring dance moves across communities. This paper investigates notions of property that rely on both the commons and individual personhood in the context of dance. (shrink)

Galen Strawson has contrasting attitudes to consciousness and free will. In the case of the former, he says it is a fundamental element of nature whose denial is the “greatest woo-woo of the human mind.” In the case of the latter, by contrast, he says it is not merely non-existent but “provably impossible.” Why the difference? This paper suggests this distinctive pattern of positions is generated by underestimating the world (to adapt a phrase Strawson uses himself in another context). (...) If you underestimate the world, and correlatively overestimate your level of understanding of the world, it is natural to think both that consciousness is fundamental, and that free will is non-existent. If you don’t underestimate the world, on the other hand, a more uniform and attractive treatment of these topics becomes available. (shrink)

Many of the major challenges facing global society are unstructured collective harms (e.g., global warming): collective in the sense that they arise as the result of the actions of, or interactions among, multiple agents, and unstructured in the sense that there is no coordination or intention to cause harm among these agents. But how should we distribute moral responsibility for these harms? In this paper, an answer is proposed to this question. This answer builds on but develops existing proposals by (...) drawing together literatures that speak to different aspects of the question. First, it is argued that the notion of causal contribution needs to be broadened to include the idea of causation as production. Second, it is discussed how the voluntariness and foreseeability conditions are best interpreted in this context. Third, literature on moral taint is drawn to introduce additional objective (external) criteria. (shrink)

Against a remarkable hardware oblivion in discussions of algorithmic intelligence, this article insists that algorithmic thought, or abstract computation, cannot be separated from its technological implementation. It requires a material medium for an abstract mechanism to become a procedural event. Temporality is both the condition and the limiting (and irritating) factor in the computational function. ‘Radical’ media archaeology is proposed as a method for such an analysis, and the neologism of techno lógos to describe some aspects of algorithmic reason which (...) only unfold in the moment of its techno-processual coming-into-being. Some core operations, such as the time-discrete rhythm of actual computing algorithms, are discussed, where the ‘tempoReal’ flashes up in computing. In a wider sense, the time-discreteness of digital computing is related to an aesthetics of existence which acknowledges the machine element within human reasoning itself, while at the same time re-actualizing previous cultural techniques of non-narrative chronology. Turing the ‘man’ himself, in the sense of the Turing machine, can be addressed ‘itself’, in its archival sense as a sequence of expressions by symbols. (shrink)

One of the main challenges in medicine is to guarantee an appropriate drug supply according to the real needs of patients. Closed-loop strategies have been widely used to develop automatic solutions based on feedback variables. However, when the variable of interest cannot be directly measured or there is a lack of knowledge behind the process, it turns into a difficult issue to solve. In this research, a novel algorithm to approach this problem is presented. The main objective of this study (...) is to provide a new general algorithm capable of determining the influence of a certain clinical variable in the decision making process for drug supply and then defining an automatic system able to guide the process considering this information. Thus, this new technique will provide a way to validate a given physiological signal as a feedback variable for drug titration. In addition, the result of the algorithm in terms of fuzzy rules and membership functions will define a fuzzy-based decision system for the drug delivery process. The method proposed is based on a Fuzzy Inference System whose structure is obtained through a decision tree algorithm. A four-step methodology is then developed: data collection, preprocessing, Fuzzy Inference System generation, and the validation of results. To test this methodology, the analgesia control scenario was analysed. Specifically, the viability of the Analgesia Nociception Index as a guiding variable for the analgesic process during surgical interventions was studied. Real data was obtained from fifteen patients undergoing cholecystectomy surgery. (shrink)

l investigate versions of the Maximality Principles for the classes of forcings which are <κ-closed. <κ-directed-closed, or of the form Col (κ. <Λ). These principles come in many variants, depending on the parameters which are allowed. I shall write MPΓ(A) for the maximality principle for forcings in Γ, with parameters from A. The main results of this paper are: • The principles have many consequences, such as <κ-closed-generic $\Sigma _{2}^{1}(H_{\kappa})$ absoluteness, and imply. e.g., that ◇κ holds. I give an application (...) to the automorphism tower problem, showing that there are Souslin trees which are able to realize any equivalence relation, and hence that there are groups whose automorphism tower is highly sensitive to forcing. • The principles can be separated into a hierarchy which is strict, for many κ. • Some of the principles can be combined, in the sense that they can hold at many different κ simultaneously. The possibilities of combining the principles are limited, though: While it is consistent that MP<κ-closed(HκT) holds at all regular κ below any fixed α. the "global" maximality principle, stating that MP<κ-closed(Hκ ∪ {κ}) holds at every regular κ. is inconsistent. In contrast to this, it is equiconsistent with ZFC that the maximality principle for directed-closed forcings without any parameters holds at every regular cardinal. It is also consistent that every local statement with parameters from HκT that's provably <κ-closed-forceably necessary is true, for all regular κ. (shrink)

We examine the question of how many Boolean algebras, distinct up to isomorphism, that are quotients of the powerset of the naturals by Borel ideals, can be proved to exist in ZFC alone. The maximum possible value is easily seen to be the cardinality of the continuum $2^{\aleph_{0}}$ ; earlier work by Ilijas Farah had shown that this was the value in models of Martin's Maximum or some similar forcing axiom, but it was open whether there could be fewer in (...) models of the Continuum Hypothesis. We develop and apply a new technique for constructing many ideals whose quotients must be nonisomorphic in any model of ZFC. The technique depends on isolating a kind of ideal, called shallow, that can be distinguished from the ideal of all finite sets even after any isomorphic embedding, and then piecing together various copies of the ideal of all finite sets using distinct shallow ideals. In this way we are able to demonstrate that there are continuum-many distinct quotients by Borel ideals, indeed by analytic P-ideals, and in fact that there is in an appropriate sense a Borel embedding of the Vitali equivalence relation into the equivalence relation of isomorphism of quotients by analytic P-ideals. We also show that there is an uncountable definable wellordered collection of Borel ideals with distinct quotients. (shrink)

The interplay between ultrafilters and unbounded subsets of \ with the order \ of strict eventual domination is studied. Among the tools are special kinds of non-principal ultrafilters on \. These include simple P-points; that is, ultrafilters with a base that is well-ordered with respect to the reverse of the order \ of almost inclusion. It is shown that the cofinality of such a base must be either \, the least cardinality of \-unbounded set, or \, the least cardinality of (...) a \-cofinal set. The small uncountable cardinal \ is introduced. Consequences of \ and of \ are explored; in particular, both imply \. Here \ is the reaping number, and is also the least cardinality of a \-base for a free ultrafilter. Both of these inequalities are shown to occur if there exist simple P-points of different cofinalities and there exist simple \-points and \-points), but this is a long-standing open problem. Six axioms on nonprincipal ultrafilters on \ and the relationships between them are discussed along with various models of set theory in which one or more are known to hold. The strongest of these, Axiom 1, is that for every free ultrafilter \ and for every \-unbounded \-chain C of increasing functions in \, C is also unbounded in the ultraproduct \. The other axioms replace one or both quantifiers with “there exists.” The negation of Axiom 3 in a model provides a family of normal sequentially compact spaces whose product is not countably compact. The question of whether such a family exists in ZFC, even with “normal” weakened to “regular”, is a famous unsolved problem of set-theoretic topology, known as the Scarborough–Stone problem. (shrink)

An ℵ1-Souslin tree is a complicated combinatorial object whose existence cannot be decided on the grounds of ZFC alone. But fifteen years after Tennenbaum and Jech independently devised notions of forcing for introducing such a tree, Shelah proved that already the simplest forcing notion—Cohen forcing—adds an ℵ1-Souslin tree. In this article, we identify a rather large class of notions of forcing that, assuming a GCH-type hypothesis, add a λ+-Souslin tree. This class includes Prikry, Magidor, and Radin forcing.

Quantum mechanics (QM) predicts probabilities on the fundamental level which are, via Born probability law, connected to the formal randomness of infinite sequences of QM outcomes. Recently it has been shown that QM is algorithmic 1-random in the sense of Martin–Löf. We extend this result and demonstrate that QM is algorithmic $$\omega$$ -random and generic, precisely as described by the ’miniaturisation’ of the Solovay forcing to arithmetic. This is extended further to the result that QM becomes Zermelo–Fraenkel Solovay random on (...) infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Moreover, it is more likely that there exists a standard transitive ZFC model M, where QM is expressed in reality, than in the universe V of sets. Then every generic quantum measurement adds to M the infinite sequence, i.e. random real $$r\in 2^{\omega }$$, and the model undergoes random forcing extensions M[r]. The entire process of forcing becomes the structural ingredient of QM and parallels similar constructions applied to spacetime in the quantum limit, therefore showing the structural resemblance of both in this limit. We discuss several questions regarding measurability and possible practical applications of the extended Solovay randomness of QM. The method applied is the formalization based on models of ZFC; however, this is particularly well-suited technique to recognising randomness questions of QM. When one works in a constant model of ZFC or in axiomatic ZFC itself, the issues considered here remain hidden to a great extent. (shrink)

The article deals with finding finite total equivalence systems for formulas based on an arbitrary closed class of functions of several variables defined on the set {0, 1, 2} and taking values in the set {0,1} with the property that the restrictions of its functions to the set {0, 1} constitutes a closed class of Boolean functions. We consider all classes whose restriction closure is either the set of all functions of two-valued logic or the set T a of (...) functions preserving \. In each of these cases, we find a finite total equivalence system, construct a canonical type for formulas, and present a complete algorithm for determining whether any two formulas are equivalent. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

The idea that “simplicity is a sign of truth”, and the related “Occam’s razor” principle, stating that, all other things being equal, simpler models should be preferred to more complex ones, have been long discussed in philosophy and science. We explore these ideas in the context of supervised machine learning, namely the branch of artificial intelligence that studies algorithms which balance simplicity and accuracy in order to effectively learn about the features of the underlying domain. Focusing on statistical learning (...) theory, we show that situations exist for which a preference for simpler models provably slows down, instead of favoring, the supervised learning process. Our results shed new light on the relations between simplicity and truth approximation, which are briefly discussed in the context of both machine learning and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

We examine the question of how many Boolean algebras, distinct up to isomorphism, that are quotients of the powerset of the naturals by Borel ideals, can be proved to exist in ZFC alone. The maximum possible value is easily seen to be the cardinality of the continuum $2^{\aleph_{0}}$ ; earlier work by Ilijas Farah had shown that this was the value in models of Martin's Maximum or some similar forcing axiom, but it was open whether there could be fewer in (...) models of the Continuum Hypothesis. We develop and apply a new technique for constructing many ideals whose quotients must be nonisomorphic in any model of ZFC. The technique depends on isolating a kind of ideal, called shallow, that can be distinguished from the ideal of all finite sets even after any isomorphic embedding, and then piecing together various copies of the ideal of all finite sets using distinct shallow ideals. In this way we are able to demonstrate that there are continuum-many distinct quotients by Borel ideals, indeed by analytic P-ideals, and in fact that there is in an appropriate sense a Borel embedding of the Vitali equivalence relation into the equivalence relation of isomorphism of quotients by analytic P-ideals. We also show that there is an uncountable definable wellordered collection of Borel ideals with distinct quotients. (shrink)

We prove that the determinacy of Gale-Stewart games whose winning sets are accepted by realtime 1-counter Büchi automata is equivalent to the determinacy of analytic Gale-Stewart games which is known to be a large cardinal assumption. We show also that the determinacy of Wadge games between two players in charge ofω-languages accepted by 1-counter Büchi automata is equivalent to the analytic Wadge determinacy. Using some results of set theory we prove that one can effectively construct a 1-counter Büchi automatonand (...) a Büchi automatonsuch that: There exists a model of ZFC in which Player 2 has a winning strategy in the Wadge gameW,L()); There exists a model of ZFC in which the Wadge gameW,L()) is not determined. Moreover these are the only two possibilities, i.e. there are no models of ZFC in which Player 1 has a winning strategy in the Wadge gameW,L()). (shrink)

There is something frustrating in the concept of algorithm that can even worry: its limitations. An algorithm does not need the time to define itself, it possesses in its structure everything that defines it and can work exclusively in a site, such as a computer, which is itself another finite system. Whenever a particular algorithm will be executed it will always be inexorably equal to itself because the number of possible states is finite. A logical­mathematical algorithm is essentially very different (...) from a living being that reveals its being only in the passage of time, in the relationship with the environment, in the happening of events. On the contrary there is a strong relationship between living things and the art, since art essentially needs time to express itself. The art has a time dimension, if for no other reason, because the purpose of art is reaching human beings. But art, through technology, can also broaden its horizons. Art can make use of the technology and can do exactly as the man whose expression is, to grow, to expand, to discover new identities, to conduct an investigation in those distant places, on the border with the irrational. (shrink)

For each class in the piecewise-local subregular hierarchy, a relativized (tier-based) variant is defined. Algebraic as well as automata-, language-, and model-theoretic characterizations are provided for each of these relativized classes, except in cases where this is provably impossible. These various characterizations are necessarily intertwined due to the well-studied logic-automaton connection and the relationship between finite-state automata and (syntactic) semigroups. Closure properties of each class are demonstrated by using automata-theoretic methods to provide constructive proofs for the closures that do hold (...) and giving language-theoretic counterexamples for those that do not. The net result of all of this is that, rather than merely existing as an operationally-defined parallel set of classes, these relativized variants integrate cleanly with the other members of the piecewise-local subregular hierarchy from every perspective. Relativization may even prove useful in the characterization of star-free, as every star-free stringset is the preprojection of another (also star-free) stringset whose syntactic semigroup is not a monoid. (shrink)

Kirby and Paris have exhibited combinatorial algorithms whose computations always terminate, but for which termination is not provable in elementary arithmetic. However, termination of these computations can be proved by adding an axiom first introduced by Goodstein in 1944. Our purpose is to investigate this axiom of Goodstein, and some of its variants, and to show that these are potentially adequate to prove termination of computations of a wide class of algorithms. We prove that many variations (...) of Goodstein's axiom are equivalent, over elementary arithmetic, and contrast these results with those recently obtained for Kruskal's theorem. (shrink)

Most elderly patients die with an order in place that they not be given cardiopulmonary resuscitation . Surveys have shown that many elderly in different parts of the world want to be resuscitated, but may lack knowledge about the specifics of cardiopulmonary resuscitation . Data from countries other than the US is limited, but differences in physician and patient opinions by nationality regarding CPR do exist. Physicians’ own preferences for CPR may predominate in the DNR decision making process for their (...) patients, and many physicians may not want the participation of the elderly or believe that it is necessary. More complete and earlier discussions of a wider range of options of care for patients at the end of life have been advocated. The process ought to include education for patients about the process and efficacy of CPR, and for physicians on how to consider the values and levels of knowledge of their patients, whose preferences may differ from their own. (shrink)

As the world keeps advancing, the need for automated interconnected devices has started to gain significance; to cater to the condition, a new concept Internet of Things has been introduced that revolves around smart devicesʼ conception. These smart devices using IoT can communicate with each other through a network to attain particular objectives, i.e., automation and intelligent decision making. IoT has enabled the users to divide their household burden with machines as these complex machines look after the environment variables and (...) control their behavior accordingly. As evident, these machines use sensors to collect vital information, which is then the complexity analyzed at a computational node that then smartly controls these devicesʼ operational behaviors. Deep learning-based guessing attack protection algorithms have been enhancing IoT security; however, it still has a critical challenge for the complex industries’ IoT networks. One of the crucial aspects of such systems is the need to have a significant training time for processing a large dataset from the networkʼs previous flow of data. Traditional deep learning approaches include decision trees, logistic regression, and support vector machines. However, it is essential to note that this convenience comes with a price that involves security vulnerabilities as IoT networks are prone to be interfered with by hackers who can access the sensor/communication data and later utilize it for malicious purposes. This paper presents the experimental study of cryptographic algorithms to classify the types of encryption algorithms into the asymmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithm. It presents a deep analysis of AES, DES, 3DES, RSA, and Blowfish based on timing complexity, size, encryption, and decryption performances. It has been assessed in terms of the guessing attack in real-time deep learning complex IoT applications. The assessment has been done using the simulation approach and it has been tested the speed of encryption and decryption of the selected encryption algorithms. For each encryption and decryption, the tests executed the same encryption using the same plaintext for five separate times, and the average time is compared. The key size used for each encryption algorithm is the maximum bytes the cipher can allow. To the comparison, the average time required to compute the algorithm by the three devices is used. For the experimental test, a set of plaintexts is used in the simulation—password-sized text and paragraph-sized text—that achieves target fair results compared to the existing algorithms in real-time deep learning networks for IoT applications. (shrink)

A minimal formula is a formula which is minimal in provable formulas with respect to the substitution relation. This paper shows the following: (1) A β-normal proof of a minimal formula of depth 2 is unique in NJ. (2) There exists a minimal formula of depth 3 whose βη-normal proof is not unique in NJ. (3) There exists a minimal formula of depth 3 whose βη-normal proof is not unique in NK.

Two semantic paradoxes, the Liar and Curry’s paradox, are analysed using a newly developed conception of procedural semantics (semantics according to which the truth of propositions is determined algorithmically), whose main characteristic is its departure from methodological realism. Rather than determining pre-existing facts, procedures are constitutive of them. Of this semantics, two versions are considered: closed (where the halting of procedures is presumed) and open (without this presumption). To this end, a procedural approach to deductive reasoning is developed, based (...) on the idea of simulation. As is shown, closed semantics supports classical logic, but cannot in any straightforward way accommodate the concept of truth. In open semantics, where paradoxical propositions naturally ‘belong’, they cease to be paradoxical; yet, it is concluded that the natural choice—for logicians and common people alike—is to stick to closed semantics, pragmatically circumventing problematic utterances. (shrink)