Cet article met en lumière l’expression des mémoires du génocide des Tutsi dans l’espace public, au niveau de la région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes (France). Nous verrons que la forme et les acteurs des commémorations du génocide ont évolué ces dernières années, avec pour seule constante une absence de témoignages de la part de rescapés. Cela nous amènera à questionner les conditions d’élaboration et de transmission des mémoires individuelle et familiale de l’événement. Les données et analyses produites ici proviennent d’une thèse en sociologie-anthropologie, (...) dont le terrain d’enquête a été réalisé entre 2014 et 2019. (shrink)

Nous étions des survivantes, des veuves, condamnées à vivre. Mais petit à petit notre lutte a été de se dire : « On veut quand même être vivantes, vivantes ! », SurVivantes.Survivre, cela veut dire qu’auparavant on avait vécu.Je me suis mariée en 1987. En 1988, nous avons eu notre première fille Anna et nous sommes allés voir la famille de mon mari. Une photo a été..

Résumé Le phénomène des « ménages d’enfants » est apparu au Rwanda après le génocide des Tutsis qui a profondément ébranlé la structure familiale et l’organisation de la société. Certains enfants ont ainsi été amenés à vivre dans des « ménages » sans parents, menés par un autre enfant un peu plus âgé, considéré simultanément comme parent et comme grand(e) frère ou sœur. Comment fonctionnent ces nouveaux types de familles? Quels sont le rôle et la place de chacun des (...) membres de la fratrie? Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche qui s’appuie sur des entretiens menés sous forme de « récits de vie » auprès de seize personnes. L’analyse des entretiens révèle notamment le rôle de l’aîné et la façon dont la fratrie crée une nouvelle structure familiale qui tente de répondre tant bien que mal à la souffrance relative à l’absence parentale et constitue une ressource et un étayage psychique. (shrink)

Entre avril et mai 1994, au couvent de Sovu au Rwanda, plusieurs milliers de Tutsi sont assassinés par des miliciens avec la complicité de la mère supérieure des lieux, sœur Gertrude. En 2001 à Bruxelles, la cour d’assises la juge et la condamne pour son implication dans les massacres. À partir des archives des transcriptions du procès, l’article revient sur la façon dont s’exerçait son autorité au sein du couvent au moment du génocide. Sa défense adopte une stratégie genrée et (...) cherche à éloigner la sœur de la possibilité même de l’engagement dans la violence. Mais les témoignages des victimes attestent l’intégration de la religieuse aux réseaux politiques locaux et la manière dont elle a mobilisé les ressources à sa disposition pour exclure de la sphère de protection du couvent les Tutsis s’y étant réfugiés. (shrink)

Résumé Le phénomène des « ménages d’enfants » est apparu au Rwanda après le génocide des Tutsis qui a profondément ébranlé la structure familiale et l’organisation de la société. Certains enfants ont ainsi été amenés à vivre dans des « ménages » sans parents, menés par un autre enfant un peu plus âgé, considéré simultanément comme parent et comme grand(e) frère ou sœur. Comment fonctionnent ces nouveaux types de familles? Quels sont le rôle et la place de chacun des (...) membres de la fratrie? Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche qui s’appuie sur des entretiens menés sous forme de « récits de vie » auprès de seize personnes. L’analyse des entretiens révèle notamment le rôle de l’aîné et la façon dont la fratrie crée une nouvelle structure familiale qui tente de répondre tant bien que mal à la souffrance relative à l’absence parentale et constitue une ressource et un étayage psychique. (shrink)

In a book that challenges the most widely held ideas of why individuals engage in collective conflict, Russell Hardin offers a timely, crucial explanation of group action in its most destructive forms. Contrary to those observers who attribute group violence to irrationality, primordial instinct, or complex psychology, Hardin uncovers a systematic exploitation of self-interest in the underpinnings of group identification and collective violence. Using examples from Mafia vendettas to ethnic violence in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda, he describes the (...) social and economic circumstances that set this violence into motion. Hardin explains why hatred alone does not necessarily start wars but how leaders cultivate it to mobilize their people. He also reveals the thinking behind the preemptive strikes that contribute to much of the violence between groups, identifies the dangers of "particularist" communitarianism, and argues for government structures to prevent any ethnic or other group from having too much sway. Exploring conflict between groups such as Serbs and Croats, Hutu and Tutsi, Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants, Hardin vividly illustrates the danger that arises when individual and group interests merge. In these examples, groups of people have been governed by movements that managed to reflect their members' personal interests--mainly by striving for political and economic advances at the expense of other groups and by closing themselves off from society at large. The author concludes that we make a better and safer world if we design our social institutions to facilitate individual efforts to achieve personal goals than if we concentrate on the ethnic political makeup of our respective societies. (shrink)

This chapter examines the role played by derogatory terms (e.g., ‘inyenzi’ or cockroach, ‘inzoka’ or snake) in laying the social groundwork for the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. The genocide was preceded by an increase in the use of anti-Tutsi derogatory terms among the Hutu. As these linguistic practices evolved, the terms became more openly and directly aimed at Tutsi. Then, during the 100 days of the genocide, derogatory terms and coded euphemisms were used to direct killers (...) to their victims. Understanding these speech acts helps to illuminate the important ways that power is enacted through discourse, how speech acts can prepare the way for physical and material acts, and how speech generates permissions for actions hitherto uncountenanced. Studying the role of speech acts and linguistic practices in laying the groundwork of the genocide illuminates how patterns of speech acts become linguistic practices that constitute permissibility conditions for non-linguistic behaviors. Further, the analysis presented here helps to make sense of the view that a steady, deep, and widespread derogation of a group can be part and parcel of genocide, not only an antecedent to it. (shrink)

Apology is a necessary component of moral repair of damage done by wrongs against the person. Analyzing the role of apology in the aftermath of atrocity, with a focus on the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, 1994, this article emphasizes the role of recognition failures in grave moral wrongs, the importance of speech acts that offer recognition, and building mutuality through recognition as a route to reconciliation. Understanding the US role in the international failure to stop the ’94 genocide (...) raises the question of how any response could mitigate a world-shattering wrong like genocide. With a focus on survivors, this article explains the concepts of recognition harm and spirit murder to illuminate what survivors experience and need. The third section develops a theory of apology as offering recognition to the victim of wrongdoing —through both the act of speaking-to and through its content. The article examines US President Bill Clinton’s 1998 apology to Rwandans, to understand it as an apology, and to see how it began reconciliation between Americans and Rwandans. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the inter-related significance of apology and material reparations. (shrink)

Freedom of expression is considered a basic human right, and yet most countries have restrictions on speech they deem harmful. Following the genocide of the Tutsi, Rwanda passed a constitution (2003) and laws against hate speech and other forms of divisionist language (2008, 2013). Understanding how language shaped “recognition harms” that both constitute and fuel genocide also helps account for political decisions to limit “divisionist” discourse. When we speak, we make expressive commitments, which are commitments to the viability and value (...) of ways of speaking. This article explores reasons a society would decide to say, “We don’t talk that way around here,” thus taking control of its own expressive commitments. Understanding the scope of the law in Rwanda promises to help clarify limits to hate speech and other forms of derogatory discourse (including images). Ultimately, the argument is that wherever recognition harms are a significant factor in social and political life, changing permissible expressive commitments is crucial to social and political repair. (shrink)

Nationalism has been a cause of great misery in the world. In this century alone we have seen a number of hideous forms of nationalism leading to genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced relocations, and civil wars. The violent conflicts between Serbians, Croatians, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia; the Hutus and the Tutsis in Central Africa; Palestinians and Jews in the Middle East; Afrikaners, Zulus, and Xhosas in Southern Africa; and the Nazis and non-Aryans, are just some of these.

Dehumanisation is a puzzling phenomenon. Nazi propaganda likened the Jews to rats, but also portrayed them as ‘poisoners of culture’. In the Soviet Union, the Stalinist regime called opponents vermin, yet put them on show trials. During the Rwandan genocide, the Hutus identified the Tutsis with cockroaches, but nonetheless raped Tutsi women. These examples reveal tensions in the way in which dehumanisers perceive, portray and treat victims. Dehumanisation seems to require that perpetrators both deny and acknowledge the humanity of (...) their victims in certain ways. Several scholars have proposed solutions to this so-called ‘paradox of dehumanisation’ that question the usefulness of dehumanisation as a concept to explain genocidal violence, claim that dehumanisation is characterised by an unstable belief in the non-human essence of the dehumanised, or contend that dehumanisation revolves around a denial of metaphysical human status. The main aim of this article is to present a novel framework for theorising dehumanisation that offers a more straightforward solution to this paradox based on the idea that perpetrators deny their victims’ human standing in a moral sense without necessarily negating their biological human status or human subjectivity. The article illustrates this framework through examples drawn from Primo Levi’s memoirs of Auschwitz. (shrink)

Dehumanisation is a puzzling phenomenon. Nazi propaganda likened the Jews to rats, but also portrayed them as ‘poisoners of culture’. In the Soviet Union, the Stalinist regime called opponents vermin, yet put them on show trials. During the Rwandan genocide, the Hutus identified the Tutsis with cockroaches, but nonetheless raped Tutsi women. These examples reveal tensions in the way in which dehumanisers perceive, portray and treat victims. Dehumanisation seems to require that perpetrators both deny and acknowledge the humanity of (...) their victims in certain ways. Several scholars have proposed solutions to this so-called ‘paradox of dehumanisation’ that question the usefulness of dehumanisation as a concept to explain genocidal violence, claim that dehumanisation is characterised by an unstable belief in the non-human essence of the dehumanised, or contend that dehumanisation revolves around a denial of metaphysical human status. The main aim of this article is to present a novel framework for theorising dehumanisation that offers a more straightforward solution to this paradox based on the idea that perpetrators deny their victims’ human standing in a moral sense without necessarily negating their biological human status or human subjectivity. The article illustrates this framework through examples drawn from Primo Levi’s memoirs of Auschwitz. (shrink)

It is often said that human rights are the rights that people possess simply in virtue of being human – that is, in virtue of their intrinsic, dignity-defining common humanity. Yet, on closer inspection the human rights landscape doesn’t look so even. Once we bring perpetrators of human rights abuse and their victims into the picture, attributions of humanity to persons become unstable. In this essay, I trace the ways in which rights discourse ascribes variable humanity to certain categories of (...) people. I set the stage for my discussion of the human in relation to human rights by examining John Locke’s account of the justification for punishment. For Locke, in committing a crime one abrogates one’s humanity and forfeits one’s rights. Likewise, I argue, human rights discourse takes a scalar view of humanity. I consider victims of genocide who are dehumanized as helpless and passive, victims of state persecution who are super-humanized as righteously agentic, and perpetrators of genocide who are dehumanized as out-of-control beasts. In each case I use relevant testimony to argue that the scalar view of humanity is factually incorrect and morally deplorable. For genocide victims, I discuss testimony that Selma Leydesdorff gathered from women who survived the Srebrenica massacre. For a victim of persecution, I discuss Liao Yiwu’s memoire of his detention and imprisonment in China because of his artwork protesting the Tiananmen Square massacre. For perpetrators of genocide, I discuss testimony Jean Hatzfeld gathered from Hutu men who systematically murdered Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. Finally, I apply my critique of dehumanized and super-humanized victims and dehumanized perpetrators to the problem of transnational trafficking in persons and argue that the view I advocate necessitates reforming immigration policy with respect to persons trafficked into forced labor. (shrink)

Le génocide du Rwanda constitue l'un des événements majeurs du xxe siècle : 800 000 Tutsis et Hutus de l'opposition au « gouvernement intérimaire » rwandais ont été massacrés entre avril et juin 1994. Or, la reconnaissance de ce génocide ne va pas de soi. Cet article analyse les « contre-feux interprétatifs » mis en place selon trois axes : négation du génocide, euphémisation en « guerre tribale », thèse du « double génocide ». La presse dans cette guerre (...) de mémoire a été un vecteur tout à fait essentiel. The genocide in Rwanda was one of the major events of the 20th century: 800, 000 Tutsis and Hutus opposing Rwanda's "interim government" were massacred between April and June 1994. But recognition of this genocide is by no means taken for granted. This article analyses the different interpretations that were brought in to deflect the issue, such as genocide denial, euphemistic references to the genocide as "tribal war­fare" and "double genocide" theory. The role of the press in this "war over memory" was crucial. (shrink)

This article uses a comparative approach to elucidate the ways in which women’s testimony operated in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in Rwanda’s gacaca courts, to draw out some important lessons for future mechanisms of transitional justice. The author argues that while restorative justice mechanisms allow more space for including women’s own experiences of human rights violation than conventional trials, they may pose greater danger for those who testify. A significant problem resulting from the narratives of both gacaca (...) and the TRC is the way in which a ‘singular woman victim’ emerges that elides the complexity of women’s experiences in collective memory. It is feared that what has emerged from the official discourse of these two truth-seeking mechanisms is a one-dimensional female victim subject – in South Africa, she is of secondary importance, in Rwanda, she can only be Tutsi, and in both cases she is stripped of all agency, where rape becomes definitive of her experience. (shrink)

The present paper aims to investigate the causes of genocidal mobilization associated with the involvement of ordinary people. I discuss the “innocent causes” of criminal choices made by perpetrators who are not leaders, sadists or radicals. To this end, I compared three total genocides, of Armenians, Jews, Romani, Tutsi and Twa, and selected partial genocides. My analysis proves that entire nations or ethnic groups may be exterminated because many people make criminal choices which are motivated by values and norms that (...) in other circumstances would be considered acceptable or even commendable. These choices are made partly due to the structural pressure of circumstances and are partly derived from dispositions shaped in the course of primary and secondary socialization. Yet, they always require the reflexive mediation of “objective” social forces. (shrink)

Respon'sible, liable to be called to account or render satisfaction: answerable: capable of discharging duty: able to pay. The old Chambers's dictionary gives a behavioristic view of responsibility: in terms of action, not thought or belief. “Lust in the heart” is not equated to lust in flagrante. It is this view I shall explore in this essay, rather than the more subjective notion of moral responsibility, as in, “I feel moral responsibility for not doing anything to save the Tutsis (...) [Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.].” My presumption is that responsibility implies capability: you cannot be held responsible for something over which you have no control. There is obviously uncertainty in some cases—where control is less than total, where the degree of potential control depends on our own efforts, where we cannot know if we have control until we try to exert it, etc. The relation between responsibility and degree of control is a separate topic which I shall not treat here. (shrink)

At the end of this century there are so many occasions, so many residues of the most violent of times, that challenge the very idea of forgivenessNorthern Ireland, Bosnia, the Tutsis and Hutus, the Shiite and Suni Moslems, the settlers and African immigrants in South Africa, indigenous populations against the dominant culture. The open violence and rapaciousness of human enmity can be viewed now in the displacement of masses of people in Kosovo. Said the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, (...) Sadako Ogata, about the Kosovo crisis: that this century, as in its darkest hours, should end with the mass deportation of innocent people.”. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of the ethical command “You Shall Not Kill” subliminally included in the main exhibition of The Kigali Memorial Centre, Rwanda. The Centre was opened on the 10th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide, in April 2004 and contains a permanent exhibition of the Rwandan genocide and an exhibition of other genocides around the world. In order to achieve this aim, this paper takes as a point of departure, Emmanuel Levinas’s interpretation of the 6th Commandment. This well-known (...) interpretation is then read through the prism of Jacques Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s early work in Violence and Metaphysics. The aim of this reading is to understand the subliminal message of the Memorial Centre as enounced not by the victimized Tutsi curators or by the Rwandan people in general, but by human beings unavoidable need to reach out towards the other, not in an effort for dialogue (forthat is always a form of violence), but in an effort to keep the future open, an opening without fulfillment. (shrink)

Tous les évènements traumatiques instaurent un rapport spécifique au temps. Parmi eux, le génocide constitue un paradigme de l’expérience extrême. Le génocide est un évènement qui échappe au temps commun et qui instaure une nouvelle temporalité, tant pour les victimes que pour les bourreaux. En analysant des témoignages oraux et écrits de rescapés de la Shoah et du génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda, on constate que la temporalité instaurée par le génocide continue longtemps après la fin des massacres à se (...) réverbérer sur la vie des survivants dont les familles ont été décimées. (shrink)

Drawing on my recent work using inferential role semantics and elements of speech act theory to analyze the role of derogatory terms (a.k.a. ‘hate speech’, or ‘slurs’) in the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, as well as the role of certain kinds of reparative speech acts in post-genocide Rwanda, this paper highlights key pragmatist commitments that inform the methods and goals of this practical analysis of real world events. In “Genocidal Language Games”, I used conceptual tools from Wittgenstein, (...) Sellars, Lewis, and Brandom, with a nod to Searle’s concept of status-functions, to develop an analysis that helps to make sense of the view that a steady, deep, and widespread derogation of a group can at least partially constitute genocide, not only be an antecedent to it. In this paper, I sketch some of the tools and lessons of this project, with an eye to highlighting their pragmatist roots and the directions to which such real-world investigations lead. (shrink)

A narrow conception of who counts among the marginalized can blind ethicists to the precarious position of groups who function as middle agents between elites and the lower class. The imposition of middle agency on such groups is a form of oppression that leaves them vulnerable to abandonment and attack. In Rwanda, discourses emanating from colonialism, classism, and racism obscured the Tutsi as middle agents, despite white Catholics' dedication to the poor. By neglecting to recognize middle agency as a type (...) of marginalization, missionaries contributed negatively to the genocide. Liberatory practices are recommended so that ethicists can expose and challenge the dynamics of middle agency and include all the marginalized in liberation strategies. (shrink)

Kassner contends that the violation of the basic human rights of the Rwandan Tutsis morally obliged the international community to intervene militarily to stop the genocide. This compelling argument, grounded in basic rights, runs counter to the accepted view on the moral nature of humanitarian intervention. It has profound implications for our understanding of the moral nature of humanitarian military intervention, global justice and the role moral principles should play in the practical deliberations of states. A new approach to (...) the intersection of human and sovereign rights that is of tremendous moral, political and legal importance to theorists working in international relations today Challenges the immutability of the right of non-intervention held by sovereign states, assessing when it becomes right for the international community to intervene militarily in order to avoid another Rwanda. (shrink)

What sort of person chooses to remain in a place like Rwanda when an easy exit is offered, when leaving seems the only safe or sane option, and when one is not directly connected to the would-be victims? And how does this person come to develop a circle of care that is expansive enough to include those who are radically Other? In what follows, I consider these questions through a detailed examination of the recent example of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu (...) hotel manager in Kigali, Rwanda, who sheltered more than a thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu refugees during the hundred-day genocide. I argue that Rusesabagina was primarily motivated by an awareness of his own mortality, his personal history, a desire to distance himself from the negative behavior of Hutu like himself, and a strong identification with the Tutsi refugees under his protection. (shrink)

The rational choice approach to the understanding of group identity and conflict tends to overlook the extent to which groups are mutable, and the element of design by group leaders (especially those wielding state power) in the definition of group identity and the shaping of rationality. The 1994 genocide of the Rwandese Tutsis was the outcome of an extreme case of planning ethnic and ideological engineering. To see such phenomena as instances of “rational self‐interest” stretches that concept beyond its (...) breaking point. (shrink)