When information is transformed from what has traditionally been a paper-based format into digitized elements with meaning associated to them, new and intriguing discussions begin surrounding proper and improper uses of this codified and easily transmittable information. As these discussions continue, some health care providers, insurers, laboratories, pharmacies, and other healthcare stakeholders are creating and retroactively digitizing our medical information with the unambiguous endorsement of the federal government.Some argue that these enormous databases of medical information offer improved access to timely (...) information, evidence-based treatments, and complete records from which to provide care. To the extent that these claims are true, it would seem that this is a valuable asset that offers immeasurable benefit to all. Others believe this digitization to be an egregious invasion of privacy. In this article, I investigate the broad research questions of whether the public good aspect of capturing private health information outweighs individual interests and whether it is ethical to mandate participation in health information exchanges by all individuals who use the U.S. health system. (shrink)

We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, (...) effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents. (shrink)

Gender discrimination continues to plague organizations. While the advent of the Internet and the digitization of commerce have provided both a mechanism by which goods and services can be exchanged, as well as an efficient way for consumers to voice their opinions about retailers (i.e., via online rating systems), recent work has begun to uncover significant biases that manifest during the review process. In particular, it has been suggested that the gig-economy’s elimination of previously anonymous arm’s-length transactions may re-introduce bias (...) into perceptions of quality. In this work, we build upon research that has identified biases based on ascriptive characteristics in rating systems of ridesharing platforms. In doing so, we conduct an online experiment using a series of factorial vignettes to consider not only willingness to transact but post-transaction perceptions of quality. Findings suggest that female drivers are not penalized ex ante for taking on gender incongruent roles, i.e., driving, and experience no penalty when a rider reports a high-quality experience. However, conditional upon a lower quality experience, there is a disproportionate penalty for female drivers. Strikingly, we also observe that historic high quality does not serve as a buffer against such penalties, as prior literature would suggest. These findings underscore the challenges platforms face in ensuring their participants are being evaluated in a fair and impartial way, and highlight the difficulties present when non-employees (customers) are rating non-employees (drivers) of the firm. (shrink)

Background: This article describes the overall attitudes of children, their parents, and attending physicians toward including or excluding pediatric patients in medical communication and health care decision-making processes. Methods: Fifty-two interviews were carried out with pediatric patients (n = 17), their parents (n = 19), and attending oncologists (n = 16) in eight Swiss pediatric oncology centers. The interviews were analyzed using thematic coding. Results: Parenting styles, the child's personality, and maturity are factors that have a great impact upon the (...) inclusion of children in their health care processes. Children reported the desire to be heard and involved, but they did not want to dominate the decision-making process. Ensuring trust in the parent–child and physician–patient relationships and respecting the child as the affected person were important values determining children's involvement. These two considerations were closely connected with the concern that fantasies are often worse than reality. Seeking children's compliance with treatment was a practical but critical reason for informing them about their health care. The urge to protect them from upsetting news sometimes resulted in their (partial) exclusion. Conclusions: The ethical imperative for inclusion of children in their health care choices was not so much determined by the right for self-determination, but by the need to include them. If children are excluded, they imagine things, become more isolated, and are left alone with their fears. Nevertheless, the urge to protect children is innate, as adults often underestimate children's coping capacities. (shrink)

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure (...) of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both (...) putative sceptical paradoxes. A particular biscopic proposal is then explored which brings together two apparently opposing anti-sceptical theses: he Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation and epistemological disjunctivism. It is argued that each proposal enables us to gain a purchase on one, but only one, aspect of the two-sided sceptical problem. Furthermore, it is argued that these proposals are not only compatible positions, but also mutually supporting and advanced in the same undercutting spirit. A potential cure is thus offered for epistemic angst. (shrink)

I discuss the difficulty posed by the ineliminability of reflective epistemic luck and offer one way of responding to this difficulty. I begin by considering Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge from On Certainty and consider, in particular, the specific claims he makes about the so-called ’hinge’ propositions that contextually determine the nature of epistemic evaluation. I claim that what underlies Wittgenstein’s remarks in this respect is a certain view about the ultimately groundless nature of our reason-giving practices. This way of thinking (...) about the structure of reasons is, I argue, correlative to the thesis described here regarding the ineliminability of reflective luck. Moreover, I contend that it is our implicit philosophical recognition of this problem that gives rise to a certain kind of general anxiety about our epistemic position that I refer to as epistemic angst. This contention is further illustrated by critically evaluating John McDowell’s content externalist response to scepticism that incorporates a strongly anti-sceptical account of reasons. I close on a positive note by arguing that while there is no epistemic response available to the problem posed by reflective luck, there is a plausible pragmatic resolution to this difficulty. Indeed, I claim that an anti-sceptical thesis of this sort can be discerned from Wittgenstein’s own fragmentary remarks on scepticism, and I develop such a view in the light of Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic response to the problem of inductive scepticism, which I maintain is cast along similar lines. (shrink)

How should we make choices where the values we subscribe to give conflicting recommendations? I will be defending a reduction of decision making under conflict to decision making under indeterminacy, in the spirit of Broome. To defend this, I set out and endorse the basic features of decision making under conflict that Ruth Chang identifies. I show that we find exactly those features in cases of decision making under indeterminacy not involving conflicting values. Further, my theory of decision making under (...) indeterminacy predicts and explains these features. Particular attention will be paid to the aspect that Chang emphasizes as the decisive problem for the Broomean reduction: the resolutional residue, or angst, that decision making under conflict evinces. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on teachers’ lived experiences during the COVID-19 outbreak. Specifically, I explore the emotional impact the abrupt shift to online teaching had on teachers’ work and life throughout the various phases of the lockdown. I develop my argument by analyzing teachers’ everyday work, using a qualitative approach, and constructing a small-scale empirical study. Philosophically, my attempt is phenomenologically developed and is framed by Heidegger’s and Arendt’s thoughts. Methodologically, my attempt falls within an emerging research horizon that (...) combines educational philosophy with empirical research. Drawing from research data, I argue that teachers’ experience bears witness to a deep modification of the schooling space-time, namely, the horizon in which the very perception of students, themselves, and teaching arise. In the case of teachers experiencing discomfort, fear, and even angst, the totality of their gestures and emotions was, as it were, swallowed by this unknown and disquieting horizon; teachers in distress were experiencing the collapse of any projecting without being freed by projecting itself. In the case of teachers experiencing feelings of fulfillment and even joy, a different horizon was allowed to emerge. Such a different space-time, rather than producing a sense of distance and alienation, created a new intimacy and nearness, which allows for a different attitude toward the topics and the educational community. Students became more sensitive, susceptible to transformation, and open to what was being said. At the same time, relationships were caught in a new web of meanings that transcended them, thus giving birth to an educational experience in its own right. I conclude with some remarks about the building of the educational community. (shrink)

Im vorliegenden Artikel wird anhand von detailliertem klinischem Material beschrieben, wie »harte« Ideologien oft als mental-autistische, fetischistische, schalenartige Objekte fungieren, durch die die Kommunikation blockiert wird, aber tief­reichende, archaische osmotisch-diffuse Ängste gelindert werden. Diese Ängste entstehen, weil das Gefühl, als eine abgegrenzte Einheit in Zeit und Raum zu existieren, brüchig ist. »Harte« Ideologien schützen vor diesen Ängsten, greifen aber gleichzeitig sowohl die geistige Gesundheit des Patienten als auch die des Analytikers an und führen zu einem Zustand des psychischen Nirgendwoseins. Menschen, (...) die sich an diese defensiv organisierten »harten Ideologien« halten, sind innerlich häufig aufgewühlt, für sie gibt es keine Balance zwischen ihren psychotischen und nicht-psychotischen Persönlichkeitsanteilen. Darüber hinaus leiden sie an einer autistischen »Verkapselung«, die durch ein starkes Gefühl des Nirgendwoseins gekennzeichnet ist. Sie sind daher rigide auf Themen wie den Schutz der Heimat, der nationalen Grenzen und Identität fixiert und mit den extremen konkreten Maßnahmen beschäftigt, die zu deren Aufrechterhaltung erforderlich sind. (shrink)

This article discusses the possibilities of the ontology of hospitality running across the categories of angst, responsibility and aporia. In this way it seeks to address the radical finitude of our concrete death, incorporating the needed, existentive, and ontic considerations of dying, which the heideggerian previous attempt moved away as irrelevant, being not original ones to philosophical reflection. This recovery does not mean, absolutely not, that death and dying have lost their true character and perplexing mystery, or that they (...) have dissolved the very nature of our aporetic existence. Rather, death is and will remain being such an indeterminate and always present concern, restlessness disturbing thought, as beautifully as Schopenhauer had said before: "death is the true inspirational genius or Musagetes of philosophy". (shrink)

Ängste sind Teil einer krisenhaften Lebenswelt. Die Texte des Bandes gehen von einer Beobachtung der Dialektik der Aufklärung aus: Diese sieht die Intention der Aufklärung darin, "von den Menschen die Furcht zu nehmen und sie als Herren einzusetzen", doch die "vollends aufgeklärte Erde" erscheine "im Zeichen triumphalen Unheils". In den vorliegenden Aufsätzen geht es darum, wie konkrete Furcht unter Bedingungen sozialer Herrschaft in diffuse Ängste diffundiert. Die Texte analysieren und kommentieren gesellschaftliche Phänomene, wie sie sich im Medium philosophischer, literarischer und (...) bildkünstlerischer Bearbeitung darstellen. Thematisiert werden auch sozialphilosophische und -wissenschaftliche Modelle der Beschreibung sowie die Analyse und Kritik soziokultureller Phänomene. Alle Texte sind verbunden durch eine ideologiekritische Perspektive auf die Widersprüchlichkeit von Aufklärung - und durch die Erinnerung an Grundpositionen des kritischen Materialismus. Gerhard Schweppenhäuser zählt zu den führenden Kennern und Kommentatoren der Kritischen Theorie und ist Gründungs- und Mitherausgeber der Zeitschrift für kritische Theorie. (shrink)

This paper defends pro-realism, the view that it is better if moral realism is true rather than any of its rivals. After offering an account of philosophical angst, I make three general arguments. The first targets nihilism: in securing the possibility of moral justification and vindication in objecting to certain harms, moral realism secures something that is non-morally valuable and even essential to the meaning and intelligibility of our lives. The second argument targets antirealism: moral realism secures a desirable (...) independence for moral justification that is qualitatively different from the anti-realistic construal of independence that is only explicable in terms of degrees of distance from our subjective responses and attitudes. Finally, I argue that while the pan-expressivist semantic program of quasi-realism has significant effects on what can be appropriately said in meta-ethical discourse, it provides no comfort to the pro-realist who is already angsty about anti-realism. (shrink)

The anguish of Erich Fromm, a philosophical journey to an hypothesis on the turbulent life of a renowed psychoanalist when he meets Martin Heidegger.

Die vorliegende Studie hat „Angst und Entängstigung“ in Kierkegaards Schrift „Begriff Angst“ zum Thema und versucht, durch detaillierte Textarbeit das hier beschriebene Phänomen der Angst als einen wesentlichen Teil des menschlichen Gefühlslebens in seiner vollen Begrifflichkeit zu entfalten. Die Arbeit ist in drei Teile gegliedert: der erste Teil beschäftigt sich mit den theologischen und metaphysisch-existentialistischen Grundlagen von Kierkegaards Schrift, der zweite Teil behandelt die Begriffe Angst und Entängstigung, der dritte Teil stellt die Angstthematik in den philosophischen (...) Horizont der idealistischen und nachidealistischen Philosophie. Der Übergang zum dritten Kapitel ist eine detaillierte tabellarische Darstellung der Angst in ihren wesentlichen Momenten, die die komplexe Entfaltung der Angstthematik übersichtlich macht und vor allem die These von der anthropologischen Grundlegung in ihren verschiedenen Stadien nachzeichnet. Mit der sich am Text durchgängig bestätigenden These, dass Kierkegaards Ansatz eine hamartologisch begründete Anthropologie zugrunde liegt, will die Studie eine der schwierigsten und dunkelsten Abhandlungen Kierkegaards in ihrer ganzen Komplexität erhellen. (shrink)

Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Angst und ihren zahlreichen Facetten gehört zum Kernbestand der psychoanalytischen Forschung und Diskussion. Darüber hinaus hat die Beschäftigung mit der Angst als einem komplexen, äußerst vielschichtigen Phänomen der Conditio humana zu zahlreichen Kontroversen und mehreren Spaltungen in der psychoanalytischen Bewegung geführt, die so weit reichten, dass die jeweiligen Betrachtungsweisen über die Angst sich zu einer Identitätsfrage psychoanalytischer Orientierungen ausgestalteten. Der vorliegende Aufsatz gibt eine Übersicht über die Entwicklung wesentlicher Angstkonzepte in der Psychoanalyse.

This paper argues for an interpretation of what Heidegger means by 'angst' in Being and Time that begins from the methodological role angst is supposed to play in Division I as that which disrupts falling. It argues that angst is a distinctive kind of ontological insight.

What responsibility do the Manhattan Project scientists have for the atomic devastation of Hiroshima? Krupps scientists for the crematoriums at Auschwitz? Is there no way to revisit the ideals of science once devoted to creating a more reasonable and open society free from prejudices? Disturbing questions like these are at the heart of this sobering exploration of scientific and intellectual responsibility.

Verbunden mit dem drohenden Verlust von kognitiven Kapazitäten und der Veränderung der eigenen Persönlichkeit, ist zu vermuten, dass bei Demenzerkrankungen ein Sinnverlust vom Erkrankten befürchtet wird. Es ist Aufgabe dieses Papers aufzuklären, was es mit einer solch meist diffus empfundenen Angst auf sich hat. Dazu wird ein Deutungsangebot gemacht, das auf die Sinnkonzeption Susan Wolfs zurückgreift. Es wird gezeigt, dass es möglich ist, bis zu einem gewissen Grad der Demenz ein sinnvolles Leben zu führen – ein Leben, bei dem (...) subjektiv Anziehendes und rational Wertvolles zusammengreifen müssen. Dies ist möglich, weil ein Mensch mit Demenz noch über entsprechende Fähigkeiten der Wertschätzung verfügt und eine Hilfsbedürftigkeit der Befähigung zu einem sinnvollen Leben nicht widerspricht. Bei einer sehr schweren Beeinträchtigung der kognitiven Kapazitäten wird es hingegen nicht mehr möglich sein, ein solches Leben zu leben; die solcherart erkrankte Person wird dies aber auch nicht mehr vermissen. Wenn das, was man mit der Demenzerkrankung zu verlieren befürchtet, durch das Sinnverständnis Wolfs getroffen ist, dann sollte man diese Überlegungen bei der Beurteilung einer empfundenen Angst berücksichtigen. (shrink)

The guides are shirt-pocket sized, easily folded, laminated for durability, and easy to read.

In this case, it is noted that while DNA testing and methylation are being studied as biomarkers for high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions in the anal canal, their efficacy is no...

The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of (...) epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned’ within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch’ with an ‘external’ world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same. (shrink)

Is fear a ‘deficient mode’ of anxiety? This claim made by Martin Heidegger in ‘Being and Time’ (1927) depends on an analysis of intentionality. Emotions take objects: to love, to hate, to fear is to love, to hate, to fear someone or something. Yet anxiety, Heidegger maintains (‘Being and Time’ § 40), is about “nothing” (“nichts”) rather than “something” (“etwas”). Heidegger then turns lack of knowledge or understanding of what one’s anxiety is about into a revelation of “Nothing” (“Die (...) class='Hi'>Angst offenbart das Nichts”; ‘Being and Time’ § 40) – a state meant to manifest freedom. Yet freedom is not increased but diminished if and when someone cannot judge the direction, extent and power of a threat. Concrete, determinate thought liberates; someone is less free in anxiety than in fear. (shrink)

This paper attempts a new interpretation of Heidegger’s existential analysis of the phenomena of fear and anxiety. Heidegger is shown to analyze both phenomena as basic states-of-mind . Basic states-of-mind are taken to differ from other states-of mind in that they are formal phenomena, i.e. phenomena that are not apparent or experienced themselves, but only concretize in apparent and experienced phenomena. As an instance of phenomena, in which the formal phenomena of fear and anxiety concretize, the paper presents hüzün, a (...) collective mood described by Orhan Pamuk in his latest novel. (shrink)