The primary aim of this article is to provide a case study of textual hermeneutics in the context of Vedic literature. It will be shown how some interpretative pitfalls, into which contemporary translators have fallen, can be avoided if we broaden the perspective beyond the semantics of words and apply a principle of plausibility. The case study concerns the analysis of Ṛgveda 10.28, with special reference to the wildlife episodes depicted in verses 10cd-11ab. A few modern translations in Western languages (...) of 10cd are here considered. Some of them show that a principle of plausibility has been actually taken into account by their authors while approaching the text, albeit the result does not seem always entirely satisfactory. Some other translations seem not to carefully consider the broader context, therefore failing to convincingly make sense of the original text. After an introduction on the general subject of the hymn as it emerges from verses 1-9, i.e., the Vedic sacrifice and the subsequent consumption of the sacrificial offerings, arguments and textual evidence are provided in order to show how the reading of 10cd acquires a cogent and very plausible meaning if regarded in light of verse 11ab. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to shed light on why the citation taken from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti and occurring in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 7, opens the door to some fundamental reflections concerning the authority and the “nature” of this latter text. On the basis of a historical and doctrinal analysis, here a new interpretation is put forward, according to which the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa should be considered a tenth century CE handbook, written by some unknown Buddhist teacher perhaps as a manual (...) for his lessons. The primary purpose of this teacher seems to have been the discussion—in the light of textual sources compiled up to this time—of the doctrinal and philosophical perspectives contained in the sixth century CE Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been composed on the basis of notes written down for the benefit of this teacher’s students. Moreover, the analysis of the general style and quotes or references of the text, on the one hand, compared with the passage containing the quote from Saraha, on the other hand, lead us to take seriously into consideration the possibility that the citation borrowed from the Dohākośagīti could have been embedded into the text a little after its composition, by someone different from its original author. (shrink)

In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...) the body. Therefore, Udbhatabhatta seems to de-scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaisesika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhatabhatta to reconsider the Cārvāka per-spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhatabhatta’s reformulation of the concept of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaisesika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhatabhatta’s idea of cognition really seems to have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view. (shrink)

Krishna Del Toso offre una penetrante analisi della cultura indiana sotto la particolare prospettiva della pratica marziale e della dimensione agonistica, riconducendole alla grande matrice di senso che è l’azione sacrificale sullo sfondo del grande testo classico Ṛgveda.

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione annotata del Madhyamakārthasamgraha attribuito a Bhāviveka.

In the Dunhuang manuscript IOL Tib J 709, which is a collection of writings concerning meditation, we come across a short text attributed to a Tibetan master called Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ (allegedly eighth-ninth centuries CE). In his work, Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ exposes a method of meditation that seems to be strongly indebted to Indian Mahāyāna scriptural sources. Besides, also a Chinese Chan influence is here detectable. Therefore, the method of meditation taught by Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ seems to represent a commingling of different elements from different contexts. (...) After a general introduction to the manuscript IOL Tib J 709, this study focuses on Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ’s text, discussing and analysing the following topics: its author and date, the Indian Mahāyāna possible sources, Chinese Chan elements, the meditational path described. An annotated translation of the text, along with its transliteration and the reproduction of the fac-simile of the corresponding portion of the manuscript, concludes the study. (shrink)

Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

The article discusses Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpavṛtti and Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā commentaries on the “not without a cause” (nāpy ahetutaḥ) alternative of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1ab, from which it emerges that at least two distinct theories of causality can be attributed to the Lokāyata school. The first one is a physicalist theory that confines all causal relations within the sphere of material elements and is assimilated to accidentalism. The second one is a naturalist theory that attributes causal power to inner nature (svabhāva). The paper (...) discusses the theoretical differences between these two approaches, considers Bhāviveka’s and Avalokitavrata’s counter-arguments and concludes that some of the conjectures that modern scholars have put forward on the relation between svabhāvavāda, accidentalism and Lokāyata should be revised. (shrink)

Analisi di un aspetto di "circolarità" delle funzioni implicate nella teoria psicologica del buddhismo antico.

ATTI DEL IV «SEMINARIO POPOLARE SUL PENSIERO DELL'ESTREMO ORIENTE», TERMINI IMERESE (5-6 MAGGIO 2012).

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione del Madhyamakabhramaghāta, opera attribuita ad Āryadeva.

This article presents the first annotated English translation and edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 5, whose original Sanskrit is to be considered lost. The Introduction contains a primary analysis of contents and aims of the chapter, together with general observations on the epoch and compositional style of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. It is suggested that the text is probably a 10 th century explanatory handbook of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā for beginner students. Chapter 5, in particular, relying strongly upon the (...) “two truths” dialectics, focuses on how students can consistently respond to the main objections opponents used to raise against the Madhyamaka standpoint. (shrink)

An interview with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya on Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy.

book review: Sylvain Lévi, "La dottrina del sacrificio nei Brāhmaṇa. Con tre saggi di Roberto Calasso, Charles Malamoud e Louis Renou", traduzione di Silvia D’Intino. Adelphi, Milano 2009, 224 pp.

Ciò che qui chiamo Materialismo indiano non deve intendersi come scuola filosofica unica ed univocamente impostata, bensì come insieme di correnti di pensiero, propugnanti differenti punti di vista, ma tutte collocate entro l’orizzonte concettuale che nega ciò che in Occidente si usa chiamare Trascendente. Inoltre, com’è ovvio, bisogna distinguere tra un Materialismo filosofico – che prenderò in considerazione qui – ed un Materialismo, per così dire, popolare – al quale mi riferirò solo se necessario. Due sono le impostazioni materialiste che (...) intendo trattare: l’una riguarda i sostenitori dell’esistenza di cinque elementi materiali (bhūtapañcakavādin) che chiamerò, seguendo Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, proto-Materialisti, l’altra concerne i sostenitori dell’esistenza di quattro elementi materiali (bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin), tra cui i Cārvāka. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the (...) factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory. RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar um esboço da maneira na qual Nāgārjuna aborda a ideia de 'relação'. O conceito de 'relação' que encontramos nas fontes pāli é aqui sistematizado teoricamente conforme três padrões: 1. lógico, 2. existencial estritamente subordinativo, 3. existencial não estritamente subordinativo. Após ter discutido a recepção e o tratamento nagarjunianos desses três padrões, este estudo dedica atenção especial à relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa. Esse tipo de relação visa descrever a maneira na qual os fatores da cooriginação condicionada estão ligados entre eles, e é tipificada por Nāgārjuna pelo exemplo da ligação pai-filho. Para explicar a doutrina da cooriginação condicionada à luz do exemplo pai-filho, um modo possível aqui sugerido é por meio do recurso à teoria do 'Cambridge change'. Embora no cânone pāli se diga que o modelo de relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa se aplique a todos os outros fatores da cooriginação condicionada, não há nenhuma evidência direta de que ele concerna também à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras. Será mostrado como Nāgārjuna, ao aplicar esse modelo à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras, pareça introduzir uma nova perspectiva na teoria da cooriginação condicionada. (shrink)

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...) From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message. (shrink)

In questo saggio sono espresse alcune riflessioni concernenti l’orizzonte etico-morale proprio della scuola di materialismo indiana nota con il nome di Cārvāka/Lokāyata. La discussione si sviluppa secondo i seguenti punti: 1. Gli assunti ontologico-psicologici; 2. Gli assunti epistemologici; 3. L’etica e la morale; 4. Conclusioni.

Edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha attributed to Bhāviveka (based on the Co-ne, sDe-dge, dGa’-ldan and sNar-thaṅ versions), along with an Italian translation and an introductory philosophical study.

In Āryadevapāda’s Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi we find a problematic passage in which some Cārvāka theories are expounded. The problem here lies in the fact that, according to Āryadevapāda, the Cārvākas—who did not admit rebirth—would have upheld that happiness in this life can be gained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. As the Cārvākas were materialists, the reference to gods and demons does not fit so much with their philosophical perspective. In this paper, by taking into account several passages from Pāli and Sanskrit (...) Buddhist sources, I have tried to demonstrate that Āryadevapāda is here probably following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, where mention is made of some Lokāyatikas who are said to have been able to infatuate gods and demons. In both the Pāli Canon and the Mahāyāna sūtras, however, the term lokāyata does not refer to “materialism”. It rather conveys the meaning of “art of disputation”, and is generally used in the description of brāhmaṇas well versed in the Vedas, in the recitation of mantras and in dialectic methods in general. It is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that introduces the idea—corroborated also by a passage from the Mahābhārata—that these brāhmaṇas, skilled in lokāyata, would have indulged in some materialistic tenet. When the two terms, Cārvāka and Lokāyata, came both to mean “materialism”, around the IV century CE, it is highly probable that non-Cārvāka thinkers and commentators—as could be the case of Āryadevapāda—had in some occasion assimilated and integrated certain points of view, originally belonging to the ancient lokāyata perspective (for instance, the references to gods and demons), into what they believed Cārvāka philosophy had to be. (shrink)

In this book the reader will find a tool-set of suggestions and thoughts, specifically selected for stimulating and enhancing a strategic approach to the early stage of assessment, validation and development of a business idea. This book doesn’t provide definitive solutions, nor a recipe for success, since definitive solutions and recipes for success (if they really exist) hardly can depend on reading a book. Rather, by taking inspiration from different philosophies and philosophers, each chapter will provide concepts, perspectives and examples (...) that can help the would-be entrepreneur to widen, change or clarify her/his own point of view, in order to strengthen her/his strategic thinking. The process that strategic thinking helps us to accomplish is first of all aimed at putting a functional and useful order among our thoughts, and accordingly at figuring out which particular actions should be done and in which sequence. Founding and developing a business today is indeed more and more an exercise that must hold together in a harmonious and complementary way a vision and a practice. An idea, with its load of aspirations, intuitions and desires, and an operative strategy, aiming at defining options, choosing timing, and developing suitable products and services. In other words, running a business is today more than ever before an exercise of sense, of excellent sense, in fact. And philosophy, when it comes to looking for sense in things, can offer surprising theoretical and practical advices. (shrink)

This article deals with the meaning and function of saññā in perception according to the Suttapiṭaka. As regards its meaning, the discussion stresses the fact that the renderings “perception” and “apperception” seem to overinterpret the actual function/activity of saññā. Also the translations “idea” and “ideation” should be used cautiously, in order to avoid misunderstandings, since these terms are fraught with very specific philosophical and psychological implications in the Western context. Moreover, though “cognition” could be a good rendering, “recognition” seems to (...) be a more adequate translation for saññā, because it conveys the meaning of both cognizing and naming, which are the two main activities carried out by saññā. In this sense, cognition should be envisaged as a recording process that labels (and gives names to) the data coming from the senses. As regards its role in perception, saññā takes place after contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). Its task is to collect the not yet well-defined information provided by phassa and vedanā, and to organize this information into a datum that can be made available to, and handled by, the consciousness (viññāṇa). The task of viññāṇa, in its turn, is to interpret this datum according to sujbective “values”. The present study stresses also the fact that the recognition carried out by saññā can be either simple (colors, tastes, etc.) or complex (danger, death, etc.). For this reason, after having dealt with simple perceptions, a section is devoted to the analysis and possible explanation of complex recognitions. Moreover, since the textual sources record the fact that saññā can fail its task to recognize things, another section is added, in which incorrect recognitions are taken into consideration. (shrink)

This is the second part of a three-part study dealing with the Madhyamaka accounts of, and commentaries on, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. Here Avalokitavrata’s discussion of the tale and the stanzas is dealt with, together with the Tibetan edition and English translation of the corresponding passage from his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.

With the present study an analysis in three parts is provided of the Buddhist reception of two Cārvāka/Lokāyata stanzas, abbreviated as "wolf's footprint" and the "beautiful lady". These stanzas seem to be conceptually related to each other, having the common aim to emphasize the idea that one should rely only upon what is or can be perceived. Consequently, from here it is concluded that any perspective concerning the existence of an afterlife or of a moral retribution of our actions, since (...) these things cannot be directly perceived, should be abandoned. The first part of the article is a study of the occurrences of the two stanzas in the Buddhist sources, taking into account also new material, recently discovered, together with a comparison with the Jain sources. The second and third parts discuss respectively Avalokitavrata's and Jayānanda's interpretations of the stanzas, offering also for the first time to the reader a translation and analysis of their versions of the "wolf's footprint" tale, so far studied only from Jain sources. (shrink)

This is the third and final part of a study focused on the Madhyamaka accounts of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. In particular, this paper discusses Jayānanda’s short account of the tale and the stanzas contained in his Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. The Tibetan edition and English translation of Jayānanda’s relevant passages are also provided.

ATTI DEL CONVEGNO DI FILOSOFIA «IL SÉ – TRA ORIENTE E OCCIDENTE», TRIESTE (11-12 GENNAIO 2010).

La siguiente es una reseña del estudio realizado por el profesor Francisco Rodríguez Valls de la Universidad de Sevilla respecto a la incertidumbre que supone la naturaleza y la condiciónn de la realidad humana. El análisis se avoca a una visión paranorámica del trabajo del profesor Valls, y de manera introductoria apunta los aspecto claves de su texto a fin de que el lector pueda hacerse una idea clara y concisa de la propia postura del autor.

The volume editors have organized the volume as a set of ten couplets and triplets.

Transcript of papers presented in a seminar and meetings.

Here the collected papers explore the whole question of the relation between the mythopoetic and the moral in the context of the Mahabharata. Here we have a story of extreme complexity, characters that are unforgettable, and a cosmic context in which gods and men alike grapple with destiny. The obligations of kinship and friendship jostle with each other. The women characters, as in everyday life, seem to bear a very heavy load of the burden of life and to stand in (...) a key position in almost every conflict. We are presented with predicaments at every turn. At times these predicaments seem to be aggravated by social structure. At other times they are cushioned by it. Philosophical tangles tied up with karma and dharma are interwoven with the mythopoetic material. Perhaps philosophical issues are pinpointed rather more than they are in Greek epic literature. The essays in this book treat the Mahabharata from an unusual angle, fastening on the moral dilemmas it presents. How universal are the dilemmas faced by the characters in the story, and are the dilemmas in fact resolved? In dealing with these questions, the discussions range over the meaning of the purusarthas, the institutions of marriage and the family, the concept of action in the Gita and the special predicaments faced by Draupadi, Arjuna and others. These studies invite the scholar to reflect afresh on the text and encourage the general reader to find in epic literature much that is relevant to life today. (shrink)

Most writings on Indian philosophy assume that its central concern is with moska, that the Vedas along with the Upanishadic texts are at its root and that it consists of six orthodox systems knowns as Mimamasa, Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, and Yoga, on the one hand and three unorthodox systems: Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka, on the other. Besides these, they accept generally the theory of Karma and the theory of Purusartha as parts of what the Indian tradition thinks about human (...) action. The essays in this volume question these assumptions and show that there is little ground for accepting them. A new counter-perspective is presented for the articulation of the Indian philosophical tradition that breaks from the traditional frame in which it has usually been presented. (shrink)

Small and medium-sized firms form 90% of the worldwide population of businesses. However, it has been argued that given their smaller scale of operations, resource access constraints and lower visibility, smaller firms are less likely to participate in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This article examines the different economic motivations of firms with varying combinations of visibility, resource access and scale of operations. Arguments are presented to propose that in terms of visibility, resource access and operating scale, very small and (...) very large firms are equally motivated to participate in CSR. However, the motivational bases for CSR participation are likely to be different. Medium-sized firms are the least motivated. This suggests a U-shaped relationship between firm size and CSR participation. This study contributes towards resolution of the long-standing debate on the effects of firm size on CSR participation, and highlights the importance of considering configurations of firm characteristics in the study of CSR outcomes. In conclusion, cautions are raised against the broad categorization of firms, without adequate attention to the underlying dimensions of such categorizations. (shrink)

Emotions play a significant role in human cognitive processes such as attention, motivation, learning, memory, and decision making. Many researchers have worked in the field of incorporating emotions in a cognitive agent. However, each model has its own merits and demerits. Moreover, most studies on emotion focus on steady-state emotions than emotion switching. Thus, in this article, a domain-independent computational model of emotions for intelligent agent is proposed that have modules for emotion elicitation, emotion regulation, and emotion transition. The model (...) is built on some well-known psychological theories such as appraisal theories of emotions, emotion regulation theory, and multistore human memory model. The design of the model is using the concept of fuzzy logic to handle uncertain and subjective information. The main focus is on primary emotions as suggested by Ekman; however, simultaneous elicitation of multiple emotions is also supported by the model. (shrink)

The relatively simple central nervous system (CNS) of the Drosophila embryo provides a useful model system for investigating the mechanisms that generate and pattern complex nervous systems. Central to the generation of different types of neurons by precursor neuroblasts is the initial specification of neuroblast identity and the Drosophila segment polarity genes, genes that specify regions within a segment or repeating unit of the Drosophila embryo, have emerged recently as significant players in this process. During neurogenesis the segment polarity genes (...) are expressed in the neuroectodermal cells from which neuroblasts delaminate and they continue to be expressed in neuroblasts and their progeny. Loss-of-function mutations in these genes lead to a failure in the formation of neuroblasts and/or specification of neuroblast identity. Results from several recent studies suggest that regulatory interactions between segment polarity genes during neurogenesis lead to an increase in the number of neuroblasts and specification of different identities to neuroblasts within a population of cells. BioEssays 21:472–485, 1999. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

The competent and detailed introduction to this book traces out the origin and rudiments of religions, their essential nature and the causes of their conflicts. It emphasises the truth that all religions are trying to say the same thing in different ways. Religions are meant to bring out the spiritual in man and to make him live a full and virtuous life. Despite the rapid progress in science and medicine, the mysteries of life and death remain as unknown as before. (...) Religions try, in their myriad ways, to explain these and to venture into the unknowable. They bring comfort to human beings in their suffering, and consolation in their bereavement. The author's belief is that if, while following their own religion, men respected the faiths of others too, much of the religious conflicts and bloodshed which debases mankind would be avoided. The fundamental concepts of Hindu religion and philosophy have exhaustively been narrated in a clear manner. This is followed by selected passages from the main scriptures and philosophical books of the Hindu religion-the Vedas, Puranas, Upanisheads, brahma-sutras, Bhagavadgita, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana of Tulsidasa. In each case there is a synopsis of the book giving its subject matter and a reading list consisting of the main texts and criticisms which will be invaluable to those who wish to know more about it. The passages have been selected to provide interesting reading, particularly connected with the problems and conditions of our own times. The book aims at providing a mine of information about Hinduism and is also an in-depth study of religion in general. It has been written in down-to-earth language and is of interest to all those who are wish to know about matters vital to life and living. (shrink)