This chapter contains sections titled: What Is the Philosophy of the Social Sciences? What Are the “Social Sciences”? How Do We Define the Social? What Is a Social Explanation? What Is Social Causation? How Are Social Science Hypotheses and Theories Given Empirical Justification? Positivism, Naturalism, and General Social Laws How Do Social Facts Relate to Facts about Individuals and Facts about Psychology? Conclusion References.

The paper is devoted to the subject status of the discipline “Philosophy of Sociology”. Philosophy of sociology is an interdisciplinary direction focusing on the main preconditions of sociological knowledge development as well as cognitive value of sociological facts, theories and conceptions. Its subject can be divided into “philosophical foundations of sociology” and “philosophical problems of sociology”. “Sociologism” as the concept of substitution of social philosophy by sociology as a science which is better (...) empirically oriented and is able to give more exact and proved picture of social reality also poses danger to social philosophy. “Sociologism” presents a positivist attack on social philosophy. Indeed, sociology is no less speculative science than social philosophy is, which is well illustrated by a lot of divergences among its theoretical constructions and empirical data. The main functions of philosophy of sociology in the world of contemporary social-humanitarian knowledge are critical function, integrative function and axiological function. (shrink)

Bourdieu’s thought is disturbing. Provocative. Scandalous even, at least for those who do not easily tolerate the unmitigated truth about the social. Nonetheless his ideas, among the most important and innovative of our time, are here to stay. This thought has taken form in the course of a career and through works on diverse subjects that have constructed a far-reaching analytical model of social life, which the author calls more readily an anthropology rather than a sociology. In their totality, (...) they constitute today an original and powerful proposal to explain human practices. In the face of criticisms commonly leveled at Bourdieu’s thought (notably the charge that it reduces everything to a single schematic model), it is important to identify the spirit of his enterprise. Early on, it is true, his thought drew on a few fundamental concepts—the trilogy habitus, field (champ), practice (pratique)—to which it constantly returned, and followed a clearly defined trajectory. At the same time, however, he continually reformulated, adapted, and refined his analytical model, depending on the operations to which he subjected new objects of inquiry. The regenerative and transformative force of his thought was supported by two convictions. First, that there being nothing more vain than theory for theory’s sake, it is preferable that theoretical production originate in the study of concrete and occasionally very specific cases. Second, that in order to escape stereotypical classifications, boundaries separating disciplines are best transgressed, thereby favoring new constructions of the object of inquiry. (shrink)

This book represents emerging alternative perspectives to the "constructivist" orthodoxy that currently dominates the field of science and technology studies. Various contributions from distinguished Americans and Europeans in the field, provide arguments and evidence that it is not enough simply to say that science is "socially situated." Controversial Science focuses on important political, ethical, and broadly normative considerations that have yet to be given their due, but which point to a more realistic and critical perspective on science policy.

Philosophy of mathematics is moving in a new direction: away from a foundationalism in terms of formal logic and traditional ontology, and towards a broader range of approaches that are united by a focus on mathematical practice. The scientific research network PhiMSAMP (Philosophy of Mathematics: Sociological Aspects and Mathematical Practice) consisted of researchers from a variety of backgrounds and fields, brought together by their common interest in the shift of philosophy of mathematics towards mathematical practice. Hosted by (...) the Rheinische Friedrich- Wilhelms-Universitat Bonn and funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) from 2006-2010, the network organized and contributed to a number of workshops and conferences on the topic of mathematical practice. The refereed contributions in this volume represent the research results of the network and consists of contributions of the network members as well as selected paper versions of presentations at the network's mid-term conference, "Is mathematics special?" (PhiMSAMP-3) held in Vienna 2008. (shrink)

This book is an interdisciplinary contribution to bioethics, bringing together philosophers, sociologists and Science and Technology Studies researchers as a way of bridging the disciplinary divides that have opened up in the study of bioethics. Each discipline approaches the topic through its own lens providing either normative statements or empirical studies, and the distance between the disciplines is heightened not only by differences in approach, but also disagreements over the values, interpretations and problematics within bioethical research. In order to converse (...) across these divides, this volume includes contributions from several disciplines. The volume examines the sociological issues faced by interdisciplinary research in bioethics, the role of expertise, moral generalisations, distributed agency, and the importance of examining what is not being talked about. Other contributions try to take an interdisciplinary look at a range of specific situations, fetal alcohol syndrome in the media, citizen science, electronic cigarettes and bioethical issues in human geography. (shrink)

Originally published in 1983. This book concentrates on the impact of philosophy of science on sociology and other disciplines. It argues that the impact of the philosophy of science on sociology from the rise of the Vienna Circle until the mid-1980s resulted in a deep-reaching and, in the author’s view, undesirable methodological reorientation in sociology.

This volume concerns philosophical issues that arise from the practice of anthropology and sociology. The essays cover a wide range of issues, including traditional questions in the philosophy of social science as well as those specific to these disciplines. Authors attend to the historical development of the current debates and set the stage for future work.

1. Philosophy of Science. The term “philosophy of science” is used here to refer to the study of the approaches and methodologies of the sciences. By “approach” is understood the totality of the presuppositions of a given science : more precisely, both philosophical and scientific presuppositions—that is, categories, postulates, and premises as conditions—and “existential” presuppositions. By “methodology” is understood the intellectual-emotional structure of a given science—that is, its categories, postulates, and premises as characteristics, as well as its concepts, (...) methods, and techniques. Further, I advocate understanding a given science through a study of its approach and of its methodology. Finally, I submit that the best understanding of either of the two is impossible without the study of the other. More specifically, I advocate the consideration of a particular science as a given, and the interpretation of its intellectual structure or methodology ; and then the study of its presuppositions or underlying approach. (shrink)

SummaryIn a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality (...) in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it. (shrink)

In summer 1960, Adorno gave the first of a series of lectures devoted to the relation between sociology and philosophy. One of his central concerns was to dispel the notion, erroneous in his view, that these were two incompatible disciplines, radically opposed in their methods and aims, a notion that was shared by many. While some sociologists were inclined to dismiss philosophy as obsolete and incapable of dealing with the pressing social problems of our time, many philosophers, (...) influenced by Kant, believed that philosophical reflection must remain 'pure', investigating the constitution of knowledge and experience without reference to any real or material factors. By focusing on the problem of truth, Adorno seeks to show that philosophy and sociology share much more in common than many of their practitioners are inclined to assume. Drawing on intellectual history, Adorno demonstrates the connection between truth and social context, arguing that there is no truth that cannot be manipulated by ideology and no theorem that can be wholly detached from social and historical considerations.his systematic account on the interconnectedness of philosophy and sociology makes these lectures a timeless reflection on the nature of these disciplines and an excellent introduction to critical theory, the sociological content of which is here outlined in detail by Adorno for the first time. (shrink)

Originally published in 1982. This volume explores some features of modern philosophy of science from the point of view of their utility for sociology’s self-understanding. Recently philosophers of science have broken with the empiricism once fundamental to their discipline, and have sought alternative methods of science. Founded on the belief that these developments are significant for sociologists, the book explores the failings of the old "received view" and some of the more recent alternatives. It proposes a schematic outline (...) of the structure of inquiry, paying detailed attention to questions about the nature of theory, explanation and demonstration. (shrink)

This volume concerns philosophical issues that arise from the practice of anthropology and sociology. The essays cover a wide range of issues, including traditional questions in the philosophy of social science as well as those specific to these disciplines. Authors attend to the historical development of the current debates and set the stage for future work.

This book explores Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy and sociology of science, which, though central to his thought, have been largely neglected in critical examinations of his work. Addressing the resultant confusion that surrounds Bourdieu's sociologized philosophy of science, it expounds his epistemology and sociology of science, situating it within the context of Anglo-American post positivist philosophy of science and shedding light on the critique of relativist sociology of science that emerges from his field theory. From (...) a detailed critique of Bourdieu's reflexive sociology and his attempt to enhance the uneasy epistemic status of the social sciences, the author draws on the thought of Jürgen Habermas to suggest critical ethnography as a way of going beyond Bourdieu's critical theory. As such, Bourdieu's Philosophy and Sociology of Science will appeal to sociologists, philosophers and scholars across the social sciences with interests in the work of Bourdieu and the sociology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

We hear nowadays in literary criticism of a type of novel that is an ‘anti-novel’ and of a type of hero who is an ‘anti-hero’. I recently read an article which argued, rather well in my opinion, that the later philosophy of Wittgenstein is an anti-philosophy. One could say the same of the philosophie positive of Auguste Comte, who is often called the father of sociology. The principle with which Comte starts off his philosophy, ‘the fundamental (...) law of mental development’, would put an end to philosophy as traditionally conceived, and would replace it by science. According to Comte, human inquiry goes through three stages. In the first stage, the theological or fictive, men try to give explanations in terms of supernatural beings. At the second stage, the metaphysical or abstract, theological explanation has given way to explanation in terms of abstract entities such as Absolute Motion or Absolute Justice. In the third stage, the scientific or positive, metaphysical explanations have given way to scientific explanations, that is to explanations which do not refer to any unobservable entities but instead simply correlate observable phenomena with each other. This is a picture of intellectual history in which philosophy takes the place of theology and then science takes the place of philosophy. (shrink)

The question of the role of science in the development of our society, and the role of the social sciences in particular, loomed large in the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. This was a consequence of the tasks posed by the present stage of the building of communism. The proceedings and decisions of the Congress emphasized the rapid advance of science, its increasing influence upon all aspects of the material and intellectual life of society, and the need (...) to assure high rates of scientific and technological progress on the basis of the growth of all branches of knowledge and the extensive introduction of the achievements of science into industry. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress, considerable attention was given to the social sciences, upon which the party is now placing even greater responsibility. "The elaboration of important problems in economics and politics, philosophy and sociology, history and law, and in other social sciences, in close association with the practical work of the building of communism," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is a most important task for Soviet scholars." Further, he emphasized: "The development of the social sciences and the introduction of their recommendations in practice play no less important a role than the employment of the achievements of the natural sciences in the sphere of material production and the development of the intellectual life of the people" . These statements call for thorough consideration. (shrink)

This volume has a misleading title: one might think that the material in this long work is by the great Indian spiritual leader. But it is not. Rather it is a collection of essays by A. R. Wadia, M.P., and it is only the first essay in the tome which is about Gandhi. Wadia is obviously some kind of Renaissance man, an interpreter of all knowledge--philosophical and religious, western and eastern--to the Indian mind. In one volume can be found Wadia (...) on "Pragmatic Idealism," "Philosophy and Religion," "Science and Philosophy," "Buddha as a Revolutionary Force in Indian Culture," "The Psychological Background of Politics and Sociology," "The Problem of Population in India," and there is lots more.--W. A. J. (shrink)

I want to make plausible the following claim:Analyzing scientific inquiry as a species of socially distributed cognition has a variety of advantages for science studies, among them the prospects of bringing together philosophy and sociology of science. This is not a particularly novel claim, but one that faces major obstacles. I will retrace some of the major steps that have been made in the pursuit of a distributed cognition approach to science studies, paying special attention to the promise (...) that such an approach holds out for bridging the rift between philosophy and the social studies of science. (shrink)

Philosophy and sociology appear to belong to separate spheres of thought, which might explain why they exist as separate academic disciplines. But in what way, if any, are philosophy and sociology different from, or related to, each other? In these series of lectures delivered at Frankfurt University in 1960, Adorno examines the relationship between philosophy and sociology and concludes that the subjects do not belong to separate spheres of thought. But Adorno has a bigger (...) aim in mind. His attempt to reconcile philosophy and sociology takes the form of a wholesale attack on positivistic sociology, followed by a critique of philosophical idealism. There is, however, a debate as to whether the origins of Adorno’s critical sociology lie in Marx’s critique of political economy or philosophical idealism. These lectures throw further light on this question as they show the development of Adorno’s social philosophy and the critical theory. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Modern Song: curious title, a curious book. If you bought it, as I did, because you are a devoted Dylan fan, hoping to find new Dylan songs inside, or at least new Dylan prose, you will be disappointed. In the photo of three musicians on the cover, none of them is Dylan. The one on the left is Little Richard. Who are the other two? Nowhere are we told their names, nor the names of the people (...) in any of the other photos, except for the sixty-six featured artists, though we will recognize many. The photo on the back cover might or might not be of the interior of Izzy Young's “Folklore Center,” reminiscent of Dylan's early days in Greenwich Village in the Sixties, when, together with my guitarist husband, I got to hear him perform after hours at the Gaslight and knew him well enough to say Hi when passing on the street.The basis for selecting the sixty-six songs anthologized and commented on is not immediately obvious. This is not a collection of Dylan's underappreciated favorites, though the taste represented is certainly eclectic and the choices are often surprising. The title does not help the reader who has not yet got her bearings... Philosophy? As if to justify his use of the word, Dylan eventually offers a lengthy comment on Albert Camus, but how relevant is that comment to these songs? And the word modern, too, means so many things—a sudden divergence from the past in the arts and literature; up-to-date and therefore good. These songs are not that kind of modern. If anything, the book looks backward, across the years of Dylan's long life to his musical awakening. Because we are almost the same age, I recognize the hodgepodge of styles and influences assembled here as belonging mostly to the early Fifties, when, like Bob, I was entering my teens by listening to, even dancing to, songs on the radio before I fell asleep at night. Enough about me! But no more apt basis for classifying these songs is suggested. They are not arranged alphabetically or chronologically.As for the anthologized songs, each one, once named, receives a commentary, and every commentary is called a chapter, and every chapter is divided into two parts, spelled out in letters as bold as a movie marquee. We are given the title of each song, the date of its release, and the name of the songwriter. The first part of each commentary consists of a paraphrase of “events” in the song, told almost exclusively in the second-person you rather than the more conventional I or the third-person he or she. Here is a passage from Dylan's paraphrase of “Blue Suede Shoes” by Carl Perkins: You get on well with most people, and you put up with a lot, and you hardly get caught off guard, but your shoes are something else. Minor things may annoy you, but you rise above them. Having your teeth kicked in, being pounded senseless, being dumped on and discredited, but you don't put any weight on that, none of it is as real to you as your shoes. They're priceless and beyond monetary worth.The paraphrase goes on for almost six pages, and to what end? The second half of each commentary, indicated by changes in the type, takes a few steps back to consider the sociological implications of the song in the context of its time. For instance, from the second half of the commentary on “Blue Suede Shoes”: “Shoes reveal character, station, and personality.” But Dylan does not use the opportunity to talk about his own character, station, personality. His associations with Carl Perkins and “Blue Suede Shoes” morph into an anecdote about a man called “Iron Felix, trusted consort to Lenin and Stalin.”A lengthy list of all required photo credits fills the two back pages but is printed in type so small it is almost illegible. If you want more information, and more importantly if you want to experience the songs discussed, your best bet is to search for the recordings on YouTube and to follow along, reading Dylan's commentary, one song at a time, while listening. Or, I hear rumors that we will need to purchase another book, the audio version of Philosophy of Modern Song, not yet released.Every song has its commentary, but nothing about this organization is stable, and as soon as the reader/listener thinks she has discovered a rationale for the order of the works selected, she is met with an exception. Basically, these seem to be songs about which Dylan has something anecdotal to say. More usefully, perhaps, they are organized around certain themes—those that have always preoccupied him: man's inhumanity to man, injustice, self-deception, the human situation. The anonymous author of the blurb on the jacket promises a master class in songwriting, but, if it exists at all, that lecture is exhausted in one or two observations, such as: “ ‘El Paso’ is built on five stanzas, each one two verses and a bridge and then returning to the next stanza.... ”It was almost fifty pages into the book that the sense of something missing overcame me. It was not only the words of the songs and the music that were missing; it was the author, the central intelligence that I love, the singer and songwriter whose name is credited on the cover but who never appears in the book, not even in a photograph. What I missed was Dylan. He had removed himself from his book's pages, except perhaps for a single instance: “You're an eighty-year old man, being wheeled around in a home for the elderly, and the nurses are getting on your nerves.... ”Has Bob Dylan grown weary of himself and all of his creations? The commentaries are not about Bob. In the whole book, the line quoted above may be the only exception. Does he refuse the “first person singular in the hopes of transcending ego”? Maybe; but we want to hear our master's voice. As for the philosophy of song? Besides the remarks on Camus, there is only one commentary in which Dylan explicitly states anything like a philosophy, and that is the one on “Willie the Wandering Gypsy and Me,” written and performed by Joe Shaver. The song has a philosophical point of view: “Keep moving, it's better, let the train keep on rolling.”. (shrink)

This engaging, wide-ranging study in comparative social and political philosophy gives a well-argued account of how ideological and even utopian views, such as normative communication, development and justice, are sociologically rooted. It also shows how this fact has been reflected in the social history of Asian countries like India and China, as well as some Western countries during the last two centuries. To illustrate the underlying concepts, reference is made to influential thinkers, both from the East and West, from (...) Hegel and James Mill to Marx and Maozedong, and from Gandhi to Rawls. The author, himself one of the major contemporary Indian philosophers, offers arguments to show that the right version of cultural relativism is objective and judgeable. Concrete case studies are cited indicating why even fundamental values like indivisible peace and "our own green planet" cannot be practically universalized. Yet this work is a sustained plea for improvable understanding between the East and the West and the transcultural value orientation of different cultures. (shrink)