Is philosophy continuous with science or does it have a distinctive domain of inquiry that differs from that of the special sciences? Collingwood claimed that philosophy has a distinctive subject matter and a distinctive method. Its distinctive subject matter is what he called the “absolute presuppositions” that govern the special sciences and its method consists in making these presuppositions explicit by showing that they are entailed by the questions asked in the special sciences. In this chapter the editors seek to (...) provide a guide to the diverging interpretations of Collingwood’s claim that metaphysics is not the study of pure being but of the presuppositions that govern knowledge of reality. They argue that a reassessment of his contribution to philosophical methodology is timely in the light of the recent revival of interest in second-order questions concerning the role and character of philosophical analysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Biographical Encyclopedia of British IdealismKarim DharamsiWilliam Sweet, editor. Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism. New York-London: Continuum, 2010. Pp. xx + 724. Cloth, $295.00.The term ‘British Idealism’ underdetermines the interests and geographies of philosophers classed under its heading. It may imply a common goal or, indeed, location. This is misleading. The Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism goes a long way in demonstrating the challenge of grouping together philosophers with (...) divergent interests and historical pedigrees, sharing some affiliation with Idealist thinking in Britain from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many transcend so-called Analytic and Continental categories, and if not transcend, certainly sidestep them. William Sweet’s volume is at once an archaeological guide to British Idealism and a guide to its relevance today. The volume excavates deeply hidden contributions to philosophy and may destabilize our customary assumptions about the geographical limits of Western philosophy; the contributors to the volume ask readers to extend their community of interest to scholars from Southern Africa, India, and East Asia. Calling philosophers working in India and East Asia “British” is also an important reminder; it has its obvious links to British imperium while at the same time speaking to the influence of Idealist thinking outside the frame of colonial England to thinkers working outside the canonical disputes of Western philosophy.This massive volume, uncompromisingly detailed and comprehensive, does have the elements of a survey, but this is not its intent, nor does one get this impression on reading its entries. This Encyclopedia aims to historically and philosophically contextualize Idealist thought. The first six chapters do just this. They are “Idealism in Britain” (William Sweet); “Idealism in Australia and New Zealand” (Mark Weblin); “The Impact of Idealism in North America” (Leslie Armour); “British Idealism in Southern Africa” (William Sweet); “British Idealism in India” (William Sweet); and “British Idealism in East Asia” (William Sweet). [End Page 146] The remainder of the volume includes entries on well-known Idealist philosophers, lesser known thinkers, and important critics of Idealist philosophy, including the familiar and highly influential Russell and Moore. I will say a little bit about the excellent chapter on British Idealism in India.While readers may have familiarity with Idealism in North America and Britain, it may come as a surprise to learn that Indian philosophers, influenced by a great deal of British philosophy, were particularly keen on Idealism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Sweet provides readers with a short history of Indian higher education and the place, for instance, of Kant and Hegel in the philosophy curriculum throughout India in the late nineteenth century; it was not long after that British Idealists were being taught to students in Bombay (Mumbai), Madras, and Calcutta (still important centres of higher education in India) along with Allahabad, Mysore, Pondicherry, and Amalner. Idealists in India, much like their counterparts in Britain, labored beyond academic philosophy, extending their discussions to questions of nationalism in India and contributing to ideas in social and political thought.The attraction of British Idealism (indeed, any “Western” Idealist philosophy) to Indian intellectuals may seem mysterious to some readers. Sweet maintains that Indian philosophy was and is by its own historical sense idealist and so the British variant was not so much as “imported” as finding a natural home. Sweet thinks that the revival of interest in the tradition of Advaita Vedanta can be reasonably traced to the influence of British Idealism’s place in Indian philosophy. There is little dispute that Kant, Hegel, and the British thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced how Indian philosophers understood the discipline’s Western identity and aims. Indian philosophers had begun to enter discussions belonging to another history. Hiralal Halder’s Hegelianism and Human Personality, published in 1910, and Ras-Vihari Das’s doctoral dissertation of 1930, The Self and the Ideal, could easily be taken as titles of works in Western European or North American libraries. Philosophy no doubt includes philosophers who come from many histories, and the discipline may be resistant to simple geographical reduction.Sweet cautions readers that Indian philosophers contributed to the development of Indian philosophical thought; they were not merely expositors... (shrink)

Dharamsi considers Collingwood’s defence of the autonomy of the mental and contrasts it with the one articulated by liberal naturalists such as McDowell. Both Collingwood and McDowell, Dharamsi argues, acknowledge the irreducibly normative nature of the study of mind and both reject the widespread naturalist assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science. The liberal naturalist’s and Collingwood’s strategy are however fundamentally different. McDowell’s strategy is to soften naturalism so as to accommodate within its womb the normative character (...) of the mental, which a harder or more traditional form of naturalism struggles to provide a home for. Collingwood’s strategy agrees with McDowell’s diagnosis of the problem, but not with his proposed solution. For Collingwood, the solution lies not in liberalizing nature, but in rejecting a conception of metaphysics as a science of pure being and understanding it instead as a historical enquiry into the presuppositions of science, including natural science. (shrink)

This book discusses Collingwood's conception of the role and character of philosophical analysis. It explores questions, such as, is there anything distinctive about the activity of philosophizing? If so, what distinguishes philosophy from other forms of inquiry? What is the relation between philosophy and science and between philosophy and history? For much of the twentieth century, philosophers philosophized with little self-awareness; Collingwood was exceptional in the attention he paid to the activity of philosophizing. This book will be of interest both (...) to those who are interested in Collingwood’s philosophy and, more generally, to all who are interested in the question ‘what is philosophy?’. (shrink)

I defend the idea that Collingwood's discussion of self-knowledge implies that meaning is normative. Against the view that treats the social as primitive in explaining a normativity of meaning thesis, I argue that Collingwood is an internalist about epistemic justification. Collingwood's internalism about epistemic justification and meaning is normative, but its character involves a logical-epistemic relation between use and meaning. I suggest that this view is well represented by Collingwood's idea of history.

This issue of Essays in Philosophy brings together five articles that work in the spirit of the philosophy of history3⁄4broadly construed. Each author provides us a glimpse into the methodological relationship between philosophy and history.

R. G. Collingwood's theory of re-enactment has long been understood as an important contribution to the philosophy of history. It has also been challenging to understand how re-enactment is operationalized in the practice of understanding past actors or, indeed, other minds occupying less remote regions of our experiences. Sebastian Rödl has recently articulated a compelling defence of second person ascription, arguing that it is, in form, analogous to first person understanding. By Rödl's lights, second person understanding follows the same order (...) of reason as its first person counterpart. In this paper I argue that Rödl's case for second person understanding, and its relationship to the first person point of view, is at once compelling in its own right but also helpful in explaining how re-enactment may be operationalized. (shrink)

In this dissertation I examine the Theory-Theory . I argue that T-T represents the orthodox conception of learning in today's psychological literature. T-T theorists hold that human beings come "equipped" with innate representations that are "a theory." Theorists believe that this innate theory guides our relations to the world. If T-T theorists are correct, learning amounts to theory-revision. Hence, T-T brings together two commitments: innate knowledge and theory-revision. In this dissertation, I show that T-T depends on a reading of Plato's (...) Meno to buttress its commitment to innate knowledge. For , T-T depends on aspects of W. V. Quine's philosophy. Theorists think that Quine's naturalised epistemology is central to their position. I show that T-T's dependence on Meno depends on a rough interpretation of the dialogue. Furthermore, I suggest while in some sense Quine's philosophy can accommodate innate knowledge, T-T theorists do not make a sufficient case for such an accommodation. By reconsidering Meno I wish to question T-T's dependence on what may not be in fact a case for innate knowledge. Later I show that no clear case has been made that Quine's philosophy is compatible with the sort of innate knowledge theorists require. I suggest that re-thinking Plato's dialogue cannot save T-T. For T-T theorists must provide a clear case of how innate knowledge is clearly compatible with Quine's philosophy. I argue that too much requires reworking in T-T, and that such a reworking is not necessary because an alternative conception of learning is possible. As an alternative, I argue that learning depends on factors that are not primarily innate but social. In terms of the social aspects of learning, I argue that an important condition of human learning involves being initiated into a set of social practices. Those practices are constitutive of meaningful behaviour that is inherently tied to the histories of those who live and work within these boundaries. Here we can read "history" as "having a tradition." This latter position stands, I suggest, in stark contrast to the view of T-T theorists and is far more plausible in providing an account of learning. (shrink)

Professor Rescher has provided us with an interesting introduction to paradoxes. His scope is literally exhaustive; the writing is clear and the content has been made accessible to a wide audience. One can imagine this text replacing many introductory level texts in critical thinking courses; while at the same time many of Rescher’s conclusions warrant detailed scrutiny by honours or graduate level students interested in this subject. Indeed, the strength of the book is Rescher’s substantively original, even controversial, thesis and (...) its application to paradoxes. (shrink)

We claim that, as it stands, the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett approach to quantum theory is conceptually incoherent. This charge is based upon the approach’s reliance upon decoherence arguments that conflict with its own fundamental precepts regarding probabilistic reasoning in two respects. This conceptual conflict obtains even if the decoherence arguments deployed are aimed merely towards the establishment of certain ‘emergent’ or ‘robust’ structures within the wave function: To be relevant to physical science notions such as robustness must be empirically grounded, and, on (...) our analysis, this grounding can only plausibly be done in precisely the probabilistic terms that lead to conceptual conflict. Thus, the incoherence problems presented necessitate either the provision of a new, non-probabilistic empirical grounding for the notions of robustness and emergence in the context of decoherence, or the abandonment of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett programme for quantum theory. (shrink)

We analyse insufficient epistemic pluralism and associated problems in science-based policy advice during the COVID-19 pandemic drawing on specific arguments in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Our goal is twofold: to deepen our understanding of the epistemic shortcomings in science-based policy during the pandemic, and to assess the merits and problems of Feyerabend’s arguments for epistemic pluralism as well as their relevance for policy-making. We discuss opportunities and challenges of integrating a plurality of viewpoints from within and outside science into policy advice (...) thus contributing to discussions about normative issues concerning evidence and expertise in policy-making. (shrink)

BackgroundObtaining informed consent for participation in genomic research in low-income settings presents specific ethical issues requiring attention. These include the challenges that arise when providing information about unfamiliar and technical research methods, the implications of complicated infrastructure and data sharing requirements, and the potential consequences of future research with samples and data. This study investigated researchers’ and participants’ parents’ experiences of a consent process and understandings of a genome-wide association study of malaria involving children aged five and under in Mali. (...) It aimed to inform best practices in recruiting participants into genomic research.MethodsA qualitative rapid ethical assessment was undertaken. Fifty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with the parents of research participants. An additional nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior research scientists, research assistants and with a member of an ethics committee. A focus group with five parents of research participants and direct observations of four consent processes were also conducted. French and translated English transcripts were descriptively and thematically coded using OpenCode software.ResultsParticipants’ parents in the MalariaGEN study had differing understandings of the causes of malaria, the rationale for collecting blood samples, the purposes of the study and the kinds of information the study would generate. Genomic aspects of the research, including the gene/environment interaction underlying susceptibility or resistance to severe malaria, proved particularly challenging to explain and understand.ConclusionsThis study identifies a number of areas to be addressed in the design of consent processes for genomic research, some of which require careful ethical analysis. These include determining how much information should be provided about differing aspects of the research and how best to promote understandings of genomic research. We conclude that it is important to build capacity in the design and conduct of effective and appropriate consent processes for genomic research in low and middle-income settings. Additionally, consideration should be given to the role of review committees and community consultation activities in protecting the interests of participants in genomic research. (shrink)

Matti Häyry presents a new ethical theory that he calls “conflict-responsive need-based negative utilitarianism.”1 In this commentary, I present my critical observations on his main points against the more general background of utilitarianism and theories of value.

A fundamental tenet of Paul Feyerabend’s pluralistic view of science has it that theory proliferation, that is, the availability of theoretical alternatives, is of crucial importance for the detection of anomalies in established theories. Paul Hoyningen-Huene calls this the Anomaly Importation Thesis, according to which anomalies are imported, as it were, into well-established theories from competing alternatives. This article pursues two major objectives: (a) to work out the systematic details of Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly import as they (...) are presented in his early publications and his Against Method and (b) to compare Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly import with corresponding features in Popper’s critical rationalist philosophy of science. As it turns out, neither the Principle of Proliferation nor the Anomaly Importation Thesis are necessarily incompatible with critical rationalism. In spite of Feyerabend’s general anti-Popperian attitude, I argue that theoretical pluralism can be seen as an advancement of the critical rationalist philosophy and that critical rationalism provides good arguments for pluralism. (shrink)

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities, there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I (...) will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Background: Recently, a singular survey titled “Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals,” which addresses shortcomings of previous instruments, has been validated. Aim: To determine how moral distress affects nurses and physicians differently across the various wards of a community hospital. Participant and research context: We distributed a self-administered, validated survey titled “Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals” to all nurses and physicians in the medical/surgical ward, telemetry ward, intensive care units, and emergency rooms of a community hospital. Findings: A total of 101 (...) surveys were included in the study. The mean Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals score for all respondents was 143.0. The mean Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals score was 1.75 greater for nurses than for physicians, and nurses were 2.52 times more likely to consider leaving their position due to moral distress. The mean Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals score for moral distress was least prevalent in the medical/surgical ward and highest in the telemetry ward. The intensive care unit ward had a mean Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals score mildly greater than the emergency room. Ethical considerations: No participant identifying information or information connecting a survey response to an individual was collected. This study was approved by the Raritan Bay Medical Center’s Institutional Review Board. Discussion: This study provides insight into the level of moral distress in the community hospital setting. Telemetry nurses experience significantly more than nurses in other wards. Telemetry nurses typically manage patients sicker than medical/surgical wards, however do not have the resources of the critical care units. This scenario presents challenges for telemetry nurses and may explain their elevated moral distress. Conclusion: In community hospitals, telemetry nurses experience a considerably greater amount of moral distress compared to their colleagues in other wards. As measured by the Measure of Moral Distress—Healthcare Professionals questionnaire, moral distress continues to be higher among nurses compared to physicians. (shrink)

This collection of new essays interprets and critically evaluates the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It offers innovative historical scholarship on Feyerabend's take on topics such as realism, empiricism, mimesis, voluntarism, pluralism, materialism, and the mind-body problem, as well as certain debates in the philosophy of physics. It also considers the ways in which Feyerabend's thought can contribute to contemporary debates in science and public policy, including questions about the nature of scientific methodology, the role of science in society, citizen science, (...) scientism, and the role of expertise in public policy. The volume will provide readers with a comprehensive overview of the topics which Feyerabend engaged with throughout his career, showing both the breadth and the depth of his thought. (shrink)

Environmental risk assessment is often affected by severe uncertainty. The frequently invoked precautionary principle helps to guide risk assessment and decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. In many contexts, however, uncertainties play a role not only in the application of scientific models but also in their development. Building on recent literature in the philosophy of science, this paper argues that precaution should be exercised at the stage when tools for risk assessment are developed as well as when they are (...) used to inform decision-making. The relevance and consequences of this claim are discussed in the context of the threshold of the toxicological concern approach in food toxicology. I conclude that the approach does not meet the standards of an epistemic version of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

Karim Fathi liefert erstmalig einen Überblick über die unterschiedlichen Diskurse und Strategien der Komplexitätsbewältigung auf der Ebene von Teams, Organisationen und Gesellschaften. Unter der Leitdifferenz kommunikativer Komplexitätsbewältigung untersucht er Fragen wie: Welche Strategien und Methoden ergeben sich im Umgang mit komplexen, vieldimensionalen und unvorhersehbaren Problemen? Wie können Kommunikationsprozesse so gestaltet werden, dass sie höhere kollektive Intelligenz ermöglichen? Sein universell anwendbarer Ansatz unterstützt komplexe Problemlöseprozesse auf allen Ebenen und fördert transdisziplinäres Denken in Zeiten globalen strukturellen Wandels.

This article aims to study the intersection between critical realism and complexity theories through the existing literature on complex systems via an engagement with Luhmann’s autopoiesis. With reference to the philosophies of substance and persistence, I build on previous critical realist scholarship and provide an explanation for what the literature has only noted as the limitations and potentials of autopoiesis for complex systems thinking and its compatibility with Critical Realism. By highlighting how Luhmann’s autopoiesis is not a trans-immanent/ perdurantist-exdurantist system, (...) I show first how a trans immanent system through the method of calibration entails a complex causation involving objects in the environment of systems and not just within their boundaries. Second, I explain how a trans-immanent system fits with CR via the Morphogenetic Régulation framework by exploring the theme of crisis in terms of the movement from inadequate to adequate understanding of objects. (shrink)

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that (...) one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

The professions have focused considerable attention on developing codes of conduct. Despite their efforts there is considerable controversy regarding the propriety of professional codes of ethics. Many provisions of professional codes seem to exacerbate disputes between the profession and the public rather than providing a framework that satisfies the public''s desire for moral behavior.After examining three professional codes, we divide the provisions of professional codes into those provisions which urge professionals to avoid moral hazard, maintain professional courtesy and serve the (...) public interest. We note that whereas provisions urging the avoidance of moral hazard are uncontroversial, the public is suspicious of provisions protecting professional courtesy. Public interest provisions are controversial when the public and the profession disagree as to what is in the public interest. Based on these observations, we conclude with recommendations regarding the content of professional codes. (shrink)

A small but growing number of studies have aimed to understand, assess and reduce existential risks, or risks that threaten the continued existence of mankind. However, most attention has been focused on known and tangible risks. This paper proposes a heuristic for reducing the risk of black swan extinction events. These events are, as the name suggests, stochastic and unforeseen when they happen. Decision theory based on a fixed model of possible outcomes cannot properly deal with this kind of event. (...) Neither can probabilistic risk analysis. This paper will argue that the approach that is referred to as engineering safety could be applied to reducing the risk from black swan extinction events. It will also propose a conceptual sketch of how such a strategy may be implemented: isolated, self-sufficient, and continuously manned underground refuges. Some characteristics of such refuges are also described, in particular the psychosocial aspects. Furthermore, it is argued that this implementation of the engineering safety strategy safety barriers would be effective and plausible and could reduce the risk of an extinction event in a wide range of possible scenarios. Considering the staggering opportunity cost of an existential catastrophe, such strategies ought to be explored more vigorously. (shrink)

Journal Name: Journal of Ancient History Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper presents a corpus of Tashlhit bu-nouns, in which bu generally expresses the possessor of what the inner noun refers to. Comparison with other dialects of Amazigh is undertaken, revealing the cross-dialectal complexity of this type of nominal formation. Notwithstanding their morphosyntactic intricacy, which challenges Greenberg’s Universal 28, the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis and the No Phrase Constraint, bu-nouns have been dealt with only sporadically and have at times even been overlooked. The presentation will shed light on the inflectional alternations (...) inner bu-nouns exhibit, the existence of an alternative periphrastic expression, the pluralization pattern of these nouns, their alienable vs. inalienable possession patterns, as well as the possible recursion of the bu-noun affixes. (shrink)

Discussions about perspectivism in the current philosophical literature often focus on questions concerning perspectival modeling or the compatibility between perspectivism and realism. In this paper, I propose to extend the debate on perspectivism by taking into account the social dimension of scientific perspectives. Scientific perspectives are always adopted and advocated for by individual scientists and groups of scientists with different epistemic affinities. I describe an example of a current and ongoing controversy in the field of epigenetics in order to illustrate (...) that diverging scientific perspectives on open scientific questions are often not fully explained by empirical underdetermination or diverging theoretical approaches alone. Opposing perspectives frequently arise from differences in systems of practice and the scientific socializations of the involved scientists, including differences in training, experimental skills, and epistemic priorities. The paper ends with a discussion of the important epistemic function of perspectives in scientific discovery. Ultimately, perspectivism is described as a valid philosophical position that explains how scientific knowledge is generated in situations of empirical underdetermination and why trust in science can be justified even in the absence of a community consensus. (shrink)

As we learn more about the human brain, novel biotechnological means to modulate human behaviour and emotional dispositions become possible. These technologies could be used to enhance our morality. Moral bioenhancement, an instance of human enhancement, alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behaviour in order to make that person more moral. I will argue that moral bioenhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy, well known from science fiction, is behavioural enhancement. The second strategy, favoured by (...) prominent defenders of moral bioenhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I will argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. Furthermore, I will argue that the usual arguments against other instances of human enhancement do not apply to moral bioenhancement, or apply only to the first strategy, behavioural enhancement. (shrink)

The generalized theory of evolution suggests that evolutionary algorithms apply to biological and cultural processes like language alike. Variation, selection and reproduction constitute abstract and formal traits of complex, open and often self-regulating systems. Accepting this basic assumption provides us with a powerful background methodology for this investigation: explaining the emergence and proliferation of semantic patterns, that become conventional. A teleosemantic theory of public (conventional) meaning (Millikan 1984; 2005) grounded in a generalized theory of evolution explains the proliferation of public (...) language forms in terms of their adaptive proper function. It has also been suggested, that the emergence of meaning, can be formalized with game-theoretical tools (Skyrms 2010) within signaling systems of coordination. I want to show how closely related these approaches are, both in terms of explanandum and of outcomes. To put it in a nutshell: If the emergence of public meaning can be satisfyingly explained in terms of signaling games, then the cultural evolutionary dynamics will serve as an adequate model to describe their proliferation. Public or conventional meaning (in contrast to personal meaning) can be fully understood in terms of its evolutionary function in a population of communicators. Furthermore, I want to argue how this understanding of conventional meaning could lead us to a strong semantic holism. (shrink)

Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticized some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealizations involved, and a particular target are ‘kinetic exchange’ approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual (...) monetary income. This article will consider such models in detail, and assess the warrant of the criticisms drawing upon the philosophical literature on modelling and idealization. Our aim is to provide the first steps towards informed mediation of this important and interesting interdisciplinary debate, and our hope is to offer guidance with regard to both the practice of modelling inequality, and the inequality of modelling practice. _1_ Introduction _1.1_ Econophysics and its discontents _1.2_ Against burglar economics _2_ Modelling Inequality _2.1_ Mainstream economic models for income distribution _2.2_ Econophysics models for income distribution _3_ Idealizations in Kinetic Exchange Models _3.1_ Binary interactions _3.2_ Conservation principles _3.3_ Exchange dynamics _ 4 _ Fat Tails and Savings _ 5 _ Evaluation. (shrink)

In this article we argue for the existence of ‘analogue simulation’ as a novel form of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspiration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes. For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its counterpart is detected (...) within experiments conducted on diverse realizations of the analogue model. A prospectus is given for further potential cases of analogue simulation in contemporary science. 1 Introduction2 Physical Background2.1 Hawking radiation in semi-classical gravity2.2 Modelling sound in fluids2.3 The acoustic analogue model of Hawking radiation3 Simulation and Analogy in Physical Theory3.1 Analogical reasoning and analogue simulation3.2 Confirmation via analogue simulation3.3 Recapitulation4 The Sound of Silence: Analogical Insights into Gravity4.1 Experimental realization of analogue models4.2 Universality and the Hawking effect4.3 Confirmation of gravitational Hawking radiation5 Prospectus. (shrink)

Ever since proposals for generalizing the theory of natural evolution have been put forward, the aims and ambitions of both proponents and critics have differed widely. Some consider such proposals as merely metaphors, some as analogies, some aim at a real generalization and unification, and some have even proposed to work out full reductions. In this paper it is argued that these different forms of generalizing the theory of evolution can be systematically re-framed as different approaches for transferring justification from (...) the natural to the cultural realm, and that their differences are basically a matter of degree. With the help of such a classification it should become clearer what to expect, but also what not to expect from the different approaches. (shrink)

Brain machine interface (BMI) technology makes direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrodes. This paper reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers a systematic inquiry into the relevant ethical problems that are likely to emerge in the following decades.

This article will explore a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species. Although the re-creation of extinct animals has been discussed to some degree both in lay deliberations as well as by scientists, advocates tend to emphasize the technological and scientific value of such an endeavour, and the “coolness” factor, 32–33, 2013). This article will provide an argument in favour of re-creation based on normative considerations. The environmentalist community generally accepts that it is wrong to exterminate species, (...) for reasons beyond any instrumental value these species may have. It is often also claimed that humanity has a collective responsibility to either preserve or at least to not exterminate species. These two beliefs are here assumed to be correct. The argument presented here departs from and places these two ideas in a deontological framework, from which it is argued that when humanity causes the extinction of a species, this is a moral transgression, entailing a residual obligation. Such an obligation implies a positive duty to mitigate any harm caused by our moral failure. In light of recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, it will be argued that humanity has a prima facie obligation to re-create species whose extinction mankind may have caused, also known as de-extinction. (shrink)

This paper expands Rami Ali’s dissolution of the gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 17:267-274, 2015). Morgan Luck’s gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31-36, 2009) rests on our having diverging intuition when considering virtual murder and virtual child molestation in video games. Virtual murder is seemingly permissible, when virtual child molestation is not and there is no obvious morally relevant difference between the two. Ali argues that virtual murder and virtual child molestation are equally permissible/impermissible when considered under different modes of (...) engagement. To this end, Ali distinguishes between story-telling gameplay and simulation games, discussing both in depth. I build on the dissolution by looking into competitive gameplay in order to consider what the morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation might be when competing in a video game. I argue that when competitors consent to participate in a competition, the rules of the competition supersede everyday moral intuitions. As such, virtual competitions ought to represent such consent from virtual characters. Virtual children cannot be represented as giving consent to be molested because (1) children cannot be represented as giving sexual consent, and (2) consent to be possibly molested cannot be given. This creates a morally relevant difference between murder and molestation. By fully addressing competitive gameplay, I answer Luck’s worry that Ali’s dissolution is incomplete (Ethics Inf Technol 20:157-162, 2018). (shrink)